SOMMAIRE

1 Etudes et témoignages
   1 Olivier Lacombe (***)
   3 Maritain's critique of pragmatism (II) (Ricardo Arias)
   17 Una piccola « querelle »: la traduzione italiana di Primaire du spirituel (Giorgio Campanini)
   20 Maritain nelle considerazioni di G. Chiaramonte (Massimo Papini)

24 Bibliographie
   24 Fiche bibliographique
      Neuf leçons sur les notions premières de la philosophie morale (Piero Viotto)
   29 Repertoire bibliographique
      Maritain e la filosofia morale (Giancarlo Gaetazzi)

32 Comptes-rendus
   J. Maritain, Oeuvres, 1943-1963 (G. Campanini)
   P. Nguyen Van Tai, Jacques Maritain, de l'Antimodernisme à l'Humanisme intégral. Essai d'interprétation des idées socio-politiques de Jacques Maritain à travers ses écrits majeurs de 1921 à 1936 (F. Cotteur)
   A. Frappani, F. Miliani, Giovanni Battista Montini giovane. Documenti inediti e testimonianze (G. Campanini)
   S. Mosano, Fede, storia e morale (Saggio sulla filosofia morale di Jacques Maritain) (G.C.)
   M. Valdo, Jacques Maritain, filosofo della politica (G.G.)

38 Mise à jour bibliographique

40 Informations

40 Colloques et congrès

45 Nouvelles de l'Institut

47 Autres nouvelles

NOTES ET DOCUMENTS
NOTES ET DOCUMENTS
de l'Institut International
« Jacques Maritain »

INSTITUT INTERNATIONAL « JACQUES MARITAIN »

Sécrétariat général: 181 via dei Coronari, 00186 Rom.
Centre de documentation: Collebassono, 60020 - Torretta di Ancona.

Comité d’honneur
M. Rafael CALDERA (Vénézuela)
R.P. M.-A. CARRE o.p. (France)
R.P. Ercole DI ROVASENDA o.p. (Italie)
M. Pierre EMMANUEL (France)
M. Pierre HARMEL (Belgique)
M. Alceu AMOROSO LIMA (Brésil)
M. John U. NEF (Etats Unis)
S.E. mgr. Paul POUPARD (France)
M. John O. RICH (Etats Unis)
R.P. Michael RICUET s.j. (France)
M. Vittorino VERONESI (Italie)
R.P. Leo N. WARD o.c.s.o. (Etats Unis)

Président d'honneur
M. Olivier LACOMBE (France)

Président
M. Ramón SUGRANYES DE FRANCH (Espagne)

Vice-présidents
M. Enrique PEREZ OLVARES (Vénézuela)
R.P. L.K. SHOOK c.s.b. (Canada)

Secrétaire général
M. Roberto PAPINI (Italie)

Secrétaire général adjoint pour la documentation
M. Giancarlo GALEAZZI (Italie)

Secrétaire général adjoint pour la programmation culturelle
M. Antonio PAVAN (Italie)

Secrétaire général adjoint pour l’administration
M. Giancarlo SERAFINI (Italie)

Conseil scientifique
M. Etienne BORNE (France) - M. Jaime CASTILLO VELASCO (Cnil) - M. Illigo CAVERO LATZAUFLE (Espagne) - R.P. Georges COTTIER o.p. (Suisse) - M. Eu- geen DE JONGHE (Belgique) - M. Gabrié- le DE ROSA (Italie) - M. Ludovic DOUGHERTY (Etats Unis) - M. Leonardo ELIA (Italie) - M. Louis GARDET (France) - Mme An- toline GRENUMELUS (France) - R.P. Ro-

MERTON AND MARITAIN

par Ralph McInerny (*)

When The Seven Storey Mountain came out in 1948 its dust-jacket bore the following legend: « The autobiography of a young man who led a full and worldly life, and then, at the age of 26, entered a Trappist monastery ».
A little reminiscent of Our Gal Sunday, perhaps, but one’s pulse quickened at the thought of renunciation, of turning one’s back on the world and being absorbed into the liturgical orderness of a Trappist monastery.
How easy it was to be romantic about asceticism, to adopt what Kierkegaard would call an aesthetic attitude toward Christianity, so that its demands are met in the realm of imagination rather than the more taxing circumstances of real life. In those far-off days it even seemed plausible that one might exhaust the possibilities of a full and worldly life by the age of twenty-six.
These slightly facetious thoughts are meant to mask the profound impact Merton’s autobiography made on me and on many others. Reading it in a minor seminary, I was perhaps ponderously more interested in the life Merton led in France and England and New York before his conversion. The accounts of repairing to mountain cabins in order to write novels fascinated me. It was important to realize that Merton was an artist before he was a Catholic or a monk. One had to take into account that he entered the monastery with the notion that his writing was among the things he was putting behind him. Later he would write a piece entitled « Poetry and Contemplation » which dwelt on the conflict he felt between his two vocations. The resolution of the conflict Merton found in his reading of Jacques Maritain.

Thomas Merton was born in France in 1915 of an American mother and a New Zealand father. The father, Owen, was a painter. Shortly after Thom- as’s birth, the family moved to the United States and there he died when he was six and thereafter Merton lived with his maternal grandparents until, at the age of ten, his father brought him to France. Merton continued his schooling there but at twelve was sent to England where he attended several schools before matriculating at Clare College, Cambridge. This, by Merton’s account, was a wild year of much drinking and carous- ing and general dissipation. His father was now dead and his guardian decided Thomas would be better off in America. In New York, Merton enrolled at Columbia and suddenly turned into a dynamo of activity, engag- ing in athletics but increasingly and more importantly in literary activi- ties. In his senior year he was editor-in-chief of the year book and art editor of the campus literary magazine. He received a B.A. in English in...
1938 and his M.A. a year later. He was also a card carrying member of the Communist Party. His party name was Frank Swift (1).

In 1938 Thomas Merton was converted to Roman Catholicism and almost immediately began to think of the priesthood. He thought first of the Franciscans and began to teach at St. Bonaventure’s University in Olean, New York. The Secular Journal of Thomas Merton, published in 1959, recounts the three years Merton spent in the world as a Catholic layman. And then in April of 1941 he went to make a retreat at the Trappist Abbey of Our Lady of Gethsemani near Bardstown, Kentucky.

«I should tear out all the other pages of this book, and all the other pages of schisms and I have ever written, and begin here. This is the center of America. I had wondered what was holding the country together, what had been keeping the universe from cracking in pieces and falling apart. It is places like this monastery—not only this one: there must be others» (2).

It was to prove to be the monastery for him. In December of that same year, Merton returned to Gethsemani. He had long since discarded the name Frank Swift. Now he discarded his own for a religious name: Louis. Nonetheless, it is because he published under the name Thomas Merton, and published prodigiously, that he continues to be known by his family name.

This brief sketch indicates that Merton’s mind and culture were anything but Catholic during his formative years. What is interesting about his conversion is the circumstances in which it took place. Poetry was one of the means God used to touch his heart with grace. Merton wrote a dissertation on William Blake and he was immersed himself in the poetry of Gerard Manley Hopkins when he was converted. Eventually, he would turn avidly to the writings of the Fathers and to the great medieval monastic authors, notably Bernard of Clairvaux. Naturally enough he became knowledgeable in the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. But St. John of the Cross perhaps spoke more directly to this poet become a monk. And it was Jacques Maritain who provided the means for Merton to think clearly about his dual vocation and to embrace a theory that put poetry and contemplation into symbiosis with one another.

«But a genuine aesthetic experience is something which transcends not only the sensible order (in which, however, it has its beginning) but also that of reason itself. It is a supra-rational intuition of the latent perfection of things. Its immediacy outruns the speed of reasoning and leaves all analysis far behind. In the natural order, as Jacques Maritain has often insisted, it is an analogue of the mystical experience which it resembles and imitates from afar. Its mode of apprehension is ‘connaturality’—it reaches out to grasp the inner reality» (3).

Maritain, inspired by passages in which St. Thomas Aquinas contrasts the judgment of moral science and the judgment of the good man, calling the latter a judgment by way of connaturality, extended this conception to the poet’s apprehension of reality, and especially as he thought affective, possible because of an affinity on the part of the poet with the reality perceived. Maritain was encouraged in this extension by his wife Raissa, a poet, and Merton’s acceptance of it is a strong endorsement of its validity. Certainly, as in the passage just quoted, it enabled the poet monk to see continuity between the experience which was the basis of his poetry and the interior life which, as a religious, he was seeking to make ever more profound. It is no less true of Maritain that he may see that emphasis on the subjective apparatus whereby the poet comes into possession of his vision of reality lends weight to the notion that art, specifically poetry, is at bottom self-expression. Not all. There was a balancing consideration.

«When Maritain—who is by no means bothered by such trivialities—in all simplicity went ahead to use the term ‘virtue’ in its Scholastic sense, and was able to apply it to art, a ‘virtue of the practical intellect’, the very newness of the context was enough to disintegrate my mind of all misgivings left in it by the ordinary prejudice against ‘virtue’» (4).

If art is a virtue and thus a disposition of the mind of the artist it is precisely the habit or virtue thanks to which the good of the artifact is achieved. St. Thomas, following Aristotle, contrasts art and prudence by saying that the latter is concerned with the good or perfection of the agent himself whereas, again, art is concerned with the good or perfection of the thing made.

There is of course another kind of tension between these two tenets Merton took from Maritain. If the knowledge of the poet is conatural and connaturality is first explained by appeal to the good man’s affinity with the end or goal of virtuous behaviour, how can a kind of knowledge that is unconcerned with the moral condition of the knower be spoken of as conatural? In The Secular Journal, Merton wrote: «You do not have to be a Christian, you have only to know Life, to write a play which, like Hamlet, is not comprehensible except in terms of the doctrine of original sin, and illustrates the consequences of it. If the play is true, it doesn’t matter how immoral the hero is, the immorality will appear for what it is, and even more clearly than it would in Life. And the play will be moral» (5). And what of the artist? Is it a matter of indifference whether or not he is moral or immoral? Maritain once wrote that it would require a saint like Augustine to do well what Proust attempted in A la recherche du temps perdu. It is not altogether clear that Merton would go so far.

But what emerges from the notion of art as a virtue of the practical intellect is its concern with truth. The poet, the playwright, the artist generally, strives to make us see and not merely to see what he sees, as if by the imposition of a private subjective vision, but to see what is there, the truth of the matter. Nor is it a matter of propaganda, of wielding a doctrinal cookie-cutter, imposing it on the matter. «We should stop demanding what the Communists demand of plays and books: that they conform to some abstract set of principles imposed upon them from the outside, not that they should merely tell the truth in their own terms and be good books or plays» (6).

One is struck in reading the letters of Flannery O’Connor (7) that it was exactly this emphasis on Art and Scholasticism that also attracted her: the artist is not concerned only to display his own ideas but to achieve, as perfect an art as possible and that perfection will consist in truth. In short, she wished to be delivered from what C.S. Lewis has called «the personal heresy», the view that art is about the artist, self-expression, subjective. What both Merton and O’Connor learned from Maritain is that the artist
seeks and finds new truths about the human heart, objective truths, and that these are not to be confused with general true statements about man and morality. The notion that a story is merely an instance of some general truth, an illustration of it, suggests a kind of imaginative casuistry that few artists would find a congenial description of what they are doing. The critic may generalize about the story after the fact, but the writer is pursuing the truth in a situation and with characters that have their own odd autonomy and which he cannot responsibly bend to abstract purposes. And if the artist finds the concrete truth it cannot be in conflict with truth in any other form.

Of course this entails a risk and many a statesman and churchman and philosopher has been unwilling to let the poet be free in his peculiar pursuit. There is a temptation to want to guide and direct from the vantage point of general truths. Flannery O'Connor was constantly getting such gratuitous and impertinent advice, often from clerical critics who should have known better.

Not that Maritain or Merton or O'Connor would regard anything an artist produces as good. That would be a mockery of the notion of art. Of course if the product is truly artful it will be good, but even Homer nods, not every poem is a product of art, not everyone who calls himself an artist is one in the sense the term has for Maritain. Art is a virtue, an acquisition, and, to return to an earlier theme, one can see that in the exercise of art (for example, the decision to write now, in these circumstances), moral decisions are constantly being made but the virtue of art does not insure that these decisions will be good ones. If no one can blink the fact that good art is sometimes produced by persons whose moral character leaves much to be desired, it can nonetheless be argued that a person who possesses moral virtues other than art will be a better artist. I think that is the point of Maritain’s remark about St. Augustine and Proust.

It is clear that Thomas Merton and Flannery O’Connor too saw in the writings of Maritain a way to put together their twin desires: to be as good an artist as possible and to pursue the Christian vocation strenuously and seriously, even unto the heights of contemplation. How often do the writings of a philosopher on art influence practising artists? Thomas Merton and Flannery O’Connor are two artists whose conception of what they were doing as Catholic artists was profoundly affected by the reading of Jacques Maritain, particularly Art and Scholasticism. I suspect that many many more artists could be added to their number.

**RESUME**

L’auteur fait ressortir l’influence que la théorie de l’art selon Maritain a eu sur Merton, dont la première vocation a été littéraire et poétique, bien avant sa conversion au catholicisme. Comment concilier les deux vocations: poésie et contemplation? Merton écrit: «Quand Maritain, d’une manière toute simple, a utilisé le mot ‘vertu’ dans son sense scholastique de l’applicant à l’art qui est ‘vertue de l’intellect pratique’, ce fut pour moi une telle découverte que son résultat fut de désintèrter mon esprit de toutes les confusions que laissaient en moi les préjudices habituels contre ce mot...» (The Seven Storey Mountain, p. 204). Les chemins que

---

(1) See besides The Seven Storey Mountain, Dennis O. McInerny, Thomas Merton: The Man and His Work.
(6) Journal, p. 41.
to orientate his entire being and life to God as a « Pilgrim of the Absolute » to borrow Leon Bloy’s apt phrase. He (Merton) saw the great tendency today of orientating one’s being and life, not to God, but to one’s neighbor in the so-called horizontal theology of social concern, or to one’s own self-fulfillment and self-realization. For Merton, however, the spiritual life was not primarily our work, but rather the work of God in us. Hence, our moral and ethical life must lead to something beyond itself; it must lead to an experience of our union with God and to our transformation in Him.

For Merton, as for all Christians, being must take precedence over doing (and having). « We are not first be sons of the heavenly Father », as Merton expressed it in an essay on monastic vocation. But this refers as well to every Christian vocation in the Church, and not only to monks and nuns. This inward-looking spirituality has been referred to as a « spirituality of being ». Yet, it is a spirituality intended to give direction and meaning not only to our understanding of God and the Mystery of our Salvation in Christ, but also to our life in the neighbor and our inner man. And above all, a spirituality of being must give a new dimension to our own life and work. All genuine social action must be grounded in this vision of reality.

Hence, we can say that focus of Merton’s spirituality consists in revealing the double-experience we all must continually undergo in the spiritual life. First, the experience of ourselves and our own destination (apart from God and His mercy). And then the experience of God whose mercy we aliud us in Christ: « mercy we aliud us in Christ ».

As Merton wrote so movingly in Thoughts in Solitude (6) wherein he describes what the discovery of the spiritual life really is: « It is the silence of our whole being in compunction and adoration before God, in the habitual realization that He is everything and we are nothing, that He is the Center to which all things tend, and to Whom all our actions must be directed ».

The Christian, then, in Merton’s view, must become acutely aware of the presence and action of God in his life, and must also enter into an intimate relationship with Him. But this presupposes a true knowledge of self. In this respect as others, Merton was following a solid monastic tradition. St. Bernard of Clairvaux, in his Degrees of Truth, stressed the essential need of self-knowledge as the first degree of truth, before one could be compassionate or merciful to one’s neighbor, or really to experience the presence of the living God in his life.
Thus, we must recognize our dignity as the object of God’s redemption and then transcend ourselves in an intimate relationship with God. Merton expressed this very well in his posthumously published volume, Contemplative Prayer (7), when he said, “We know him [God] insofar as we become aware of ourselves as known through and through by him.” Hence, the continuity between self-knowledge and the awareness of God. And this knowledge is affective in Merton’s spirituality: we are made essentially for a loving knowledge of God. Our whole being, including thought and feeling, must be brought into communication and ultimately into communion with God. Merton firmly believed that every Christian should ideally have some experience of God as a living and personal reality in his life. For a fully integrated Christian life, our contact with God must be such that we experience a union with Him as well as a transformation of consciousness. These two principles underlie Merton’s spirituality, and are closely related as we shall see in the pages that follow.

MAN, CREATED IN THE IMAGE AND LIKENESS OF GOD

Our one goal in life, according to the teaching of Thomas Merton, is to realize the end for which we were created, that is, a personal and intimate union with God in Christ by love. In Zen and the Birds of Appetite (8) Merton expressed this well: “Paradise is not the final goal of the spiritual life...the ultimate end is the Kingdom of God.”

In the language of our great patristic heritage, Merton believed that man was created in the image and likeness of God, but that he has fallen from the divine likeness. Yet he retained deep within his being the image of God. Man has wandered far off into a region of unlikeness, but still was alive with an innate thirst to return to God. Modern man is especially conscious of a radical self-alienation and longs for an authentic home-coming to his true self. Likeness lost, yet image retained; alienated, yet yearning for home; lost realization of God, yet deep capacity for God. “Man is the image of God, not His shadow,” wrote Merton in his book, Conjectures of a Gugly Bystander (9). Merton believed, with the Fathers, that the image of God is the summit of spiritual consciousness in us, the highest peak of self-realization. Following St. Gregory of Nyssa, who in turn had influenced St. Bernard of Clairvaux, Merton was absorbed in the thought that the divine image in man is especially constituted by his freedom. For St. Augustine God is sought in the most intimate depths of his own spirit. “At the summit of his own self-realization, which he calls the memoria, Augustine finds not only himself but the light by which he sees himself as he really is. And in this light, he is aware of God from whom the light comes. His awareness of God instantly broadens out into love. Charity springs up in the illumination of his soul’s depths and carries him out of himself and beyond himself to the God who is enthroned in the very summit of his own personal being: the apex mentis or the ‘spark’ of the soul.”

These lines are quoted from The New Man (10), a work of Thomas Merton which manifests a turning point in his thought. The idea of transformation of consciousness becomes one of his favorite themes, which will be treated in greater detail in the pages that follow. In fact, it was to be a preoccupation for him all during his latter years, especially in studies of Eastern philosophies and religions.

SIN - FREEDOM - INCARNATION OF CHRIST - RESTORATION

Very early in his writings, Merton expressed his views on the subject of freedom, although it is a part of the unpublished manuscript of the Saviores by Mountain: “The freedom that is in our nature is our ability to love something, someone besides ourselves, and for the sake, not of ourselves, but of the one we love. There is in the human will an innate tendency, an inborn capacity for disinterested love. This power to love another for his own sake is one of the things that makes us like God, because this power is the one thing in us that is free from all determination. It is a power which transcends and escapes the inevitability of self-love.” (11). (See A Thomas Merton Reader, edited by Thomas P. McDonnell, for the complete text.)

In a later writing, New Seeds of Contemplation, Merton spells out this idea further: “To say that I am made in the image of God is to say that love is the reason for my existence, for God is love” (p. 60). Writing an introduction to The Monastic Theology of Aelred of Rievaulx (12) in 1968, shortly before his death, Merton again speaks of the image theme in these words: “The image of God in man — the openness to love, the capacity for total consent to God in Himself and in others — remains indestructible. But it can be buried and imprisoned under selfishness. The image of God in man is not destroyed by sin but utterly disfigured by it. To be exact, the image of God in man becomes self-contradictory when its openness closes upon itself, when it ceases to be a capacity for love and becomes simply an appetite for domination or possession: when it ceases to be the capacity for the self-giving of love...In monastic terms this is the I cling to Self, which is at the core of man’s very nature as a free being, is turned in on itself as its own object and ceases to love.”

Man has, in Merton’s words, “become alienated from his inner self which is the image of God.” Thus, Merton in Life and Holiness sees sin as essentially a refusal to be what we are, a rejection of our mysterious, contingent, spiritual reality hidden in the very mystery of God. Sin is our refusal to be what we were created to be...images of God.” (p. 12). In a word, sin is a refusal to grow.

Our alienation from God, the result of sin through Adam’s fall, has been rectified in the Incarnation of the Son of God, Christ Jesus. This great mystery is central to Merton’s theology, as he himself expressed it in The Ascent to Truth: “For although like all other mysteries it flows from the highest of all, the mystery of the Trinity, yet we the Incarnation is the most important of all because it is through Christ that we are incorporated into the life of the three Divine Persons and receive into our souls the Holy Spirit, the bond of perfection. Who unites us to God with the same Love which unites the Father and the Son” (p. 319).

Merton saw this mystery as essentially a recreation or restoration of the divine likeness and freedom in man, as John Higgins has shown in his excellent study on Merton’s Theology of Prayer (13). (Published later as Thomas Merton on Prayer by Dubedel), “Having lost his capacity for realizing his union with God to the extent that the divine image in him has been distorted, man now recovers the original perfection intended for human nature by God. Christ, Merton holds, has now restored man to his original existental communion with God, the source of life.”

In The New Man Merton defines our supernatural union with God in Christ as “an immediate union with the Triune God as the source of
the grace and virtues in our spirit" (p. 85). This implies an actualization of the divine image in us and our basic orientation towards God. In this new re-creation God's love is further revealed and concretized in the love of Jesus Christ. It is through Him that the divine image is restored to a likeness. We thus become a new creature, sharing in God's supernatural life through our incorporation into Christ.

Merton describes this new union in *New Seeds of Contemplation* as a spiritual union in which Christ mystically identifies His members with Himself by giving us His Holy Spirit: "A new being is brought into existence. I become a 'new man' and this 'new man', spiritually and mystically one identity, is at once Christ and myself... This spiritual union of my being with Christ in one 'new man' is the work of the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of Love, the Spirit of Christ" (p. 158).

Our whole work in life, according to Thomas Merton, is to seek the perfect possession of God in Christ. This was really the secret of his spirituality, and such an ideal is meant not only for monks, to whom St. Benedict in his Rule singles out the starting of God as the one requirement for the novice in the monastic way. Since God is present in the depths of our being, the ground of our being, we must find ourselves, become conscious of our true selves. This search consists in a double-movement, in Merton's theology: our entering into the deepest center of ourselves and then, having passed through that center, to go out of ourselves to God. The first thing we must remember in our search for God, is that we are in some way already possessed by God in the innermost depths of our being. This is why Merton could write in *The Silent Life* (14): "In the end, no one can seek God unless he has already begun to find Him. No one can find God without having first been found by Him". In *Life and Holiness,* he says the same thing with a slightly different nuance: "our seeking of God is a matter of our finding Him, a matter of certain avenues. It is rather a quieting of our whole life by self-denial, prayer and good works, so that God Himself, who seeks us more than we seek Him, can find us and 'take possession of us'." (p. 29).

We will never reach the realization that we are possessed by God unless we first realize our own nothingness and emptiness. This requires a complete surrendering of our exterior self, the empirical ego, to God's love in order to get ourselves as the object of His love. To the extent that we lose everything that is centered on our illusory and superficial selves and thus gain the truer and deeper self that is the image of God within us. God's love will then fill the emptiness, and we will be one with Him. Thus there is a fullness in our nothingness as Merton writes in *Zen and the Birds of Appetite:* "It is as if the 'emptiness' and 'nakedness' are also pure gift that in Christian terms they equal fullness" (p. 130). So we lose our own 'false ego' but that God becomes the highest and most perfect self-realization.

This *kenosis,* or self-emptying, is essential to Merton's thinking in this area. Writing again in *New Seeds of Contemplation* he stresses the fact that a man cannot enter into the deepest center of himself and pass through that center into God, unless he is able to pass entirely out of himself and empty himself and give himself to other people, in the purity of a selfless love (p. 64).

**Presence of God in Each Man**

Towards the end of his life, writing in *Faith and Violence* (15), Merton formulated our problem today as the failure of many Christians to realize the truth that "the infinite God is dwelling within them, so that He is in them and they are in Him. They remain unaware of the presence of the infinite source of being right in the midst of the world and of men... What is required of Christians is that they develop a completely modern and contemporary consciousness in which their experience as men of our century is integrated with their experience as children of God redeemed by Christ." The idea of consciousness then is very important in our seeking a solution to the problem of our search for union with God. We are enabled by means of it, to undertake the double movement of which we spoke above — the entering into ourselves and then transcending ourselves. It is in reality a self-awareness, and Merton explained this in detail in *Zen and the Birds of Appetite:* "Modern consciousness then tends to create an introspective bubble of awareness — an ego-self imprisoned in its own consciousness, isolated and out of touch with other such selves as for so long as they are all 'things' rather than persons" (p. 22). In this type of Cartesian self-awareness, man becomes so preoccupied with his own self as subject that awareness of self becomes all important.

In contrast to this kind of Cartesian self-awareness, Merton then proposes a type of consciousness which really underlies this subjective experience in that it is an immediate experience of being in which the subject as such disappears; and yet, at the same time, this consciousness goes beyond the awareness of oneself as an inner product of the ego. It is not necessarily the awareness of the awareness of the subject as such, but rather a direct awareness of being. It is rather the awareness of being as being, the awareness of the being of God. Merton contrasts this kind of consciousness with the previous Cartesian consciousness: "It starts not from the thinking and self-aware subject but from Being ontologically seen to be beyond, and prior to the subject-object division. Underlying the subjective experience of the individual self here is an immediate experience of Being. This is totally different from an experience of self-consciousness... It is not 'consciousness of' but 'pure consciousness,' in which the subject as such disappears" (*Zen and the Birds of Appetite*, pp. 23-24).

When the self has arrived at this dissolution or loss, it has entered into the very center or ground of its being where it is totally empty and naked. Only now it is capable of going beyond itself by becoming filled with the presence of God. A real "transformation of consciousness" occurs in the individual subject from an awareness of his false empirical ego, the true self or the person. Now the individual is no longer conscious of himself as an isolated ego, but sees himself in his inmost ground of being as dependant on Another or as being formed through relationships, particularly his relationship with God. By forgetting himself both as subject and as an object of reflection, man finds his real self hidden with Christ in God. And so, as his self-consciousness changes, the
individual is transformed; his self is no longer its own center; it is now centered on God. This entire theme is wonderfully developed in a chapter of Zen and Birds of Appetite entitled "The New Consciousness.

We must begin to take the first step in our transformation by being what we actually are at the moment and recognize our present alienation. In Merton's words as recorded in New Seeds of Contemplation: "Everyone of us is shadowed by a false self. This is the man I want myself to be but who cannot exist, because God does not know anything about him. And to be unknown to God is altogether too much privation. My false and private self is the one who wants to exist outside the reach of God's will and God's love — outside of reality and outside of life. And such a self cannot help but be an illusion" (p. 53).

That precisely is the great danger today, according to Merton's thinking: we settle to live our illusory lives and yield to a superficial individualism which identifies the "person" with this external or empirical ego and devote too much effort to the cultivation of this false self. When pursued, it leads only to frustrations of all kinds because we become alienated from our deepest self which is the image of God. The result of this is only too apparent in our day as evidenced by the rugged individualism where the individual ego becomes the center of all endeavors. Unbridled selfishness, greed and injustices of all kinds ensue.

Speaking of this rugged individualism in society, Merton wrote with great precision in Disputed Questions: "Individualism is nothing but the social atomism that has led to our present inertia, passivism and spiritual decay. Yet it is individualism which has really been the apparent ideal of our western society for the past two or three hundred years. This individualism, primarily an economic concept with a pseudospiritual and moral facade, is in fact mere irresponsibility. It is, and has always been, not an affirmation of genuine human values but a flight from the obligations from which these values are inseparable. And first of all a flight from the obligation to love" (17).

UNION WITH GOD, SOURCE OF CHARITY TOWARDS MAN

The discovery of the true self, in Merton's thought, is also a discovery of one's responsibility to other such selves, all our brothers and sisters in Christ, because this lifts us from our hiding places to our hidden and infinite source, goes out through us to those who have not yet known Him, and unites them, through Christ in us, to the Father" (p. 111).

In No Man Is an Island, Merton asserts that "all charity comes to a focus in Christ, because charity is His life in us. He draws us to Himself, unites us to one another in His Holy Spirit, and raises us up with Himself to a higher center that holds us together in union with God in Christ's charity. He expresses this eloquently in The New Man where he writes: "And the charity of Christ, which springs from the Father as from its hidden and infinite source, goes out through us to those who have not yet known Him, and unites them, through Christ in us, to the Father." (p. 111).

By way of conclusion, we can say with Thomas Merton that it is our privilege and our Christian duty to ever strive for an awareness of our union with God in Christ. Our life must be a continuous search for God as we come to realize that we are already possessed and loved by God. And God loves us to ourselves for the past two or three hundred years. This individualism was primarily an economic concept with a pseudospiritual and moral facade, is in fact mere irresponsibility. It is, and has always been, not an affirmation of genuine human values but a flight from the obligations from which these values are inseparable. And first of all a flight from the obligation to love" (17).

CONCLUSION: LOVE IS EPHANISM OF GOD IN OUR POVERTY

The Christian who has thus found his true self is the one who has become intensely aware of his life in Christ as well as our need, the vital necessity of love in his life. His life becomes one of self-transcendence and of communion. So, in the end, we can say with Merton that this is not only a matter of either God or man, but rather of finding God by loving others and discovering the true meaning of the person in our love for God. Actually neither is possible without the other.

This thought was expressed well in a letter written by Thomas Merton in response to a request of Pope Paul VI in 1967 for a message of com-
TEMPLATIVES just a year before Merton's death in Bangkok, Thailand. It was later published in Cistercian Studies and is included in a volume of monastic texts by Merton recently published. Thomas Merton came to the conclusion that «we exist solely for this, to be the place He has chosen for His presence. His manifestation in the world, His epiphany... if we once began to recognize, humbly but truly, the real value of our own self, we would see that this value was the sign of God in our being, the signature of God upon our being. Fortunately, the love of our fellow man is given us as the way of realizing this... It is the love of my lover, my brother or my child that sees God in me, makes God credible to myself in me. And it is my love for my lover, my child, my brother, that enables me to show God to him or her in himself or herself. Love is the epiphany of God in our poverty.» (20).

The entire life of Thomas Merton can be summed up as the living out of a great desire for solitude and a contemplative experience of the living God. His tremendous gift from God, his personal charisma, was to articulate something of that ineffable experience, something of the reality of the mystery of God, to all of us. Thousands of readers have drawn strength from his words as well as the witness of his life, which was essentially a contemplative vision. May his words and his life guide us on our journey through life, so that one day we may all be united in the splendor of God's glory.

RESUME

L'article examine la question de l'unité de la personne: «savoir qui nous sommes, d'où nous venons et où nous allons» et que notre «être réel n'est pas le masque extérieur, mais le 'moi' profond, où nous sommes nous devant l'amour et la miséricorde de Dieu». Là se trouve le centre de notre vie et la base de tout engagement pour les hommes. Connaître intimement Dieu aide à se connaître soi-même intimement; notre capacité d'amour gratuit pour les autres nous rend semblables à Dieu, et dans ce sens le péché essentiel est le refus d'être «ce que nous sommes», fils de Dieu. L'Incarnation du Christ nous restaure dans la communion originelle avec Dieu, car l'acte d'être est une participation directe à l'Étre de Dieu, et non pas comme le pense Descartes, un «ego» emprisonné sur lui-même.

LA PHILOSOPHIE CHRÉTIENNE SELON J. MARITAIN

par Yves Foucat

Etudier les rapports qui doivent exister entre la sagesse théologique et la sagesse métaphysique, cela revient, au moins en partie, à poser le problème de la philosophie chrétienne. Il n’est pas question de retracer ici les grandes lignes du débat qui eut lieu autour des années 1930-1935 sur le problème de la philosophie chrétienne et qui opposa des philosophes ou des théologiens comme Emile Breheret, Léon Brunschvicg, l’abbé van Steenbergen, Maurice Blondel, Jacques Maritain et M. Etienne Gilson (A.H.) (*). Nous nous contenterons d’exposer ici les positions de Maritain auxquelles, du reste, se sont ralliés Gabriel Marcel, le R.P. Garrigou-Lagrange et M.E. Gilson.

Comment donc J. Maritain définit-il la philosophie chrétienne ? La philosophie chrétienne, écrit-il, « c’est la philosophie elle-même en tant qu’elle est placée dans les conditions d’existence et d’exercice absolument caractéristiques où le christianisme a introduit le sujet pensant, à raison de quoi certains objets sont vus, certaines assertions établies valablement par elle, qui dans d’autres conditions lui échappent plus ou moins » (PC, in OB., pp. 654-665). Finalement la philosophie, lorsqu’elle est chrétienne, est dans un état, le seul à vrai dire, qui lui permet d’atteindre à sa plénitude propre. C’est pourquoi J. Maritain préférera, dans ses derniers articles, abandonner l’appellation de philosophie chrétienne qui risque de faire croire que la philosophie est prisonnière de convenances d’ordre confessionnel, au profit d’expressions comme « la philosophie allant de l’avant » ou « la philosophie comme plénièrement telle » (Cf. SPS., in AE., p. 591). Quoi qu’il en soit de ces questions de vocabulaire qui ont toutefois leur importance si l’on pense aux équivalences auxquelles a donné lieu le terme de « philosophie chrétienne », il n’est pas de mieux comprendre le sens de ces diverses appellation.

J’ai écrit plus haut qu’il fallait parler d’un état chrétien de la philosophie. Ce faisant, je reprends la distinction que J. Maritain établit entre état et nature au sujet de la philosophie puisque, à son avis, « il faut distinguer la nature de la philosophie, ou ce qu’elle est en elle-même, et l’état où elle se trouve de fait, historiquement, dans le sujet humain, et qui se rapporte à ses conditions d’existence et d’exercice dans le concret » (PC, in OB., pp. 640-641).

En ce qui concerne la nature de la philosophie, il faut affirmer tout de suite que le domaine sur lequel s’exerce cette sagesse est accessible à l’esprit humain usant de ses seules forces. En ce sens, la philosophie n’est nullement dépendante de la foi chrétienne, que ce soit dans ses principes ou que ce soit dans son objet. Celui-ci est en effet d’ordre purement naturel et, pour l’explorer, la philosophie n’use que de moyens naturels c’est-à-dire rationnels.

Il n’en reste pas moins qu’en état chrétien, la philosophie trouve un nouvel éclat. En réalité, elle atteint à sa majorité, à sa plénitude. C’est toute la conception chrétienne de la grâce et de la nature qui est ici engagée. En effet, « le chrétien, écrit J. Maritain, croit que la grâce change l’état de l’homme, en élevant sa nature à l’ordre surnaturel, et en lui faisant con-
Les créatures, le philosophe les considère en elles-mêmes tandis que le théologien ne s’intéresse à elles que dans leur rapport à Dieu.

Théologie et philosophie sont par conséquent directement distinctes et indépendantes. La théologie ne prouve ni ne démontre les principes de la philosophie qui se suffisent à elles-mêmes. Inversement, la théologie ne retient que quelques-uns de ces principes. Pourtant, elle, encore, distinguer ne veut pas dire séparer; si ces deux sagesse sont distinctes, elles ne sont en rien coupées l’une de l’autre. Il existe un contrôleur extérieur et une régulation négative de la théologie par rapport à la philosophie. En ce sens la Doctrine Sacrée protège la philosophie d’un certain nombre, mais n’empêche pas que, à cause de la fallacité de la raison humaine, elle se perde parfois ne pas voir. De plus, comme souligne Maritain, une fois reconnue la distinction de nature entre philosophie et théologie, rien ne s’oppose à ce que la pensée, en possession des deux disciplines, passe d’un seul mouvement concret de l’une à l’autre (Ibid., pp. 660-661).

La philosophie connaît deux sortes d’états par rapport à la sagesse théologique. Lorsqu’elle poursuit pour son propre compte ses recherches, elle ne reçoit de la théologie que ce contrôle extérieur et cette régulation négative dont nous venons de parler. Mais elle peut aussi être employée par la théologie. Alors celle-ci se dote de vérités établies par la philosophie pour aboutir à des conclusions proprement théologiques. Cela peut se produire de trois façons: d’abord, en apologétique où la philosophie sert à établir les vérités qui concernent les fondements de la foi; ensuite, lorsque la philosophie s’embarque dans des analogies empruntées au philosophe d’anciennes écoles et de créer des mystères de la foi; enfin, pour réfuter ceux qui s’opposent à la foi. Mais, dans tous les cas de sagesse philosophique devient l’antique etc non serva d’une science philosophique car, dit Maritain, qui est traitée par la philosophie selon ses lois propres: ce n’est pas parce qu’elle est, c’est une secrète de l’État (Ibid., p. 658).

Voilà donc, dans ses grandes lignes, la pensée de Maritain sur la nature des rapports qui doivent exister entre la sagesse théologique et la sagesse philosophique. Cette pensée est directement inspirée de la doctrine de saint Thomas d’Aquin qui a bien défini les domaines propres aux deux sagesse et les relations qu’elles doivent entretenir. Toutefois, selon Maritain, les rapports entre théologie et philosophie qui pose le problème particuliers, le vrai parmi la philosophie morale. Celle-ci pente en effet sur l’homme comme le point qui n’est pas celui de la nature mais qui est déchu et racheté. Dans ses conséquences sur l’homme, le philosophe devra donc trouver une source d’inspiration et des principes dans la théologie. En ce sens, souligne Maritain, «l’éthique au sens le plus général de ce mot, en tant qu’elle concerne toutes les choses de l’âge humain, la politique et l’économique, la psychologie collective, la sociologie comme la morale individuelle, — l’éthique en tant qu’elle travaille sur l’homme dans son état concret, dans son être existentiel, n’est pas une discipline purement philosophique. De soi elle relève de la théologie ou pour s’y intégrer, ou au moins pour s’y subalterner (Ibid., pp. 661-662). La philosophie morale que Maritain désigne comme «adéquatement prise» est donc subalternée à la théologie. Bien sûr, elle est le plus de ces domaines qui ne lui appartiennent en tout, c’est pour cela qu’elle a besoin de s’informer auprès de la théologie. Cependant, c’est uniquement en raison des principes que la philosophie morale adéquatement prise est subalternée à la théologie. C’est pourquoi «ce n’est pas une science matériellement philosophique et formellement théologique, c’est une science formellement philosophique et subalternée à la théologie» (Ibid., p. 693). L’existence d’une théologie morale n’empêche de reste nullement la philosophie morale de se développer à son niveau propre. Les points de vue sont en effet différents. «Au lieu de considérer les actes humains eux-mêmes sous la raison formelle de la vie intime de Dieu révélée et communiquée, la philosophie morale adéquatement prise considère la fin surnaturelle elle-même sous la raison formelle et humaine de la régulabilité des actes humains par la raison» (Ibid., pp. 688-689). On peut dire de toute façon que la philosophie morale est entièrement d’erreur, pour être proportionnée à son objet, elle doit user des principes qu’elle reçoit de la foi et de la théologie. Ce faisant, la raison demande à la foi, comme à une amie divine, de l’aider à découvrir dans les tresons de la terre des richesses qu’un alliage supraterrestre a rendues trop lourdes ou trop subtils à ses mains» (Ibid., p. 663).

Avec ce problème concernant la philosophie morale adéquatement prise (MML), nous avons laissé, semble-t-il, le tour de la question des rapports que la philosophie doit entreatre avec la théologie. Concernant Maritain ne se satisfait pas d’un tel point de vue. Il pense qu’il faut aller plus loin et il propose, dans un de ses derniers articles sur le savoir théologique déjà fréquemment cité, des remarques audacieuses sur ce sujet (Cf. RST, in AE, pp. 321-323). Pour Maritain, le philosophe peut et doit réfléchir sur des matières qui relèvent de la théologie, non pas pour se substituer au philosophe, mais pour compléter, dans sa perspective à lui, la recherche de l’être sur le plan de la connaissance de son intelligence procède alors à titre de «research worker» et l’objectifs de son travail n’est pas de voir de l’extérieur du déplacement, qui est, toujours, au premier mot. Alors, sa perspective n’étant à absolument aucun titre celle d’un savoir ex auctoritate, le philosophe en question, une fois planté devant l’objet qui l’intéresse (telle théosephilologique ou celle philosophique), et seul à sa victoire, n’autheur et cherche à comprendre le mieux qu’il peut, et se trouve peut-être, il a le mérite de voir de la philosophie d’apporter des aspects dont rien n’a été dit par les maîtres et docteurs qui se sont succédés depuis l’âge apostolique et aux énoncés desquels le savoir théologique a de par son essence même à se référer, tout en argumentant dans la foi à propos d’eux, et en ne manquant pas de les sommets quand il le faut à interprétation et à critique (Ibid., p. 321).

Finalement, comme l’explique M. E.-R. Korn dans sa belle préface au dernier livre de Maritain exposé qui met définitivement au point la question dont nous parlons, c’est l’objet formel lui-même dont il a l’habitude de celui-ci de tourner ses regards vers des matières qui, de soi, relèvent de la science théologique. «En vertu de son objet formel, écrit-il, la philosophie est un savoir et une sagesse d’ordre purement naturel, œuvre de la seule raison. Mais du fait même qu’elle porte sur l’être, elle déborde les limites de son objet formel, pour atteindre — mais en n’étant plus alors une science — et en devenant la simple instrument de recherche — d’autres zones de l’être, et des phénomènes qui l’espert ne renoncera jamais à la détermination de l’être» (ERK).

Il n’en rest pas moins que la démarche du philosophe restera fondamentale et différente de celle du théologien même lorsqu’il étudie des matières théologiques et fait des réflexions de caractère proprement théologique. Son allure sera plus libre et sans doute aussi plus audacieuse.
Peut-être pourrait-il, ce faisant, éclairer le théologien sur tel ou tel point, l'aider même à renouveler sa problématique. En tout cas, c'est une exigence pour la philosophie pleinement philosophique de considérer des matières qui dépasse son objet formel.

Telle est, brièvement résumée, la conception de J. Maritain concernant les rapports de la philosophie et de la foi chrétienne, de la philosophie et de la théologie. Il semble que Maritain soit allé aussi loin que possible dans l'examen de cette question en considérant que la philosophie, pour accomplir intégralement ce à quoi elle est appelée, doit appliquer sa réflexion à des objets qui appartiennent à la sagesse théologique. Au reste, il a lui-même montré quel pouvait être l'intérêt d'une telle démarche aussi bien pour la philosophie que pour la théologie, dans ses travaux sur la mystique que nous allons analyser dans les pages qui vont suivre, dans ses derniers livres, De la grâce et de l'humanité de Jésus et De l'Église du Christ ou dans divers articles rassemblés dans Approches sans entraves et que, pour la plupart, nous avons déjà cités. (GH, p. 154; EC, p. 428.) On peut dire avec M.-R. Korn que la philosophie ainsi comprise est une « théo-philosophie » ou, mieux encore, une « Seinsphilosophie ». Si de son nom le plus sublime, écrit-il, la philosophie est appelée theo-philosophie, elle préfère le nom de Seinsphilosophie parce que celui-ci lui rappelle ses humbles origines en même temps que son objet le plus haut : la défait qui est l'être même subsistant. (ERK.) De toute façon, ce que l'on désigne par « philosophie chrétienne », « philosophie comme plénitude de la foi », « philosophie allant de l'avant », « théo-philosophie » ou « Seinsphilosophie », c'est la philosophie en tant qu'elle répond pleinement à sa vocation et affirme sans aucune ambiguïté ses rapports avec la théologie dont elle reçoit et met en œuvre les lumières.

(*) PC = De la philosophie chrétienne, Oeuvres de Jacques Maritain, choisies par H. Bar.
AE = Approches sans entraves.
AH = André Henrion, La quête de la philosophie chrétienne, la Recherche et débats, 1955, n. 10, pp. 304.
ERK = E.R. Korn, Prêche & AE.
GH = De la grâce et de l'humanité de Jésus.
EC = De l'Église du Christ.

MARITAIN AND THE NOTION OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS (1) *

par William A. Wallace, O.P. (**) 

Perhaps an apology would seem to be in order for reading a paper on scientific progress in the Maritain Congress on Human Rights, where most of the contributions deal with moral and political problems. Those who are aware, however, of the character of the problems besetting us in the latter part of the twentieth century, particularly in the area of human rights, will recognize that they are not indifferent to the view one has of science or of the technology that is intimately associated with it. Now Jacques Maritain was very interested in scientific knowledge, particularly that provided by the so-called positive sciences, and he spent a considerable portion of his life attempting to situate it, accommodate it, and appreciate it in the larger context provided by philosophical knowledge. Because he was so eminently successful in doing so, it may be worth our while to see how his thought can be brought to bear on a pressing problem that has recently arisen and that, to my knowledge, he never addressed explicitly in his writings.

The problem to which I refer seems innocent enough when put in the form of the question: Is there any such thing as scientific progress? When I say « scientific progress » what I have in mind is the cumulative growth of scientific knowledge. For science to progress means that, as time goes on, scientists learn more and more about the universe in which we live, about the creatures that inhabit it, about man himself and his various institutions. Stated otherwise, it means that science is a body of knowledge consisting of truths already known, to which accretions are continually being made as more and more discoveries are registered, as a result of which man gains an ever increasing comprehension of himself and the world of nature of which he is a part.

Most ordinary people, philosophers and theologians included, would probably not hesitate to give an affirmative answer if asked whether science progresses in this sense or not. It may come as a surprise, then, to realize that this has become a hotly debated issue in current philosophy of science, and that attempts at a resolution thus far have not been very encouraging for those of us who lie an interest in traditional philosophy, and perform in human rights. The initiator of the controversy is Thomas S. Kuhn, who in 1962 published a provocative book entitled The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1). When this first appeared I welcomed it as a challenge to the philosophy of science establishment in the U.S., which was then dominated by logical positivists and analysts, as forcing them to rethink what the scientific enterprise is all about. Now, sixteen years later, I am not so sanguine. Only two serious attempts have been made to confront Kuhn’s thesis, the first by the late Imre Lakatos (2), a disciple of Karl Popper, and the second


(**) William A. Wallace est professeur de philosophie à la « Catholic University of America » et rédacteur de The Thomist.
by Professor Larry Laudan of the University of Pittsburgh (3). In what fol-

ows I should like to present to you the problem as formulated by Kuhn, a
brief sketch of the resolution proposed by Lakatos, and then a fuller ac-
count of the solution more recently advanced by Professor Laudan. It is the latter
that will enable me to reflect, in the latter part of the paper, on what Ma-
ritain's philosophy of science would have to contribute by way of a solution,
and how this bears, albeit indirectly, on the problem of human rights (4).

THOMAS KUHN AND IMRE LAKATOS

The argument of Kuhn's *Structure of Scientific Revolutions* is fairly
straightforward and possibly is known to many of you in a general way (5).
The key to the argument is the term paradigm, which Kuhn introduced to
describe a theory and a body of work associated with it. This is what he
proposed to demolish the myth of scientific progress. A paradigm, by Kuhn's
own admission, is difficult to characterize unambiguously, but it need not be de-
defined in order to be recognized. Broadly speaking, a paradigm is a way
of looking at the world, an insight into how the phenomena in any domain of
experience should be explained (6). (An example might be Newton's laws of
motion as applied to the world of mechanics). Related to the paradigm will
usually be several related theories that utilize one or more of its elements. (Again,
examples might be the Newtonian theories of planetary motion, of the tides,
of the precession of the equinoxes). Having adopted such a paradigm and its
related theories, scientists proceed to work out all of its problem-solving
implications, an activity characterized by Kuhn as "normal science" (7). While
normal science is going on, the paradigm that controls (and defines) it will
itself remain stable or, at least, relatively stable. Any deviation from
acceptance may be criticized; they may be falsified, and even abandoned; but
the paradigm itself remains unchallenged. This state continues until suffi-
cient anomalies accumulate for the scientific community to begin to question
whether the paradigm under which it has been working is valid after all.
When this happens, as Kuhn sees it, the science is in a period of crisis. In
a crisis situation, scientists entertain for the first time the possibility of
abandoning the reigning paradigm and of investigating anew. Should
one of the later turn out to be more successful in solving problems, a scien-
tific revolution occurs; the new paradigm takes the place of the old, and a
new phase of investigation begins. A scientific revolution, therefore, is no
thing more than a transition to a new paradigm, since the decision to reject
one paradigm is simultaneously the decision to accept another. Or, to state
Kuhn's thesis in his own words, scientific revolutions are "non-cumulative
developmental episodes in which an older paradigm is replaced in whole or
in part by an incompatible new one" (8).

For those of us interested in traditional philosophy, Kuhn's thesis ini-
tially appears as a bulwark against irresponsible innovations by scientists
and so as safeguarding enduring philosophical values. Enthusiasm wanes,
however, when the fuller implications of the thesis are explored. For one
thing, Kuhn claims that, after a revolution has occurred, scientists see a dif-
f erent world. Their new way of conceptualizing nature and its problems is
very much like a switch of visual Gestalt (9). Sensory experience is thus not
fixed and neutral with regard to different interpretations that may be put
upon it; after a revolution, as Kuhn sees it, the data themselves have chang-
ed (10). And the new ways of looking at things — and here we come to the

key issue for our purposes — are not closer approximations to the way things
actually are, they are not closer approximations to truth. Science seems to
progress toward truth, Kuhn argues, but this progress is documented only
in periods of normal science, when puzzle-solving is going on under the
aegis of a particular paradigm. In such a case science progresses because
its progressive procedures are circularly defined as scientific. Scientific
progress therefore lies essentially in the eyes of its beholders, those engaged
in the procedure, scientists themselves (11). They progress because they so de-
define their puzzle-solving activity that progress is inevitable. Moreover, their
education insulates them from the intellectual world at large; their textbooks
disguise the revolutions that have previously taken place in their discipline;
their authoritative sources make the history of science appear linear and
cumulative (12). Actually the choices by which the scientific community se-
lects new paradigms are made on faith, on subjective and aesthetic consider-
ations. This is what Kuhn calls "research programme" (13).

The resulting indictment of modern science is devastating in the extre-
me, and its full import can only be appreciated when Kuhn's line of rea-
soning is extended to every other intellectual enterprise, philosophy and
theology not excluded. A few philosophers have recognized this danger. One
such is Dudley Shapere, of the University of Maryland, who prepared for me
a penetrating critique of Kuhn's thesis that appears in Volume 16 of the
New Catholic Encyclopedia (14). By and large, however, the attacks on truth
and on the possibility of its attainment that is jeopardized in Kuhn's view,
have not been met by any philosopher on the American scene.

The most serious attempt to meet Kuhn on his own ground was that
inaugurated by Imre Lakatos, under the inspiration of Karl Popper, to which
I have already alluded (15). Lakatos sought to do this by identifying Kuhn's
paradigms as effectively "super theories" or general theories that exercise
a type of regulative influence in the evolution of science. Lakatos attributes
to Kuhn the catchphrase of the "research programme" (16). Kuhn calls it "the
research programme". Lakatos calls it "research programme" (17). The
characteristics found in Kuhn's paradigms, but he rejects other features that
for him make Kuhn's proposal border on the irrational. For Lakatos, a re-
search programme is made up of three components: 1) a hard core of funda-
mental assumptions that cannot be abandoned or modified without repu-
dication of the programme itself; 2) a positive heuristic, which is a partially
articulated set of suggestions as to how to change particular theories within
the programme to meet the programme's wishes to improve them; and 3) a series of
theories that go to make up the programme, where each subsequent one results
from adding modifications to a previous theory (16).

In these respects Lakatos's proposal, though more developed than Kuhn's,
does not seem significantly different in character from his. The crucial dif-
ference between the two is that Lakatos believes that scientific progress is
not illusory, that it actually comes about, and that it is reflected in ever
more responsible and better corroborated accounts of the cosmos. So he
asserts that successive theories within a research programme register pro-
gress and they do so to the degree that they possess a greater empirical
content or a higher degree of empirical corroboration. This is what, in
his view, makes one theory superior to, and more progressive than, an-
other. Therefore the adoption of theories is not a whimsical matter, something
based on the social and psychological factors influencing the investigator, but
is rather a matter of rational choice based on testable consequences (17).

Lakatos does not make extreme truth claims for scientific theories, but
he implicitly follows the correspondence theory of truth advocated by his mentor, Karl Popper. He does so in endorsing the technique of falsification—a technique that, while never attaining truth directly, permits a closer and closer approximation to it. Fundamental to Popper's logic of falsification is the recognition that one theory has more empirical content than another if it has more testable consequences (18). The more such consequences, the more readily a theory can be falsified, for each testable consequence leaves it open to disconfirmation and ultimate rejection. Any theory that is more falsifiable, therefore, and despite empirical test has not yet been falsified, has a greater claim to verisimilitude than a competitor that has not met such a test. As Popper sees it, the fact that our conjectures and theories can clash with, and be falsified by, something beyond themselves, point to the existence of an independent reality (19). Moreover, the fact that this reality can have at least a falsifying influence upon the way we formulate theories means that such independent reality contributes over the long run to our scientific knowledge. Thus, within any research programme, as Lakatos proposes this, I am quite certain that he would maintain that successive theories represent closer approximations to the truth, in the Popperian sense just indicated. With regard to any research programme in its entirety, however, Lakatos sees no way to apply Popper’s testability criterion, and thus, like Kuhn, seems at a loss to explain why the programme is adopted in the first place. Theories within a particular programme are progressive, and on this one can say that the research programme is progressive also. But when one inquires about the relative acceptability of competing research programmes, there appears to be no way in which one can decide between them on a cognitive basis. Thus there is no direct connection, for Lakatos, between ultimate progress and rational acceptability, and in this matter, at least, his solution does not escape completely the charge of irrationality that has already been levelled at Kuhn (21).

LAUDAN'S THEORY OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS

It is in such a setting that Professor Laudan has come to offer a new solution in his Progress and Its Problems: Toward a Theory of Scientific Growth. The new solution was called for, says Laudan, because the very question of the rationality of science had been called into doubt, implicitly by Lakatos, explicitly by Kuhn. According to the latter, whose thesis is the more extreme but whose views seem to have taken the day, science can be neither true nor progressive; in the past, scientists have shown themselves to be irrational in their paradigm choices; yet the situation is more serious still, for science must be irrational, since this is the only way it can work. Now Laudan’s answer to this challenge is simple enough, and may be stated in a few words. He observes that two competing factors are at work in this problematic, one which he calls temporal, progress, the other which he calls atemporal, rationality (22). If we examine these two carefully, he goes on, we see that progress is readily understood, whereas rationality is obscure. Thus it is a mistake to define progress in terms of rationality; the converse should be done, we should define rationality in terms of progress. His proposed definition is this: rationality consists in making the most progressive theory choices (23). Now a theory is effectively an answer to a question, the solution of a problem. Kuhn is partially correct in seeing puzzle-solving as the putative indicator of scientific progress, only he has the wrong word. Not puzzle-solving, but problem-solving—a word that is what is most characteristic of science. Scientific rationality thus consists at the solution of problems: the rationality is measured by its problem-solving effectiveness. This has no necessary connection with truth, or with cumulative growth or development. Scientific progress is simply a matter of problem-solving, whence the title of the book, Progress and Its Problems.

So stated, Laudan’s thesis is reduced to its bare bones. Flesh can be put on those bones, however, and in the process most of the current literature that surrounds the Kuhn-Lakatos controversy can be taken into account. There are two kinds of problems scientists must face, progress continues, although the difference between them has not always been appreciated. One kind is the empirical problem; the other, the conceptual problem. Empirical problems are somewhat like factual problems, though the identity need not be pressed too closely (25). Samples of empirical problems would be: How and why do bodies fall? Why does alcohol evaporate when left standing? Why do progeny resemble their parents? These are factual problems. What are the known facts generally? Of problems (24). Its progress is empirical problems have turned out to be counterfactual also, such as the problem of spontaneous generation. All of them, to be sure, presuppose a context of inquiry. And empirical problems are divisible into three classes: the unsolved, the solved, and the anomalous or partially solved (26). Here the measure of progress is relatively simple: progress consists in the transformation of unsolved and unsolved empirical problems into solved problems (27). The question of truth and falsity is a matter of course, clearly the Ptolemaic theory of epicycles solved the problem of the retrograde motion of the planets, regardless of whether or not anyone accepted the truth of epicyclic astronomy.

The mention of epicycles brings us to the other kind of problem scientists must solve, namely, the conceptual problem (28). Such problems, by definition, are concerned with non-empirical factors, and they have counterparts in methodological and philosophical puzzles that have engaged mankind for centuries. Some samples would be: the validity of axioms and epicycles; the possibility of action at a distance or of absolute space; the nature of evolution or of psychoanalysis. A conceptual problem is exhibited by some theory or other, to which it is related internally or externally (29). Internal conceptual problems relate to questions of inconsistency, circularity, and ambiguity—they are of great interest to the logician. External problems look beyond the theory to how it may be conceptually compatible with another theory; or to how it may generate methodological or normative problems; or even to how it may be in conflict with a worldview or an extrascientific belief deriving, say, from metaphysics, ethics, or theology (30). Throughout the history of mechanics the ontology of forces has generated conceptual problems of this type, and quantum theory is especially notorious for the problems it has generated with regard to the concepts of causality, substance, and reality itself.
Conceptual problems are the more pertinacious throughout science's history, but they too must be taken into account when one wishes to measure scientific progress (31). Laudan's formula would take them into account, without being weighted down by them entirely. For him, the basic unit of scientific progress is the solved empirical problem. Therefore the aim of science is to maximize the scope of solved empirical problems, while at the same time minimizing the scope of conceptual problems and of empirical problems that remain unsolved or anomalous (32).

In the Roman Catholic tradition there has been a constant tension between the commitment to orthodoxy and freedom of expression. Across the centuries this has been expressed in varying ways but the opposition has been there. It can be expressed benignly as a devotion to the truth which it possesses or less benignly as inquisitorial heresy hunting, but the general tendency has had the effect of putting Rome in a different camp from those who have sought to promote freedom of thought or the First Amendment liberties or rights as they are known in the United States.

In an essay, *The Historic Origins of Liberalism* (1), Christopher Dawson explored the basis of the tension. He placed the origin of the movement towards toleration in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries in the growing scepticism of this period. Historically I believe he was correct, but I believe this has been a movement which has been going in the right direction but perhaps for the wrong reasons. That is one can rejoice in the affirmation of the long range result: the Vatican II Declaration on Religious Freedom without having to agree with the historical roots of toleration, scepticism or a defeatist attitude toward attaining truth.

In some remarks made in the context of discussing *Liberty Versus Equality* having praised the contribution of John Stuart Mill, I added:

> "While I agree with the results of this trend I am not satisfied with the premises. One feels the need for a metaphysical foundation of our First Amendment freedoms... What is needed is a more metaphysical John Stuart Mill, someone who can defend our First Amendment freedoms by rooting them in the dignity of the human person." (2)

The metaphysically based political philosopher whom I had in mind was, of course, Jacques Maritain. I had referred to him and to John Courtney Murray in the lines which I omitted from the quotation and I knew in a vague way that if I were to return to the study of his writings I would find at last the metaphysical justification of natural rights, and perhaps even a special consideration of what I find it convenient to call, as a kind of shorthand, our First Amendment freedoms. I am not going to quote the First Amendment, but for the purpose of this paper to focus attention on the part of it which is ordinarily called « freedom of expression. »

Congress shall make no laws respecting an establishment of religion.

---

(5) The exposition that follows parallels Laudan's account (note 3 supra), pp. 53-56.
(7) Ibid., pp. 34-35.
(8) Ibid., p. 91.
(9) Ibid., pp. 111-112.
(10) Ibid., p. 135.
(11) Ibid., pp. 136-137.
(12) Ibid., pp. 136-137.
(13) Ibid., p. 179.
(14) Vol. 16, pp. 202-204; this volume is a supplement to the fifteen volumes that appeared in 1987, and was published by McGraw-Hill and Publishers' Guild in 1978.
(15) Specifically in the essay in the volume cited (note 2 supra) entitled « Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, » pp. 91-105.
(16) See the summary in Laudan's account (note 3 supra), p. 76.
(18) Ibid., p. 117.
(19) Ibid., p. 231.
(20) Ibid., p. 232.
(22) Ibid., pp. 56.
(23) Ibid., p. 9.
(24) Ibid., p. 17.
(26) Ibid., p. 17.
(27) Ibid., p. 18.
(28) Ibid., p. 44.
(29) Ibid., p. 44.
(30) Ibid., p. 51.
(31) Ibid., p. 44.
(32) Ibid., p. 66.

(*) Une version précédente de ce texte a été présentée au congrès de l'American Maritain Association consacré aux Droits de l'Homme, à Washington D.C., en avril 1975.
(**) Desmond J. Fitzgerald est professeur et directeur du département de Philosophie de l'Université de San Francisco. Il est ancien président de l'American Catholic Philosophical Association (1975) dans le bulletin de laquelle il a publié récemment « Liberty versus Equality. » Avant de recevoir son Ph. D. (Doctorat en Philosophie) à l'Université de Californie à Berkeley, il avait présenté sa thèse de maîtrise sur « La peine politique de J. Maritain. »
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.

Today there are various defenders of freedom of expression, but two organizations come to mind as especially organized for its defense: the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Association of University Professors. While both organizations do other things any review of their activities across the years would indicate a good part of their efforts has been devoted to the protection of individuals or associations who have suffered some bad consequences after the expression of some unpopular or generally unacceptable opinion or theory.

At this point I believe it is only fair to acknowledge that John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, published mid-nineteenth century, has come to be acknowledged (despite rather fashionable academic criticism) as a landmark in the defense of what the First Amendment stands for. To this one might add the bits and pieces of a series of Supreme Court opinions which sought to clarify the conditions according to which this constitutional right might be exercised.

I have referred to freedom of expression as a constitutional right and so it is. But can it be regarded as in any way a natural right? That is the point I wish to reflect upon in the context of a selection of some Maritain’s writings.

Just as Maritain sometimes begins his analysis of natural law with the affirmation that he does not propose to argue there is such a reality as human nature, so too in this context I do not intend to argue either the reality of human nature or human rights. This I anticipated would be done in other papers earlier in this conference. Rather I propose to consider whether or not Maritain would affirm some form of the freedom of expression as a natural right.

Without claiming to have put my finger on all the texts in which Maritain has made reference to freedom of expression in some form or other, I propose to present some representative quotations which, in my opinion, reveal a development in his thinking regarding the free expression of opinions in society.

In Integral Humanism (1936), based upon a series of lectures presented at the University of Santander, Spain, in August 1934, Maritain noted that Karl Marx had fought for freedom of the press in his youth, but that today there was no liberty of the press in the Soviet Union. Then he added:

> When Rome, in the time of Gregory XVI and Pius IX, condemned the claim to make freedom of the press and freedom of expression of thought ends in themselves and unlimited rights, it was only recalling a basic necessity of human government. These freedoms are good and answer to radical needs in human nature: they have to be regulated, as does everything that is not of the order of the Deity itself. The dictatorial or totalitarian way of realizing them — seems detestable to me; the pluralist way — by justice and a progressive self-regulation — seems good to me, and it is as strong as it is just” (3).

Maritain goes on to suggest that professional self-regulation would be the best way to limit abuses which might arise from the abuse of freedom.

> Let me suggest that in virtue of an institutional status various groups of publicists and writers, assembled in an autonomous body, would have

a progressive control over the duties of their profession. Then we would see whether, through the natural severity with which the potter judges the work of the potter, they would not be able to exercise an efficacious control; it would rather be to protect the individual from his associates that the supreme judicial organs of the State would have to interfere” (4).

Commenting on this last thought Maritain adds the further reflection that exterior regulation is useless unless it serves to develop in the person a sense of his own creative responsibility and a sense of communion. “To feel responsible for one’s brothers does not lessen freedom, though it puts on it a heavier load” (5).

In a section of The Rights of Man and Natural Law, published in 1943, having to do with the rights of the civic person, Maritain’s thinking about freedom of expression seems to have deepened. He is not entirely happy with the phrase “freedom of expression”; he prefers to call it “freedom of investigation and discussion.” His words are:

> I should like merely to propose two more observations concerning the right of association and freedom of expression. The right of association is a natural right which takes political form when it is sanctioned by the State and subject to the regulations of the State concerning the common good (the State has a right to prohibit and dissolve — not arbitrarily, but according to the decision of the appropriate juridical institutions — an association of evil-doers or an association of enemies of the public good). What we know as freedom of speech and expression would, in my opinion, be better designated by the term freedom of investigation and discussion. Such freedom has a strictly political value, because it is necessary to the common effort to augment and diffuse the true and the good in the community. Freedom of investigation is a fundamental natural right, for man’s very nature is to seek the truth” (6).

Thus Maritain grounds the right of freedom of investigation in man’s nature and man’s need to know the truth. To come to possess the truth, to enlarge the truth we have, and to correct the errors we suffer we must be open to learn from others and to try to teach others; for in trying to teach others what we believe is the case we learn ourselves; our mistaken notions are exposed, and we sometimes have to pick up the pieces of our theories and think again.

However, Maritain is careful and does not wish to be understood as advocating an unconditioned or unqualified freedom of expression. He continues:

> Freedom to spread ideas which one holds to be true corresponds to an aspiration of nature, but like freedom of association it is subject to the regulations of positive law. For it is not true that every thought as such, because of the mere fact that it was born in a human intellect, has the right to circulate in the public political community. The true political community resists the propagation of lies or calumnies; to resist those activities which have as their aim the corruption of morals; to resist those which have as their aim the destruction of the State and of the foundations of common life” (7).

As he continues these reflections Maritain indicates that he believes the worst way to protect society is by censorship and police methods. What he has in mind is not entirely clear to me but again I believe his preference is for the self-discipline which different communities within the State might
assert on their mistaken members; that is the press disciplines other members of the press, and television, for example, disciplines television.

On what is a burning question today in civil liberty circles: does our First Amendment right of free expression demand that we permit the propaganda which may lead to the destruction of our right to free expression? Maritain had not hesitation. He would not permit it. His words are:

"In any event I am convinced that a democratic society is not necessarily an unarmed society, where the enemies of liberty may calmly lead to the slaughterhouse in the name of liberty. Precisely because it is a commonwealth of free men, it must defend itself with particular energy against those who out of principle, refuse to accept, and who even work to destroy the foundation of common life in such a regime, the foundations which are liberty and cooperation and mutual civic respect." (8).

Of course, he adds, whatever moves must be taken to protect society from those who would use freedom to destroy freedom must be done with institutional guarantees of justice and law.

Up to the mid-1940s Maritain had written as an observer of the political processes; a political philosopher involved in the political scene through friends and associates who engaged in political life but he was not a participant himself. Then General Charles De Gaulle in March of 1945 appointed Maritain to be France's representative to the Vatican. This was hardly a political role in the usual sense but it undoubtedly involved Maritain more in the day-to-day process of intergovernmental communication and negotiation. Before he left the United States to take up his appointment an article of his appeared in The Nation (April 21, 1945) which was basically a response to Professor Sidney Hook's review of a proposal by T. S. Eliot. The article, "The Foundations of Democracy," was interesting for a number of things: I should like to note two of them.

First he affirmed the possibility of common action in the political sphere by parties who might disagree on their premises, but who from different directions could reach the same conclusion as to what should be done. He says: "Mr. Hook reached by means of questionable theoretical arguments a practical solution which for quite different reasons seems to me to be on the right track." (9).

In the same article Maritain made a further remark not bearing directly on the right of freedom of expression but reflecting the spirit which most of us associate with its defense.

As a result, it is but normal that in a democratic culture and society the diverse philosophical or religious schools of thought which in their practical conclusions agree with regard to democratic tenets, and which claim to justify them, come into free competition. Let each school assert its belief with fulness and integrity! But let no one try to impose it by force upon the others! The reciprocal tension which ensues will enrich rather than harm the common task." (10).

Shortly after Maritain's appointment as the French Ambassador to the Vatican, World War II ended in Europe. In San Francisco in June 1945, the United Nations was founded, and along with it, subsidiary organizations such as UNESCO; Maritain was a member of the French delegation to a UNESCO session which met in Mexico City in the fall of 1947 and worked on the subject of the Rights of Man. In an address to one of the sessions he reflected on how agreement was possible regarding conclusions such as what human rights should be proclaimed, although men and countries might differ on the premises of justification. When two years later he gave the Charles R. Walgreen lectures at the University of Chicago, published in 1951 as Man and the State, he returned to the subject of human rights presenting what one would have to consider his most profound thinking on the subject.

Maritain had been writing and lecturing on topics closely related to political philosophy for some thirty years; but in these Walgreen lectures he had the opportunity to organize and systematize his reflections such as he had not had before. Often on past occasions his political insights had been prompted by the challenge of a crisis or some incident that provoked his reply. Now he was approaching his seventieth year and he probably wished to make these lectures his full statement.

In a section on The Political Heretics in the chapter "The Democratic Charter" he returned to the problem of those who would use the freedom of freedom in respect to their own ambition to overturn the State and then suppress freedom of expression along with other freedoms. He again argued that a democratic society should not be an unarmed society which would passively allow itself to be led to the slaughterhouse in the name of liberty. He argued a commonwealth of free men must be prepared to defend their freedom against those who would work to destroy it. At this point in his lecture a new note is introduced: a distinction between political activity and illegal activity. The fact that legal political propaganda of volunteer sorts, should be met by the opposite political activity freely developed by citizens in a body politic sufficiently lively and alive." (11). When the so-called heretic embarks on, let us say, violence or terrorism, then « he will be met with, and checked by, the authority of the State » (12).

It appears to me that Maritain's thinking while not changing has undergone a refinement here. He seems to be saying that the better way to deal with the subversive idea would use freedom to undermine freedom to meet them with counter-arguments and expose their shortcomings in the arena of public debate. He says he has no problem with illegal activity; it should be stopped according to the judicial procedures according to all due process safeguards. Rather « the difficulty begins when it comes to the speaking and writing activity of the political heretic ». And he adds: « The question of freedom of expression is not a simple one » (13). Here a long footnote occurs in which Maritain makes reference to a recently published study of the press done under the chairmanship of Robert M. Hutchins. I shall not go into his detailed review of it which is rather a summary of the Hutchins report. This report had as its general intention the affirmation of First Amendment freedoms to all aspects of communication. Maritain notes without comment that one recommendation was « the repeal of legislation prohibiting expressions in favor of revolutionary changes in our institutions where there is no clear and present danger that violence will result from the expression ». (14).

As Maritain continues his analysis two features emerge: first, he does not regard freedom of expression as an unqualified right; he calls it a right « substantially » not « absolutely », and refers back to an earlier remark on this distinction. It amounts to affirming it as a basic, that is, inalienable right but subject to restriction in its exercise according to the needs of the common good of the community. In this it is comparable to the right of association; these he says: « (...) are of such a nature that the common good
would be jeopardized if the body politic could not restrict in some measure (all the less as societies are more capable of and based on common freedom) the possession that men naturally have of them» (15). Thus the affirmation of the right to freedom of expression is maintained as a natural right, but there is retained the notion that it can be conditioned according to the circumstances for the sake of the welfare of the community.

The second feature of his analysis is in a kind of opening up of the exercise of the right. Not being privileged to his day-to-day conversations in this period, I cannot say for sure, but I am inclined to guess that the longer he stayed in America the more favorable was his evaluation of the working in society of our First Amendment freedoms. It is almost as if his examples of justification for some conditioning of free expression were becoming examples where he was more concerned to limit the restrictive powers.

"On the other hand, not only censorship and police methods, but any direct restriction of freedom of expression, though unavoidable in certain cases of necessity, are the worst way to ensure the rights of the body politic to defend freedom and the common charter and common morality. Because any such restriction runs against the very spirit of a democratic society; (...) It also knows that it is no use fighting ideas with cordons sanitaires and repressive measures (even totalitarian States known that; consequently they simply kill their heretics, while using psychological means to tame or corrupt ideas themselves) » (16).

As if to underline his point about censorship and police methods, Maritain commented on the incongruity of asking the police to judge a Baed-klaire or a James Joyce with respect to the immorality of their art. His point is that you cannot ask the State to judge philosophical questions, to make decisions regarding whether or not some piece of writing is a political heresy. He says:

"It is too much for the State to judge whether a political theory is heretical with regard to the democratic faith; it is enough to judge — always with the institutional guarantees of justice and law — whether a political heretic threatens the democratic charter by the tangible acts he undertakes or by receiving money from a foreign State to subsidize antidemocratic propaganda » (17).

Thus Maritain seems in practice, if not in theory, to have come to appreciate the value of what has developed as the Supreme Court's interpretation of our First Amendment. He still defends in theory the notion that freedom of expression not be used to promote an ideology which would cancel freedom of expression, but when it comes to acting he prefers that such a position be refused in debate, and that the police powers of the State not be burdened by having to determine what is orthodox and what is heresy.

I have two further references which indicate to me that with the years he grew in his commitment to the full freedom of expression and investigation such as he saw it operating in the United States and Canada. In Reflections on America, having referred to the moral concern he noted in America, he said:

"A second aspect is the fundamental part played in this country by free discussion, involving that right to dissent without which there is no community of free men, and which no historical circumstance can impair here for long. There is a perpetual process of self-examination and self-criticism going on everywhere and in every sphere of American life: a phenomenon incomprehensible without a quest for truth of which a materialist cast of mind is incapable » (18).

The other passage which I wish to consider since it represents, not directly his views on freedom of expression as a natural right, but the value he came to place in his maturest thinking on freedom of investigation and self-determination in matters relating to the pursuit of truth. This he found is his reflection on professors of theology who were showing a negative attitude towards the theology of St. Thomas Aquinas in that period near the close of and just after Vatican II. He knows the teaching of St. Thomas can be imposed as a kind of order from above demanding obedience to authority, but he does not want it to be done this way. He writes:

"But perhaps an old hermit will be allowed to express a humble wish: I am dreaming of a day when the Church would turn, even in these most delicate matters toward the roads of freedom. Of her own intellectual life she has a particularly keen awareness (because particularly assisted by the Holy Spirit) in the person of the chief who here on earth is responsible for her universality. It is in exercising the liberty proper to the mystical Body of Christ that she has adopted the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor. Could not a kind of reversal take place in the practical manner in which she recommends this doctrine? More fervently than ever, but by appealing less to obedience and docility than to the freedom of the intellect in its pursuit of truth and by relying less upon her disciplinary authority than on her own unfailing confidence in the truth of this doctrine? » (19).

This is a rhetorical question, of course, but it is one which affirms freedom of investigation, freedom of inquiry, freedom of expression, not out of a sceptic's despair of attaining truth, but out of the confidence of one who judges we are made to know the truth and that in a fair fight (other things being equal) truth will triumph.

This, of course, is the Maritain I hoped to find; the metaphysician who would affirm the freedom of investigation and inquiry, the freedom to tell the truth as one sees it. This is the philosopher I could set up in opposition to Marcuse's Repressive Tolerance who could be completely Catholic and fully supportive of the freedom of investigation and discussion.

RESUMES

Il y a toujours eu une tension dans le catholicisme entre la liberté d'expression et la revendication d'orthodoxie. Partant du « First Amendment » de la Constitution américaine, l'auteur montre que la déclaration sur la Liberté Religieuse de Vatican II, ouvre une nouvelle période pour le catholicisme. Il pense que Maritain est le philosophe catholique le mieux qualifié pour donner à cette déclaration les bases métaphysiques indispensables, et il la prouve en analysant quelques textes de Humanisme Intégral, des Droits de L'Homme et de la Loi Naturelle et de L'Homme et l'État.

Letter from the General Secretary of the I.J.M. to the American Maritain Association, St. Louis Conference


Ayant été empêché de participer à cette réunion — à laquelle l’Institut a été représenté par le Vice-Président, R.P. L.K. Shook c.s.b. — le Secrétaire Général a voulu faire parvenir aux membres américains un message de sa part à l'occasion de cet événement particulièrement significatif pour l’Association.

Dans sa lettre M. Papini souhaite que la rencontre soit l’occasion d’une réflexion sur l’idéologie de connaissances scientifiques dans une perspective de vérité, pour redécouvrir la valeur et la signification de l’homme; en même temps il souhaite que l’A.M.A. puisse prendre conscience des implications de son nouvel rôle au sein de l’Institut Maritain, du fait que l’Association a été acceptée officiellement au nombre des Sections nationales lors de la dernière Assemblée Générale de l’Institut en novembre dernier.

Mr. Donald A. Gallagher, Ph. D.,
President,
American Maritain Association
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

Dear President,

I regret to say that I cannot be present for the next American Maritain Association conference, May 9-10 in St. Louis. I am even more deeply sorry because until now I have been able to attend every meeting of the American Maritain Association, since you started the North American group of the Maritain Institute. Especially today, since the AMA has become a full fledged member (upon the decision of the General Assembly in Lecce, 25/11/79) of the International Jacques Maritain Institute, I would like to have shared personally in the internal family joy.

Since 1974, the year of its foundation, the Institute has spread throughout various countries of Europe and America, has participated in many important debates in the fields of art, politics, education, seeking to maintain a faithful « openness » to Maritain, attentive to the new historical-social problematic and to the position of man in society which is becoming more and more soulless. The Maritain comeback has above all signified for us a search for a new humanism founded in truth and open to the transcendent.

The A.M.A. has existed since 1977; surely long enough to make reflection on its role and direction fruitful. Would it not be wise now to reflect on its cultural strategy and influence on North American intellectual society? With respect to Thomism, for example; we must avoid giving the impression that the thought of St. Thomas has only scholastic significance, as if it were something to be preserved in a schoolroom. Rather, we must show its vital capacity for interpreting human problems, both individual and social.

The theme to be discussed in St. Louis has particular importance; the
epistemological research of Maritain, prompted by the philosophy of "being," can lead to a rethinking of the intelligence of present day man, both to question scientific knowledge in the horizon of truth, and to guide it to a rediscovery of the value and significance of man. It could also help to unravel the role and the limits scientific knowledge has in the planning of the City of man. In this society in which we are living, after having asked for liberation from the constraints of science, and having then been disappointed, it seems today, the spiritual possibilities are obscured. Therefore, it is extremely urgent to rediscover and re-establish a concept of scientific knowledge as defined in the essay. The seminar in St. Louis, in this framework, offers an important occasion for reflection.

Last, but not least, the AMA should reflect upon the significance of its full membership in the International Institute. This would not only give international dimension, but also help to supply an openness and an open ear, without which the liberation of intelligence and research cannot exist.

The other hand, the Institute cannot help but receive an immense contribution of vital energy from your continent. It will certainly be a great extension of the scope of your work.

I would be more than happy if you could pass these brief reflections onto the attention of the assembly, and if at all possible, to discuss them.

Our Vice President, F.L.K. Shook, will represent the Institute at St. Louis. But, I would appreciate it if you could pass it on to all, greetings and best wishes from our President, Ramón Sugranyes de Franch, and mine personally, because I am...

Sincerely yours,
Roberto Papini

Bibliographie

FICHE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE

Le songe de Descartes, suit de quelques essais, Buchet-Chastel, Paris 1932, pp. XII-236.

Dans l'introduction l'auteur indique les intentions de ce recueil de textes: "essayer de discerner la valeur et la signification de la réforme cartesiane par rapport à la sagesse métaphysique et théologique" (X), en montrant comment les efforts du rationalisme moderne, de science rationalisation engendrée inévitablement des résultats absurdes quand elle ne s'est pas ouverte de raison intégrale, dicée à l'ordre de la sagesse et à celui de la nature" (XI).

I

Le premier chapitre « Le songe de Descartes » (1-31), qui donne le titre au recueil de textes, est tiré de la revue La Revue Universelle, décembre 1920, n. III, pages 95-407, et il examine la signification du songe que Descartes pose à la base de la fondation de la science et qu'il a écrit le 11 novembre 1619, comme une espèce de « révélation privée » dont les contenus « sont ainsi les articles de foi d'une révélation naturelle dont l'organe est la raison » (28). En effet, « l'ordre suivi par Descartes en physico, où il prétend déduire des attributs de Dieu les premières lois du mouvement, n'est que l'ordre idéologique, qui va de Dieu à la création » (27); toutes les sciences sont rapportables à « une seule science universelle parfaitement une, comme est la science de Dieu, qui voit tout dans son essence » (29); et cette seule science se fonde sur l'autorité de Dieu et elle est en même temps spéculative et pratique. Descartes a été appelé à cette tâche, il doit faire « table rase de tout ce qu'on a pu penser jusqu'à lui » (21) et doit formuler tout seul « Le projet d'une science universelle qui puisse élever notre nature à son plus haut degré de perfection » (17). De même que la vraie religion est l'œuvre d'un seul Dieu, de même la vraie philosophie sera l'œuvre d'un seul homme. « Il est seul capable, seul homme, peut l'aider; nul maître, nul livre, aucune expérience séculaire, aucune voix du passé ne lui parlera » (21). La raison se suffit à elle-même, tous les hommes, même ceux qui n'ont pas pu étudier, sont à même de connaître les matières les plus difficiles. La raison n'a besoin que de bonnes règles de méthode pour parvenir au sommet de la science et de la sagesse » (22). Il s'agit de chercher en soi-même « les notions les plus aisées à concevoir, les plus simples, et qui se peuvent le plus distinctement représenter » (24). La raison « liant avec évidence des éléments évidents, (ii) ne peut pas manquer de réussir » (34). Voici le songe de Descartes.

II

Le deuxième chapitre « Révélation de la science » (33-76), déjà publié dans Les Lettres, février 1922, pages 175-204, examine la position de Descartes par rapport à ses contemporains et l'ambiguïté de sa pensée: « la pensée de Descartes se couvre du double prestige de la science et de l'apologetique, de la géométrie et de la spiritualité. Elle prend sincèrement le parti de la religion contre les athées et les libertins, et se présente comme chrétienne, et sera reçue comme telle » (34). Le succès du cartésianisme ne s'explique pas seulement par la facilité des idées claires et distinctes, mais par la présence de deux vérités, les deux précieuses, l'une ancienne et l'autre moderne: le rappel sacratoire et chrétien à l'intolérance et la revendication des droits de la science physico-mathématique. Mais ces deux vérités sont corrompues et gâtées.

« Descartes rentre dans son intérieur, il s'enferme en soi-même, non pour priver mais pour penser, non pour faire raison, mais pour philosopher;
Il transposerait ainsi de la plus curieuse manière un procédé de la spiritualité chrétienne sur la planche des sciences de la raison (44). Quant aux sciences physico-mathématiques, qui pouvaient s'accorder avec la philosophie, « Descartes consomma la rupture de la nouvelle science de l'ancienne sagesse » (48) « faisant de la science physico-mathématique la philosophie naturelle elle-même » (48), en parvenant à un mathématisme et à un mécanicisme universels.

La philosophie cartésienne est ambiguë, mais l'ingéniosité et l'ontologie peuvent sauver la spiritualité et l'ontologie de l'impénétrable existence et la transcendance de Dieu. Cependant la séparation de l'âme du corps, avec le mécanisme de la vie physique-physique qui en dérive, prépare le matérielisme et l'affirmation que l'existence de Dieu peut être tirée de son idée, mais que l'il est pas possible d'avoir une science de la réalité divine, prépare l'anti-philosophie.

Descartes n'admet pas une pluralité et une hiérarchie des sciences, toutes les connaissances étant rapportables à une méthode scientifique unique et par conséquent il ne reconnaît pas dans l'âme humaine une pluralité d'habits intellectuels. Il ne trouve dans la science n'est plus en nous une qualité spirituelle, une lumière, un feu vivant qui perfectionne internes inextricablement notre âme, elle n'est plus une collection de concepts bien ordonnés (65). La science ne se développe plus par un approfondissement intérieur mais par un simple croisement de quantité de notions, par addition. Il naît le mythe de la science, qui existe par elle-même, abstraitement, qui est omnisciente et au service de l'homme, son bonheur terrestre.

Le rationalisme est, si l'on peut dire, l'intellectualisme de l'imaginaire » (69).

III

Le troisième chapitre « Déposition de la sagesse » (77-150), tiré de la tradition de La croisade (1502, p. 175-204), aborde les rapports entre science, philosophie et théologie, en comparant les positions de Descartes et de S. Thomas sur la nature de l'acte de foi et sur la valeur de la théologie. Pour le théologien acte de foi est un acte d'intelligence vue par la volonté sous l'influence de la grâce; son objet n'est pas évocé rationnellement mais il est certain et sûr, même s'il n'y a pas encore la vision de Dieu. La foi est une connaissance imparfaite, mais vraie et ouverte aux dons du Saint-Esprit. « C'est pourquoi l'intelligence de la foi jusqu'à la vérité divine devrait être complétée par les dons d'intelligence et de sagesse, et se fait disciple de l'amour, pour obtenir un amour qui est le droit à cette vérité qu'il connaissait, mais qui ne peut pas ici-bas dévorer par la vision » (85). Pour Descartes l'acte de foi est un acte de raison, définitif, matérialiste, et satisfait de soi-même, indifférent à la philosophie, sans rapport avec la raison. « La religion de Descartes apparaît comme simple assurance contre les risques de l'audél et qui doit laisser libre ici-bas de conduire au gré de sa seule raison, sa vie, sa philosophie et ses plaisirs » (86). Pour le théologien l'âme est un savoir supérieur à la philosophie, qui procède selon le mode discursif moyennant une raison et perfectionnée par l'amour. Si le théologien perd la foi, il perd la science théologique, puisque la foi, même si elle est indépendante, il continuera à perdre des choses de Dieu. Descartes la théologie est une simple application de la philosophie aux données de la foi, elle n'est plus une connaissance d'une source qui n'est plus la divinité de l'âme ou l'autorité de l'âme. Ainsi Descartes sépare philosophie et théologie, et à la philosophie le caractère de science et la confirmation de la science, c'est le savoir philosophique. Les vérités de foi sont absolument intangibles à l'homme. Descartes a cru sauver la foi en la séparant de la raison mais il a fini par opposer raison et foi, préparant ainsi le chemin à Kant.

Ainsi Descartes a faussé le concept de science et détruit l'acte de foi; c'est le savoir philosophique. Les vérités de foi sont absolument immatérielles à l'homme. Descartes a cru sauver la foi en la séparant de la raison mais il a fini par opposer raison et foi, préparant ainsi le chemin à Kant.

Ainsi Descartes a faussé le concept de science et détruit l'acte de foi; c'est le savoir philosophique. Les vérités de foi sont absolument immatérielles à l'homme. Descartes a cru sauver la foi en la séparant de la raison mais il a fini par opposer raison et foi, préparant ainsi le chemin à Kant.

IV

Le quatrième chapitre « Les preuves cartésiennes de Dieu » (151-244) a été écrit exprès pour ce volume comme recherche du fil logique qui unit intégralement les trois préuves et des conséquences dans l'histoire de la philosophie post-cartésienne de la pré-supposition de l'existence de Dieu de son idée en nous.

La première preuve « passe immédiatement de l'idée de Dieu à Dieu lui-même » (152), car Descartes, confondant philosophie et art, conçoit l'idée de l'homme comme des idées-taupes, raison pour laquelle Descartes est portrait de l'infînî (154). Descartes regarde les idées comme des images ou des tableaux points dans l'âme et qui constituent, au sein de la pensée, l'objet immédiat de celle-ci » (152). L'idée de l'âme est considérée comme une image des idées et dus aux études modèles à réaliser. Descartes est l'ordre du « faire » dans l'ordre du « connaître » et le fait pour connaissance de la raison, le débat et non plus le terme, la base et non plus le sommet de la philosophie, un orgue utile et non plus le chef, renonçant d'importance capitale pourvoir que le peuple aille la place des pieds » (150-151). Chez Descartes on peut retrouver la première racine de l'utilitarisme et du pragmatisme. L'erreur pour Descartes a été celle de supprimer la distinction entre science et sagesse, entre « uti » et « frui », entre les causes secondaires et les causes premières, entre physi-que et métaphysique. « Pour Descartes, c'est par la science, avant tout par ses mathématiques, que l'homme devrait se concentrer pour s'empêcher de ses artifices et de sa technique les forces de la nature matérielle il gagnera à liberté » (158). Il y a un grand mal dans la philosophie cartésienne: la raison est à même de connaître à elle seule toute la vérité sans le secours de la grâce; l'homme pour se perfectionner par ses forces naturelles, car le péché original n'a pas laissé de blessures dans notre nature. La fin dernière de la vie est la manière du monde.
tique l’argument ontologique car il s’agit d’un passage indu de l’idéal au reel, mais surtout il a critiqué aussi l’argument cosmologique, qui passe du reel au reel, tombant dans un sophisme. 

"Si Kant a pu tomber dans un sophisme, c’est qu’il en est vrai, selon les présumptions de son système à lui, il y a comme une sorte d’argument ontologique caché dans toute assertion existentielle concernant un sujet intangible." (210).

Les vérités éternelles sont éternelles car Dieu est immuable, mais étant pour Descartes des vérités créées, elles sont contingentes et dépendent de la liberté du Créateur. "L’erreur de Spinoza est de confondre avec le pur possible ou le créable, qui n’est rien hors de Dieu, le créé et l’existant qui comme tel est voulu, aimé, choisi. Ainsi il fait injure à la liberté de Dieu. L’erreur de Descartes est toute contraire, il confond avec le créable le créable et le possible, tout tombe alors sous la pure volonté et libérité d’un suprême Arbitraire; Descartes fait injure à la sagesse de l’intelligence de Dieu." (222). Descartes croit que les vérités éternelles sont comme des modèles qui existent comme objets dans l’âme de Dieu.

La théologie cartésienne est "incroyablement anthropomorphique" (228) car elle part d’une perfection créée, l’espèce à l’infini et prétend connaître Dieu. "Il est impossible d’affirmer plus violemment l’univocité de l’être" (234). Mais cette réduction à la mesure de l’homme de l’incompréhensibilité divine lui fait horreur, et l’agnosticisme finit par marquer la théodicée cartésienne.

V

Le dernier chapitre "L’héritage cartésien" (245/28) est tiré d’une table ronde qui a eu lieu le 27 janvier 1931 au Studio francophone sur le thème "Descartes et l’esprit cartésien", et qui a été publié avec d’autres interventions et les réponses (Descartes: textes suivis de débats au studio francophone, Paris, Cahiers de la Quinzaine, 1931, p. 93-185, 95-104).

Maritain commence le chapitre par quelques considérations sur la situation de l’héritage de la philosophie au temps de Descartes. "...l’histoire des sciences était bâtarde par l’épuisable somme d’une scholastique qu’avaient gâtée le contentement de sol, la rue..."

226 lettres, dont certaines sont passionnantes à lire, qui s’étendent sur une période de 26 ans, entre un “élève” et un “maitre”, qui peu à peu deviennent des amis intimes. Les lettres du début sont d’un ton léger et complice et quid du côté de Green, reflet d’une psychologie scrupuleuse et méticuleuse, et ont un caractère de politesse formelle des deux auteurs, celui de Martinat et de Green. Mais au fur et à mesure qu’on avance dans la lecture, tout cela s’élargit, prend du souffle, et on reste subjugué, séduit par la profondeur et la délicatesse des sentiments, l’estime réciproque, et disons-le, par certaines lettres qu’il faut absolument lire, parce que les sujets qu’elles traitent sont passionnants. Ce sont la lettre 72, sur la métapsychose et le fonds commun des souvenirs immémoriaux de l’homme (Green); la lettre 101, sur la création littéraire et la saineté (Martinat); la lettre 100 qui traite du salut de l’humanité ‘maîtrisé’ elle (Green); la lettre 107, sur la souffrance de Dieu (Green); la lettre 110, immédiatement après la mort de Raissa (Martinat); les lettres 114 et 115, sur la trahison et l’abandon (Martinat); la lettre 116, sur l’église (Mar- tain); la lettre 117 sur “Terre Lointaine”, le troisième volume de l’autobio- graphie de Green (Martinat); et la lettre 148, sur la souffrance de Dieu (Green).

Il est plus que probable qu’après avoir jeté un coup d’œil sur ces quelques lettres, le lecteur voudra lire tout avec la plus grande attention.

1) Il ne peut être question dans cette courte recension de signaler tout ce qui est intéressant dans cette correspondance. Il n’est pas question de précéder un portrait de Jacques Martinat vivant, par Julien Green lui-même, et par une introduction de Jean-Pierre Siou, qui retrace à grands traits la vie des deux auteurs des lettres et montre le parallélisme de leurs choix essentiels.

Mais il me semble important de signaler quelques points, et en premier lieu qu’en deux passages nous avons retrouvé la passion de Jacques Martinat, qui le passionne de justice, quand il parle de l’assassinat de John Kennedy: “L’assassinat du président m’a plongé dans l’horreur...” Mais ce silence n’est pas la seconde surification du crime, comment supporter cela? Je suis très au courant par Tom Merton et John Griffin des meurtres de haine sordide et de violence que la France craine de la intégration “fait montrer les blancs. Nul doute pour moi que ce crime (qu’ils ont cherché pour sauver leur peau et leur complicité avec le parti communiste) a été commis par des fanatiques résolus à se venger sur Kennedy de la marche sur Washington et à punir en élus tous les voyous... La chose terrible est que les américains ne croient pas au diable; ils ne croient pas non plus que de ‘braves gens’, bons péres de famille chercheront-ils en somme de nos jours, s’ils le peuvent, ‘devenir des possédés, des morts, tellement obsédés par la haine que le crime surgira un jour inévi- tablement des Noirs pourraient-ils dire, que nous avons vu que le président est mort pour eux et pour leurs droits!” (lettre 147, pp. 145-146). C’est dans le même sens que Julien Green a cherché à marquer Green, qui lui a parlé du voyage de Paul VI en Palestine: “...comme vous y a été très ému et bouleversé par le pèlerinage de Paul VI en Palestine. Vous savez que j’ai beaucoup connu Mgr Montini à Rome et qu’il y a une vraie amitié entre nous. Mais il reflé- chissait avec beaucoup de grandeur, cher- chant toujours la plus parfaite exactitude, alors que Jean XXII suivait les impulsions d’un instinct de pays- age italien plein d’intuitions à la fois poétiques, cyniques et salantes. J’avoue avoir bien réfléchi que Paul VI n’a pas déposé lui-même les six chierges déposées par l’Italie Tisserand en membrane des six millions de Juifs mas- sacrés...” (lettre 155, p. 154).

Au sujet de l’enfer, Green fait la remarque suivante: “Je suis beaucoup préoccupé, dit Raissa au sujet de l’enfer. A vrai dire l’éviter un peu de jeter les yeux de ce côté-là. Je re- tiens cependant que l’église, si elle fait de l’enfer un article de foi, nous ne a jamais demandé de croire au grand nombre des réprobés, qu’elle soit l’opinion des uns sur ce point, et Dieu sait s’ils sont pressimis- ques quand ils s’y mettent. C’est peut-être parce que j’ai plus qu’un autre besoin de croire que je crois de plus en plus et à l’immense pitié de Dieu.” (lettre 93, p. 103). Mais malgré cela Green restait obsédé par le mal et la peur des damnés, et Martinat dit à ce sujet: “Chez Julien, com- ment vous pouvez écrire (p. 27 du sixième volume du “Journal”): ‘En- gerre de toute façon, que l’ennemi illuminé ne se souci- rage, puisque tout me cre que j’y suis pas. Est-ce que nous pou- vons jamais savoir quelque chose de cela? Et que je ne peux pas avoir l’air d’accepter cela, même un instant?” (lettre 96, p. 105).

Quelques notations sur la vieillesse (Martinat): “Vous avez sur la vieil- lesse des remarques que je ne crois pas exactes. Et d’abord il n’y a pas de vieillesse. Il y a une limitation des forces physiques et de la liberté de mouvement. Mais je ne dirais pas que je n’ai pas de déchéance de devenir plus forte et plus détachée. Ce n’est pas la vieillesse qui est crueille, c’est la maladie, et le fait de devenir plus faible.” (lettre 102, pp. 111-112), et Green, en réponse: “Chez Jacques, vous avez raison. La vieillesse n’existe pas, ou plutôt il n’y a de vieillesse que là où il n’y a pas d’amour.” (lettre 102, p. 113).

On ne finirait pas de citer les juge- ments de chacun des deux auteurs sur l’autre. C’est Martinat qui parle de Green sur Martinat, dans la lettre 102, p. 113: “...chez vous le chemin de l’intelligence passe toujours par le cœur”, et de rage au livre 201 par Green, et qui vient de Léon Boy: “(Martinat) je le savais supérieur, mon fils bien-aimé, et de combien de manière! Mais je ne m’attendais pas à voir sortir un bras si fort de la guenille philosophique. Un bras d’athlète, et une haute voix de lamenator. J’ai senti en même temps, comme une vague de poé- sie douloureuse, une pulsante vague de fond tenue de très lôt...” (La note 1 de la lettre 206, p. 194 est trop longue pour être citée, mais il faut la lire, elle est très belle, et très concrète). Signa- lons aussi ce que dit Martinat sur Green dans le long texte d’un article qu’il écrit pour un “Cahier” consa- cré à Green, et est reproduit à la suite de la lettre 107, pp. 195 à 197.

Mais cela est du détail dans cet en- semble admirable, détail qui ne doit et ne peut cacher ni la beauté des lettres ni les sentiments exprimés, ni surtout cette étonnante chaleur d’amitié qui sourd à chaque ligne, une fois les gê- nes d’une certaine ironie et de hasard dépassées. Quelle belle correspondance!

(Jean-François Noithomb)

Lino Prenna, Dall’essere all’uomo: (Anti- tropologia dell’educazione nel pensiero rossimianino) Stresa Roma, Centro interna- nazionale di studi rossimianini - Città Nuova editrice, 1979, pp. 240.

Fin dal 1815 Antonio Rosmini Serba- (Rovereto, 1797 - Stresa, 1855) scrive- va che l’educazione è “quell’argomento che lo veggio tanto utile, anzi necessa- rio, quell’argomento che tanto mi place per mille versi, e che non mi trovo tanto comuni- tato compostamente da italiano veru- no”. Questa affermazione del giovane Rosmini ha trovato poi una sua conferma nell’opera del Rovereto, non solo per gli scritti specificamente dedicati alla problematica educativa, ma per il signifi- cato globale della sua filosofia: la spe- cializzazione tecnica di Rosmini era in- fatti per struttura e scopi una dimen- sione squisitamente pedagogica.

Finalizzato a “rilevare, nell’impianto antropologico sotto a tutti il pensier- ro di Rosmini, una tipicità pedagogica, che fa della sua filosofia per l’uomo una filosofia dell’educazione” è il volu- me di Lino Prenna Dall’essere all’uomo (volume nato dalle lezioni tenute al XII Corso della “Cattedra Rosmini” di Stresa). Il Prenna insiste ripetuta- mente su questo concetto, sottolineando che la filosofia, “intesa come pedagogia dello spirito umano, trova nell’in- tento educativo la sua vera finali- tà” (p. 10). L’autore si assicura di essere ovvio, come fa l’Autore — che tale conce- zione rossimiana non va confusa con quella idealistica: mentre questa identi- fica il maturo (e non il giovanile) — signi- fica che “il seguente si distingue dallo spirito, che pedagogicamente sa- la sua pura espressione di sé”, la filo- sopgia pedagogica del Rovereto è una
La seconda parte dell’antologia maritainiana dilata il tema politico del pluralismo ai valori più alti d’ordine religioso ed educativo. Viene sottolineato, in una terza sezione, il tema delle modalità concrete e delle strutture giuridico-costituzionali entro le quali il pluralismo trova un’adeguata e concreta realizzazione ed efficacia, nell’ultima parte, l’argomento riprende il taglio “meta-politico” con la tematizzazione della cooperazione in rapporto alle verità ed al pluralismo nella sfera scolastica ed educativa.

Il lavoro costituisce un utile contributo ad un corso di reflexione sul pluralismo maritainiano attraverso l’approfondimento di un tema-chiave, quel è il pluralismo, considerato criticamente e visto in una prospettiva multipolare che va dalla sfera giuridica e politico-sociale a quella etico-pedagogica e religiosa. Utile ed esauriente la bibliografia finale.

(Generale)


L’opera antologica sul pluralismo nel pensiero maritainiano, curata da Giancarlo Galeazzi per le Edizioni Cinque Lune, affronta un tema stimolante ed attuale che ha interessato ambienti politici e movimenti culturali negli ultimi anni.

Nella prefazione sono ricordati interessanti scomititi su questo argomento da parte di esponenti di diverse estrazioni culturali, da quella laica e socialista a quella cattolico-democratica. Va menzionato in particolare il seminario di studio tenuto a Montecitorio di Ancona nel febbraio 1978 promosso dalla Sezione Italiana dell’Institut Internazionale del lavoro, alla cooperazione e all’umanità civile.

Il taglio della raccolta maritainiana è caratterizzato dall’organicità e dal’ampioezza tematica dei testi, scelti secondo un criterio che rispecchiava tutta la pretesa dell’autore nella sua evoluzione dall’umanesimo integrale a Il rinnovamento.

Nell’economia del pensiero politico e filosofico di Maritain il pluralismo rappresenta un moto fondamentale e significa che senza questo concetto di pluralismo al contesto democratico ed è per questo che ha portato cogliere il valore senza militarlo, è per questo che deve cambiare l’ortodossia del pluralismo e nasce la necessità della cooperazione, dell’unicizia e della fraternalizzazione… La struttura pluralistica, insomma, non può scinderla dalla dimensione personalistica, comunitaria e teistica (p. 9).

Su questo tema si sono appuntate le conclusioni di uno scritto di uno studioso di «sovranità» del pluralismo cattolico e di quello maritainiano in particolare. Al di là delle polemiche contingentì di estrema positività e che si distolgono sul pluralismo per evitare posizioni esclusivistiche che tradirebbero nella sostanza un principio di apertura che sceglie una rigorosità semplice e di punti di vista sul terreno culturale e politico.

Parlare poi di «medievalismo» dei pensieri non significa costruire la nascita dell’umanesimo integrale e della proposta di una «Nuova Cristianità» che vogliono prospettare una nuova saggezza storica del cristianesimo rispettosa dell’autonomia delle realtà temporali e allena da suggerimenti sacri e teocratici.

Se vogliamo addentrarcì nella struttura dell’opera ci è possibile verificare l’organicità della scelta dei brani maritainiani secondo un’articolazione che immanitututto affronta il tema della società e dell’umanesimo con particolare riferimento ai diversi tipi di civiltà cristiana, dell’autonomia del terzopera e alla libertà in un contesto politico e culturale non ideologizzato.

In una prima parte viene analizzato il pluralismo su diversi piani, politico giuridico economico, ed in relazione alla cooperazione e all’umanità civile.

Jacques Maritain, Questions d’ecologie, tr. it. di Luigi Frasnelli, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 1980, pp. 222. Le questioni di coscienza — di cui Maritain parla nell’omonimo libro edito in Francia nel 1938 e ora tradotto in italiano presso Vita e Pensiero — sono relative al ruolo della Chiesa cattolica nella civiltà, al mistero d’Israele, al nessuno tra azione e contemplazione, al rapporto tra azione cattolica e azione politica, ed infine al problema della libertà del cristiano. Accanto a questi soggetti si collocano, poi, i selvíri che Maritain teme in varie occasioni tra il 26 e il 33, su temi tipici della sua speculazione di filosofà del suo impegno di intellettuali. Tali contributi, pur nella loro diversità tecnica, sono ricadute d’uno solo problem: quello del la relazione tra spirituale e temporale; problema che Maritain imposta secolo dopo secolo ed elaborando fra il 30 (Religion et culture) e il 36 (Humanisme integral); ai bisogni aggiungere che questi saggi e discorsi pongono l’accento su alcuni problemi che troveranno specifica trattazione in una successiva opera maritainiana (Christiamtisme et democra.tie del 1943 a l’homme et l’égal del 1951) quanti in documenti del Mil- istero ecclesiastico e nella riflessione di intellettuali cattolici. Si può, pertanto, dire che questo volume è importante sia per le “guerre” di realizzazione ed efficacia, nell’ultima parte, l’argomento riprende il taglio “meta-politico” con la tematizzazione della cooperazione e nasce la necessità della cooperazione, dell’unicizia e della fraternalizzazione. La struttura pluralistica, insomma, non può scinderla dalla dimensione personalistica, comunitaria e teistica (p. 9).

Su questo tema si sono appuntate le conclusioni di uno scritto di uno studioso di «sovranità» del pluralismo cattolico e di quello maritainiano in particolare. Al di là delle polemiche contingentì di estrema positività e che si distolgono sul pluralismo per evitare posizioni esclusivistiche che tradirebbero nella sostanza un principio di apertura che sceglie una rigorosità semplice e di punti di vista sul terreno culturale e politico.

Parlare poi di «medievalismo» dei pensieri non significa costruire la nascita dell’umanesimo integrale e della proposta di una «Nuova Cristianità» che vogliono prospettare una nuova saggezza storica del cristianesimo rispettosa dell’autonomia delle realtà temporali e allena da suggerimenti sacri e teocratici.

Se vogliamo addentrarcì nella struttura dell’opera ci è possibile verificare l’organicità della scelta dei brani maritainiani secondo un’articolazione che immanitututto affronta il tema della società e dell’umanesimo con particolare riferimento ai diversi tipi di civiltà cristiana, dell’autonomia del terzopera e alla libertà in un contesto politico e culturale non ideologizzato.

In una prima parte viene analizzato il pluralismo su diversi piani, politico giuridico economico, ed in relazione alla cooperazione e all’umanità civile.

(Generale)
camente né aristocraticamente — ma come amore, all'insegna della universalità (tutti sono chiamati alla contemplazione e della differenziazione (infine, sono i medi di incarnare la contemplazione) — rappresenta il nuovo stile di santità, per cui il primato dello spirituale si sposa con l'impegno di trasformazione del mondo, realizzando così un cristianesimo che non si riduce né ad escatologia né a ideologia, ma che — senza tradire la sua specificità — ritralizza l'attualità, cogliendone nella sua dimensione di finalità e di subalternità. Se la contemplazione costituisce la radice della nuova cri
ti
ci
ta
e
to
e
l pluralismo ne rappresenta la condizione: «lo stato di fatto necessario al progresso della coscienza». Si tratta di un pluralismo che non è fine a se stesso, ma che è finalizzato alla comprensione e alla collaborazione reciproca. In breve, si potrebbe sostenere che l'opera di Maritain è tutta incentrata su un ideale pratico: «l'ideale dell'amore fratremo, dell'amore e

vangelico come opera eretica da completare, grazie alla quale si realizzerà no nella storia, a poco a poco, condizioni temporali che si addicono nu
glio alla dignità e alla vocazione del la persona umana».

Prima di concludere, vogliamo ricordare che l'edizione italiana di Questio
ni di coscienza è correlata da un sag
ggio introduttivo di V. Possenti, mentre è di P. Viotto la nota bibliografica, in merito alla quale è da segnalare che il testo della prima questione non è stato steso appositamente per questo volume (come afferma Viotto) ma si tratta del corso «le catholicisme, agent de coopération» tenuto da Maritain alla XXVII sessione delle Settimane socio
ciali di Francia (Versailles, 1936), come si può vedere nel volume: Les con
flits de civilisation, compte rendu in estensione dei corsi e conferenze (Chron

(G.G.)

NOUVELLES DE L'INSTITUT

Du 31 mars au 9 avril 1980 le Secr&egrave;
itaire de l'Institut, M. Roberto Papini et le Secr&egrave;
taire G&eacute;n&egrave;ral adjoint pour la programmation culturelle, M. Ant&oslash;no Pavan, ont effectué un voyage aux Etats-Unis pour participer à une rencontre de travail à Fort Worth (Texas), organisée par Marie Carol McKay, rencontrant ayant comme but la mise au point du programme d'un pro
chain colloque de l'Institut Internatio
nal Jacques Maritain et de la Kinwood Foundation de Fort Worth sur: «Identité et intégration des cultures». Il est prévu que le colloque sera réalisé au mois d'octobre 1981.

* * *

Après une première rencontre prépa
ratoire, qui s'est passée à Rome les 10 et 11 décembre 1979, en vue de l'or ga
nisation d'un séminaire sur le problèmeme de la gouvernabilité de la démocratie dans le monde occidental, a eu lieu à Rome les 29-30 avril 1980 une deuxième réunion pour évaluer l'état de pré
paration de cette importante initiative de l'Institut International Jacques Maritain en collaboration avec le Jacques Maritain Center de l'Université de Notre Dame (Indiana, Etats-Unis). Y ont par
ticipé MM.: Achille Ardigò, Costantino Cipolla, Francesco D'Onofrio, Sadio Ga
ravini, Ralph McInerney, Antonio Pavan. Le colloque américain, qui se tiendra à l'Université de Notre Dame les 12-15 octobre 1980, sera divisé en deux gran
des parties: la première comprendra quatre rapports théoriques; la deuxième sera composée de trois rapports, réalisés par trois équipes qui actuelle
ment sont en train d'analyser la situa
tion du développement démocratique en Europe occidentale, aux États-Unis et en Amérique Latine. Le séminaire de Notre Dame abordera l'aspect po
litique institutionnel du problème de la

* * *

Du 1er au 3 octobre aura lieu à Lou
vain-Belgique) un séminaire interna
tional sur: «Mouvement catholique et expériences des catholiques: problèmes d'histoire, de théorie et de langage» organisé par l'Institut Interna
tional Jacques Maritain et un groupe de professeurs de l'Université Catholi
cque tant de la section flamande que de la section française. Ont assuré leur participations à la rencontre les rappor
teurs suivants: M. Achille Ardigò (Bo
ligne), M. Roger Aubert (Louvain), M. J. A. Bornemasser (Tilburg), M. Eugene De Jonghe (Louvain), M. Yves-Marie Hilaire (Lille), M. Philippe Lavelain (Ro
to), M. Emile Foulon (Paris), M. Louis Pronel (Louvain), M. René Rémond (Paris), M. Rudolf Reschhazy (Louvain).
AUTRES NOUVELLES

Du 25 au 27 juin prochain aura lieu à l'Université de Merida (Vénézuela) un séminaire sur « Pensee chrétienne », organisé, entre autres, par le Professeur Lino Rodriguez-Arias Bustamante, membre collaborateur de l'Institut International J. Maritain; parmi les relais participera à la rencontre le Professeur Enrique Perez Olivares, président de la Section vénézuélienne, qui fera un rapport sur « La pensée politique de Jacques Maritain ».

* * *

A Cracovie, Pologne, les 30 et 31 mai 1980 s'est déroulée une rencontre à la résidence du Cardinal Franciszek Mac- charski qui réunissait des intellectuels, des écrivains et des artistes polonais et polonais et avait comme but de provoquer un échange de vue et d'expériences liées à la pastorale de la culture. Cette initiative qui est déroulée sur la lancée des initiatives du même genre lancée par le Cardinal Wojtyla, a centré ses réflexions et ses travaux sur une analyse de la crise de la culture européenne et s'est intéressé à des expériences comme la Semaine de la culture chrétienne et le Sacroscon (Pologne) et le Théâtre de l'Arca (Italie). Le personnel de Maritain et de Moutet, en plus d'une conférence, a eu lieu un débat sur la pensée politique de Jacques Maritain.

* * *

Vie des sections nationales

Italie

Le 1er mai 1980 s'est réuni à l'Abbaye Bénédictine de Praglia (Padoue) l'Assemblée des membres du Centre Studi Vescovi J. Maritain, sous la présidence de M. Valdarno Tombolato. Les décisions suivantes ont été prises. La réalisation est prévue dans le courant de 1980, à savoir: un colloque international sur la conscience intime des catholiques entre 1930 et 1980; une série de 5 séminaires sur divers aspects de la philosophie de Jacques Maritain; un séminaire sur l'histoire du mouvement catholique de la Vénétie; le lancement d'un centre de documentation sur la culture du mouvement catholique en Vénétie.

Membres ordinaires

M. Marcello BEDIAZZI (Italie) - M. Philipp BENETON (France) - M. Angelo BERNANI (Italie) - M. Etienne BORGES (France) - M. l'Abbé Ambróz CANDELARIES (Italie) - M. Jaime CASTILLO VELASCO (Chili) - M. Italo CAVERO LABALADE (Equateur) - M. Maurice COHEN (France) - M. José CALVANI (Vénézuela) - M. Cesare CRESPI (Italie) - M. Alfredo DE POI (Italie) - M. Ivan DELIOLI (Italie) - M. José Luis GUTIERREZ (Espagne) - M. Karel J. HAHN (Pays Bas) - R.P. Alfredo IMPERATORI (Italie) - M. Angelo SALZONI (Italie) - M. Alfredo TRIFOGLI (Italie) - M. August VANSTENDELA (Belgique).

Membres collaborateurs

M. Aldo AGAZZI (Italie) - M. Jean Louis ALLARD (Canada) - M. Achille ARIDOGU (Italie) - M. Roberto ARIAS (États-Unis) - M. Marcello A. BARBERÀ (Argentine) - M. Carlo BO (Italie) - Mme Denise BIJHAT (France) - M. Giorgio BOSCARA (Italie) - M. Giorgio CAMPAGNOLO (Italie) - M. Jean CHEVALLIER (France) - M. Jean DAIJUT (France) - M. Italo DE CURTIS (Italie) - M. Patrick DE LAUBIF (Suisse) - M. René DE LEONT (Guadeloupe) - M. Jean FOURRIER (France) - Mme Isabeau GALLAGHER (États-Unis) - M. Louis GARDIN (France) - M. Jordi GENOFF (Célé) - M. Giuliano GIORIO (Italie) - M. Ludovico GIUSTI (Italie) - M. John Howard GRIFFIN (États-Unis) - M. Koichi HARA (Pays Bas) - M. José LUIS ILLANES MAESTRE (Espagne) - M. Marco IVALDO (Italie) - M. Kevin KELLY (Australie) - M. Pierre LETAMENDIA (France) - M. Guy MALEN- GEEAU (Belgique) - M. Gilbert MANUEL (France) - M. Gianfranco MARTINI (Italie) - Mme Corine MOLLER (États-Unis) - M. Miles MULHEIM (Italie) - M. Jean Hervé NICOLAS (Suisse) - M. Marisa José NICOLAS (Italie) - Mme Christine NOSELLE (Italie) - M. Jean-Michel OYES (Espagne) - M. Georges REMIEZ (Belgique) - M. Rudolf REUSCH (Belgique) - M. Lino RODRIGUEZ ARIAS BUSTAMANTE (Vénézuela) - M. Coelho SCARCELLE (Italie) - M. Rudolf SCHLOZ (Allemagne) - M. Angelo SERRAZZA (Italie) - M. l'Abbé Kare SKALICKY (Italie) - M. Manfred SPEIKEK (Allemagne) - M. Eduardo TAY- MASEGAS (Vénézuela) - Chaminade VAN DE KERKER (Pays Bas) - R.P. Pierre NGUYEN VAN TAI (Vietnam) - R.P. Ringar WUVAMANS (C.) (Colombie) - M. Francesco VIOLA (Italie).

Sections nationales de l'Institut

Section nationale argentine

c/o FARPS - Mejía 1980 - Buenos Aires, Argentine

Président: R.P. Fernando STORNI s.j.

American Maritain Association

7714 West Wisconsin Avenue

Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53213, États-Unis

Président: M. Donald A. GALLAGHER

Association canadienne « Jacques Maritain »

Université d'Ottawa

90, rue Willbrod

Ottawa, Canada

Président: M. Jean Louis ALFAR

Section nationale espagnole

Isaac Perel

Madrid, Espagne

Président: M. Rafael AICALA-SANTAELLA

Section nationale italienne

Via del Coronaro, 181

00185 Rome, Italie

Président: M. Antonio PAVAN

Instituto Jacques Maritain de Venezuela

Apartado Los Ríos 70492

Caracas 107, Vénézuela

Président: M. Enrique PEREZ OLIVARES
SOMMAIRE

1 Études et témoignages
   1 Morton and Maritain (Ralph McInerney)
   6 The contemplative vision of Thomas Merton (Patrick Hart)
   18 La philosophie chrétienne selon J. Maritain (Yves Fouchet)
   21 Maritain and the notion of scientific progress (I) (William A. Wallace)
   27 Some reflections on Maritain and freedom of expression (II) (Desmond J. FitzGerald)
   35 Letter from the General Secretary of the I.I.J.M. to the American Maritain Association, St. Louis Conference

37 Bibliographie
   37 Fiche bibliographique
      Le songe de Descartes, suivi de quelques essais (Piero Vloto)
   42 Comptes-rendus
      Une grande amitié, Julien Green-Jacques Maritain, Correspondance 1926-1972 (J.F. Norbert) - L. Provesa, Dall'essere all'uomo (Antropologia dell'essere umano) (G.G.) - J. Maritain, Pluralismo e collaborazione nello stato democratico (G. Del'Arte) - J. Maritain, Questioni di coscienza (G.G.)

47 Informations
   47 Nouvelles de l'Institut
   48 Autres nouvelles