The Chicago School and the Problem of World Government

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Etudes et Documents

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INSTITUT INTERNATIONAL JACQUES MARITAIN
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Sommaire

Editorial (Gianfranco Martini) 5

Editor's Preface (D.W.H.) 14
Mortimer J. Adler and World Government (Deal W. Hudson) 16
Robert M. Hutchins and the Rule of Reason (Jeffrey D. Wallin) 24
New World Order? The Case of C.A. Borgese (Robert Royal) 34
Leo Strauss on Plato and Power Politics (Don T. Asselin) 43
Yves R. Simon, The Merit and Limit of Federalism (Michael D. Torre) 53
World Government and the Maastricht Treaty: Maritain's View (Pierre L'Abbe) 64

Public Opinion and Attentive Citizens in Western Democracies: A Discussion (Sergio Fabbrini) 74

Comptes rendus 90
M. Luisa Paronetto Valier, Sergio Paronetto. Libertà d'initiatica e giustizia sociale (Ramon Suguionys de Franch) 90

NOTES ET DEBATS 106
Humanisme intégral... encore. Un livre pour demain (Ramon Suguionys de Franch)

INFORMATIONS 110
Chroniques
The American Maritain Association's Annual Meeting (Gregory J. Kerr)

113 Information, Culture et Participation. Deuxième Symposium de Budapest (Gianfranco Martini)

News of the Institute Nouvelles de l'Institut

Contents

93 J. et R. Maritain, Oeuvres Complètes, Volume XII (J.F.N.)
94 C.J. Pinto de Oliveira, Ethique chrétienne et dignité de l'homme (Joseph Joblin)
95 Michel Ciry, La vie est une ombre (Piero Vietto)
97 G. Campanini-P. Nepi, Cristianità e modernità (Giancarlo Gallozza)
98 Peter Nickl, Jacques Maritain. Eine Einführung in Leben und Werk (Jean-François Nothomb)

100 Revue des livres
103 Fiche bibliographique
Le mystère d'Israël (Vittorio Possenti)

NOTES ET DOCUMENTS / septembre - décembre 1992
Dans le dernier chapitre de son livre L’Homme et l’État, publié pour la première fois à Chicago en 1951, Jacques Maritain évoque le livre de Mortimer Adler paru en 1944 et intitulé How to Think about War and Peace, dans lequel Mortimer Adler affirmait, avec d’excellents arguments à l’appui, que la seule façon d’assurer la paix résidait dans l’unification politique du monde et dans la création d’une autorité mondiale (World Government). À quoi Maritain ajoutait que le problème de l’autorité mondiale était essentiellement celui d’une organisation véritablement politique du monde (en italique dans le texte). Dans le livre cité, Mortimer Adler émettait l’hypothèse qu’une interdépendance croissante sur le plan mondial aurait eu deux conséquences alternatives: soit 1) un rapprochement politique et économique, soit 2) des luttes et des distractions plus que jamais néfastes et dues précisément à la grande proximité des hommes entre eux. Adler disait encore que ces deux éventualités se seraient vérifiées au cours de la prochaine grande époque historique, mais que des deux, la seconde se serait manifestée en premier lieu.

Près d’un demi siècle s’est écoulé depuis la publication du livre de Mortimer Adler, tandis que celui de Jacques Maritain a paru voici un peu plus de quarante ans; qu’en est-il aujourd’hui de cette généreuse réflexion de philosophie politique?

Au cours des dernières décennies, le monde a vécu des transformations tout à fait imprévisibles, sur le plan économique, social, politique et culturel; il peut sembler banal de le rappeler, mais peut-être que seule une réflexion sur notre histoire plus récente, tourmentée, complexe et pleine de contradictions, peut nous permettre de tenter de trouver une réponse à la question qui précède.

Malgré le spectaculaire quotidien de conflits sanglants, d’incessantes querelles internationales, et d’une succession ininterrompue d’espoirs et de déceptions, le sentiment de la nécessité d’un «gouvernement mondial» a timidement progressé; l’opinion publique se laisse aujourd’hui peu à peu gagner par ce qui - à l’époque des écrits de Mortimer Adler en 1944, ou en 1947-48, lorsqu’il se posait de la question de Maritain de l’œuvre précitée, en 1951 - semblait n’être qu’une fine intuition, une exigence de la raison, un souhait utopique et le fruit de la réflexion collective d’un groupe d’intellectuels.

Le choix du thème du dossier monographique de ce numéro de Notes et
Documents est dicté précisément par la volonté de l'Institut International "Jacques Maritain" d'attirer l'attention sur l'un des problèmes décisifs de notre temps, sur lequel le siècle qui s'achève et celui qui s'annonce seront appelés à se prononcer, non seulement en termes de philosophie politique, mais également par des activités concrètes, en prise directe et en dialogue constant avec les événements. On pourrait en effet appliquer ici aussi la très célèbre phrase d'Emmanuel Mounier : « L'événement est notre maître. »

Le choix de ce thème ne représente donc pas uniquement une commémoration et un geste de reconnaissance légitimes envers ceux qui, parce qu'ils ont souffert les tragédies de la seconde guerre mondiale, ont éprouvé le sentiment d'une responsabilité personnelle qui les a poussés à contribuer à la création des conditions permettant d'éviter qu'un tel holocauste ne se reproduise. Il exprime aussi une invitation à vérifier, par rapport à la réalité actuelle, la valeur de l'initiative d'alors, l'ampleur des changements qui en ont modifié le contexte et les perspectives que peut encore engendrer aujourd'hui cette réflexion des années 40.

Les contributions apportées à ce dossier par des collègues américains qui ont tant vécu cette expérience, tantôt connu personnellement ses auteurs ou étudié leur pensée avec un intérêt bienveillant, accroissent ultérieurement le sens de ce travail : il est la preuve d'un dialogue toujours vivant d'un continent à l'autre, entre intellectuels engagés dans la construction de la « cité terrestre » et fidèles à la quête du « bien commun » de l'humanité (souvent laissé pour compte dans la pensée et la pratique politique actuelles). À ce dialogue, la double racine commune, du humanisme d'une part et de l'enseignement de Jacques Maritain d'autre part, confère une connotation bien précise : la fidélité non seulement émotive, mais aussi rationnelle et fondée, à la recherche d'une continuité et d'une nouveauté toujours liées.

Pour appréhender sa juste valeur le sentiment de la nécessité d'un « gouvernement mondial » et la signification de ce terme, il faut nécessairement remonter au concept d'humanité. Ce n'est certes pas un concept juridique, même s'il est de plus en plus repris dans les textes de loi, renouant ainsi avec une approche classique du droit international. À ce propos, la lecture des Réfections et des autres ouvrages de Francesco de Vittoria demeure édifiante, même à distance de 450 ans ! L'évolution du droit international au XXème siècle fait émerger, à grande peine, l'individu dans les rapports internatio-
l'humanité n'a pas commencé, mais le temps des États est révolu».

Il serait opportun et très intéressant de pouvoir effectuer une analyse historique des différentes propositions, des divers mouvements et des personnalités les plus marquantes qui ont anticipé, en Europe et aux États-Unis, cette aspiration à la création d'un gouvernement mondial. De même qu'il serait intéressant d'évaluer la justesse de cette aspiration ainsi que la portée utopique, généreuse mais lucide, qu'elle comporte. C'est un pas réalisable dans le cadre d'un article éditorial, même si l'on peut au moins citer quelques éléments de référence ayant trait à la seconde guerre mondiale et aux périodes successives. Il s'agit de faits en soi assez disparates. Mais toute étude touchant aux problèmes du gouvernement mondial devra les interpréter à la fois sérieuse et approfondie, pour en dégager les motivations premières et l'enseignement de l'histoire, et curieux, au-delà du sens politique, le sens éthique d'une aspiration qui répond parfaitement aux besoins les plus dramatiques de l'humanité tout en professant un idéalisme considéré comme utopique.


La seconde piste à suivre pour une réflexion profonde ne peut ignorer les prises de position officielles et compétentes des Papes et en particulier de Jean XXIII, de Paul VI et de Jean-Paul II, qui dans différentes encycliques et dans d’autres déclarations font clairement dépendre d’une autorité mondiale la condition d’une paix durable dans le monde, la suprématie du droit et la sauvegarde des droits de l’homme.

Nous avons choisi ces deux références parce qu’elles démontrent respectivement d’une part, que le problème dont nous nous occupons a des racines plus solides, plus étendues et plus anciennes qu’on ne le pense généralement, et d’autre part, que la plus haute autorité morale existante a fait preuve d’un soutien cohérent et continu à un projet aussi généreux et indispensable.

Malgré a clairement cerné les données du problème. Nous vivons, écrivait-il dans L’Homme et l’État, une situation d’indéniable interdépendance entre États, mais elle est basée essentiellement sur l’économie et, sans un développement correspondant des structures morales et politiques de l’existence humaine, ne peut qu’exaspérer les besoins conflictuels et l’orgueil national. Même s’il est plus vrai que le plan économique, le monde sera toujours plus divisé par les revendications idéologiques des nationalismes antagonistes. La paix est menacée tant qu’elle se situe dans une phase d’évolution politique irrationnelle dans laquelle aucune organisation politique mondiale ne correspond à l’unification matérielle du monde.

La génération issue de la seconde guerre mondiale s’est trouvée confrontée à un des plus vieux problèmes politiques : savoir comment doter d’un gouvernement une société qui en est dépourvue, même si chaque fraction de la communauté y réclame depuis un gouvernement propre. Un fait nouveau se précise toutefois par rapport au passé (qui offre l’exemple de la réunion des cités-États en empires ou en États nationaux souverains), à savoir que la communauté actuelle est vaste comme le monde et est une par un même destin.

Relisons à la lumière de ces considérations l’art. 2.7 de la Charte fondamentale des Nations Unies dont on fête dans trois ans le cinquantième anniversaire. Il reconnaît qu’aucune disposition n’autorise les Nations Unies à intervenir dans les questions qui relèvent essentiellement de la compétence nationale d’un État. Nous sommes loin d’un projet de gouvernement mondial qui se devrait d’inclure le droit devoir d’ingérence et d’intervention, au moins dans des cas de besoins humanitaires (aujourd’hui recon-
nus). Ce serait le droit d'intervenir pour imposer à un État le respect des droits de l'homme, considérés comme indivisibles ou en tant que membre d'un groupe social, en limitant ainsi sa souveraineté. Il faut cependant prendre garde aux motivations ou pour le moins à l'esprit qui sous-tend le droit d'ingérence: les interventions des États-Unis au Liban, à Crimée et à Panama; la doctrine de la souveraineté limitée appliquée par l'URSS en Hongrie et en Tchécoslovaquie; l'intervention soviétique en Afghanistan ou vietnamienne au Cambodge ne sont certainement pas assimilables à un droit d'ingérence lié au respect des droits de l'homme et qui viserait à subordonner la structure et la souveraineté de l'État à l'homme. Ce droit d'intervention suppose qu'on reconnaisse qu'à la base des relations internationales, les «peuples» avec leurs droits ont pris la place des États.

La structure de médiation qui rejoint la volonté du citoyen à l'histoire du monde et qui était assurée par l'organisation de l'État, est en train de se disoudre. Pour le citoyen, le bien commun lui-même s'arrêterait au bien-être inscrit dans les enceintes de la ville ou dans les frontières de l'État. L'humanité dans son ensemble se présentait comme un horizon idéal inatteignable sinon par les voies du bien commun individuel. Hors de l'espace régi par l'organisation étatique, le sujet des droits et des devoirs n'était plus l'individu mais l'État. Il se peut que les idéologies - bourgeois et prolétaires - aient assuré jusqu'à présent un autre type de médiation entre la conscience de l'individu et le bien de l'humanité. Aujourd'hui cette situation a également changé: un nouveau pacte universel est en gestation.

Le magistère de l'Église catholique lui-même le reconnaît dans l'encyclique Centesimus annus. Tertullien l'affirmait textuellement lorsqu'il écrivait dans l'Apologeticum: «Unam omnium rempublicam apognosimus, mundum».

Ces constatations, que les événements des années récentes ont mis à jour, présentent une convergence éclatante, dans les faits, avec les affirmations prémonitoires de la philosophie politique de Maintain, avec ses incitations répétées et justifiées à ne pas confondre l'État avec le corps politique, même en vue de l'unification politique du monde: «La réalité politique de base ne se lasse-t-il pas de répéter - n'est pas l'État mais le corps politique avec ses institutions multiformes, avec les communautés multiples qu'il réunit et la communauté morale à laquelle il permet de prendre corps et de se développer. Le corps politique n'est autre que le peuple organisé par de justes lois. L'État n'est que partie, et non le tout, et ses fonctions sont purement instruments.»

Le gouvernement mondial ne s'identifie donc pas avec un super-État absolu ou État suprême, sans corps politique, qui viendrait se superposer à chaque État pour interférer dans leur vie, mais il évoque une société internationale qui serait organisée politiquement dans la liberté et non pas uniquement par peur de la guerre, mais en vue d'entreprendre une tâche commune et de réaliser le bien dans le cadre d'une unité pluraliste.


Je pense qu'en exprimant à la fin de ce chapitre ma proposition politique, j'ai peut-être cédé à la vieille tentation des philosophes qui voulaient que la raison, par l'intermédiaire de certains savants, soit acceptée comme une autorité en matière d'affaires humaines. Après tout, il s'agissait, je crois, d'une illusion moins grave, en tout cas moins fréquente, que la conviction qu'embrassant tant de fatalistes, à savoir qu'il faut éviter avec soin toute confiance dans la raison en ce qui concerne la conduite de l'homme et de l'État.
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DOSSIER
THE CHICAGO SCHOOL AND THE PROBLEM OF WORLD GOVERNMENT
EDITOR'S PREFACE

Deal W. Hudson

The names Mortimer J. Adler, Robert M. Hutchins, Giuseppe A. Borgese and Leo Strauss will be much less familiar to the readers of Notes et Documents than those of Maritain and Simon. The occasions that obviously elicit these essays, clustered around the theme of «world government», are the dramatic developments in Eastern and Western Europe - the crumbling of Soviet hegemony and the likelihood in the near future of economic federalism. These reflections are offered as a further stimulus, from American friends of the International Jacques Maritain Institute, to your already intensive conversations.

What justifies, however, bringing these thinkers together under the additional rubric of «The Chicago School» other than the fact that each of them, with the exception of Maritain, either taught or administered at the University of Chicago? Certainly it must be said from the outset that they do not share the same philosophical foundation, even if they do share a vital concern for the engagement of philosophy with politics. Leo Strauss, like Heidegger in metaphysics, reintroduced the study of classical political philosophy at a time when it was only studied in Catholic circles. Thus like Maritain, who delivered his Man and the State as the Walgreen Foundation Lectures at the University of Chicago in 1950, each sought to understand contemporary politics in terms of the lessons already learned in ancient and medieval debates over human nature, happiness, and the virtues, especially justice. Regardless of how one considers their actual schemas, the fact is that each represents a type of highly intellectual, political thinking that has once again risen to prominence both in Europe and Latin America.

Yet, even among themselves University of Chicago philosophers did not always agree concerning what the ancients had to say, as the comment on Leo Strauss will testify. The legacy of Strauss, by the way, is more discussed at the present moment in Chicago and the rest of the American academy than any of the other figures named here. We must remember that the aristotelian-thomist Adler, who had his appointment in the Law School, was never welcomed into Chicago's Philosophy Department.

Hutchins' educational reforms were constantly met with opposition from the faculty. Bitter feelings toward both Adler and Hutchins are still in evidence here. Their combined efforts, for all intents and purposes, were defeated by a faculty already disposed toward welcoming more «progressive» thinking.

In Adler's first volume of memoirs he identified the «Chicago School» with the pragmatism of Dewey, the philosophical movement most responsible for the overturning the classical model of public education for the sake of greater relevance and vocationalism. Today is no different - the University of Chicago still offers state of the art instruction in the most influential movement of contemporary thought: postmodernism. So we must be wary when speaking of any perennial «Chicago School».

Borgese, as Royal remarks, has been forgotten but deserves renewed attention, particularly in the light of current events. Maritain's and Simon's legacy are secure, most strongly at Catholic institutions but also at scattered secular institutions throughout the country. Adler remains a celebrated public figure but still awaits the scholarly attention he so obviously deserves. The stamp of his, and Hutchins', insistence on the «Great Books» and the «Great Conversation» transformed American thinking about liberal education and continues to be invoked against the inflated claims of the social scientists. Some attention is beginning to be awarded to Hutchins, as Wallin points out, but the verdict as yet has been somewhat critical. But the future seems poised to ratify the importance of their vision of informed citizenship after all.

The contributors to this volume, all members of the American Maritain Association, join with the editor in thanking Notes et Documents for offering this forum for renewed consideration.
MORTIMER J. ADLER AND WORLD GOVERNMENT

Deal W. Hudson

Mortimer J. Adler is a philosopher who needs no interpreter. Since he published his first book in 1927, prophetically entitled *Dialectic*, his writings have been a model of clarity, economy, and accessibility. These are qualities not often associated with philosophers. Indeed, in the today's world where deliberate obscurity and self-contradiction are taken as signs of profundity, the clear «common sense» approach of Adler unfortunately seems out of place.

Yet few people would be in a better position to explain this development than Adler himself. The philosophical establishment has undergone many changes in fashion since Adler first announced his intention to revive Aristotle, St. Thomas, and the dialectical study of the «Great Books of the Western World». He met these new challenges as they arose - pragmatism, existentialism, Marxism, positivism, phenomenology, deconstruction - constructing a unique legacy that stands out even more plainly as a signpost of philosophical and pedagogical sanity than it did in Adler's heyday of the 1950s. In the summer of 1992 Adler celebrated his 90th birthday at the Aspen Institute where he has been giving annual summer seminars since 1951, and as yet there is no sign of America's best-known philosopher slowing down.

To this day no American is more identified, in the eyes of the general public, with the vocation of philosopher than Mortimer J. Adler. He remains a celebrity in spite of the fact that his contributions to philosophy, to education, and to public affairs have been largely unheralded by the academy for the past twenty five years. This is to prescind, however, from the fact that Adler's influence can still be detected throughout American education, especially in those liberal arts curriculums that stress primary reading in the classic texts of Western civilization.

Adler's name is immediately identified with the «Great Books» movement which swept the United States in the 50s, luckily infiltrating many college curriculums, and leaving behind, for example, the still flourishing St. John's College in Annapolis, Maryland and Santa Fe, New Mexico. Yet if it has been his many television appearances, especially those in conversation with Bill Moyers on public television stations about the existence of God as well as his Aspen seminars on the «Six Great Ideas», that insured his continued popularity into the 1990s. Thus there is no reason to feel sorry for him.

Adler learned long ago that his foremost audience and best student would be the American public. His *How to Read a Book: The Art of Getting a Liberal Education* (1940), co-authored with Charles Van Doren, made him the bestselling author he has ever since. In addition, his editorship of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* (15th edition), *The Great Ideas Today*, *Great Books of the Western World* (52 vols.), and *The Annals of America* (20 vols.), among other projects, has earned the further gratitude of his public by providing them access to a world of ideas and learning previously available only in large personal or public libraries.

That his books can be read, and are read, by the intelligent layperson as well as the scholar is no accident. Adler has always desired the marriage of accessibility and probity, since he has always been committed to the principle that philosophy, like education, is for everybody. Thus the aptness of the title *Philosopher At Large* (1977) for Adler's first volume of memoirs, where he describes his wide-ranging travels and activities than from his conviction that the cultivation of a philosophical *habitus* is necessary to a democratic people maintaining their grip on freedom and self-determination. Adler's constant appeal to the fundamental relation of sound philosophical thinking to the good life and democratic government may be a key to his popular appeal, as well as an indication of what the public is not hearing from their professors. Thus even his early works, like *The Dialectic of Morals* (1941), written when he was still among the academics, display Adler's characteristic appeal both to a common sense reflection on everyday experience, to an accessible philosophy of citizenship. Adler had originally hoped that these books would appeal to both public and professional audiences: *The Difference of Man and The Difference It Makes* (1967) and *The Time of Our Lives: The Ethics of Common Sense* (1970) are two of the best and most widely-read examples. Adler eventually gave up his attempt to encompass both readers, but it wasn't the public who disappointed him. Due to the increasing narrowness of the academic world, its promulgation of jargon and in-talk, Adler faced a choice between the public and the professoriate. He predictably chose the public audience, the last book written for an academic audience being *Some Questions About Language: A Theory of Human Discourse and Its Objects* (1976). Disgusted with the
direction taken by professional philosophy and with the state of post-secondary education in general, Adler has
decided to devote himself to writing the books he had always wanted to write but never could find the time.

Simply because Adler no longer writes expressly for the university professors does not mean that he has given up on the world of education. On the contrary, one of his most consuming projects of the past decade has been his Paideia Program for reforming elementary and secondary education. As he has said publicly on many occasions, colleges and universities cannot be saved without a reform of education from the very beginning. Adler's program is much more than curriculum based upon the study of the great books but comprehensive view of the pedagogical methods necessary to inculcating the basic skills and information necessary to fostering good lives and responsible citizens. The Paideia Program has been implemented with great success at a limited number of public schools all over the United States. One imagines, however, that this America's infatuation with the grandiose promises of -multiculturalism- will have to pass before the good sense of Adler's proposals can be widely recognized.

One of Adler's latest books, Hates Without Hate-Notes: Essays for the 21st Century on Democracy and Socialism, is a timely one for Western nations, European ones in particular, who due to the breakup of the Soviet Empire are grappling with question of federalism. For Adler it represents a return to a commitment he made fifty years ago; he has been a consistent proponent of world federalism since World War II. The idea of world government as the only means to achieve world peace is one of the ideas, he says, that he has not changed over the course of his life. Indeed, the arguments that he lays out in this latest book, along with excerpts from earlier ones and the Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution itself, reveal consistent development of basic insights over the past five decades of Adler's authorship.

In Philosopher At Large: An Intellectual Biography, Adler gives his own account of the basic convictions that led him to pursue a practical solution to world peace through world federalism: «Civil government produces civil peace. Anarchy, or the absence of government, is identical with a state of war; either the cold war of the diplomats and of espionage or the actual war of the generals with guns and bombs. To identify the state of war with the violence of actual warfare is to misconceive the state of peace in purely negative terms as the absence of fighting. Civil peace, positively conceived, consists not in the absence of fighting but rather in conditions that make it possible to settle all difference without recourse to violence or bloodshed. Civil government, by providing that set of conditions, establishes and preserves civil peace.» Thus the impetus to world government is derived from an understanding of the positive meaning of peace and the global form of governance necessary to bringing it about. Within a world government, for example, there would be no need for military power, as we know it, since these exist to wage war between nations. Police power could replace military power for the sake of enforcing the laws now common to all citizens.

The basic premises of his argument, Adler says, are to be found mainly in Dante's De Monarchia, along with associated passages from Hobbes, Kant, Cicero, and Locke. It is a perspective he first set in How to Think About War and Peace (1944), written during the siege of Stalingrad, in which he set forth the unification of the thirteen original American colonies as model for world federation. In fact, Adler thought at the time that development of world history made such a unification very likely over a 500 year period, a projection he has since revised downward.

During 1944 and 1945 Adler was given the opportunity to lecture on world government at various U.S. military bases. His willingness to subsume the sovereignty of the United States under the collective umbrella of a world federation caused Adler trouble: he began to be suspected of subversive activities. He admits that he fueled these suspicions with a rhetoric that sometimes ran away with him. For example, he once was quoted by Cleveland newspaper for saying in a lecture that «We must do everything we can to abolish the United States», a comment which was eventually read, for the purposes of discrediting him, into the Congressional Record. He thinks that it was only his
habit of never putting his signature on any public statement or declaration that saved him from being brought before Senator Joseph McCarthy's infamous UnAmerican Activities Committee.

The dropping of the atomic bomb, however, gave the world federation movement a temporary impetus. Especially at the University of Chicago, where scientists had helped usher in the atomic age with the Manhattan Project, there was a great deal of soul-searching. Adler and Robert Hutchins, the University President, formed a «Committee to Frame a World Constitution» comprising many of America's most prominent scholars: Richard McKeon, Giuseppe Antonio Borgese, Erich Kahler, Stringfellow Barr, Robert Redfield, Albert Guernard, and Charles McIlwain were among its members. The committee met thirteen times between November 1945 and July 1947, produced over 4,500 pages of reports, some of which found its way into a monthly magazine Common Cause, which culminated in the publication of the Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution.

The high point of the movement was the 1950 international meeting of world federalist organizations in Stockholm which Adler attended as the representative of the Chicago Committee. Within a few years it was apparent that the movement had lost its wide appeal. The adoption in 1948 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights held the promise of international agreement on «constitutional provisions needed to secure these rights for the citizens of a world political community». It still puzzles Adler why interest in world federalism died so quickly. After all the technological advances since the 60s have made world government more feasible than ever. Even the very real threat of nuclear war in the early 60s failed to make a world government more attractive. Although there is no longer a looming threat of nuclear holocaust, Adler argues that the likelihood of an ecological disaster, essentially, the problem of the deteriorating ozone layer, can only be avoided by international cooperation such that a single sovereign nation would allow. In addition to aiding the environment, the development of a world community would also enable cooperating nations 1) to overcome the inequitable distribution of resources and wealth 2) to combat racism around the world, and 3) to discourage the «political schizophrenia» that manifested by those states which violate in their own foreign policy the very principles of justice they enforce within their own borders (Politics, pp. 156-7). Or, in other words, powerful countries could no longer create wealth for themselves at

Adler hopes that it will not take an apocalyptic event to rekindle wider interest in pursuing a world federation, but he doubts whether it will happen any other way. It is interesting to note that some right-wing fundamentalist Christian groups in the United States and elsewhere are presently attempting to warn the public against those, like Adler, who consider the ecological crisis as motivation for global political cooperation. It is very likely that the strong advocacy of environmental issues represented by the newly-elected Clinton/Gore ticket, coupled with the possibility of greater federalism in Europe, will rekindle interest in the issue of world government.

But for Adler it is not just a matter of a proper grasp of ethical «issues», no matter how often they are found on the front page of the newspaper, whether they be ecological pollution or minority rights. Such states of affairs become «issues» for our ethical and political reflection only because of their relationship to a correct understanding of human nature and its inherent teleologies. In fact, for him the most serious obstacle to the future of world government in our increasingly fragmented notion of humanity. Ethnocentrism, or what Adler calls an «inventive detachment to localities» (Moore, p. 262), places too much emphasis on the differences between human beings based upon nurture.

The best hope for fraternity is the universality of human nature and the human mind, a hope which can be exemplified in our recognition of the transcultural character of math, natural science, and technology. Adler's understanding of human beings has its roots deeply embedded in the tradition of Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Jacques Maritain, his close friend for many years. Humans are defined by their common species and the natural powers belonging to that species; this common nature establishes the foundation for understanding their moral lives and their need for political cooperation. Success in the moral and political spheres, the very happiness of the individual and the state, is judged on the basis of nature coming to completion and growing into wholeness. Thus without a common rational nature, and our ability to apprehend it, democratic governments, much less world governments, would be impossible.

Nothing could be more at odds with the postmodern rejection of human nature as a hierarchical and essentialist view in service of elitist and oppressive interests. The postmodern view, of course, tends to be localized to the

extreme - factors of gender, race, sexuality, wealth, and class each shape the contour of the particular rationality seeking it «correspondence» with reality. Adler recognizes that different human communities and societies, whether differentiated along ethnic, religious, or class lines, are capable to actualizing their human potentialities in differing ways. The «babel» of different languages itself attests to this diversity. But those who are invested in the celebration of cultural diversity canblind themselves to the more important issue - that these languages themselves are unique to the human species and bespeak a uniquely human potential differing in degree rather than kind from other animals. Once attention has returned to the remarkable successes of human potentialities, the issue of diversity will seem superficial by comparison (Haines, p. 224).

That human beings possess a nature different in kind from animals, specified by a rational intellect and free will, leads us to recognize their natural and unalienable rights. By overlooking the crucial difference between what belongs to human beings by nature and what belongs to them by nurture, or acculturation, we risk losing the foundation which justifies our respect for human rights in the first place.

One can see with Adler's help an obvious irony in the present American cultural climate: what began as a protest for equality in the name of human rights on the part of women and minorities has evolved into theories of multiculturalism and feminism that deny the very notion which over the past two centuries has insured those rights - a shared human nature. As Adler writes, «if a world community is ever to come into existence, it will retain cultural pluralism or diversity with respect to all matters that are accidental in human life... but we have at last overcome the natural illusion that there is a Western mind and an Eastern mind, a European mind and an African mind, or a civilized and a primitive mind. There is only a human mind and it is one and the same in all human beings» (Haines, p. 242).

Thus for world government to be feasible there must exist some degree of common self-understanding about the nature of human life, its history and ends and purposes. A new cultural unity and world community will begin to emerge when a consensus forms concerning what are matters of truth and what matters of taste. The former will always be transcultural, the latter indigenous. Controversies over matters of truth are, in theory, capable of resolution, while disagreements over taste are not. Hence Adler opposes, and would regard as politically dangerous, the attack on the classical ideal of human nature being waged in the name of correcting historical injustices. Certainly Aristotle made a mistake in considering both natural slaves and women as inferior beings, but the apparent antidote - the wholesale deconstruction of the idea of human nature - sets the stages for perhaps even worse crimes in the future, a future in which the ground of human rights and dignity has been lost.

Adler's insistence on the reaffirmation of human nature as the transcultural basis of world community, and eventually world government, may seem overly abstract and optimistic. Indeed one may read the recent outbreak of ethnic enthusiasms as a reaction against totalitarian regimes who also operated from a very abstract, albeit entirely different, view of human nature. But even if one wished for some greater appreciation for the role of locality in Adler's thought, one must agree that in the main he is right to direct both Europeans and Americans to reaffirm the only sound philosophical basis for governance. Those nations who seek a greater degree of cooperation with their neighbors around the world had better take a more active interest in what their children are being taught in school about nature and nurture. Cooperation that remains only pragmatic will move only when the accidental conditions warrant it, usually toward the merely negative kind of peace as Adler understands it. To move further toward genuine world community something more - philosophical agreement - is required (or perhaps one could say in Maritain's sense «pre-philosophical») about the purposes of human life. Although human nature continues to reveal its own basic dynamism to the human mind, we need the aid of a proper education and the established wisdom of the past to grasp it clearly. Thus it is appropriate that Mortimer J. Adler's name be invoked at this crucial moment in political development. Few twentieth-century philosophers have thought as comprehensively about the prospective character of world government, but none, as far as I know, has done more to provide the pedagogical endowment by which that government's cornerstone, a shared idea of a common human nature, can be laid for subsequent generations.
Robert M. Hutchins AND THE RULE OF REASON

Jeffrey D. Wallin

Robert Maynard Hutchins was something of an enigma to Europeans. He represented a type uniquely American (at least in this century): a proselytizing educational reformer of a secular Calvinist tone committed to uncompromising ideals of reason, prudence, and justice in public affairs. In other words, Hutchins was a utopian; a man whose belief in the power of reason so far exceeded the bounds of what reason dictates that, in spite of his charm, gravity of demeanor, sparkling intelligence, and lightness of wit, is difficult to take seriously.

In his own eyes, Robert M. Hutchins was something of a failure. Yet, as the world usually judges such matters, his life was an early and sustained success: Dean of the Yale Law Faculty at the age of 28; President of the prestigious University of Chicago before the age of 30; one of the two or three most widely known educational reformers of his age; intellectual standard-bearer for world government and peace in the intensely nationalist period of the early Cold War; associate director of the powerful and influential Ford Foundation; director of the Fund for the Republic, which became notorious in its battles against the anti-communist witch-hunts of the infamous Senator Joseph McCarthy and the House Un-American Activities Committee; and, finally, president of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, an institution that became known for its dialogic, iconoclastic inquiries into what Hutchins referred to as the "basic issues" facing democracy.

There was a measure of truth in Hutchins's overly critical self-judgement, at least according to his own uncompromising standards. Extraordinarily handsome, intellectually gifted, high-minded and hard-working, with an unforgettable personal presence, he nevertheless left behind at least as many failures and partial successes as thorough-going, lasting accomplishments. Widely influential during the time he wielded control over the University of Chicago, few of his reforms survived him: world government and world law seem as remote today as they were in his own time; and the "basic issues" of democracy seem as pressing now as they were before his famous Center ever addressed them.

Yet this is not to say that the world - or at least the United States - did not benefit from his charismatic presence. Far from it. Especially in the field of liberal education, the name of Hutchins deserves a place of distinction. For in this regard Hutchins and those who drew to him - Mortimer Adler, Stringfellow Barr, Mark Van Doren, Scott Buchanan, Richard McKeon - laid the groundwork of a case for general education that continues to provide the strongest impetus for educational reform in America today.

The heart of Hutchins's reform was his "New Plan" for the College of the University of Chicago, designed to attract students at the beginning of their third year of high school, and graduate them after they had taken two years of a common curriculum and passed examinations in general education (after approximately two more years), the theory being that they would then be ready for the specialization of graduate or professional school. This system, which broke the typical pattern of earning degrees by accumulating course credits in specialized fields, was much more akin to individualized university tutoring in Europe than in the United States. In time, this "New Plan" would emphasize general education by means of reading common texts as well as by mandatory survey courses.

The notion that there are "great books" without which no one can be considered to be educated, has been the subject of considerable criticism (the idea, by the way, was not invented by Hutchins; it originated with a course given in the 1920s by John Erskine at Columbia which required reading a book a week for sixty weeks. Adler, who had taken the course, and subsequently taught it, brought the idea to Chicago). To understand the importance of this concept for American higher education, one must remember that the sort of pre-collegiate general education that until recently could be taken for granted in Europe, has not been in fashion in America for decades. When students reach collegial in the United States, they begin - and this was especially true of the University of Chicago in Hutchins' time - with specialized studies. This is on top of years of pre-collegiate courses, not in classics or languages, but in social studies and other similarly artificial compounds of the sciences and humanities.

Hutchins believed that such a system hardly qualified to be called educational, that it was in fact little more than technical or pre-vocational training masquerading as education. But his concern went far beyond the principle that one should be broadly as well as narrowly educated. Although a political and social progressive, Hutchins did not believe that the new was always superior to the old, nor...
was he a cultural historian, cut off from intellectual traditions pre-dating his own by a conviction that all ideas are the products of impenetrable, and therefore inaccessible, historical circumstances. This was fortunate, for such a view often carries with it the implication that one's own time should never be subjected to the criticism of ideas outside of it.

Hutchins believed in progress. But he did not think that progress carried a sufficient standard within itself: whatever was new was not by definition better. Progress should be judged on the basis of reason and argument regarding the better and the worse. To speak of human progress in terms of better and worse is to presuppose an enduring reality - human nature - that transcends historical circumstances, the presence of which makes possible a «Great Conversation», as he put it, between different cultures, and between the greatest minds of different times. «It is the task of every generation» he wrote in the preface for a set of The Great Books, «to discard what it cannot use, and to bring into context with the distant and intermediate past the most recent contributions to the Great Conversation which has gone on from age to age in these creative writings».

Hutchins's critics at the time, as is the case with many of those who criticize the Great Books today, claimed that the effort to define the world's - or even the West's - great literature, is necessarily an effort to create a «canon», an exercise which by definition excludes far more than it includes (only seventy-seven writers were included in the Great Books of the Western World, which Hutchins, along with Adler, edited for the Encyclopaedia Britannica), and which sets unnecessary limits to liberal learning.

The potential parochialism of this approach may be granted, however, without granting the notion that these authors constitute a «canon». For a canon implies that the readings present a coherent world view, which, in fact, they do not. Being unfamiliar with the actual works of these authors, many critics assume that they constitute a unity of teaching that, while masquerading as a means to liberating the mind, in fact entraps it in a perspective as much noted for its narrowness and western biases as for the force and felicity of expression characteristic of its authors. This is said to result in a subtle but pervasive form of indoctrination of the sort that says: in order to become educated, you have studied the great works of the western world; therefore, to know the western world is to be educated.

Such a static mode of treating these authors fails to take seriously the way in which the authors of these works may be said to engage in a «conversation». For Hutchins's own formulation too often implied that it was only the new that entered into conversation with the old, whereas in fact, the main authors of the liberal tradition argue among themselves, whether it be Thomas Hobbes arguing with Aristotle, or John Locke with Hobbes, or Jean Jacques Rousseau with Locke. The tradition is, in fact, anything but monolithic. Indeed, it is precisely this sharp disagreement that is so aptly captured by the wonderfully illustrative phrase «great conversation», and that, along with the presentation of views and opinions outside of one's own time and culture, promises the intellectual liberation and knowledge that true liberal education seeks.

Yet there is a deeper charge that might be leveled at Hutchins's sort of general education today, namely, that the great intellectual tradition reflected in the Conversation presupposes the superiority of reason to passion, and that it presupposes as well the existence of both nature and human nature as the fundamental backdrop against which that conversation takes place: after all, how could there be a «conversation» about justice between, say, Hobbes and Aristotle, or Smith and Marx, unless there were something essentially unchanging about human beings and justice? Yet the existence of human nature is called into question by today's most fashionable theories of radical multiculturalism, feminism, literary theory, and so on. All of these perspectives reject a concept that implies the superiority of reason and objectivity to passion, feelings, or culture, on the ground that affirming such «western» standards in turn implies the superiority of science and civilization to the «other», and it is the «other» that each of these «isms» seeks to rehabilitate.

Such questions go beyond any of the controversies regarding liberal education that Hutchins participated in. Nevertheless, one might remark in passing that these and other criticisms of the western tradition are in fact part of that tradition and of no other. Inquiry into what is right by nature, as opposed to what is right according to the times, is the intellectual engine that propels cultural discourse in the western tradition. It generates questions regarding the status of nature, of language, and of science; hence, concerns regarding the worth of the Great Conversation form a crucial part of that Conversation. This is why the readings at St. John's College - one of the few institutions founded on learning through the Great Books - include such authors as Friedrich Nietzsche, who argues against the deepest presuppositions of modern science and objectivity, and therefore of the West.
A good portion of this essay has been spent on the Great Books simply because The Great Books epitomizes Robert Hutchins's understanding of education. Hutchins, unlike most university administrators then or now, never ceased to inquire into the presuppositions of academic disciplines, into the purposes of universities, of the purposes of education itself, and into the great abiding questions concerning the relation of faith to reason, of science to moral and political well-being, of justice to mercy, of prudence to conviction. Consequently he spent a good deal of his time reading musty authors like Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle, agreeing with them that education's highest goal is for the sake of perfecting learning and intelligence, and that this is a necessary condition for the perfection of human nature: "A human being acts in a human way if he thinks."

Of course, Hutchins's fellow educational progressives, to say nothing of the conventional academics of the University of Chicago, had nothing but contempt for such non-scientific and unprogressive figures as Thomas or Aristotle. In this regard, little has changed. But the debate goes on, and the place in it of Robert M. Hutchins is assured, at least in the minds of those who take seriously the possibility of education as an end rather than a mere instrument, of the good life.

Hutchins is perhaps best known for one of the least significant aspects of his career: his involvement in promoting the cause of world government through the drafting of a World Constitution. This activity generated much adverse publicity at a time when Hutchins was already becoming a favorite target of those who wished to take a firm stand against the Soviet Union following World War II.

The alarming potential of nuclear power was of especial concern to Hutchins, not only because of his life-long concern with international peace (he had been against U.S. involvement in the war), but because of the connection of the University of Chicago to the Manhattan Project, which produced the atomic bomb. In any event, Hutchins was convinced that the age of nuclear power made the concept of war unthinkable. But what is unthinkable to the reflective is not necessarily unthinkable to those ruled by their political passions. Hutchins believed that age-old ethnic, racial, and historical enmities, as well as the divisive ideologies of more recent years, made it unlikely that traditional "balance of power" politics would be able to keep the peace. Indeed, the mere presence of the technology that made possible delivering nuclear weapons across national boundaries by air appeared to him to settle the matter: states qua states go to war; in the future such wars will be catastrophic; therefore the state system must be supplanted with something new: world government. As he said in a broadcast a few days after Hiroshima and Nagasaki:

"Up to last Monday I must confess that I did not have much hope for a world state... But the alternatives now seem clear. One is world suicide; another is agreement among sovereign states to abstain from using the bomb. This will not be effective. The only hope, therefore, of abolishing war is through the monopoly of atomic force by a world organization."

In pursuit of this ideal, Hutchins accepted the presidency of Giuseppe Antonio Borgese's (then a member of Chicago's faculty) new Committee for a World Constitution. The Committee published a world constitution and several arguments in its favor. But it was in general dismissed as a utopian notion to be taken seriously only in the "ivory tower" of the academy. The Committee dissolved when Borgese returned to Italy.

Although it would be difficult to find fault with the motives behind the notion of world government, it is doubtful whether any of those associated with the idea ever understood the legitimate fears of those who believed that, in giving to such a body the powers requisite to such formidable tasks, one would almost by definition either:

(a) create a center of such unprecedented scientific power, that neither the imagination nor the experience of mankind could give any reassurance that it might be benevolent, or
(b) become possible only if the human ambitions, desires, and failings that lead to war could be resolved in a fundamental and permanent manner: in short, if men should become perfectly wise, just, and good. Yet it is no dispensation from the court of human wisdom to expect the attributes of God to rule the affairs of men.

The last cause with which Hutchins's name is associated is that of civil rights. In December, 1958, Hutchins resigned from the University of Chicago to become associate director of the Ford Foundation (responsible for the Foundation's efforts in education and peace). Hutchins eventually left to head up the Fund for the Republic, which he had helped to create with Ford Foundation money. The Fund was established to promote individual rights and freedoms against the attacks of Senator Joseph McCarthy, Westbrook Pegler, and others who, in their attempts to expose communists in the U.S. government and elsewhere, had little patience with those they thought were "hiding" behind the protections of the Bill of Rights.

There are few episodes in American history so perplexing to Europeans as the anticommunist crusades of Senator McCarthy. McCarthy was vulgar, abusive, and utterly unmindful of any of the 'rights of conscience' that America is taught to stand for. Hence, it is difficult in the 1990s to understand how he could have amassed so much power, and stirred up so much fear. After all, the number of actual communists in this country was never very large, at least in terms that became familiar to Europe.

To understand this portion of America's past, and Hutchins's role in it, it is necessary to revisit the political turmoil of the period with a clear eye. Above all, this requires refraining from indulging ourselves in the easy hindsight that dismisses the anticommunism of the 1950s as simply the work of rude, untutored, frightened reactionaries resisting the efforts of reasoned and enlightened men dedicated to the preservation of American civil liberties. This was in fact a question men and women of sophistication and sound judgement could - and did - disagree upon.

We who have seen the Cold War dissolve in front of our eyes should have no illusions concerning either its origins or its seriousness. Stalin was no 'Uncle Joe'. He was a ruthless builder of empires backed, not just by a cult based on 'personality', but with an ideology of world-wide implications. Soviet actions in Poland, Greece, Iran, and elsewhere as the war wound down, and Stalin's refusal to be included in the Marshall Plan, were reason enough even for those without the vision of a Churchill to see a threat from Soviet communism. And that threat was present in the United States. The Rosenbergs (or at least Julius) compromised the secrets of the atomic bomb. Alger Hiss was indeed a spy, and one in very high standing at the State Department. Certainly there were others who's allegiance was to an idea and a way of life hostile to the American Constitution.

Under these conditions, it is not surprising that many Americans might begin to question the loyalty of individuals who, although holding positions of public trust, refused to say whether they were or were not members of the Communist Party. It is true that, under the terms of the United States Constitution, no one rightfully could be compelled to admit such an association, and it is also true that this was a nicety too often lost upon the McCarthy's of the world. Indeed, if this were all there was to the matter, few would deny that this period of 'guilt by association' - a phrase that nicely captured the heart of a situation in which some people lost their jobs merely because of a suspected association with subversive organizations rather than because of anything they actually did or advocated doing - was one in which all reasonable individuals would wish to be counted on the side of civil liberties, and against the anticommunist 'witch hunters'.

Yet the issue is complicated by two particulars. The first I have already mentioned: this was a period in which freedom was in fact threatened by a major international power supported by individuals who thought of themselves as agents in place throughout the world. Second, one must consider the nature of the American polity, an entity which is peculiarly open to ideological threats.

Most nations of the world find their identity in shared blood, in shared history, and in shared territory. But the territory of the United States has never been fixed, its population has always been mixed, and its history is more the history of an idea - the idea of civil and religious liberty as rights belonging to all by nature - than of the victories and defeats, the customs and habits, and the piouss prayers of memory that characterize most other peoples. In this, the United States might best be thought of as the first modern nation. Those that came after it, whether Napoleonic France or the communist countries of this century, were, like the United States, regimes founded upon ideas, with all the strengths and weaknesses that attach to such a condition.

Regimes based upon ideas are by definition susceptible to being defeated by ideas. As Abraham Lincoln once said, public opinion, in a democracy, is everything. With it, almost anything can be accomplished; without it, almost nothing can. In a regime dedicated to preserving the consent of the governed as the only legitimate basis of political authority, the idea of political equality that justifies and demands the consent of the governed is the bedrock of public opinion. If that opinion should change, it, to take the most serious example, opinion in America should come to support the notion that the consent of the people is not required. America would become a different nation, regardless of how much it still might look as it always did. This is why Lincoln so adamantly refused to agree with Southern spokesmen who argued that slavery was morally right. It was one thing to admit the actual presence of slavery, an institution introduced before the Revolution, or even to admit that there was no easy way to rid the nation of it under the terms of the Constitution; but it would have signaled a fundamental shift in the nature of the regime if the people should come to see it as right and just to rule men without their consent.

Marxism, like the chattel slavery of Alexander Stephens
and John Calhoun, posits that the consent of some people in not required in order to rule them justly. (Certainly one would find it hard going to find a reason for respecting the rights of the bourgeoisie, for instance, in any text of Marx or Lenin.) In this respect, it must be admitted that the challenge of communism represents as great a threat to the United States could ever entertain, just as the principles of the Declaration of Independence could be said to represent the greatest threat to communism. The Cold War was, in this regard, a sort of existential necessity; whether it ran «hot» or «cold», it could only disappear with the disappearance of one of the antagonists, something that happened, not when the Soviet Union formally ceased to be, but when the Communist Party lost legitimacy in the eyes of the Soviet People and rulers to such an extent that its principles - its ideas - could no longer stand the light of day, even in the USSR. In this sense, the Cold War was over sometime in the late 1980s.

This digression is necessary in order to appreciate Hutchins’s position, which, while mindful of the dangers of Marxism - Hutchins, it should be noted, was never a communist, in spite of what some of his more reckless enemies charged - believed that it never represented a serious threat to the United States. Consequently, he feared that in order to combat it the nation might go to such excesses as to destroy the very liberties that the anticommunists sought to preserve. For Hutchins, the fact that the United States stood for civil and religious liberties meant that to give them up, however temporarily and in however limited a fashion, was to lose the purpose for which the people gave their consent to be governed in the first place. Hence, he had no sympathy for those who would abridge the rights of witnesses to refuse to answer questions about their political opinions, or for those who would deny employment to individuals suspected of being communists. To encroach upon an individual’s liberties when nothing had been proven against him - one must remember, after all, that it was not a crime to belong to the Communist Party - was to save the republic by means of abandoning what it stood for.

During the life of the Fund for the Republic, Hutchins was a lightning rod of public controversy because of his support for civil liberties, and the consequent attention this support generated from Congressional bodies and others who believed that his actions were giving aid and comfort to his country’s enemies. True to his Calvinist upbringing, Hutchins never wavered in his belief that the highest duty of public figures during this period was to interpose themselves between the mob-like activities of anticomunist politicians and a public too ignorant of its liberties to know when they were in danger.

In 1959 the Fund for the Republic was dissolved, and the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, with Hutchins as its president, emerged. Hutchins spent his remaining years presiding over this idyllic institution set in the hills of Santa Barbara, California, uniting the tripartite themes of his life: education, world peace, and civil liberties. The McCarthy years had convinced him that the great dangers posed to civil liberties by the advance of technology and the concentration of political power could only be met by a public educated in the Constitutional source of their freedoms, and willing to consider new forms of political organization more appropriate, as he saw it, for the new times. So the Center focused on the «basic issues» of democracy in the hope that by bringing the best minds together to ponder them in a congenial setting, answers conducive to peace and freedom would be forthcoming.

Although the Center became known for its many interesting dialogues and a few of its world-wide convocations on peace (such as the Paxem in Terris conferences), it failed to live up to Hutchins’s expectations. He never was able to convince men and women of the requisite capacity and reputation to take the necessary years out of their lives needed to work through the basic issues in a systematic and thorough way. Or perhaps those issues did not lend themselves to resolution along the lines he envisioned. In this he was also a failure, but an interesting and provocative one, as was the case with every endeavor he undertook, from the University of Chicago, to liberal education and the Great Books, to world government, to the protection of civil liberties, and finally, to his retreat on «the Mountain Eclectico», the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions.
NEW WORLD ORDER?
THE CASE OF G. A. BORGESE

Robert Royal

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the question of what form the future politics of the world will take. During the 1991 Persian Gulf conflict, U.S. President George Bush invoked a New World Order that he thought he saw emerging from the instability, at times bordering on chaos, of the new moment. Bush’s tentative phrase provoked no little controversy in the United States and elsewhere despite some very real changes in international values and institutions. Some people did not like the apparent shape of the new order, others resented the very idea of yet another fatter on national liberties, still others thought it was too early to speak in such sweeping terms, much more needing to be done before the notion of a New World Order could turn into a reality.

The largest obstacle to defining a New World Order, assuming that such a thing is inevitable, is the basic lack of reflection on what such an order would entail. For the most part, thought about world politics since the demise of Communism has concentrated on immediate practical problems such as what to do about large nuclear arsenals, how to respond to ethnic clashes in the Balkans and former Soviet Union, and who shall be responsible for halting aggressors like Iraq and Serbia. Everyone now assumes that democracy accompanied by a market economy (more or less free as particular national conditions require) will be the preferred form of government for the foreseeable future. Francis Fukuyama received worldwide attention last year when he argued in The End of History (New York: Free Press, 1992) that liberal democracy is now the undisputed form of national states. But in the enthusiasm for teaching democratic procedures and market economics to formerly Communist states, the question of how these democratic nations will relate to one another and to the rest of the world has been largely postponed.

Most of the little thought devoted to this subject assumes that ethnic resurgences, the fluid international situation, and competing economic blocs will make the nation-state system as we have known it for several centuries an inevitable part of the future. In fact, one of the most poignant phrases used by citizens of the new democracies emerging from the collapse of the Soviet Union is that they want «to live in a normal country». By normal, of course, they mean countries resembling the relatively prosperous, relatively just societies of North America and Europe in the past few decades. But even to describe the geographic and temporal limits of this phenomenon shows how «abnormal» these supposedly normal countries are in the history of the human race. Nevertheless, that type of state is likely to be the aim of various national aspirations in the short term, but there may be some other forces on the horizon that we should anticipate. The worldwide spread of democracy is certainly to be welcomed. But what of the order among the individual democratic states? Should we simply return to an older balance-of-power international system, a system overwhelmed by the two great power blocs in the cold war? Or are there other modes for ordering the international system in the future? We might do well to approach these questions by turning back to a post-World War II theorist who argued that the Age of Nations is over, Giuseppe Antonio Borgese.

Borgese is a fascinating, if somewhat forgotten figure now. During World War II he founded an international group of intellectuals including Reinhold Niebuhr, Thomas Mann, (who was married in the late 1930s), Lewis Mumford, and Gaetano Salvemini among many others, seeking to provide a solid base for democracy and human liberty. In 1940, before the United States had entered the war, they published a manifesto urging it to do so and spread democratic ideals1. These may seem like obvious goals now, but the group was responding to a crisis within democracies that had undermined their capacity to resist totalitarian evils. In fact it would not be an exaggeration to say that the parliamentary democracies had come to the point of understanding solely what they did not believe in — Fascism and Nazism. What democracies do believe in and must be willing to defend was much less clear, and the totalitarian states were not slow to assert that democracies would perish because they believed in nothing. (The Oxford Union declaration that undergraduates should not fight for King and country sharply shows that a concrete negative in the service of a very abstract and indefinite positive — perhaps pacifism or world peace — had come to dominate even some of the best minds.) After the war Borgese was largely responsible for a «Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution», and wrote a lengthy commentary on the draft entitled Foundations of World Government1. Working in Chica-

1 Committee of Fifteen, The City of Man: A Declaration of World Democracy (New York: Viking, 1940).
and foreign issues, Borgese came to the United States after refusing to sign a Fascist loyalty oath. In the United States, his energy and hunger for fame remained unquenched. He taught at the Universities of California and Chicago, even briefly gave courses in political science in Puerto Rico, earning a reputation as an intense and energetic lecturer. In 1945, he founded the association for world government in Chicago. The Nobel Prize Committee nominated him as a candidate for the Peace Prize in 1952, the same year he died in Italy.

This varied and driven activity has led to charges that his thought was haphazard and superficial as well as to criticism of his writing style as overly rhetorical. Eminent critics have lined up for and against Borgese. No less a figure than Arturo Momigliano thought him a sort of genius, while the literary critic Luigi Russo and the historian Eugenio Garin found Borgese ultimately incoherent. In the United States, his adopted country for almost a decade and a half, he is now virtually unknown. No major studies of him and his work have appeared in English, though a few short analyses have appeared in Italian. Whatever else might be said of Borgese, however, during his life and for some time after he was the kind of dynamic figure that could not be ignored.

He combines a literary scholar’s keen sensibility about form and language with wide emigration and analysis of all human history. His reading of that history is not as in Hegel, an artificial construct based on a philosophical partis pris so much as a relatively supple view from the standpoint of a convinced and unwieldy modern democrat. Who else would have noticed of the twentieth century: “A remarkable trait of our wars is the almost total lack of those earnest hymns, martial prayers, with which the singing combatants of other generations confessed to the sacredness of their sacrifice.” Borgese finds more mundane grounds as well for his belief that modern war was different from war in earlier ages, but he has a very sensitive appreciation for intellectual atmosphere and modes of the human spirit.

Borgese draws on wide reading from the classics to the memoirs of modern politicians and generals for his arguments in favor of world democracy. After years spent studying, teaching, and writing about Dante, he bases part of his vision on the work of the Florentine, particularly on the pages of the One World Book he inappropriately called Monarchia (i.e., De Monarchia). We should not be misled by the One World rhetoric here into thinking that Borgese is merely putting forward another in a long line of utopian and unrealistic proposals for the supposedly easy
unification of mankind. His contribution to this recent aspiration was to recognize the necessity for an institutional structure that respects profound human depths as well as pragmatic questions of culture and history on the way to One World. He speaks frequently, for example, of the Swiss canton system and even more frequently of the federated structure of the United States as two concrete examples of how diversity may be preserved within unity. As he often put it, though the Age of Nations was over, nations and even regional associations would continue to exist in a federated world.

Just one example of how Borgese adapts classical sources for modern ends may be glimpsed in his uses of Dante. To be sure, Borgese is always an engaged reader, never merely an antiquarian. We have to be careful not to identify Borgese’s reading with what a scholar might regard as central in the original text. Yet Borgese’s readings are always stimulating. Of Dante’s political vision, Borgese observes:

“The goal of civilization as a whole, he states, chapter iii [of De Monarchia], is the realization of all the potentialities of the human mind; and this demands the harmonious development and co-operation - the federal union, we would translate - of the several members of the universal body politic.”

In Dante, there are six distinct ends, each for: 1. the individual; 2. the domestic group; 3. the district; 4. the city-state; 5. the kingdom; and 6. the human race in its universality.

For Dante, contemplation is the highest good and action of only secondary importance, since “the specific potentiality of humanity... cannot all be reduced to actuality at the same time... by one man, or by any of the limited associations distinguished above,” Borgese formulates Dante’s vision thus: “The full development of the human intellect requires the united effort of the universality of man.” Such a goal can only be achieved when man’s contemplation is not disturbed: “Whence it is manifest that universal peace is the best of all the things which are ordained for our blessedness.”

Having outlined what he believes to have been Dante’s position, Borgese remarks archly that the writers of the “Preamble” to the Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution, that is to say he himself, must have had Dante in mind, since they speak of the “advancement of man” as the “common goal of mankind.” But they also seem to differ with the medieval poet in that they refuse to accept the actualization of the speculative intellect as the goal of civilization. Instead, they promote what Borgese terms “the less rigid and more comprehensive phrase spiritual excellence.” Furthermore, “writers for this generation, could not demote the practical intellect to an ancillary task below the speculative, both being equal in dignity as they are equal in necessity.” Spiritual excellence and physical welfare become the undeniable universal goal of mankind in Borgese.

This use and recasting of Dante’s shows both the strengths and weaknesses of Borgese’s mind. His unflagging drive toward a World Federation and his lifelong originality lead him into speculations that, if not always convincing, always reflect a sophisticated and informed intelligence at work on concrete, living situations. Jacques Maritain thought Borgese’s plan “both the best among the plans of international organization which are being elaborated today, and the most comprehensive and well-balanced ideal pattern that prominent political scientists could work out in order to exacerbate frowning realists, and to prod the thought and meditation of men of good will and far-sighted ingenuousness.” Maritain also rightly underscored the drafters’ repeated and emphatic declarations that the World Federation was not going to be the work of a day, but of generations. We might add: at best, of all generations.

But there is weakness in Borgese’s very strengths. As early as 1940 in The City of Man: A Declaration on World Democracy written by Borgese and the Committee of Fifteen, a certain and central intellectual sleight of hand takes place. In spite of the declaration’s pointed formulation of several realistic problems (“Military defeat was the outcome of moral abdication”, “the collective purpose of democracy, with its commandments of discipline and loyalty, had given way to a corrupted liberalism, with its claim of unrestricted liberty for each one to act and think as he pleased”), it cannot find a common basis for world government except by denying many realities of its world.

For instance, the declaration notices the several existing religious systems in the world, but swiftly brushes past their quite different and even contradictory visions of man, morals, and human destiny to very doubtful universalist principles.

Thus definitions like the following appear: “Democracy is nothing more and nothing less than humanism in theocracy and rational theocracy in universal humanism.” But this is a very vague formula by which to attract large, diverse, democratic peoples. Borgese and his collaborators can only resort to the often asserted, and absolutely unfounded statement that despite all appearances the various religions are really at one on this point.
This universal religion, harbored in the best minds of our age, this common prayer of democracy militant which must be the hymn of democracy triumphant, was anticipated by saints and sages of all ages. Its substance matured out of whatever rose highest in man's speculations and hopes.12

To be clear about the claim here: the founders of the major religions and all their adherents down to the present have misunderstood their own core beliefs, which have now been revealed to Giuseppe Borgese and the Committee of Fifteen. The only way to arrive at a harmony of saints and sages of all ages on these points, of course, is to redefine them in ways that they and their followers may well not accept. What is left is an appeal to the deep religious commitments of all people, but only on the assumption that they abandon a particular, for the new, unincarnated democratic faith.13

There are ways that some practical agreements among the various religious worldviews might be worked out; if those being asked to participate are not told at the outset that their particular faiths are deficient or limited and that some non-existent, unified world system is both more useful and helpful to what is "highest" in each religion. The nations in which religious pluralism has succeeded have made no such attempt to establish a super-religion above existing ones. A few principles about the nature of man and his rights sufficed to begin the modern experiments we now know as the United States, the French Republic, Switzerland, and other non-confessional nations. What was more important to the success of these experiments was the practical experience of working out arrangements acceptable to vast majorities.

But we should not underestimate the difficulties encountered in these nations. America fought a Civil War to maintain its union despite basic disagreements about the nature of the state and human rights. France until the last few decades was divided into lay and clerical camps often bitterly at war with one another. Borgese and his collaborators were aware of these past examples and the likelihood that similar struggles would take place in the future.

Yet something like an obsession to explain all human life and to press on quickly toward world unity obscures some of Borgese's more nuanced contributions. Foundations of World Government, for example, announces itself as the first volume of a trilogy entitled Syntax, to be completed in seven years (Borgese died without finishing it). Volume Two was to have been called Haga Sophia (the outline of a new religion for the modern world) and the final volume Poecis a modern aesthetic. While we cannot help but admire the largeness of mind exhibited and the sheer sweep of Borgese's ambitions, these esoteric speculations could not help but make his concrete recommendations about world government seem more insubstantial than, in fact, they were.

Borgese often acknowledged the massive obstacles that continued to hamper the creation of a world federation. Yet there are also concrete political realities that Borgese seems to neglect. To begin with, he is like many other thinkers after World War I assumed that communism and capitalism must equally be superseded by a third thing, which he called liberal socialism. Borgese never made the vulgar error of supposing, however, that the United States and the Soviet Union were moral equals. In 1940, he encouraged the United States not to confuse the possession of imperium with imperialism. History had chosen America to be the champion of world liberty and Americans should no longer assume that it was possible to remain isolationist. The Nazis had announced a definite timetable for invading New York after capturing Britain. The City of Man asserts "American leadership is world-trusteeship: the Pax Americana a preamble to the Pax Humana."

Yet for all his admiration of America, Borgese did not reflect sufficiently on the concrete steps by which the thirteen original colonies were able to forge themselves into a federal union. Widespread belief in certain basic principles already existed among the American populace, but even with that advantage it took serious work over decades to achieve a basic satisfaction with the form of government. Today's architects of the European Community, as Paul Johnson has recently noted, have also failed to pay sufficient attention to the American experience. Instead, of slow evolution of structures, they somehow expect the several states to immediately cede power to central bureaucracy in Strasbourg, presumably in the belief that there will be more benefits than drawbacks to the limitation of sovereignty. Even in as harmonious and relatively uniform a region as Europe many obstacles remain to be overcome. And after recent nervousness among voters in Denmark, Britain, and France, it is not clear that these problems, even among such closely related societies with now almost a half century of peaceful relations with one another, will disappear any time soon.

Johnson cites one cultural difference for example: in Britain, there are laws but they are generally respected; in Italy laws are numerous but not always enforced. How will the new European community force individual governments
to police activities regulated by the European Parliament that they are not able or willing to enforce by decree of their own national capitals? In Borgese, even large issues like security are sometimes simply brushed past. For instance, he posits it as a given that a world federation must have a monopoly on armed forces. Yet to date, not even Western Europe has been able to achieve a fully integrated security system, let alone a community defense force.

Both the religious overreaching and the political wishful thinking share a common root in World Federation thought up to the present. Such thought has assumed that the way to unity lies by appealing to select elements that shall be made to stand over and against individual national or religious elements. In fact, if the experience of American and other pluralistic democracies is any guide, it must precisely be an appeal through religious and national traditions that leads to such unity as may be realized.

Yet when all is said and done, Borgese’s work is a highly sophisticated clarion call to a new stage in human history. Borgese says at several points in his work that a world federation is at present a myth, but a myth like the story of Icarus. After a few thousand years of thinking about that myth, the human race was led to the scientific discoveries and technological engineering needed to make human flight a reality. Human societies are infinitely more complicated than any machine, but without question Borgese’s brilliant tableau of what some future world might be may inspire a similar imaginative ferment in political thought.

Whatever the shortcomings and premature hopes of Borgese’s work, it is the kind of sophisticated reflection needed to prepare the soil for any large-scale integration of the world’s nations. Such an integration may not be as desirable as it once appeared, but there is no question that a large amount of intellectual work needs to be done and that right now is the time to see what degree and type of global system best suits the nature and destiny of the human race. Even to speak in terms of human nature and destiny is to take a step in the direction of Borgese: most political scientists and theorists do not believe in either of those concepts. But for those of us who do believe that the human race possesses certain universal qualities and may flourish best where the entire world adopts a form best suited to promote human flourishing, Giuseppe Antonio Borgese’s name should stand as one of the shining precursors who reminded us that all is not getting and spending with us, nor are the low certainties of Realpolitik the last word on the relations of men in this world.

Leo Strauss on Plato and Power Politics

Don T. Asselin

Leo Strauss (1899-1973), Robert M. Hutchins Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Chicago, taught there from 1949 to 1967. Before coming to Chicago, Strauss was a member of the faculty at the New School for Social Research (1938-49); after retiring, he taught at Claremont Men’s College and was also an instructor at St. John’s College in Annapolis, Maryland. Some judge Strauss the most formidable political thinker of the twentieth century. Many think that his analysis of classical modernism constitutes a tour de force in political theory. Strauss believes that politics is not formed by knowledge of the good - he sometimes prefers the biblical couplet, knowledge of good and evil - can never become rational and humane. His arguments to this effect demonstrate that the standard liberal-democratic view of Plato (e.g., Karl Popper)“cannot be refuted”.

Strauss remains of interest not simply because of his wide influence, but also for two general qualities of his own thought. First is its profundity. Few have matched Strauss’ diagnosis of modern liberalism and so of the democratic nation-states of the West. The signs of ill-health include: an apolitical concept of human nature behind contractualist political thought (Hobbes and Locke); historicism in political and social thought grounded in Hegel and Marx; and amorality in twentieth century political theory (Anglo-American positivism as well as the humanistic elements of the thought of Nietzsche, Heidegger, and their followers). The second general quality mentioned above is negative, even if occasionally hard to separate from Strauss’ depth. It is his obscurity. There is an undue reserve; that is, Strauss does not complete his arguments and his criticisms of modernism by demonstrating the foundations and consequences of his criticism. This is due in part to another flaw: Strauss often does not separate his own voice from that of his champions, who include Xenophon, Alfarabi, Spinoza, and above all Plato. Last, Strauss largely fails to engage not only his abler opponents, but also partial sympathizers such as Adler, Arendt, Hutchins, Maritain, Simon, and Vogelius. Thus Strauss’ thought is
indeterminate on some critical points, but no less worthy of continued study.

In this paper, we examine primarily Strauss's Platonic concept of political legitimacy. This should enable us to judge his relation to other Chicago thinkers who supported world government after World War II. Available bibliographies indicate that Strauss published nothing directly on world government, nor the United Nations, nor its Universal Declaration of Human Rights. So our judgment of Strauss's position on world government must be indirectly developed. The legitimacy of philosophic rule and of philosophically enlightened aristocratic rule, as Strauss understands these concepts, is one sound angle of approach.

Strauss on Virtue and Philosophy

Following Plato's lead, Strauss tried to rescue the rationality and humaneness of politics. Strauss's target was the sophist-like threat to politics posed by modern liberalism in the forms already mentioned. Above all, Strauss's sympathy with Plato makes him oppose power politics. For also with Plato, Strauss accepted the natural fitness and privilege of philosophic rule. To Strauss, Plato's concept of natural justice means that human perfection consists in philosophic activity. To be more precise, philosophic activity is the highest human good, because humans seek only it for itself alone: «...Man is so well ordered that he can find satisfaction in his bliss in free investigation, in articulating the riddle of being». Strauss believes that philosophy and politics are in conflict. Politics requires authoritative opinion about man, nature, and the «whole» (Strauss's word for the cosmos). But philosophy would clarify, revise, or even reject authoritative opinion. Strauss also describes this conflict as one between true virtue and political virtue, between philosophic and common morality. Yet benevolent states, including modern liberal democracies, remain open to philosophic and aristocratic influence. Such states enable a second-best, a liberally educated, or philosophically informed rule. Even in this case, however, a conflict between what is philosophic and what is not strictly philosophic remains. For second-best regimes operate essentially upon «merely political or vulgar virtue». Thus Strauss believes that common morality in no way expresses true virtue. Not only does he call civic or common morality «merely political and «vulgar virtue», but he believes that noble civic persons actually dissemble true virtue: «...[Gentlemen have this in common with the wise

man, that they 'look down' on many things that are esteemed by the vulgar or that they are experienced in things noble and beautiful. Yet they differ from the wise because they have a noble contempt for precision...». From this perspective, Strauss defends a hierarchical politics. This hierarchy is grounded in the truly moral privilege of philosophers. Because true virtue has the best claim to political rule, the philosopher (or, failing this, the philosopher's sometime affiliate, the gentleman) should rule; and those having a passive, obeying form of virtue are to be ruled. The naturally just regime reflects the order of the soul. Reason rules with the aid of spiritedness (the auxiliaries), and the passionate element (the vulgar) simply is to be passive and ruled.

Setting politics within a Platonic concept of what is right or best by nature, Strauss can be expected to present a theory coherent with relevant parts of Plato's political philosophy and its basis in Plato's own «first philosophy». This is the theory of Forms. Plato develops full statements of the theory in the Republic, not only in Plato, Plato, Phaedrus, and Symposium, and in modified forms, in later dialogues. One of the theory's prime goals is to demonstrate the causal dependence of the visible world on the transcendent realm of subsistent (existing independent of the visible world) entities that Plato called ideals, «Forms». In Republic, Plato uses his conception of causal primacy in an extended way, in order to justify philosophic rule. Having come to know the entities (Forms) that make sense to objects and have come to know the Form of the Good (to tou agathou ideon) - the philosopher is naturally fit to rule. In this way, justice in the city reflects justice itself (dikaiosyne kath auton). Thus in philosophic rule, the Form of justice, itself dependent upon the Form of the Good, directly informs politics, making it the best according to nature. Or failing this, politics becomes the best it can be when the political ruler becomes philosophically. Turning to Strauss's express judgment on this «first philosophy», however, we find that he has little use for it.

The Forms and Agnosticism in First Philosophy

Strauss's own opinion about the theory of Forms as an element of Platonic first philosophy and foundation of practical philosophy is found in the chapter, "On Plato's Republic", in The City and Man. Citing Book Six of Republic as requiring the subsistence (existence independent of sense particulars) of Forms and their supremely intelligible status, Strauss writes that «[the doctrine of ideas which
Socrates expounds to his interlocutors is very hard to understand; to begin with, it is utterly incredible, not to say that it appears fantastic. Hitherto we had been given to understand that justice is fundamentally a certain character of the human soul or of the city, i.e., something which is not self-subsisting. Now we are asked to believe that it is self-subsisting, being at home as it were in an entirely different place from human beings and everything else participating in justice (cf. [Republic] 509d-510a; Phaedrus, 247c). No one has ever succeeded in giving a satisfactory account of this doctrine of ideas.1 In the following pages, Strauss argues that this doctrine is accepted readily by Adeimantus and Glaucon. They confute the subversive and causality of their gods with the same qualities in the Forms; they take the Forms to be their gods. Strauss acknowledges that there are important differences between the popular deities (e.g., Nike who is not this victory or that one, but exists separately and is the cause of victory in every victory) and the Forms understood as transcendent. One primary difference in his mind is a connection that Plato makes between «idea» and «nature». In his discussion subsequent to our extended quotation, however, Strauss glosses an essential metaphysical component in this comparison between the popular gods and the Forms: existence separate from sense particulars. He is interested in the rhetorical impact of the theory of Forms, how it prepares the minds of good citizens to acknowledge the rule of philosophy.2

Doubtless, that rhetorical impact was Plato’s intention in Republic. But there is also no doubt that this rhetoric has its own rationale, that the Form of justice is the standard of justice in the city. In fact, Strauss acknowledges this. So one is bound to be perplexed by his calling the theory of Forms «utterly incredible, not to say… fantastic». Does Strauss think that Plato, too, failed to give a satisfactory account of this doctrine of ideas? Strauss seems to advocate a hierarchical politics based upon the philosopher’s true knowledge in «first philosophy» and (ii) in some way to negate or offset one main Platonic reason for that hierarchy, viz. that the philosopher knows a reality higher than the city, existing independent of it, and also transcendent in grounding knowledge that is certain.

A look at Strauss’ exegetical position shows how unusual this reaction would be. He is not likely to criticize the theory of Forms as had Aristotle. The Stagirite’s own basic objection was to the subsistence of Forms. He adapts elements of the theory in devising his hylomorphic interpretation of nature. Against the Platonic doctrine, Aristotle’s hylomorphic makes

2 See City and Man, p. 120.
3 The attribute of subsistence is here taken to mean self-existence, existence independent of sense particulars and objects in nature. It goes without saying that what self-existence means is itself a complex and difficult problem. We are required only to indicate that there can be little reason for Strauss to deny or ignore the fact of subsistence. This in no way implies upon us the burden of clarifying in any more detail what subsistence means for Plato. (A fair review of scholarly opinion on this topic can be found in Leo Strauss, S.J., Participation in Plato’s Dialogues, The New Scholasticism 62 (1958), 125-49.)
subsistence-predicate is what bothers him most, Strauss effectively denies it any literal meaning. Thus what Strauss would preserve is (what he sees to be) the true Platonic instruments for overcoming power politics. These are the altered theory of Forms and the doctrine that the best men by nature are the wise, the philosophers.

Recalling Strauss's own position on philosophy as a form of knowledge, we find this alternative to be nearer his objective. For Strauss, to know 'the unchanging ideas' is to know the 'fundamental and permanent problems' confronted in the philosopher's quest for complete knowledge. Strauss connects (i) knowledge of the Forms with (ii) knowing fundamental problems by stating that the philosopher's goal of true and complete knowledge cannot be met. Thus in *The City and Man*, Strauss writes that the lack of completed wisdom 'necessarily affects knowledge of every part' of the philosopher's knowledge of the whole. On this basis, Strauss creates conceptual room to affirm the presence of the theory of Forms in all of Plato's mature works and to eliminate the belief that true knowledge of Forms is adequate knowledge of separately existing, subsistent entities. In this case, Plato's doctrine of the Forms as an instrument for justifying philosophic rule is preserved; the philosopher knows some ultimate truths of reality. Lost is that the philosopher adequately knows entities that transcend nature.

Let us describe this second alternative more fully. In Strauss's view, not only (i) Plato's Socrates but also (ii) Plato himself believes that philosophic wisdom is essentially knowledge of ignorance. According to Strauss, when in early, problematic dialogues, Socrates asks 'What is...?' questions, these questions are answered incompletely. And Strauss extends this problemmatic quality not only to all Platonic philosophy, but to philosophy as such. He believes that humans are torn between imposing order on the cosmos by the norms of mathematical knowledge and the productive arts, and 'the charm of humble awe, which is engendered by meditation on the human soul and its experiences. Philosophy is characterized by the gentle, if firm, refusal to succumb to either charm. In a similar vein elsewhere, Strauss defines philosophy with a view to this cosmologic ignorance: 'Philosophy as such is nothing but genuine awareness of the problems, i.e., of the fundamental and comprehensive problems... Therefore the philosopher ceases to be a philosopher at the moment at which the "subjective certainty" of a solution becomes stronger than his awareness of the problematic character of that solution.' In these two quotations, Strauss speaks in his own voice for philosophy as such. The reason for Strauss's alleged new interpretation of the Forms would be that philosophy is problematic cosmology. Philosophy so understood harmonizes one's human desire for mathematical certainty with one's awe at the human soul and its experiences. The reason is Socratic ignorance interpreted in a Straussian way.

But this implausibly interprets the Socrates of the *Republic*. The Socrates who therein outlines the theory of Forms is no agnostic. Plato's remarks about the downward path of dialectic in *Republic* (and on the consequence of knowing Beauty itself in *Symposium*) leave no room for saying that knowledge of other Forms is defective, incomplete, uncertain, or inadequate in any way. On the contrary, all subsequent knowledge becomes certain by the light that the supreme intelligible sheds. (See *Republic*, VI, 511 c; VII, 533 b-d.) Knowing supreme intelligibles, one knows how other things depend on them as on their supreme cause. The second alternative appears to be as un-Platonic as the first.

Nor is it likely that another form of the second alternative will help. Indeed, it has been argued that Strauss's metaphysical agnosticism - his belief that philosophy as such is a form of ignorance of the whole and also a wonder about the soul's cognitive nature - is in fact radical. Thus in his 'Introduction' to *Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy*, Thomas Pangle writes that 'the object of a 'What is...?' question [is]... inductively problematic'. Pangle claims that the problem remains 'even in those cases where we make the greatest progress in properly separating the beings' in question. Pangle judges that for Strauss the Platonic political philosopher suffers an acute conflict between the desires to speculate and to act in civic life. The question of justice, Pangle writes in defense of Strauss, must be seen from this perspective, because philosophy is in fact unique among human excellences. Philosophy good radically alters the notion of human good, and so of the common good. Philosophy is not naturally political, but is so by force. Justice would thus depend on philosophy, but not because of a cosmologic fitness between philosophy and power, or even because the ruler and ruled in fact need each other. No: citing Strauss's *What is Political Philosophy*, Pangle writes: 'philosophy is, above all, a unique way of life; and the authentic philosophers are human beings of a different kind from all other human beings'. Accordingly, one could maintain that justice is the philosopher's ruling, but remaining silent about his own agnosticism. So, in essence, Strauss's Platonic philosopher is not the agnostic whom we have indicated. He is at

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15 *Strauss, City and Man*, p. 21.
16 *Strauss, Political Philosophy*, p. 40.
18 Pangle, op. cit., p. 6.
19 Ibid., p 9.

least knowledgeable of his own ignorance and perhaps other aspects of his own noetic nature as a philosopher.

These objections avail little. If the Socrates presented in Republic is no metaphysical agnostic, then it is vain to plead that he is not completely agnostic. Nor is the Socrates of Republic a solipsist, or near solipsist, as in Strauss's belief that philosophy oscillates between meditation on the self and imposing order on the cosmos.

More important, there is an insufficient Platonic basis for Strauss's «Platonic» politics. Strauss in fact acknowledges Xenophon's influence for his belief that subsistence was a theological-mythical aspect foreign to Plato's real doctrine. According to Strauss, it is Xenophon's Socrates for whom «things are good in relation to needs; for whom something that does not fulfill any need cannot... be known to be good.» This Xenophonic agnosticism about Forms is no more Platonic than Strauss's equating knowledge of the Forms with knowledge of fundamental, insoluble problems.

Still more, for Plato any form of justice that combines (i) philosophic rule with, (ii), what we are calling metaphysical agnosticism, and also with, (iii), political silence of this agnosticism on the ruler's part, would be irrational and immoral; it simply would not be justice. If he were agnostic about subsistent Forms, the philosopher would have reason to conceal it, only if justice is a forced compromise. That it may be for Plato, but only from the subjective, anti-social interest of the philosopher. That is not what justice is from the objective, metaphysical viewpoint of Republic. True enough, Plato knows of the psychological egoism that makes the philosopher lose the politics. Yet to acknowledge psychological egoism is not to endorse moral egoism. Because it is irrational, the philosopher's disinclination from rule has no place in justice. According to it, one would turn justice into a power politics, philosophic moral egoism.

Finally, if Plato accepted agnosticism about the Forms and Platonic justice required philosophic silence about that, then again Strauss's position reduces to a power politics. When the philosopher conceals his agnosticism, he acknowledges that there is no basis for his power. But the regime in question presumes that his authority is based on true philosophic knowledge of the sort Plato speaks about in Republic. VI. Thus if Plato would reject agnostic-philosophic rule because it is an impossibility, he would also say, per impossible, that agnostic-philosophic rule would degenerate into a politics of self-interest. Such consequences are, for Plato, perverse. He would deny their premise, that the philosopher is agnostic and that justice requires silence of the fact.

*See Picard, op. cit., p. 5.


In sum, the more Strauss tries to resurrect Plato, the more he confounds Plato first with the historical Socrates of (some) early Platonic dialogues, and then with Xenophon's concept of Socrates. Yet as we indicated at the beginning, Strauss's view is neither modern nor post-modern; and we have noted that he disavows any stony natural law theory. From a viewpoint that is by intent Platonic, and plainly philosophic-aristocratic, Strauss rejects all modern and post-modern forms of power politics. He appears mainly to believe that regimes, aristocratic and with liberally educated rulers, are the most legitimate the more they are ruled philosophically. A study of Strauss on liberal education and aristocracy probably would confirm as much.

The Chicago Legacy and World Government

Our main results place Strauss outside the stream of other Chicago thinkers who formulated and criticized concepts of world government. It is safe to say that Strauss lacks fundamental sympathy with any form of universalism in politics. In one form or another, natural law concepts grounded the work of Adler, Hutchins, Maritain, and Simon. But disavowing natural law, Strauss defends «natural right». This form of politics, he often stresses, is compatible only with regimes small enough to depend on relations more or less directly personal. It goes without saying that the «universalism» of natural law does not ipso facto call for world government. The point is that Strauss is a neo-classical («Platonic») political theorist. He is not a natural law political theorist in the sense that natural law is a timeless element of any and all just governments; thus not of a world government.

Yet Strauss's concept of natural justice bears indirect consequences for world government. Notwithstanding the intellectual paradoxes of classic modern liberalism, Strauss respected modern liberal democracy. Its liberalism, he thought, allows aristocratic and philosophic influence upon political rule; at any rate, liberal democracy is not manifestly evil - as Strauss thought all recent totalitarianisms are. He believed that the more legitimate regimes are (other things equal), the smaller. Thus it is likely that the only form of world government acceptable to Strauss is a weak international federation. Such a federation, presumably, would be legitimate on the condition that contemporary liberal democracies are: that it be open to philosophic and aristocratic influence. In this event, Strauss would reject any pure democratic form at the international level.
Simultaneously, he would be unimpressed that the United Nations, for example, is a government whose individual representatives are, in many cases, liberally educated, aristocratic members of their own homelands. For one thing, this fact alone need not prevent the political form of that international federation from being purely democratic: it may only mean that the international federation operate aristocratically. For Strauss, this aristocratic function need be no more than an incidental good. The members (properly speaking) of the federation, which are governments and not individual representatives, might still be organized by the principle of pure democracy - on Platonic and Straussian principles alike, the merest shadow of good political rule.

Again, Strauss finds liberal democracy legitimate in part because it remains open to philosophic and aristocratic influence. Whereas this approval of liberal democracy does not straightforwardly eliminate pure democracy from being good government, still Strauss does not believe that pure democracy is good. In other words, to be good, democracy must not be pure; perhaps it must be something more like Aristotle's mixed regime. But even this regime - not itself democratic as such, but precisely, mixed - rests on a strong normative basis. It is that virtue, power, and number are, each in their own way, legitimate claims to rule. Strauss, on the other hand, wants to be committed to a deep Platonic form of legitimacy, moral (sc. philosophic and philosophic-aristocratic) excellence alone. For this reason, Strauss would think that modern political theory is incapable of formulating a sound idea of international organization. Rejecting also the natural law as a ground of (his view of) natural justice, Strauss probably would approve an international politics that operates something like this: those possessing true excellence truly have the privilege of power. Member-states formed by true excellence thus would have the privilege of acting according as they perceive their own best interests.

In practice, such a form of international organization probably is too weak to survive for long. To the extent that some democratic element defines the whole system, claimants to true virtue might simultaneously appeal to democratic tolerance and plead virtue to impose their will on other members willing to play by the rules. Such practical contradictions have in fact plagued the United Nations. Perhaps it was the prospect of such contradictions that made others at Chicago support a relatively strong international federation.

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that characterize the contemporary era, but is demanded by and supportive of that very autonomy. The notion of a Christian or Catholic democracy is thus perfectly viable; indeed, by rights the Church ought to be opposed to any form of authoritarian rule, above all fascism. The theme of liberty and law is an ancient one, but it is worth recalling Simon’s presentation; for much of his greatness as a philosopher lay in his ability to breathe life into well-known doctrines. As we will see, his central argument leads to a defense of federalism, as the government best suited to the temper of our times. It also demonstrates its limits, however, ones made ever more clear in the last thirty years. Simon aims to see better our current situation; he also challenges us to face its dangers.

The Central Argument

The basis for understanding the relation between autonomy and authority is a just notion of human freedom. Simon defends the classic Thomistic notion of freedom as self-determination. Yet he helpfully coins the notion of “super-determination” to define the causality proper to freedom. And he indicates how the indifference of power to true liberty radically differs from the “in-determination” that characterizes the weakness or perplexity of our liberty, a moat not to be confused with its essence.

Thus, he offers us a series of contrasting characters: a sick and a healthy man, an ordinary and a gifted student, an average and a born teacher, an unskilled and skilled laborer, a poor and a well-financed enterprise, an undeveloped and developed economy, a weak and a powerful nation. In each case, the second term is more powerful than the first; correspondingly, the second term is freer in its choices than the first. A healthy man can eat more food; a gifted student can find his way with less structure; the skilled laborer can choose from a greater job pool; a well-financed enterprise can afford to take greater risks with its capital; a developed economy can conserve its environment more easily; a powerful nation can ally itself in more ways.

Simon here illustrates for us a fundamental principle: freedom is founded on plenty, on active power. Nor is that power determined by the moral excellence of the person who possesses it. A virtuous healthy person still has enough foods he can eat; an honest skilled laborer still can choose from a variety of job opportunities. A just nation still has a number of ways it may choose to ally itself. Neither theoretical knowledge nor right desire can determine the choice at hand.

Thus, Simon is led to see the indispensable role played by practical wisdom (or prudence) in the determination of free choice. It is the intellectual virtue needed to determine our free will in relation to the contingent objects that confront us. And, precisely because these objects are contingent, the truth of the prudential choice remains incomparably constant.

The man of practical wisdom is confident of his decision not because he has deduced it, but because it conforms to his honest inclinations in this matter (MV 108, P 11-23).

Furthermore, as he brilliantly illustrates, the truth of the prudential judgement cannot be gained by future events. Thus, a father indeed has made the right prudential decision to take his family on a beach vacation... even if disaster accidentally befalls the trip. His decision cannot be held to foresee such an accident, and it remains a good choice, despite the bad outcome (NF 22). For the essence of a good prudential decision is not its conformity to what is the case (in this case, a future event), but its conformity with right desire. This is precisely the difference between theoretical and practical wisdom.

Now, the insight that Simon so lucidly develops is that this classic analysis of the prudential judgement is true equally, if analogically, in the political sphere as in the ethical. Free men, precisely as free, can determine their common life in diverse ways, even when they all arrive at the common good. While certain laws can be deduced from principles of natural law (namely those that make up the law of nations), many are to be specified as the society sees fit (NF n. 10). To take a simple instance, we cannot deduce what side of the road we should drive on (TDG 30). Yet it obviously is essential that a society agree about such a matter! Precisely because no deduction of the “right way” is possible, however, unanimity cannot be expected (NF 16). We thus discover our need to specify ways to accomplish common aims.

In this fashion, Simon deduces the necessity of authority for our common life. For to have the power to specify means to a common goal is to be endowed with authority: “The power in charge of unifying common action through rules binding for all is what everyone calls authority” (GT 4). Just as prudence is necessary to determine which way we should freely act, so authority is necessary to determine which way a group of free men should act. A statesman by rights possesses a political wisdom analogous to the practical wisdom that should govern individual choices. We need to live under and by the authority embodied in the
statesman not because we are weak or bad, but because we are powerful and good.

Contrary to the illusory goal of many modern «social scientists», therefore, there is no way of discovering the right way to «engineer» society for the best possible outcome (MV 8-12). This is a typical goal of overbearing rationalism, but it is illusory, for man possesses a greater excellence than the material objects of the physical sciences; that is, he possesses a plenitude of power that he can diversely determine. Freedom, then, gives rise to the necessity of authority, rather than its elimination.

The contrary notion - that authority diminishes the free - we become - mistakenly identifies the essence of authority with one of its functions. The modern animus against authority derives from assuming that it is always paternal, that it substitutes for the deficiencies of the subjects it rules (PDG 7). This is one of its functions, one that truly is based on the minority of the subject. It is right to see paternal authority as educating for self-government, and hence as diminishing in necessity when successful (NF 42-4). But this function is not essential to authority, whose proper basis lies in plenitude rather than deficiency.

For a free and honest man, therefore, desire to live under authority; for they want to achieve the common good, and they can see this is not possible without authority. They want to flourish together, co-operating in the daily tasks that make for life in common nobly pursued. They transmit authority to a governing power in order to enjoy and perfect their freedom (PDG 1 n. 23). Properly used, authority does not diminish man’s freedom, but enables and ensures it.

The Merit of Federalism

The argument so far advanced, and the distinction between the substational mode and the essence of authority, was basically given in Nature and Functions of Authority. In Philosophy of Democratic Government, he makes one more important distinction, namely between the essence of authority and what he terms its «most essential» function (PDG 59). He had previously argued that authority was necessary to specify the means to a common end. He now argues that authority is also necessary to ensure the very will of that end, materially considered.

His point here is subtle, but profound. It lies in distinguishing between the will of the common good taken formally and materially. The first is to be found in all honest men; the second is not. Authority must intervene from his mentor as well. Maritain had spoken of the will's «excess of motive power» in Une philosophie de la liberté. The following year, in his Sept leçons sur l'Etat (Paris: Téqui, 1934), p. 114, he was to speak of the «trop-plein» determinations of the free will. Simons indicates the parentage of his own expression in «Law and Liberty», p. 93, n. 5. Nonetheless, Simons, in making the expression «super-determination» a systematic part of his own exposition of this common doctrine, helps clarify its essential difference from the «in-determinations» of perplexity. He thereby highlights John of St. Thomas’ point.

> On the essential incommensurability of the prudential judgment, see NF 17 ff., and his Practical Knowledge, ed. by Robert J. Maltzak (New York: Fordham University Press, 1987), pp. 23-26. (This work is hereafter abbreviated in the text as PK). This is Aristotle’s classic position in his Nicomachean Ethics, VI (in particular 1138b: 15 - 1139a 14).
> Simon shows that Thomas and later commentators support the theory that the people transmit the authority to govern, which authority resides first in the people itself (see «The Doctrinal Issue Between the Church and Democracy» [note # 13]; 116-117).

He gives a number of examples to explain his meaning. Let us take his last example, from A General Theory of Authority (p. 58). Suppose a group of citizens is confronted with the possibility of a thoroughfare being constructed near their homes. Having children, they are naturally concerned about the danger increased traffic will bring. On the other hand, they recognize that the needs of the community may require a road to be built there. What should be their attitude towards this situation?

They cannot but be ambivalent, for these men and women are simultaneously parents and citizens. Supposing them to be virtuous, they desire the common good. They want the community to be well served by proper roads. They want its decisions to be settled according to law, and by due process. Thus, they stand ready to abide by any decision fairly reached. This indicates that they will the common good taken formally; they want the good of the entire community, and accept that this takes precedence over their own individual desires (in this case, for their families).

Yet, precisely because they are good parents, they do not want this road, and the increased danger it brings, to be placed in their community. It is good that they do not want this, for it bespeaks a proper parental love actively engaged. Thus, these families will do their best to see that this road is not built in their own back yard, if at all possible. Therefore, they do not will the common good taken materially: they want the individual good of their families to prevail, if this is at all possible.

It might be wondered whether it would not be better for these families to work for the common good taken materially from the very beginning (GT 59). After all, they are ready to abide by the community’s final decision. Yet this would be a mistake. Simon argues. For it would deprive the community properly of its vibrant life (PDG 55-6, CT 64-5). A good, a healthy, society is one whose citizens freely and spontaneously pursue the goods nearest their hearts. We cannot help loving our families and friends, those that are near and dear, in a way that is different from all citizens abstractly considered. This is in our nature. To ignore those interests in the name of this good is to short-circuit the proper direction of our human energies (PDG 56-9). It is to cut off the life-blood that ought to nourish the organs of the body politic.

Simon shows himself here a loyal follower of Aristotle against Plato (PDG 51-4). Unity and the pursuit of a good
in common can be carried to excess! Indeed, as Aristotle had noted, it can destroy the state, rather than form it. Simon also here indicates his debt to Proudhon, who resolutely fought against all centralization in government (NFP 53). But Simon notes that Proudhon wrongly supposed democracy was essentially centralized, because he conceived it after Rousseau’s notion of the general will (NFP 64). Another form is possible, however, namely Jefferson’s de-centralized democracy. 

And yet, if individuals and families are rightly to pursue their own goods (ever being willing to sacrifice them for the common good), there must be some agent whose concern precisely is the common good materially (as well as formally) considered (PGD 58, GT 62-3). This is the “most essential” function of authority, for it is precisely the task of the state to attend to such matters. He must make the hard yet fair decision that the road should go through these people’s yards rather than somewhere else. Without such authority, the common good cannot be carried through into concrete actions and will remain merely a disembodied ideal.

Thus we see the merit of federalism, as Simon presents it. For, by delegating authority to the state to determine the will of the common good materially considered, the people are free to pursue their goods free to the rich and the mysterious contingency of their personal existence (GT 67-79). The great advantage of federalism is its equal support and defence of freedom and justice (TLT 70-1, NF 44-5). Each social unit develops according to its own vital principles (the principle of autonomy or freedom); yet, it is subordinate to the higher unit precisely where a more all-embracing perspective is required (the principle of authority or justice). Without saying so, Simon is defending Pope Leo XIII’s doctrine of subsidiarity. He shows that Jeffersonian democracy elaborates an identical doctrine here, in concept if not in word.

We also see what Simon takes to be the modern enemy of Catholic social thought. It is not democracy, which can be its ally. Rather, it is an overweening rationalism set against the freedom democracy seeks to foster (NF 30-1, GT 65-7). The danger in the modern world comes from a force in it that aims at too great a unity, that imposes a standardization opposed to the contingency proper to human life. The great advantage of a federal concept of democracy lies in its opposition to this perversion of the true spirit democracy embodies. Without it, it would be at the mercy of the centralizing tendencies Proudhon rightly opposed.

The Limit of Federalism

If the authority of the state is properly limited in a federation, it is not thereby negated. Its authority is still supreme and its responsibility still tremendous. For the state exists for the common good. Such a power is needed, because there is no “invisible hand” working through individuals alone that guarantees justice: this is precisely the fallacy of classical liberalism. The people delegate authority to the state, therefore, as a way to ensure that the common good is intended both formally and materially, and is aggressively pursued. To succeed in this task even to some degree, however, is a daunting proposition. In order to see just how difficult this is, we must first properly understand the common good itself. The latter is not a product exterior to citizens, but an end in which they participate. Furthermore, this good precisely is common: all are benefited by the common good. The justice, the freedom, the peace of a community redound to all its citizens. These goods are established by common action and effect a true communion among all members of the state. They act together to secure true human goods (PGD 48-71). Let us apply this to his earlier example of the families fighting the thoroughfare. Suppose that a just decision is made that it go through their neighborhood. This decision redounds to their own good. They are committed to justice, and justice is being secured. Although they do not want to be unconnected, they do want to be so if this is the just decision of the community. In a similar way, a baseball pitcher will accept being pulled out of the rotation (however much he might want to play), if this will benefit the team; for all players have a share in the team’s victory.

Important of Simon distinguishes between the true common good and the pseudo common good of partnership (PGD 49). This latter involves a sum of individual goals and interests, but does not proceed from a common end or establish true communion (GT 30). The importance Simon attaches to this appears in Nature and Functions of Authority or «Liberty and Authority»; it is thoroughly discussed in Philosophy of Democratic Government (pp. 63-66) and then italicized in The Doctrinal Issue Between the Church and Democracy (p. 102); finally, in A General Theory of Authority, it becomes a chapter sub-heading (pp. 29 ff). Surely the reason for its growing importance in
Simon’s eyes was his sense of the formative influence and continued strength of individualism within contemporary democracy. From its point of view, the common good is merely the aggregate of private goods (PDG 50). A true communion of purpose and action remains illusory. This is to deny the very possibility of a common good.

Simon diagnoses the cause of this pessimism in the great difficulty all men have in agreeing upon the common good and upon its proper pursuit. The nature of justice or freedom (or truth itself) is notoriously difficult to grasp. Unlike positive or pragmatic matters, we seem unable to reach any consensus about such lofty goods. Such an absence of agreement leads many to sceptical and agnostic views regarding the most important of all political matters: the goals towards which we should work to achieve a good society (GT 100-31). No longer believing these can be objectively determined, people also lose confidence in the authority created to carry them forward.

To over-evaluate freedom and underestimate authority is the classic vice of democracy. The proper antidote to such tendencies is to build non-democratic institutions into the very fabric of government. Simon acknowledges that the mixed form of government is the best (and the one Aquinas favored) (PDG 105-06). He does not spend much space, however, discussing ways to balance democracy with such counterweights. His attention is primarily on combating totalitarianism. Today, having witnessed our sense of the common good erode even further, we see the clear need for such weights. Simon’s theory requires maintaining a two-fold vigilance: against a rationalism that buries freedom under a false uniformity and an individualism that undermines all sense of true community.

That Simon himself was aware of the danger the above forces posed to democratic life is clear from the following passage:

> Some call sheer murder what others consider altogether beneficial surgery; some call suicide what others praise as heroic sacrifice; some call exploitation and robbery what others understand to be the fully normal operation of the market, and some call violations of human rights what others interpret as the consequences of facts obviously designed by providence. Civil society cannot afford indifference to opinions on such subjects as murder, suicide, honesty in economic life, and justice and brotherhood in the relations between groups distinguished by color or language (GT 123-24).

Reading this, we see how well Simon foresaw the struggles that now beset us with a vengeance: abortion, euthanasia, economic injustice, racial prejudice and rioting. The democratic fabric of society is more and more torn apart by its inability to solve these crucial matters of the common good and reach a true consensus on them.

Just to take the most scandalous of these issues, a society that allows the systematic slaughter of its unborn members radically undermines its pursuit of the common good! One cannot help wondering how Simon - whose own burning, Proudhonian, sense of justice abounds in his writing - would have viewed this present crisis. He surely would have re-emphasized democracy’s need to inculcate that inferior discipline and sense of obedience without which there can be no true freedom (GT 148-55).

Here we reach the real limit of federalism: our present condition. We are sinners, not paragons of virtue. Nor does it take the light of revelation to see this palpable fact. Simon himself quotes Aristotle here. Referring to the supposed golden age attendant upon the abolition of private property, he observed that such legislation may have a spurious appearance of benevolence; men readily listen to it, and are easily induced to believe that in somewonderful manner everybody will become everybody’s friend, especially when someone is heard denouncing the evils now existing in states, suits about contracts, convictions for perjury, flateries of rich men and the like, which are said to arise out of the possession of private property. These evils, however, are due to a very different cause: the wickedness of human nature.

A knowledge of original sin is not required to see its effects! Plainly, we are inclined to false goods. Reason and passion war, with the latter being frequently the victor. It was again the pagan Aristotle who said that men are slavish in their tastes, preferring the life of pleasure appropriate to brutes.

This means, however, that we do stand in need of a pedagogue, of a paternal authority: one that can help lead us out of our moral darkness and help heal those wounds that destroy our moral integrity and defeat our pursuit of the common good. We must be willing to attend to such an authority and abide by it. And here, again, we see the weakness of a federal democracy: for, like all democracies, it inculcates a habit of mind that is suspicious of paternal authority. We again see the need to counter this with contrary habits that would dispose us to be open and obedient to a higher wisdom. Without God’s aid, no human government can be good.

We must also ask here whether Simon, in his exposition of the essential function of authority, has paid sufficient
attention to the paternal function that is now essential, in our fallen state. Certainly, he recognizes and teaches that ethics (and therefore politics) must be subordinate to the higher wisdom contained in Christian faith (PK 87-99). Yet Simon approaches the mystery of God very gingerly, particularly regarding practical matters. It almost appears as though even raising the need for God and His grace were to speak of a matter that transcended philosophy. Yet this is surely not true. Surveying our present condition, human reason can clearly see how desperate is our plight, how dependent we are on God’s aid. Rather oddly, Simon devotes little space to the difficulties surrounding the right relation between religion and politics, Church and State.

The Present Challenge

Simon’s entire doctrine is very much relevant to our present political situation, particularly in Europe. For federalism is in the air: in relation to the old Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and to the new promise of a truly united Europe. Does Simon shed some light upon our current dilemmas, offer some salutary counsel?

As a first point, we should note that he recognizes that certain states—due to their immaturity—may stand in need of a paternal governance (PDG 10-13). Self-rule is something that needs to be achieved; it is not automatic. No doubt, he would caution us regarding the rapidly changing situation in Eastern Europe. The dire consequences of insisting upon self-rule before its groundwork has been properly laid are plain for all to see. Turning to the proposed union of Western Europe, Simon’s philosophy appears to offer at least two counsels. First, a healthy federation is one that allows as much freedom as possible to member states. The model before him was principally the United States of America: a country whose states had a common language, law, and culture prior to their union. How much greater ought we to expect the differences to remain between the states of a federated Europe? If this does not prove to be so, we should suspect that a false rationalism is at work, killing the native energies that characterize a healthy state.

This leads to a second counsel: we must be watchful that partnership is not substituted for true community! The temptation for unified Europe will be to craft a union that is merely economic, and that does not really take seriously the pursuit of the common good. For all its manifold faults, America is based on an ideal: its union is as much spiritual as material. If Europe is content merely with reaping the material rewards of union, without seeking for a deeper spiritual union, it will only continue the trend towards secularism, materialism, and hedonism that is so prominent in the present day. It will thereby fail to aim for the true common good, which should guide its present political renewal.

Thus, finally, we can see that the real opportunity for Europe now is a spiritual one. What is demanded of it is nothing less than the revitalization of its Christian and Catholic faith. The Catholic kings and queens that led it for so long are largely a thing of the past. Power and authority have passed to the people. If they are to be worthy of these, they must turn them to good use. Yet they will be unable to do this save through the grace of God and the animation of a true faith. Europe can again become a beacon to the world. It can model that universal desire for international co-operation and peace to which the United Nations bears such eloquent witness. Yet, as the tragic divisions in Yugoslavia and the old Soviet Union make appallingly clear, this can only be accomplished through the incarnation of Christ’s love in us (see PK 137-55). Union must be sought, and sought heroically, at the deepest spiritual level, in God. Only then can we truly hope to enjoy the fruits of the common good; for which we all must deeply hunger—communion with universal nature, the conquest of time through everlasting faithfulness, temperance, dignity in poverty, holy leisure, contemplation.

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2 As he notes, ethics and politics are inseparable within an Aristotelian perspective (CT 139-140).

3 For a clear statement of the relation between politics and ethics, see his «Pour la notion de science politique», in La Vie Intelle

4 For remarks on the tension between Church and State posed by the legalization of divorce, see his «Beyond the Crisis of Liberalism», in Europe in Thom
ism, ed. by Robert E. Brennan (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1942), 261-286, p. 273, and his slightly different approach in Practical Knowledge (see note 18), p. 94. For a brief comment on the problem of censorship, see «A Comment on Censorship» in International Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XVII, No. 1 (1977), pp. 33-42. Also, see the remarkable comments contained in footnote n. 11 of A General Theory of Authority (p. 142) that outline what a society animated by Christian faith might look like. All these flashes of light are tantalizing in their brevity.
WORLD GOVERNMENT AND THE MAASTRICHT TREATY: MARITAIN’S VIEW

Pierre L’Abbé

As Maritain posed the problem of world government it was one of lasting peace. For Maritain and the Chicago School who penned the Preliminary Draft for a World Constitution in the 1950s, it was imperative to respond to the threat to a civilization which had just emerged from Second World War and was then exposed to the threat of a potentially much more devastating nuclear war. As all pervasive as the nuclear threat quite recently appeared to be, the problem of a lasting peace for the 1990s has taken on a very different character. Today, the perception is that the threat to peace comes not so much from international conflict, but from internal civil conflict. In the wake of the Soviet Union’s demise and the resulting realignment of power blocks, internal conflicts have arisen in Yugoslavia and several former Soviet countries. This shift has also affected internal conflicts in Somalia, Ethiopia, the Middle East and Cambodia among others. Further long-lasting civil conflicts continue in South Africa and Palestine. And it is felt that if totalitarian regimes in Latin America, Africa and Asia were to be lifted, further civil strife would result.

How a world government would respond to internal civil unrest was not a primary concern of Maritain or the Chicago School. Yet, the various international bodies as they exist today (the U.N., the European Community [EC], NATO, and the Commonwealth of Independent States), as fragmentary as they may be, have all found themselves dragged into the role of peacemakers. Even though these groups seriously attempt to offer stability to peace efforts which are achieved domestically, in practice they are in the role of gently coercing peace propositions and are then obliged to put troops in place to support such initiatives. What is evolving in a practical way both in terms of international co-operation and in terms of establishing lasting peace is by way of a very different route than that envisioned by Maritain and the Chicago School. What is evolving is a groping towards peace through trial and error methods. And usually only when peace efforts are thought to be in the best interests of those who maintain the balance of power. Maritain and the Chicago School would have preferred a thought out plan which first established the

principles of co-operation then brought the peace efforts of an international federation to bear on the problems at hand.

Maritain clearly saw that the achievement of an international federation would be the work of future generations, and he recognized that it would not come about without many attempts and trials and errors. From one point of view, the Maastricht Treaty, a proposal for political co-operation hitherto unseen between consenting states, might be seen as one important step in this process. Even if the EC should never succeed in ratifying Maastricht, it will have provided an essential lesson in international cooperation: that economic interdependence cannot progress to the degree it has in the 20th century, without countries becoming involved in each other’s internal political affairs.

Maritain’s proposal for one such effort in the process toward a world government was a supranational council which would offer unsolicited and just advice. In respect to this proposal, Maritain expressed a fear (in part a sarcastic one) that the proposal perhaps suffered from making of reason an authority. Indeed the same might be said of the Preliminary Draft for a World Constitution and much of the theorizing on world government of the thinkers represented in this issue. If developments in the EC are to be examined from the point of view of elements contributing to the lengthy process toward a world government, then it must be said that these developments, in contradistinction to the rational theorizing of philosophers, have come from the bottom up; they are the fruits of practical efforts in the trial and error methods of international cooperation. The latest of these developments, the Maastricht Treaty offers something of a rapprochement with the political theory of philosophers because it recognizes that economic cooperation cannot exist independent of a theoretical framework for political cooperation.

The Nature of Nations

One of the most troublesome issues in deciding upon the nature of world government is the nature of the national integrity of the countries within it. Perhaps the single strongest irritant to national integrity, at least in times of peace, is economic interdependence. It is clearly the single strongest, and some would say only, impetus for European unification. Shortly, before the European push toward unity began with the Treaty of Rome in the 1950s, Maritain observed that economic interdependence was blurring the lines between national identities. What he found to be

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1 Maritain borrows from Adler on this point. See David W. Hoel's contribution to this issue, "Maritain and World Government".
particularly problematic was that this interdependence was not agreed upon. Economic interdependence thus offers an affront to national integrity, particularly to countries with relatively limited economic clout. An international federation, according to Maritain, could preserve international balance and fairness in the area of economic interdependence.

The view which has evolved in the European context on the nature of national integrity comes from an entirely different point of view from Maritain's concept of the body politic (which can foster civil liberties and the common good). In Europe where language, religion, cultural traditions and territorial integrity have all served as the basis for drawing national boundaries and where linguistically and culturally hybrid countries, such as Switzerland and Belgium exist, a consensus has emerged within the context of EC law making that what constitutes a country is simply whatever elements have historically evolved into a workable unity. Although Maritain would disapprove of the utilitarian aspect of this consensus, the European situation is nevertheless tending away from what he describes as one of the principal evils of the State, the Hegelian (or pseudo-Hegelian) concept of the State as a person. The obvious danger is that the modern State assumes the right to its own preservation and growth in power by whatever means. In this way, the State takes on a position superior to that of the body politic. In the United States, Hutchins' battle against Senator McCarthy, through his work with the Fund for the Republic, as Wallin shows, provides an example of how the State, or proponents of a static view of the State, can promote its preservation to the point where it denies the legitimate political aspirations of the people within, Hutchins' attempts to preserve the full scope of civil liberties against McCarthy represents a real attempt to allow the body politic to define its own national identity.

After the issue of economic interdependence, issues of security are perhaps the most problematic for the preservation of national identity. Both Hutchins and Borgese advocate that an international federation take on the premier role in the area of security. Their insistence on this point was directly affected by the experience of the Second World War and the consequent desire to prevent any country from amassing a dangerous military force. Even though Europe experienced the terrible devastation of this war, the proposals of Maastricht suggest a different solution. They would see individual countries maintaining their own independent militaries, as their proper insurance of national integrity. Yet, at the same time, the EC would develop a common defense policy which would have the flexibility to incorporate the positions of countries with an expressed neutrality, such as Ireland and Switzerland.

Maritain's position that a world body politic would have to be a pluralist unity fostering the diversity of particular bodies politic (MS, 209), would be compatible with the Maastricht proposals on security from the point of view of the plurality they foster. Economic interdependence is itself a mechanism of plurality in the way it demands that one country be exposed to others in trade of goods and services as well as in the movement of labour. Thus in the European context a pluralism is evolving in many aspects of national identity and this pluralism is part of the fabric of the European federation in a way Maritain saw as necessary for a world government.

Within a pluralist world federation there must be some assurance that not only will the national integrity of the body politic be respected but that it will also be able to pursue independent growth in a direction of its own choosing. As both Torre and Asselin have argued in this issue, with respect to the positions of Simon and Strauss, an international federation must be empowered to allow the maximum independence for member states. For Strauss in particular this would mean a minimal scope of operation for a world government. With the Maastricht Treaty the EC has for the first time directly addressed this issue. Its formulation of a solution to the problem comes by way of the concept of 'subsidiarity', according to which the Community will only take action on an issue if it cannot be properly handled by member States. Although very true that conflicts over independence and the spheres of authority of States in a federation would occur under any form of world government, Maritain points to the positive aspect of world government for independence that nations would be able to achieve a higher level of independence than they could enjoy otherwise because their internal political life would be free of the economic and political pressures placed upon them by rival nations (MS, 211).

The Nature of Persons

The difficulties in making the shift from the current order of international relations to a world government seem almost insurmountable given the complications of interdependence, both cultural and economic, and complications of assuring national integrity. In the face of these difficulties Maritain proposed that the shift to a fully
political world society would be impossible without a change in the inner structure of human morality and society. This change he held was the only way to create within people a common will to live together (MS, 206). Borgese also recognized that such a change was essential to the introduction of a new world order. And as Royal shows, this change was central to Borgese’s thought, in which a “spiritual excellence” or the “advancement of man” becomes the common goal of mankind. Maintain did not believe that such a change could come about on its own, rather he saw this growth or development in human morality as something which would come about over time and through a period of maturation and education (MS, 213). Similarly, as Wallin has pointed out, Hutchins saw a role for education in leading people to a better society. For Hutchins this role was also somewhat protective in that it could work against the ever present threat to civil liberties which was entailed in the advancement of technology and the concentration of political power.

From Maintain’s point of view, the most important aspect of this internal change in human morality for the success of a world federation would be that people should become aware that living together as a world-wide unity was worthy of self-sacrifice. Particularly for the peoples of more advantaged nations this would mean the acceptance of real suffering for the love of the common good. On a national scale this acceptance would have negative impacts in that the free business and wealth of some nations would have to be curtailed in order to work towards the good of the equalization of the standard of living throughout the world (MS, 207-8). As Torre has shown, Simon has closely examined this problem of the conflict of the promotion of the common good considered from the perspective of the immediate and the broader community. When considered from the point of view of the entire community, that is the common good formally considered, the good of the broader community would take precedence over individual desires. There is, however, a natural propensity in people to purse the good of those closest to them and to insure that they are not disadvantaged by the desires of the broader community: this being the common good materially considered. This need to care for those who are near cannot be discouraged for it is the very source of the desire to protect the interests of the broader community. The fact that these types of conflicts exist both at the level of families and communities and at the level of nations and international relations is an argument for higher (or broader) forms of government. An international federation would be responsible both for the maintenance of freedom and justice within the union and unlike the nation is bound to do, it would not promote the advantage of one unit in an internationally competitive environment.

The case of Switzerland and its consideration of taking up membership in the EC provides an example, very apt for the consideration of the merits of an international federation and the conflict between pursuing the benefit of the immediate community as opposed to the broader community. Leaving other arguments aside for the moment (such as the benefit of membership in the trade bloc, and protection of Switzerland’s neutrality), arguments surrounding questions of equality and the standard of living have been a major reason for Switzerland’s not joining the community, although it has been eligible to do so since 1973. The Swiss feel they have achieved a good for the citizens of their country in a high average standard of living and low unemployment. These benefits have come not without self-sacrifice on the part of some Swiss for the benefit of all. Even if the standard of living and employment could be protected with membership in the EC, they fear that the relatively narrow margin in salary range throughout the country would disappear on account to the introduction of cheap labor. Thus a measure of equality they have been able to create in their society is threatened by an appeal to join a larger community. In part, this appeal is based on the principle of creating a more equal society for all of Europe.

A similar charge has been directed at the EC as a whole. That it is attempting to create a power block of its own which will be economically superior to its neighbours and that it will promote the equality and standard of living of its own citizens at the expense of its competitors. The EC has, however, allowed into its ranks such countries as Greece, Ireland and Portugal, while it could have gone the route of excluding weaker countries and held out for the inclusion of the economically strong Scandinavian countries and the Swiss. The probable future membership of such countries as Poland, Hungary and Turkey also demonstrate that the principle of equality is to some degree alive in the philosophy which holds the Community together.

Nevertheless, it is very true that much of the impetus behind the EC is negative. While platiudities of European fraternity are sometimes alluded to in connection with the need to bind Europe together in a political union, it is clear that a major driving force behind the movement to unionization has been the desire to create a power block which
would rival the American and (until recently) Soviet power structures. In fact, the recent push for a political treaty was largely spurred on by the demise of the Soviet empire, and the recognition that without its presence as a threat, achieving political union would be more difficult. An additional negative impetus was the recognition that a unified Germany might be so strong that it would not require the cooperation of its European partners. Therefore, the fear was that unless European unification was achieved in the near future, an independent Germany may emerge as the dominate European powerhouse. This negative impetus would give Maritain cause for alarm since he saw one of the essential benefits of the anticipated fundamental change in the structure of human morality as its bringing about a positive creative rationale for people to live together. He did not believe that the fear of negative consequences could hold an international federation together. Torre's perspective on the European situation is similar in that he offers the caution that if Europe does not attempt to create a spiritual union, but only tries to reap the material rewards of union it will continue on a trend toward secularism, materialism and hedonism.

Maritain carried his apprehensions about the consequences of founding an international federation on a negative footing one step further. He feared that any effort to create a world state without a world political society's will to live together would result in war and not peace (MS, 212). While not so extreme, recent attempts to ratify the Maastricht Treaty have shown that when pressure is applied countries may opt not to join. The EC has always had to tread carefully so as not offend national pride. The Danish rejection of the Treaty in a national referendum has shown that when coercion is felt the Community becomes a useless diffuser of nationalism (EC, 14).

**Steps Toward World Government**

Maritain believed that it was possible to start a germ of political preparation for the foundation of a world political society. His own suggestion for such a germ was a supranational advisory council, a type of superior agency which would be deprived of power but which would have unquestionable moral authority. Its only function would be the offering of ethical and political wisdom. The members of the council would be equitably and proportionally selected from across the world by means of direct election and nominated by institutions and governments. Once they became members of the council, they would lose their

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11 Boccaz also tried to counter a range of negative motivations for creating a world federation. See Common Cause, (NY: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1943), p. 391.
eration to include agreements on foreign policy, security, health, education, the environment, industrial and consumer protection, immigration and common law on the treatment of workers. These elements made the EC much more than an economic community, however. Maastricht also proposes strengthening economic union with a single currency, a central bank and national budgetary limits (EC, 9-13).

In so far as the EC is an international federation, the Maastricht Treaty has introduced a check to the Community's power. The Community had hitherto been a government in Brussels accountable to a parliament in Strasbourg directly elected by Europeans. Maastricht, however, proposes that a Council of Ministers, appointees of national governments, be ultimately responsible for many of the new political powers of the Community, such as foreign policy, policing and immigration. This introduction of "government by member states" introduces a check against Brussels itself becoming a power base, which would promote its own ends. This solution once again shows that the EC has developed out of practical considerations of cooperation and not from the introduction of a rational plan of how best to run an international federation. One of the lessons of Maastricht, however, does show a real move toward the ideas of Maritain and the Chicago School: that economic cooperation cannot exist without a theoretical framework establishing political cooperation.

As Maritain pointed out, it is the reality of economic interdependence that has created the need for an international federation. Such an international federation would allow for a pluralist society which itself is the best assurance of maintaining national integrity. Under an international structure, nations could gain a greater degree of independence because they would be the free of the need to protect themselves from the encroachment of rival countries. The ability to achieve such an international federation, according to Maritain, is however dependent upon a change in the inner structure of human morality. And such a change is necessary for there to be a common will to live together, without which the fears that would normally bind people together will not succeed in achieving a lasting federation or peace. In a limited way, Maastricht has shown that a practical process of economic cooperation can lead to the realization that a political agreement with a theoretical framework is necessary if there is to be real cooperation for the material benefit of all people.
PUBLIC OPINION AND ATTENTIVE CITIZENS IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES: A DISCUSSION

Sergio Fabbriini

A preliminary distinction

It is difficult to deny that for at least twenty years the western democracies have been undergoing a period of significant political change. A "silent revolution" (Inglehart 1977) has progressively changed the structure of the values and the forms of political behaviour that predominate among citizens; structures and forms that developed in the course of the complicated historical process leading to the full maturation of these democracies. Naturally this "revolution" has been (and is) internal to democratic regimes and has not affected their essential natures. There is now a considerable body of empirical data available that bears witness to the change that has occurred in values, just as there are numerous indicators of the changes that have taken place in political behaviour.

The starting-point for analysis of such change is public opinion. Within the institutional sphere that organizes the "points of view" of citizens vis-à-vis the res publica, public opinion acts as the barometer for the political system. It is in fact the expression of the set of values that guides citizens in their political behaviour, which orients their electoral choices, and which more generally justifies a particular political order. There exists, therefore, an insoluble link between public opinion and democracy, since democracy necessarily entails the consensus of citizens; and public opinion is the locus in which such consensus progressively takes shape. As Easton (1965) has pointed out, consensus can give origin to different forms of political support - that is, it can address itself to one area rather than another of the political system (which, as we know, Easton sees as consisting of three different levels: "political community", "regime" and "political authority"). Again, support can have diffuse or specific features: it can, that is, in the former case take the form of a "state of mind" favourable to the general functioning of the political system or, in the latter case, take the form of a selective political endorsement of particular courses of action adopted by the government. The changes I refer to have altered the forms of political support by diminishing its diffuse type (which concerns the "political community" and the "regime") and by accentuating its specific type (which is inevitably oriented towards the concrete performance of the "political authority").

Obviously, changes in patterns of support, and hence transformations in public opinion, have a well-established vehicle for their expression: the vote. Public opinion, Sartori reminds us (1987a, 184) "is precisely that opinion that the citizen manifests in his role as a voter (...) without free elections, opinion is disarmed and the consensus of opinion is only presumptive". However, while recognizing the inevitable link between public opinion and electoral behaviour, one should also bear in mind that this link is by no means an unconstrained one: its institutional organization (i.e. the features of both the electoral system and of the party system) determines the electoral form that any change in public opinion will take. In other words, such change may not find "electoral" opportunities to express itself (or at least express itself fully) because of the inadequate party structure of the political alternatives on offer to the electorate. After all, voters are the decisive actors in the political arena, but their power of choice is institutionally constrained by the existing alternatives, to the definition of which they do not contribute in any substantial manner.

One must therefore distinguish between public opinion and electoral behaviour, precisely because changes among citizens may find different ways (i.e. ones that differ from voting decisions) to express themselves. And it is on this distinction that I shall base my arguments concerning these changes.

Public opinion: the elitist approach

I begin with Sartori and his model of public opinion. In contrast with both a classical tradition of studies (ranging from Locke to de Tocqueville and to Mill), which stressed the sovereignty of the democratic citizen, and with a more recent tradition of empirical studies (Key 1966), Sartori builds, with his customary rigour, a model intended to provide a realistic representation of public opinion. This latter, Sartori argues, generally comprises inattentive, under-informed citizens with distorted perceptions, who may be even wholly ignorant of issues pertaining to the res publica. On the basis of figures published in 1962 and 1963 (and results of empirical research conducted in the latter half of the 1950s), Sartori argues that proportion of the adult population that deserves the label of "informed" amounts to no more than 10-20 per cent of the total; a figure
that does not differ greatly from the one that Key arrives at for his category of «attentive public», the existence of which is considered - not only by Key - as essential for the functioning of a democratic regime.

Whereas Key endeavours to understand analytically the paradox of a democracy comprising both a limited attentive public and a diffuse rational citizenry, Sartori resolves the paradox by adopting a wholly elitist model which stresses the central role of leading minorities («elites and counter-elites») in shaping the beliefs required to orient and sustain the rational government of democracies. From this it follows that mass publics are generally incapable of developing systems of articulate beliefs and wind up by becoming «dependent variables of elite belief-publics» (Sartori 1987b, 118). Or, better, these latter reveal themselves to be «fully able to manipulate the mass public» (Ibid., 118). In other words «one may presume that mass belief systems are inherently (or, in the English version - 1969, 407 - «are likely to be») largely amorphous and undifferentiated with respect to the ideology-pragmatism distinction» (Ibid., 119). Hence it is equally plausible that the label («ideological» or «pragmatic») attached to «mass beliefs» is largely decided by the elite belief systems to which the mass public is exposed (Ibid., 119). Nor is Sartori's use of Deutsch's «cascade» model (which certainly countenances a «top down» shaping of public opinion but with constant «bottom up» counteraction) able to attenuate the rigidly elitist character of his approach to analysis of public opinion.

The feature which Sartori takes to be an unconditioned element in the democratic political process (i.e. the autonomy of elites and the dependence of the masses; the self-directed nature of the beliefs of the former and the other-directed nature of the beliefs of the latter) Key, by contrast, sees as a feature conditioned by the process's institutional structure. An example is provided by the electoral process: it is true, Key admits (1966, 7, italics mine), that many individual voters behave in an «odd way», yet «in the large the electorate behaves about as rationally and responsibly as we should expect given the clarity of the alternative presented to it and the character of the information available to it». If nothing else because the electorate can pass retrospective judgement on the behaviour of elites (Key's acute insight of «retrospective voting» was later given full scientific treatment by Fiorina) and therefore assesses the «mismatch» between promises and achievements (although one should not forget that Key was writing about a well-established, alternating two-party system).

The elitist approach to public opinion has a practical - so to speak - outcome of great importance, which should be looked at very carefully. Other-directed, dependent and misinformed public opinion is not considered to be a constraint on democracy. On the contrary, it is a condition for its very existence. On the basis of the premises set out above, Sartori draws a crucial analytical distinction between «negative» public opinion and «positive» public opinion. The former, which epitomizes the general condition of public opinion in the representative democracies, gives substance to the model of a «governed democracy», while the latter, which probably makes its appearance in particular and brief historical periods of fierce social and political conflict, gives substance to the model of «self-governing democracy». There is no escaping the fact, of course, that Sartori based his article on the public opinion of 1979, at the end of a decade marked - in Italy especially - by a major impulsion towards political participation among citizens, which was responsible to a large extent for the referendum explosion of the late 1970s. It is against this explosion that Sartori writes, as if it was the precursor of a new «model of democracy».

It is not my purpose here to justify the reasons for this referenda period, nor to defend the referendum as an institution and as a necessary instrument (at least in consensual democracies like Italy) for broadening the scope of the only (and generally accepted) possible model of democracy: the representative model. Rather, my interest lies in evaluating the analytical postulate that Sartori, and with him other authors of the elitist school, uses as the basis for his argument in favour of «governed democracy». This is an analytical presupposition that generates a necessarily and appropriately negative view of the democratic citizen. «Negative» public opinion is in fact an opinion that is strongly emphatic in saying «no», in stating its preferences «without information»: in brief, it is a public opinion that resists the governors and is watchful that they «don't govern badly». Thus individual opinions of the «masses» appear to be influenced very little by information, since they are merely anchored in reference groups, or better they have been shaped before they encounter such information.

Moreover, Sartori and the elitist school maintain that democracy only requires autonomous public opinion, which need not necessarily be informed. The electoral process cannot be legitimated on the basis of the rationality of the vote that it bestows on citizens, but only insofar as it serves the sole purpose of regulating competition within
the elite. Thus, in the majority of western countries (to a lesser extent in the two-party systems and to a greater extent in the multi-party ones; to a lesser extent in systems with predominant pragmatic beliefs and to a greater extent in those with predominant ideological beliefs); the voter casts his vote according to his position on the right-centre-left axis. That is to say, he or she votes for a party on the basis of the image that it projects of itself and therefore according to where the party is located in political space. Whether this is "rational" or not is of no importance: elections, after all, do not decide issues; they decide who is going to take decisions about such issues. What is of importance is that the opinion of citizen as expressed electorally should set (possible) limits on the (deviant) actions of the elites. In brief, rationality lies in the electoral mechanism, not in the electorate.

Let us return to Key. Although he reasons in terms of a two-party system with the maximum simplicity of choice, Key shows that voters do in fact also vote on the basis of policy considerations (that is, one may say, on the basis of the remedies proposed or the results achieved relative to a given issue of public policy); they do not primarily (and always) vote according to party positions in political space. Thus at the end of the nineteen-fifties, in a scientific climate favourable to the elitists, Key not uncontroversially asserted that the (American) voter in many cases started from his/her own policy preferences concerning a particular issue, gathered information concerning party positions on this issue, and then voted for the party or candidate closest to his original preference. Certainly, adds Key (1961, 461-462), this interpretation runs counter to easy generalizations to the effect that the voter is a bozo at the mercy of slick operators. Certainly some voters magnificently fulfill the specification, but the motivations that bring many people to a decision about their presidential vote include a policy component.

Thus all voters, and not just the "attentive public", are able to form opinions which are not generically autonomous but specifically matched to the problems that interest them most (or affect, or involve them most), and that therefore provide the basis for their voting choices. Hence there is no need to counterpose "negative" public opinion with the artifice of a "positive" public opinion - that is, the opinion of a public fully informed on all issues and therefore able, in Sontori's view, to take the place of the elite in government. In other words, there seems to be no plausibility (even for polemical purposes) to the model of a "self-governing democracy", in which public opinion constitutes itself as a deciding demos and with an electorate endowed both with information about all political issues and with knowledge of the most suitable measures to deal with them. In brief, rather than conceive of one single "positive" public opinion, it might be more fruitful to consider numerous specific "positive" public opinions; public opinions that form around specific issues and, within such limits, are able to "propose-pilot" the government's actions (not just resist its misdeeds).

This is a highly unconvincing aspect of the elitist approach: the assumption, as the target for its polemic, of an improbable model of a democratic citizen and an equally improbable model of participatory democracy, thus avoiding having to deal with the more articulated models of representative democracy. Key's contribution has been to indicate an analytical path whereby such simplifications can be avoided - also because he is a procedure organized around concepts such as "attentive public", "institutional constraints", and "retrospective vote" which seem able to handle the paradoxes of democracy. Thus, if we recognize that public opinion is internally articulated, and if we recognize that this articulation is horizontal as well as vertical, then it becomes difficult to argue that its only internal division is between elites and masses. A fortiori it is difficult to argue that, by definition, only elites are able to form "firm" or pragmatic beliefs (i.e. generalize both strong emotional states and open cognitive states), while the masses can only succumb to "fixed" or ideological beliefs (i.e. to beliefs marked by strong emotions but also by mental attitudes of equally strong closure). In other words, the problem of the "form of beliefs" cannot be dealt with in general terms, but has to be examined in the light of the issues against which such beliefs are measured.

Changes in values and political behaviours

Let us take a step forward. If the reductive nature of the elitist model of public opinion is analytically weak, it appears even more inadequate when its analytical structure is measured against the changes that have occurred in public opinion since the war. These changes have been engendered by two fundamental processes, which merit careful examination. The first process has been an unprecedented (in terms of its extent and nature) cognitive mobilization of the population; the second has been a mobilization of public resources, also without precedent, intended to guarantee the welfare of the citizenry. Increased educational opportunities and the raising of levels of schooling,
combined with the development of systems of mass communication, have inevitably spread (firstly and mainly among young people) new attitudes towards and a more sophisticated awareness of political issues. Thus increasingly broad-ranging state intervention and increasingly widespread public responsibility (there is no important aspect of social relations that is not influenced by state action and there is no social problem of any significance that such action does not seek to remedy) have focused greater citizen attention on political issues because “politics matter” - that is, politics has a direct impact on the lives of citizens.

Now, it is within this structural context (very different, one should remember, from that of the first fifty years of this century which provided the setting for the Schumpeterian-style elitist analysis illustrated above) that discussion on the features of modern democratic public opinion must be conducted. Citizens more cognitively mobilized and more conditioned by the state than they were in the past must inevitably display new value systems and new forms of political behaviour.

In fact, what was emerged from wide-ranging empirical research conducted at regular intervals over the last twenty years in the advanced democracies (of Western Europe in particular) is a qualitative transformation in their value structures - that is, a progressive shift from the predominance of values associated with economic growth and material well-being to the predominance of values associated with the quality of life and individual freedom (Inglisart 1990, ch. 2). Of course, this has been a shift, not a radical overturning of hierarchies of importance. Nevertheless it has been of sufficient significance to signal a more general change in the "cultural climate" of the societies of advanced democracy. Schooling and information have fostered the spread of an individual rationality, while the "feeling of security" bred by public welfare programmes has in its turn encouraged this rationality to search for greater personal satisfactions in life, work and politics. The distinction between "materialist values" and "post-materialist values", which Inglehart and his associates have drawn on the basis of their research findings, refers more exactly to the opening up of a political split in public opinion; a split which is not so much concerned with material interests as with life-styles and perceptions of individual roles in society.

This split would have been impossible without the rise of the modern welfare states, which have encouraged the processes of mobilization outlined above (Fabbri 1988). In this sense, it is a phenomenon that has acquired non-contingent features and moved increasingly to the centre of political conflict. The split between "materialist" and "post-materialist" values has brought out cultural contrasts which could not and cannot be explained in terms of established patterns of class ideologies. It is sufficient to cite the conflict over gender: cognitive mobilization has broken down (or, at any rate, has greatly reduced) differences of political role based on sex, and has brought into the political arena a sector of citizens for whom traditional political conflict has very little significance. Women's entry into politics could not and cannot take place solely through a broadening and adaptation of the traditional channels of political participation. Their entry has entailed a reorganization of the political system along gender cleavage, so that the issues associated with it can be fully developed (and at the same time governed).

It is improbable that this split will only open up at the level of party competition, given the institutional persistence of political systems structured around a different set of cleavages; even though not negligible changes are currently in progress. The point to remember is that although it is difficult to give a political interpretation to changes in individual behaviour, this should not be mistaken for the fragility of those changes, and even less that they cannot institutionalize themselves. The general decline of political participation in the advanced democracies (and in the United States in particular) has become something of a commonplace (although it is also the "strong" component in the elitist argument). By collapsing political participation into electoral participation or participation in party affairs, not a few commentators and researchers (Di Palma 1970) have suggested that economic and cultural development will inevitably foster apathy and indifference to politics (interrupted by periodic explosions of activism). After all, increased well-being may plausibly lead to a privately-oriented exit of individual preoccupations, just as increased information may plausibly generate a plurality of individual interests which traditionally have been monopolized by political affairs. It is not surprising, therefore, that citizens are reluctant to flock to the ballot box (in countries where voting is not compulsory) or to attend party meetings and rallies (in countries where more stimulating entertainment is on offer).

This argument fails to deal with both the institutional link (which I have already emphasized) between values and political behaviour and the specific relation that has arisen between the ratio of cognitive mobilization and that
of traditional forms of political participation. If cognitive mobilization has encouraged the spread of an individual culture of the difference ('every individual can make the difference'), traditional participation continues to emphasize mass involvement ('it is the number that makes the difference'); if cognitive mobilization has emphasized the culture of individual influence (also because an individual has the cultural resources necessary to achieve his/her purpose) traditional participation continues to presuppose an individual influence that has been named (casting a vote every few years) or at any rate subordinated by the influence of large-scale aggregates (ranging from social classes to interest groups). Hence the new splits in values find it difficult to achieve a political form: both because the political system is unable (or unwilling) to represent them and because the rationality that orients (and justifies) their functioning seems to bear very little relation to the rationality that orients and justifies the behaviour of important sectors of the citizenry.

It must be stressed that discussion of the rationality of a political system does not imply talking about "hot air" (Simon 1963, ch. III). In this case it means talking about the criterion that the elites claim necessarily governs the way in which relations internal to a democratic political regime (and which are probably internal to every regime) pattern themselves; the integration of the citizenry into politics (or, if one wishes, the integration of the masses into the state) under the control of the elites. Thus, to use the expression of Dalton and Inglehart, this means talking about "elite-directed political participation" - that is, participation determined by them and with objectives set by them. One may perhaps disagree with Dalton and Inglehart's assertions that through cognitive mobilization "(a) balance between elites and masses that was upset centuries ago is in the process of being redressed" (Inglehart 1990, 340), or when they claim that this mobilization has laid the basis for a crisis of faith in modern democracies, "... a crisis of faith which is not primarily a crisis of the public spirit, but a crisis of the political process" (Dalton 1988, 241). Nevertheless, while remaining within the bounds of representative democracy and while acknowledging that the existing representative democracies do not appear to be on the brink of collapse, one can concur with analysis that points to the inadequacy of present forms of the political integration of citizens.

Among these citizens, in the societies that concern us here, there is an unprecedented number of non-elites equipped with considerable political skills; non-elites, that is, that have demonstrated their ability to promote initiatives and to build communicative (and organizational) networks outside the normal channels of political participation. Thus those of them that display a strong interest in (non-conventional) politics seem at the same time to show little identification with (traditional) politics. In some cases certain of these non-elites have experienced accelerated political socialization in non-conventional areas (the mass movements of the 1960s); in other cases other non-elites have had direct experience of the ineffectiveness of traditional political participation, from which they have been alienated. The point is, as Tarrow (1999) has brilliantly explained in relation to Italy, that the political skills acquired through these different experiences have not been dissipated. Instead they have merged with new political awareness and have contributed to the consolidation of a fabric of initiatives and political membership justified by commitment to specific and significant issues rather than by identification with a political party.

Issue and policy publics

The fundamental features of the context within which to conduct analysis of political beliefs should be clear by now. It is a context characterised by a peculiar process; the number of citizens interested in politics is increasing, while the number of citizens not identified with any particular party is decreasing. It is this dual and contradictory process that has been responsible for the change in patterns of political support. With the decline in the number of citizens identified with and loyal to the elites (i.e. "massified" in that their political and electoral choices are guided by group ties and not by autonomous decisions), and with the growth of independent citizens (i.e. "individualized" in that their choices are based on autonomous judgements), some sort of shift has occurred in political questioning loyalties ("diffuse support") towards better-informed and less conditioned loyalties ("specific support"). Evidently the key element in this process has been the rise of a group of citizens which, while politically sophisticated, has not been mobilized by any existing political institution - that is, a group that has mobilized itself around a set of specific issues, many of which were ignored by the existing political institutions. Let us now return to Key and his basic research framework: first that there is a large number of (American) citizens committed to a particular issue and who therefore vote according to a policy preference relative to that issue;
second that in a democracy (in every democracy) a decisive role is played by that proportion of citizens defined as "attentive publics". Let us apply this framework to the changes described above. Empirical research has revealed the existence of political tendencies that, individually, seem to confirm Key's analysis: an increasing number of citizens identify with a political issue; they thus constitute its attentive public. Of course, there is a significant difference between these studies and Key's work: when Key talks of "attentive public" by this he means a general section of the population which is generally interested in politics.

The extremely interesting result of these research studies is that in the advanced democracies there does not (and probably cannot) exist a general "attentive public", but rather a plurality of specific (i.e., committed to specific issues) "attentive publics". Why, probably, can a general "attentive public" not exist? First because of the cost of interest in politics: being politically interested requires time, information and knowledge— that is, it entails the use of resources that citizens may not possess "in abundance". Committing one's interest to one issue (or to a limited number of issues) is a way of balancing the costs and benefits of such interest, and thus of making more profitable use of such resources. Second the effect on political culture of cognitive mobilization seems, with its individualistic implications, to have been the fostering of suspicion of large-scale political aggregations not directly controllable by those who belong to them. Thus, this rise of a plurality of issue publics can be interpreted as the response of cognitively mobilized citizens to the complexity of modern politics.

The form of political beliefs should therefore be measured against the individual issues with which the citizen chiefly identifies him/herself. In other words, as Flanagan (1982) puts it, every citizen is sophisticated on one particular issue but not on others: that is, to use Sartori's terminology again, one can legitimately claim that on specific issues we can find "firm beliefs" among groups of citizens who do not belong to the political elite. Of course, it is highly improbable that Sartori would recognize this, given that a pre-analytical presupposition of his is that a citizen who does not belong to an elite but who is politically committed "...does not see, does not want to see, the pros and cons: he only sees in black and white, with good entirely on one side and evil entirely on the other. In politics, the highly "intense" is therefore nine times out of ten - the dogmatic, the sectarian, the fanatical" (Sartori 1967a, 198).

It would be beyond the scope of my present analysis to comment on this presupposition, which has in any case been the subject of wide and critical counter-argument (Barber 1984) demonstrating, amongst other things, the link which has historically evolved between the degree of institutional openness of a political system and the rate of ideologization (assuming the ideology-pragmatism continuum) of citizens not belonging to the elites. Cognitive mobilization has snapped this link by revealing the rigidity (i.e. the low level of institutional openness) of the political system (in advanced democracies in general), and by showing the inverse relation that holds between ideologization and "cognition".

Of course, this is not to argue (nobody would) that there is a necessary connection between educational level and pragmatism; indeed there are (and will probably continue to be) many cases of educated but ideological publics, just as there have been numerous examples of the opposite case: uneducated but pragmatic publics. Nevertheless, in the experience of the western democracies, the development of cognitive mobilization has led to the formation of citizens committed to finding the remedies best able to deal (technically or, better, in terms of policy) with the specific issues that happen to concern them at any particular time and which displays an open but strongly emotional cognitive stance: even though, naturally, one must also mention those cases (until today in the minority) of cognitively mobilized group of citizens interested in specific issues but which has not been impervious to fundamentalist temptations. Thus the "form of beliefs" must be empirically investigated for each specific issue public; this being also because the "pragmatic" effect of cognitive mobilization may differ in intensity from issue to issue.

Issues, therefore, are the common coin of modern democratic citizens: it is to issues that citizens address their attention and it is around issues that they mobilize and organize themselves. The political resources available to any substantial number of citizens generate the "bottom up" and ad hoc mobilizations (to use Inglehart's terms) that have been a distinctive feature of the political scenario of the advanced democracies (from environmentalist and anti-nuclear movements to those for immigrant rights; from "right to life" movements to anti-drug ones).

Neither should one forget that issues have also become the common currency of electoral campaigning: now that the strategists of communication have realized that citizens make their choices (apart from basing them on the images of the candidate - an argument that goes beyond
my present scope) according to how closely a party (or a candidate) reflect their issue and policy preferences. Hence the parties themselves now increasingly tend to identify themselves with a single issue, or a limited number of issues, precisely in order to increase their visibility in the eyes of the electorate (an example being the Italian Socialist Party-PSI and its aggressive anti-drug campaign). Thus, elections (if organized within an appropriate institutional framework) may come to function as mechanisms where by not only is selection made among “beams of leaders”, but also among competing policies on specific issues.

Moreover, the position that a citizen takes up on a single issue is determined not only by his or her values, but also by contingent political factors. Consequently the size of an issue public reflects the importance of that particular issue in the citizen’s hierarchy of values; but it also reflects the significance it acquires because of exclusively political (and party) reasons. Hence the nature of the beliefs that a given issue reveals is also influenced by the amount of political-party polarization provoked by that issue. Thus the ideological intensity of beliefs relative to a particular issue may change with time. The progressive rise of “issues politics” and the progressive decline of “party politics” has generated new kinds of citizen mobilization which differ in both features and form from what they were in the past. As regards the former, mobilization has acquired features of discontinuity, of overlapping and of transversality. Mobilization by issue does not require organizational stability of the agencies that promote it: it can be encouraged by a combination of issues that overlap and which therefore have overlapping issue publics (take, for example, the issues of the environment and nuclear energy), and it may stimulate the sideways activism of citizens belonging to different social groups with different political memberships. After all, mobilization by issues involves citizens “who think in the same way” on each issue and does not entail the constitution of stable and long-lasting political identities and organizational loyalties.

As regards forms of mobilization, these (especially those concerning certain issues neglected by existing political parties) have taken on unconventional features (with respect to the tradition of continental Europe), ranging from noisy, non-violent protests to more silent community action and voluntary work. More in general, the forms of mobilization adopted by non-identified citizens have proved well-suited to action in unstructured areas of the political system (or, at any rate, in those areas where party constraints are weaker). They have also—since mobilization is designed to achieve specific and limited objectives—fulfilled their purpose of giving transitoriness to the mobilization itself. More generally, these new features and forms of mobilization have been able to promote political relations that are not directed by the elite.

**Democracy and institutional innovation**

The coexistence of politics directed by elites with other politics seeking to direct such elites requires the building of an institutional framework able to harmonize and use both of them to revitalize representative democracy. Yet this institutional framework does not emerge from the transformations we have discussed. Not only this, there are voices and interests that maintain, in keeping with their elitist inspiration, that the problem is not one of adapting the institutions of democracy to more demanding citizens, but rather one of cutting back on such demands in order to make existing institutions more governable.

In reality, despite these positions, western democracies cannot hope to adapt to changed citizens—also because, in the final analysis, democracy has been made for the citizens, and not the citizens for democracy (Schatzrieder 1975, 132). Therefore the problem of institutional innovation must necessarily be tackled if encouragement is to be given to the formation of a political order more in harmony with the citizens that constitute it (Pasquino 1990). This problem has not escaped the attention of a liberal thinker like Dahrendorf (1987: Italian translation 1988, 225) who, addressing those who share his political convictions, writes that “one of the principal tasks of liberals at the end of the twentieth century is to create institutions which give meaning to liberty. Not any institutions whatever, but ones such that their meaning is evident, or at least may become evident”. After all, the German British scholar adds (Ibid., 226), “we should not forget that building institutions is a nobly human activity... It is important to stress that the meaning of an institutional arrangement lies precisely in its capacity to promote and to guarantee the freedom of citizens—that is, to encourage their conscious participation in political life. In conclusion, the problem of institutional innovation must not be confused with the replacement of the model of representative democracy with one of improbable participatory democracy: the problem requires appropriate reformist action able to make the institutions of representa-
tive democracy more flexible, more receptive to change and, simultaneously, more able to give such change clear and responsible governmental direction. That this institutional adjustment will be a painful one is entirely predictable; that it will proceed by «fits and starts» is also entirely predictable. What cannot be predicted, however, is whether the outcome will be necessarily and invariably in equilibrium, necessarily and invariably coherent with the initial intention. This is where politics intervene — that is, traditional actors or otherwise with their ballast of political culture, with their courage and with their capacity for foresight.
COMPTES RENDUS


Il y a des personnes que nous n'avons jamais connues directement et avec lesquelles, des années plus tard, nous nous découvrons en profonde communion de pensée et d'idéal. C'est ce qui m'est arrivé avec la riche personnalité de Sergio Paronetto. Je connaissais son nom et je savais le rôle qu'il avait joué dans la vie économique italienne par son poste à l'I.R.I. (Institut pour la Reconstruction industrielle) aux moments les plus difficiles de la guerre et de l'immediat après-guerre. Et, plus près de mon champ d'action personnel, je savais la part si importante qu'il avait eue dans la création et l'orientation du « Movimento Laureati » de l'Action catholique italienne, l'ancêtre et le modèle du Mouvement international des intellectuels catholiques de « Pax Romana », auquel j'ai consacré une bonne partie de ma vie. Et je connaissais surtout la meilleure part de lui, cet esprit d'élite qu'est Madame Maria Luisa Paronetto Valier, celle qui fut « hélas, pour si peu de temps » son épouse.

Maintenant, en lisant les pages captivantes du livre qu'elle vient de dédier, j'ai eu de plus en plus cette sensation de rencontrer une âme soeur, de retrouver dans ses écrits tant de pensées qui me sont familières, tant d'idées communes qu'il a si bien élaborées et si solidement exprimées.

Plus de la moitié du livre - 174 pages sur les 306 - figure comme une Introduction à un choix de textes, connus ou inédits, de Sergio Paronetto. Mais en réalité elle est beaucoup plus que cela; cette introduction constitue une étude complète de sa pensée et de son action, faite avec compétence et amour par celle qui l'a le mieux connu et qui possède le trésor de ses archives personnelles, en plus de ses confidences. Me serait-il permis de dire que, malgré l'importance et la rigueur des textes publiés, je préfère lire l'exposé introductif ? Ici, les textes sont placés dans leur contexte, illustrés avec une riche documentation historique et accompagnés des commentaires qu'ils ont suscités. Mieux encore: ces textes, qui datent de cinquante ans en arrière, ont été relus et repensés, décanetés et mis en valeur, en 1990, avec la sensibilité de quelqu'un, l'auteur du livre, qui a vécu intensément ce demi-siècle d'histoire politique et religieuse de notre monde.

Le premier chapitre (« Una vita nella storia ») n'est pas qu'une biographie de Sergio Paronetto, mais aussi une réflexion sur l'impact que les événements ont eu sur lui et celle de l'impact qu'il a cherché à avoir sur les événements de l'histoire italienne, depuis l'attentat dont, jeune militant de la FUCI (Fédération Universitaire Catholique Italienne), il a été victime de la part de quelques fascistes enragés en 1931, jusqu'à la rédaction des rapports qu'il adressait à De Gasperi sur les problèmes de l'Italie à peine libérée du fascisme et de l'occupation allemande. Suivent, tout au long des chapitres II, III et IV, la réflexion économique, la réflexion politique et la réflexion religieuse, qu'ici prend la forme de son engagement dans l'action catholique.

Deux grands principes fondent l'idéologie sociale et économique de Sergio Paronetto, ceux-là même qui mettent en évidence le sous-titre du livre: la liberté d'initiative et la justice sociale. Ils sous-tendent et orientent tous ses commentaires et ses propositions. Et je voudrais en ajouter un autre, qui me tient à cœur et que la doctrine sociale officielle de l'Eglise n'a reconnu que tardivement et non sans peine: la constata- tion de « la valeur essentielle du facteur économique dans la détermination des destinées des peuples », pour dire avec ses propres paroles (p. 23). Point n'est besoin d'être marxiste pour reconnaître le rôle central de l'économie dans la vie des hommes, comme l'ont fait, finalement, les événements des États-Unis dans leur Lettre pastorale de 1986, Justice économique pour tous.

Mais Paronetto, dans sa thèse de docteur de 1933, arrivait déjà: « Nous pouvons, dans un certain sens, appeler providentielle l'apparition de la conception matérialiste de l'histoire, qui, avec des déformations et des exagérations, affirme l'interdépendance des faits politiques et économiques » (p. 25).

Cette « découverte » de l'importance de l'économie dans la vie des hommes ne va pas sans la découverte parallèle de ce qu'on peut appeler « les exigences chrétiennes en économie ». Car il est un grand devoir d'articuler dans son journal intime en 1930 déjà: « qu'on approfondisse l'insertion de l'éthique dans la vie économique, dans les individus, dans la société, dans l'État » (p. 66). Détailler les faits économiques de l'ensemble des actes humains demeure la base même de la science économique. Mais cela ne doit pas nous amener à considérer l'acte économique comme un fait en soi, isolé. L'activité économique est une activité humaine, comme telle, immerse dans la vie morale. C'est pourquoi le vrai sujet de l'économie n'est pas l'homme économique dans les clas- siques de l'école hégémonique, mais l'homme tout entier, avec ses raisons, ses passions, ses habitudes et ses instincts, en tant qu'il participe de la vie économique. Et Paronetto de conclure que seul le « personnalisme peut nous montrer la voie pour parfaire l'éduc des rapports entre l'économie et la morale, qui peuvent être relativement clairs pour le moraliste, mais ils le sont beaucoup moins pour l'économiste » (p. 68a).

Economiste avant tout, Paronetto dénonce l'insuffisance des élaborations théoriques qui n'ont pas comme fondamentale la solide l'analyse complète et exhaustive des phénomènes et il postule la nécessité de descendre de la généralité des principes à leur application dans la complexité de la vie (p. 23). Ce qui amène l'observateur conscient à se rendre compte des actes - et même des systèmes - d'injustice, devant lesquels l'homme pauvre et petit s'insurge avec rage, tandis que nombre de bons esprits, chrétiens et même diçcne, en prennent aisément leur parti (p. 66). Dès lors, la valeur absolue de la justice sociale prend place au premier rang de sa construction doctrinale, à côté de la liberté d'initiative qu'il revendique face à toutes les tentatives dirigistes et face aux coalitions monarchistes. Liberté économique, certes, mais non pas une conception froidement juridique de la liberté qui ignore les exigences de la justice sociale (pp. 108-109).

Cela peut paraître aujourd'hui une affirmation obsolète. Elle était pourtant tout à fait nouvelle, pour ne pas dire révolutionnaire, en 1943, pour l'ensemble de la doctrine sociale chrétienne. Comme il le dira dans une lettre à Igino Giordani, « persister dans le refus de parler de justice dans les rapports sociaux et seulement de collaboration dans l'acceptation (des faits économiques) et de la résignation, signifie laisser de côté un aspect fondamental de la doctrine de l'Eglise et, surtout, de la théologie morale et du droit naturel » (p. 139).

La conséquence en est que l'on ne peut pas livrer l'économie à l'automatisme aveugle du jeu concurrentiel, mais que l'État doit intervenir pour discipliner les forces libres et les préserver des abus de pouvoir des requins de l'économie. Ce qui importe est de libérer l'entreprise privée des entraves du corporatisme fasciste et du collectivisme communiste. C'est-à-dire lutter contre les privilèges économiques de quel- ques-uns et protéger l'autonomie et l'initiative du travail. Tel est l'apport de Paronetto attribué à l'intervention de l'État en économie (pp. 75-78). Ainsi conçue, l'intervention de l'État n'est pas seulement nécessaire.
re dans des moments pathologiques et transitoires; elle répond à la normalité de la vie économique, comme une exigence intrinsèque du système libéral actuel (p. 59).

Liberté et justice, en politique et en économie, aucune de ces thèses n’a perdu aujourd’hui sa validité. Cependant, Paronetto n’avait rien d’un pur théoricien. S’il s’est livré à des profonde réflexions en matière de morale sociale, d’économie et de politique, ce fut toujours en vue de l’action. Une action qu’il a exercée, en économie, de son poste de responsable au sein de l’I.R.I. aux heures difficiles de la transition du fascisme à la démocratie. Dans la vie politique son intervention fut plus discrète; d’une part parce que son engagement dans l’action catholique l’empêchait d’être un homme de parti, d’autre part parce que sa santé chancelante l’obligait à écrire plus qu’à agir en public. La longue série de ses articles, de ses journées, dans Azione fucina et dans Studium, sont la pour prouver la profondeur et le courage de ses opinions. Spécialement, l’article intitulé « Morale professionale del cittadino » (Studium, août-septembre 1943), reproduit in extenso dans le livre que nous commençons (pp. 177-185).


Un intellectuel orienté comme lui ne pouvait pas manquer de rencontrer des espaces frères dans la pensée catholique de son temps. Il en fut ainsi avec Jacques Maritain, le Maritain de Christianisme et démocratie, ou avec Tristan d’Atayde (Alceo Amoroso Lima) dont il traduit pour Studium en 1942 les Fragments de sociologie chrétienne, parus en français dans les Questions disputées de Ch. Jourdain et J. Maritain en 1934. Mais la rencontre décisive fut celle de Alcide De Gasperi. Ils ont eu des réunions clandestines dès les premiers mois de 1940. Elles sont devenues ciment d’une amitié profonde qui a conduit Paronetto non seulement à une adhésion à la fois critique et constructive aux idées et aux programmes de De Gasperi, mais aussi à sa collaboration personnelle à l’élaboration des programmes eux-mêmes (p. 97 ss.). Comme une simple apostille, pour montrer la lucidité politique de notre homme, je voudrais citer une phrase d’un de ses carnets intimes, où il prêche la vertu d’autorité des papes et la dissolution de la classe politique (p. 99).

Il reste l’engagement fondamental de Sergio Paronetto en tant que catholique. Il s’est accompli au sein des mouvements universitaires de l’Action catholique italienne, la FUCI et le « Movimento Laureati ». Il appartenait à cette génération d’esprits qu’avait formés un grand animateur, Monseigneur Giovanni Battista Montini, celui de Vittorino Veronese, d’Aldo Moro, de Fausto Montanari, de Federico Alessandri, de Silvio Golcio, de G.B. Scaglia, de Vittorio Grifoni, d’Alfio Mauro, avec leurs anciens compagnons Emilio Guano et don Francisco Costa, ceux qui ont constitué l’intelligentsia catholique italienne du milieu de ce siècle. Le rôle de Paronetto dans ce groupe a été aussi surtout celui d’écrire pour orienter.

Il n’est pas de préoccupation dans ce domaine, fait de bien délimiter la fonction des laïcs dans la mission salvifique de l’Eglise, avec le dialogue constant et nécessaire entre la culture religieuse et la culture profane, entre les théologiens et moralistes et les personnes engagées dans les professions temporales (p. 133). Sachant, bien entendu, que les laïcs dans le monde assurent en chérissant les risques de leur métier. A quoi servirait la vie sociale pour ne pas impliquer l’Eglise dans les contingences politiques: distinction bien claire entre les entreprises propres de l’Action catholique et celles de type politique, dont l’institution ecclésiale doit rester soigneusement éloignée (p. 151).

Il est la plus importante à laquelle son nom reste attachée la préparation et la rédaction de ce qu’on appelle communément le Codice di Consalboli. Fruit du travail d’un groupe très nombreux de collaborateurs, ce furent Sergio Paronetto et Pasquale Seracini qui en assurèrent la rédaction définitive et c’est Paronetto qui en a rédigé entièrement la Présentation (reproduit ici, pp. 286-294). Ce n’est pas pour un Code proprement dit, de style apodictique, et moins encore d’un catechisme, qu’il s’agit. Son but était de tirer des affirmations de l’enseignement officiel de l’Eglise, qui dans son magistère général s’adresse à tous les peuples de tous les temps, celles qui résultent spécialement adaptées aux contingences historiques actuelles, en tenant compte particulièrement des problèmes posés par la reconstruction d’un ordre social, après le collapsus de la guerre. C’est pourquoi le petit livre s’appelle Per la comunità cristiana. Principi dell’ordinoamento sociale et il fait appel à toutes les observations, critiques ou propositions que l’on voudrait lui faire.

Et une apostille encore qui, comme celle de tout l’heure en matière politique, montre la clairvoyance de Paronetto; dans une note personnelle adressée à Monseigneur Montini, il exprime sa crainte de voir le Saint-Siège s’engager dans des investissements industriels sans en voir les conséquences techniques indispensables et courir ainsi le risque de se prêter au jeu, non des forces économiques, mais d’un amas de spéculateurs privés de la paire espèce (p. 71).

Ramon Sugranyes de Franch


Il vaut la peine de s’arrêter un peu plus longuement sur ce nouveau volume, le XII, des Oeuvres Complètes de Maritain, parce que les ouvrages qu’il contient appartiennent à la période 1961-1967 sont parmi les ouvrages les plus importantes de Jacques: Carnet de Notes, Le mystère d’Israël, Le peuple de la Gaume, Dieu et la permission du mal. De la grêle et de l’humanité de Jésus.


Rédige le Carnet de notes nous est fait revivre
dans l'intimité des Maritain quelques événe-
ments-clés de leur vie. Je pense spécialem-
ment aux « vieux souvenirs » du début, où
l'on retrouve l'influence que joua sur eux
Maurice Maeterlinck - c'est grâce à lui qu'ils
eurent connaissance de La femme panou de
Léon Bloy, ce qui les amènera sous peu à la
foi et au baptême. La page que nous citons
est emouvante, on y découvre déjà comme
en filigrane la présence invisible de Dieu:
« Raissa et moi nous avons clairement senti
après la lecture de Maeterlinck, rentrés dans
la chambre, appuyés sur la fenêtre, penées
vers l'air léger et des couleurs indécises de
des montagnes, et de la ligue pâle et continue
et vivante de la route, nous avons, l'une bes-
sure, clairement senti notre vériété à nous
deux dans le définitif. J'écris ceci pour fixer
to mon souvenir le cadre sympathique et la
situation extérieure; mais ce qui s'est passé
à l'intérieur est métaphorique et divin. La sincé-
rité absolue, l'harmonie profonde de nos
âmes nous ont rempli d'un bonheur inex-
hensible... » (p. 145).

Feu d'hommes ont parlé comme Mar-
itian du Mystère d'Israël grâce à Raissa, il
le portait dans son cœur et dans sa chair. Sa
profonde méditation nous ramène à St Paul
et aux trois chapitres de son Epître aux
Romains qui nous remettent en mémoire
que « les dons de Dieu sont sans repentan-
tce ».

Le Puy de la Ceranne a fait beaucoup
parler en mai de Maritain; on lui a reproché
son retour en arrière. Quel erreur! Maritain
ne s'est jamais montré aussi jeune et libe-
tr qu'en écrivant ce livre de vieillesse. En
lisant le préface choisi qu'il met en exer-
çage, « Ne prenez jamais la bête trop au
sérieux », je revois son sourire malicieux de
« vieux laca » qui n'a plus rien à perdre en
disant crûment ce qu'il pense et en mettant
les pieds dans le plat pour dire quelques
vérités essentielles.

Nous trouvons aussi le court texte De la
grace et de l'humanité de Jésus, dans lequel il
met si bien en valeur ce qu'il avait déjà écrit
en L'invocation créatrice dans l'art et la pré-
se, sur le superconscient de l'esprit, cette
trouille générale pour ce qui concerne
la psychologie humaine et qui touche intime-
ment la personne même de Jésus-Christ,
dans « la sphère de la conscience et dans
celle du superconscient divinisé » (p. 1087),
- et il critique St Thomas d'Aquin de ne pas
suivre St Luc (252) qui dit que Jésus crois-
ait en sagesse, en âge et en grâce devant
Dieu et devant les hommes, lorsqu'il glisse
ces paroles en affirmant que la grâce du
Christ ne pouvait augmenter; il l'excuse
néanmoins en reconnaissant que la philo-
sophie de son temps manquait d'un instru-
ment adéquat.

Le volume se termine, comme toujours,
par une série de courts textes de témoigna-
ges et de débats qui sont tous de fer pur,
comme des notes de musique et de poésie
qui rendent le livre plus léger.

J.F.N.

C.J. Pinto de Oliveira, Ethique chrétienn,
dignité de l'homme, Editions
Universitaires Fribourg Suisse -

L'époque actuelle s'interroge sur les
fondues éthiques de l'action. Elle hésite
sur les valeurs qui doivent déterminer les
comportements sociaux, prisonniers du
que démeure de l'appréhension qui fait voir en
Dieu un concurrent de l'homme. L'on ne
compte plus maintenant les œuvres des
théologiens qui ont affronté ce problème.
Celle du père Pinto de Oliveira occupe
une place spéciale parmi toutes ces contri-
butions au renouvellement de la pensée
céllnique.

L'ouvrage Ethique chrétienne et dignité
de l'homme livre au lecteur une double expe-
rience, celle du dominicain brésilien qui ne
voie pas les problèmes de la société con-
temporaine à travers les seuls yeux de l'Oc-
cident, et celle du théologien qui a consacré
sa vie à la réflexion sur le lien qui peut
exister entre les problèmes de la société
actuelle et l'affirmation d'une transcendant-
ce. Les différents chapitres de ce livre met-
ten en lumière que la dignité humaine est la
clé de ces questions; elle est en effet la
valeur fondatrice d'une éthique du com-
portement que pousse celui qui s'y soumet
t à entrer en communion avec les autres; elle
le fait rencontrer avec les divers partenaire-
es sociaux pour une recherche commune
de ce que doit être l'église et l'application
de la justice, de la liberté et de la solidarité.
Bien que ces valeurs n'aient pas été inconnues des temps anciens, elles consi-
tent aujourd'hui le fil conducteur que doit
suivre la conscience chrétienne désireuse d'inviser l'absolu des valeurs dans les cir-
cunstances présentes de l'existence. Leur
contenu a été enrichi et, parfois, transformé
du fait que les conditions nouvelles de l'ex-
istence ont fait découvrir de nouvelles pos-
ssibilités de vivre la liberté, l'égalité et la
solidarité.

L'idée générale qui vient d'être présen-
tée est développée au cours de 20 chapitres
qui s'articulent en trois parties: dignité de l'
homme, créê créateur à l'image de la com-
munion divine; Église, communion et com-
munication; engagement responsable pour
la justice et la libération. Le premier partie
préside les fondements historiques et théo-
logiques de toute la réflexion entreprise;
le chapitre sur l'image de Dieu y occupe une
place spéciale car il permet de com-
prendre comment la pensée moderne s'est
détachée des fondements que le christian-
isme avait donnés à la civilisation occi-
dentale; point de vue repris dans le chapit-
re 3, notamment dans l'opposition entre
Michel Ciry, La vie est une ombre,

Un autre volume qui s'ajoute à la lon-
gue liste des titres du Journal que Michel
Ciry a écrit à partir de 1942, en racontant
dans une sincérité totale le laborieux che-
mien de sa création artistique multi-
forme, comme peintre, comme dessinateur,
comme compositeur musical, tout en ex-
primant des jugements critiques sur la lit-
térature, sur le cinéma, sur le théâtre, sur
la musique, sur la politique et sur la religion,
sans le moindre reticence psychologique et
ingue une rigueur morale digne d’un disci-
ple de Bloy et de Bernanos.

Dans la suite des 15 volumes publiés
chez Plon, on constate une interruption
relative à la période de 1949 à 1967; elle est
maintenue récupérée par ce premier livre
qui donne les annotations journalières du
16 juillet 1949 au 31 décembre 1952, dans
une publication qui respecte sans aucune
variante la structure originale du manu-
script. De cette façon il est possible au lecteur
de retrouver les états d’esprit de l’auteur, de
le suivre dans ses oeuvres, ainsi que dans
ses voyages, dans ses visites aux musées,
dans ses réactions aux premières théâtra-
les, dans ses amitiés et dans ses rivalités.

Ce volume, comme le précédent Le temps
des promesses (1942-1949) et les quatorze
qui l’ont suivi, aux titres fréquemment pro-
vocateurs (Le temps du refus, L’approche du
soir, Au plaisir de Satan, Le temps des faux
dieux, La chute des...), nous révèle égale-
ment un Cyr pré à payer de sa personne
et à accepter l’isolement et l’ost exercant,
at ne pas avoir d’accès public et de la
part des critiques, préférant rester fidèle
à son intrinséquité morale, à sa liberté inté-
riore et à sa foi religieuse.

Pour Cyr, qui vit seul et isolé en Nor-
mandie, l’amitié est extrêmement impor-
tante, au point qu’il a intitulé des vol-
umes de son journal, La passion de l’amitié
(1956-1957), et de nombreuses pages de
ce livre sont consacrées à manifester ce se-
timent qui anéantis l’homme.

On ne peut pas lever ce nouveau volume
du journal de Michel Cyr sans se sentir
impliqué dans l’aventure spirituelle d’un
artiste qui, dans la peinture et la musique,
manifeste toutes ses convictions morales
et esthétiques sans aucune prétention, mais
également sans fausses pudeurs et en lut-
tant souvent contre une ambiance hostile
qui n’accepte pas ses jugements et qui pré-
férerait l’emmaginé. Cette solitude de Cyr
est un signe de noblesse spirituelle, à l’ima-
ge de ses maîtres de spiritualité qui sont
Georges Bernanos et Léon Bloy.

Piero Violto

G. CAMPANINI - P. NEPI, Cristianità e

Ce livre, de la collaboration de deux
spécialistes, Giorgio Campanini et Paolo
Nepi, respectivement professeurs à l’Uni-
versité de Parma et à l’Université «La Sa-
pienza» de Rome, donne la preuve de l’in-
time relation entre religion et société civile à
l’époque de la secularisation (comme le indi-
que le sous-titre de l’ouvrage), grâce à l’étu-
de de la catégorie de cristianità par rapport
avec celle de modernità du XIX et du XX
siècle. Dès le début, les témoins nous prévi-
sent que «dans le concept de cristianità se
sont condensés historiquement, dans une
acceptation so propositiva soit ouvertement
pomelique, de nombreuses catégories in-
terprétables sous-tendues à la question du
rapport entre foi et culture, religion et so-
ciété civile, communauté religieuse et so-
ciété politique».

Comme en le sait, l’idéal historique con-
cré de l’une nouvelle cristianità a caractérisé
le Martin d’«Humanae vitae», celui des années ’30 et ’40, et c’est au cours de ces
années que se situe l’intervention qui s’est déve-
loppée autour de son projet. Un débat qui a
pu être réouvert dans les années ’80 par le livre
de Scoppola sur La nuova cristianità
perdu (une anthologie des interventions
qui ont suivi) se trouve dans le volume
collectif: Humanae vitae et nouvelle chré-
tien, publié sous la responsabilité de P.
Nepi et G. Galeazz, Ed. Massimo, Milan
1987). Ce livre a bien analysé se situe au-
delà de la contingence de la discussion qui
a accompagné l’Eccles de Scoppola. Il
ouvre une reconstruction des posi-
tions sur la nouvelle cristianità, qui, même
incomplète, est certainement représentati-
ve des lignes de tendance principales et est
caractérisée par l’approche historico-criti-
que dont le but est de «comprendre les
raisons culturelles de la genèse de cette
catégorie (de la chrétienté) et de sa capacité
permanente de jouer une fonction d’inter-
prétation par rapport à la question de la
présence du christianisme dans la société
sécularisée, même à travers la multiplicité
et le contraste des acceptances qui lui ont été
attribuées». Nous devons reconnaître que
le but poursuivi par Campanini et Nepi a été
heureusement atteint grâce à ce travail
biennanment et de lecture claire et agréable.

Après un chapitre d’introduction, dans
lequel Campanini parcourt l’histoire de
l’idée de chrétien, celle-ci est étudiée au
moment de sa restauration lors du Risorgi-
mento italien. Nepi s’occupe ensuite de la
chrétien vue par l’existentialisme et par
le marxisme en s’arrêtant donc sur l’idéal
historique concret élaboré par Maritain et
sur l’idée de christianisme sans chrétien
auxquels Croce a fait allusion. Campanini
reprend ensuite la plume pour s’occuper
de l’idée de la chrétien vue à travers le
personnalisme communautaire de Moun-
ier et le passage de l’idée de l’État chrétien
à celui d’État pluraliste. Il revient alors à
Nepi d’illustrer la critique de la chrétien dans
les théories de la sécularisation et la
reprise en Italie du débat sur la chrétien.
Campanini conclut l’ouvrage par quelques
réflexions sur le christianisme et la culture
européenne.

De ce travail collectif, il ressort avec
evidence la conviction que, au-delà de la
solution qui a été donnée par Maritain à ce
problème, celui-ci existe encore et que
Maritain a eu le mérite d’avoir indiqué la
question sur laquelle il fallait se concentrer
pour bien situer le problème de l’humanis-
té chrétien. Mais il y a une deuxième
conviction qui émerge avec force: la trans-
ition du moderne au post-modern pose la
question de la chrétienté d'une manière nouvelle, même si la terminologie reste la même. Et finalement, la sécularisation est tant que processus typique de la modernité montre qu'il y a deux possibilités de développement, celle qui mène au sécularisme et celle qui porte au contraire à la sécurité. Et celle-ci peut aller ensemble avec le besoin de raisonnement de religion, et c'est pourquoi l'idée maritainienne d'une société profane chrétienne semble pouvoirs être une heureuse intuition, si la dimension laïque et la dimension chrétienne sont vues dans une optique qui ne correspond pas à la conception moderne ou pré-modern de la réduction séculière ou sacrée, mais au contraire répond à la conception post-moderne (ou celle dans laquelle la post-modernité peut, si elle le veut, s'engager) de la compatibilité, ou même de la possible intégration, à condition de désecraliser (mais en évitant de «désescler») le christianisme et de désecraliser l'humanisme (dans le sens d'une absurderisation). Parler de chrétienté ne signifie alors rien d'autre que l'exigence d'un nouvel humanisme, un humanisme de la limite, où cette dernière n'est pas celle illuministe de l'immanence mais celle qui provient de l'acceptation de la transcendance.

Giancarlo Galeazzi


Saluons ce livre sur Maritain comme un événement. Comme le dit le Prof. Robert Speimann, dans sa présentation du volume, «l'influence de Maritain, si répandue dans d'autres pays ou continents, ne s'est jamais fait sentir en Allemagne, et on peut dire que son nom y est à peine connu». On peut se demander le pourquoi de cette absence. Est-elle liée à une certaine mentalité ou à une philosophie idéalisthe dont Hegel a été le grand protagoniste, et qui n'a pas permis au marxisme de Maritain, dans le cadre du grand renouveau qui a pris le départ au Concile du Vatican I et s'est poursuivi dans les deux guerres, de prendre corps dans la pensée allemande ou germanique? Quoiqu'il en soit, on doit constater là un fait. Voilà donc pourquoi on est surpris aujourd'hui, heureusement, par la publication de ce livre qui, espérons-le, sera suivi de nouveaux travaux sur la vie et l'oeuvre de celui que Marshall McLuhan, en 1953 déjà, appela «le plus important penseur français vivant de notre temps».

Tel qu'il est, ce livre semble bien adapté à un public cultivé qui n'a qu'une très faible connaissance du marxisme et surtout du nom auquel le renouveau du marxisme est intimement lié. Il est divisé en quatre parties, suffisamment longues pour donner les notions de base nécessaires pour découvrir l'homme Maritain, mais également suffisamment courtes pour ne pas laisser de prime abord un lecteur peu proche à se laisser séduire par son contenu et aisé à le faire réfléchir pour, par la suite, provoquer son intérêt.

Les 50 premières pages - la première partie - sont consacrées à donner un bon résumé de la vie de Jacques Maritain; on peut y suivre l'influence de l'élu, de Bergson, ensuite, de Charles de Foucauld finalement. La deuxième partie du livre, une vingtaine de pages, s'occupe de la philosophie de l'art chez Maritain en s'arrêtant spécialement sur Art et scolastique, une de ses œuvres majeures. Une cinquantaine de pages ensuite pour parler de «l'anti-modernité et de l'anti-modernité de Maritain et de sa compréhension de l'histoire et de la politique». La quatrième partie s'attache à la partie philosophique qui est au cœur de toute l'oeuvre philosophique de l'auteur des Degrés du savoir, la philosophie de l'être.

Une conclusion de deux pages termine l'introduction qui, espérons-le, sera suivi d'autres ouvrages qui aideront à mieux connaître les travaux et la pensée de Maritain dans les milieux intellectuels et cultivés allemands. Peter Nickl y dit entre autres: «Si on cherche derrière les facettes si riches de la philosophie de Maritain un principe d'unité, on découvre l'être. Il est bien évident que ce qu'il dit sur l'art est différent de ce qu'il dit sur la théorie politique et que ces deux domaines sont traités de façon originale par rapport à ce qu'il dit sur la métaphysique. Mais dans tout cela, il s'agit toujours de l'être. Tout ce qui est dit sur l'être ou bien sur la distinction réelle entre essentiel et existentiel est imprégné ou entrelacé avec le tue rez agit... La philosophie de l'être se termine pas dans la critique d'une civilisation, qui découvre dans l'argent un rue réalités et y voit la cause matérielle, efficace et finale de tout ce qui existe. Elle est indispensable comme un corréctif capable de contrecarrer le danger constant que le Rien devene une apparance de l'être... Cette même considération doit se faire dans tous les domaines de la philosophie, aussi bien dans la philosophie de l'histoire que dans l'anthropologie... Dans ce livre, notre but n'était que de donner quelques indications pour pousser les autres à poursuivre la recherche...» (pp. 160-161).

Le volume se termine par un index des ouvrages de Maritain et des livres qui ont été publiés sur lui ou sur les auteurs qui ont joué une influence dans sa vie. On ne pouvait faire mieux pour une introduction générale à Jacques Maritain. Il faut en remercier l'auteur et les Éditions Schöningh de Paderborn qui ont publié ce volume.

Jean-François Nothomb
REVUE DES LIVRES


L’oeuvre de Maritain peut être caractérisée par une conception métaphysique précise, qui pousse ses racines principalement dans la philosophie de St Thomas d’Aquin. On reconnaît bien vite la particularité de sa pensée sur l’homme: la nécessité de recomposer l’unité de l’être, la distinction des aspects variés de cet être pour découvrir ou redécouvrir l’harmonie de l’ensemble, etc. Le lecteur sera intéressé par cet exposé, mais mettra quelques points d’interrogation sur ce qu’affirme l’auteur sur «l’animation retardée» (pp. 128-129), «la distinction homme-femme» (p. 130). Mais dans l’ensemble on ne peut dire que du bénéfice de cette exposition de l’anthropologie selon Maritain.


C’est avec joie que nous annonçons à nos lecteurs l’édition en langue croate du livre de Jacques Maritain, L’Homme et l’État. C’est le Père Tomo Veres o.p. qui s’est occupé de la publication. Espérons ainsi que l’œuvre de Maritain sera de plus en plus lue dans les pays de l’Est européen où ses livres sont à peine connus du public cultivé, à part quelques brillantes exceptions, en Pologne notamment.


Le MIRC (Mouvement Écclésial d’Engagement Culturel), à l’occasion du 60ème anniversaire de la fondation des «Laureati Cattolici» sous l’impulsion de deux hommes, Igino Righetti et le futur Paul VI, a convoqué le quatrième Congrès de son histoire à Assise, du 2 au 5 janvier 1992, sur le thème « Savoir, pouvoir, foi dans la transition vers la nouvelle Europe ». Le Congrès a posé une série de questions importantes, utiles à la réflexion dans la fidélité à une tradition de recherche culturelle, ouverte aux défis que pose l’Europe qui se présente à nous dans le futur immédiat. Il s’agit d’une recherche en même temps ancêtre dans le christianisme et dans une pensée moderne marquée par une culture ligue qui déborde de partout et joue de plus en plus un rôle dont les églises ne peuvent ne pas tenir compte.

Le volume que nous présentons ici contient les Actes de ce Congrès. Les 18 chapitres qu’on peut lire sont l’oeuvre de personnalités extrêmement qualifiées dans leurs secteurs: ce sont des théologiens, des professeurs d’université, des écrivains, des économistes ou des sociologues. Tous veulent la peine d’être lis et nous ne voulons rien d’eux en particulier. C’est tout le livre qu’il faut lire.


Antonio Pavan qui a rassemblé ces textes, fruit d’un Colloque de l’Institut International Jacques Maritain tenu à Jaques, en Italie, en décembre 1986, écrit dans sa préface de l’ouvrage: «Nous nous trouvons à un moment où le langage utilisé dans Humanisme intégral est déjà du passé, ainsi que les événements de l’époque; mais en vérité ce passé est aprés avait été envisagé par Maritain lui-même dans les années qui vont de 1950 à 1960, surtout pour ce qui concerne la désignation des problèmes en termes de chrétienté. Mais au-delà de ces termes, le problème que se poses Humanisme intégral est encore le nôtre. Sans ce livre, dans la mémoire de notre présent, non seulement nous aurions été plus dépourvus pour ce qui concerne notre conscience historique, mais également nous aurions été plus dépourvus devant les nouvelles tentations que le retour du spirituel, avec sa charge imposante de libération, met au cœur de notre société. Les reconstructions historiques, les apports théoriques et les témoignages fournis par ce volume ne sont finalement que de cela, sous des registres différents, mais avec des nuances diverses: faire attention aux débats d’ici, parce qu’il en va, en vérité, d’un problème d’aujourd’hui».


AA.VV., I cattolici e la lotta all’antisemitismo, Ed. Massimo, Milano 1992, pp. 158.

Ce petit volume contient les exposés présentés aux Colloques de Rome et de Ancône, en 1991, organisés par l’Institut Italien J. Maritain de Rome en collaboration avec l’Association Amicizia Ebraico-Cristiana de Ancône, à l’occasion du 50ème anniversaire de la législation raciale fascis-
la seconde partie est consacrée à l’exposition didactique de l’enseignement socio-économique de l’Église et se divise en deux sections, la première sur tout le Moyen Âge et la deuxième jusqu’aujourd’hui.

Robert Royal, Columbus on Trial: 1492 v. 1992, Young America’s Foundation, Herndon (Virginia) 1992, pp. xiv + 50.

La Young America’s Foundation est connue pour son engagement en défense des grands principes de la nation nord-américaine et de la liberté de la civilisation occidentale. Devant les attaques répétées de certains groupes extrémistes des États-Unis, qui jugeant de manière outrancière la découverture et la conquête de Christophe Colomb et de notre culture européenne, Robert Royal, déjà auteur de plusieurs livres et articles sur la question, a rédigé un petit « pamphlet » qui veut rétablir avec objectivité la situation. Nous devons dire qu’il y a simplement réussi et nous recommandons son petit livre à tous ceux qui s’intéressent à ce problème.


D’après ce livre du Prof. Sabourin, canadien, diplômé de l’Université d’Ottawa, on distingue deux courants contradictoires en apparence – au sein d’une nouvelle dialectique mondiale. Le premier met l’accent sur l’amour et le bien-être économique, alors que le second donne plus d’importance à l’être et aux identités socio-culturelles. Existe-t-il un rapport entre cette dichotomie mondiale et le dilemme du Canada ? L’auteur croit que oui, il analyse le dilemme Québec-Canada dans une perspective nationale et surtout internationale, en s’éloignant sur les différentes étapes de théorie de la connaissance. Il fait ressortir de nombreuses idées jusqu’ici occultées, telles l’évolution de la nature et des fonctions de l’État, de la démocratie, de la justice, ainsi que la place grandissante occupée par les pouvoirs publics et les communications qui commencent à modifier les manières d’agir et de penser. Il prend aussi en considération la montée progressive de principes liés à la qualité de vie, au rôle capital du savoir dans la liberté individuelle et collective. Enfin il propose la théorie de l’indépendance réelle, qu’il ne faut pas confondre avec le principe anarchique de la souveraineté absolue, et met en avant les concepts de l’« endogénité » – celui de l’homme social qui porte en lui-même sa véritable dynamique individuelle, sociale et universelle. C’est en effet à la manière effective plutôt que formelle des pouvoirs.


Ce livre, publié par l’Université Catholique de Lublin, contient les Actes d’un Séminaire qui a rassemblé à Varsovie les meilleurs spécialistes de Maritain en Pologne, et ils sont nombreux ! Il suffit de prendre vue de la table des matières pour s’en rendre mieux compte. Après une Introduction, le livre étudie les éléments de la pensée maritaine dans ses divers aspects: philosophico-anthropologique, philosophico-social et théologique. La dernière partie est consacrée à « La pensée de J. Maritain en Pologne. » Nous devons également signaler la très bonne et complète bibliographie des œuvres de (à partir de 1929) et (à partir de 1924) Maritain.


L’ouvrage présenté ici se situe dès le point de départ au niveau d’une tentative de compréhension à la hauteur de son objet : l’histoire de l’Israël et de la pensée et de l’héritage de l’histoire d’Israël. La pensée et de l’alliance de la promesse, de la culture et de la prophétie, de l’Écriture et de la désobéissance jusqu’au moment de la réintégration finale, Maritain, tout en acceptant le monde éternel et sa condition, de l’action de l’histoire et de l’histoire humaine des Juifs, adopte réellement la vision biblique de l’histoire et les indications de la révélation judéo-chrétienne. Sur ce point crucial.

Nous avons de sérieux motifs de croire que nous sommes au début d’une ère de rénovation fondée dans la connaissance mutuelle entre Juifs et chrétiens et de leurs relations réciproques. Les sources fondamentales de ces réseaux sont des documents de l’histoire et des publications qui commencent à modifier les manières d’agir et de penser. Il prend en compte la montée progressive de principes liés à la qualité de vie, au rôle capital du savoir dans la liberté individuelle et collective. Enfin il propose la théorie de l’indépendance réelle, qu’il ne faut pas confondre avec le principe anarchique de la souveraineté absolue, et met en avant les concepts de l’« endogénité » – celui de l’homme social qui porte en lui-même sa véritable dynamique individuelle, sociale et universelle. C’est en effet à la manière effective plutôt que formelle des pouvoirs.

La question suscitée par la méditation maritaine est la plus profonde et la plus passionnée de la question. Dans une intervention au colloque « Juifs, catholiques et antisémitisme » (Ancona, 5 avril 1990), Mme Tuillia Zevi, Présidente de l’Union des Communautés Juives italiennes, après avoir lu les écrits rassemblés dans Le mystère d’Israël, affirmait : « Je pense que ces pages de Maritain sont peut-être les plus instructives et donnent les raisons les plus valables et les plus profondes pour comprendre et aimer Israël qu’un chrétien puisse exprimer de nos jours. Je pense aussi que la définition d’Israël comme la présence d’un fœtus caché au cœur des nations de la terre, constamment présente dans la pensée maritaine, est semblable à l’image que nous recevons de lui comme maître de vie, de foi et de pensée parmi les chrétiens du monde. Sa vision n’est autre que la vision renouvelée des rapports entre le christianisme et le judaïsme qui ont animé les œuvres et les écrits de Jean XXIII et de Paul VI et qui est exprimée dans le document conciliaire Nostra aetate.

Au sujet de l’influence du judaïsme sur l’histoire temporelle on pourrait rappeler les idées de Maritain de celles de Ber- daeus et de Moses Hess. Pour eux, le judaïsme est le principe fondamental du mouvement de l’histoire, l’augmentation de l’humanité et une force permanente de recherche active. C’est ainsi que Giorgio La Pira a perçu l’enorme nouveauté que constituait le retour d’Israël en Palestine et y a vu comme une réorientation de l’histoire. Dans une lettre adressée aux monastères de Palestine en 1661, si阙的 avant le silence absolu d’Israël, je reléguerait au mystère historique, le plus évident de nos jours, celui du
retour d'Israël en Palestine. Il y a dans ce fait un signe des temps d'une telle grandeur qui ne peut qu'éblouir tous ceux qui essayent d'en scruter le sens et la valeur ! Que signifie cet événement dans le plan de Dieu ?

Pour un chrétien du moins, le mystère d'Israël peut se révéler aujourd'hui comme un élément notable au service de l'amitié judéo-chrétienne, dans le sens de la nouvelle bouleversante annoncée dans la Lettre aux Ephésiens, en 2/14-16 : « C'est Lui qui est notre paix, Lui qui des deux mondes en a fait un seul, réunissant le mur qui les séparait - la haine - abolissant dans sa chair la loi avec ses décrets et ordonnances. Il a voulu ainsi, en établissant la paix, crée en Lui de ces deux hommes un seul homme nouveau, et par la croix, tuant en Lui la haine, les réconcilier avec Dieu, tous deux en un seul corps » S'aider et se respecter réciproquement, se connaître de la manière la plus loyale et la plus approfondie possible, voilà ce à quoi doit tendre le dialogue judéo-chrétien, sans se cacher pourtant les écarts et les difficultés qu'il devra affronter. En vérité, de même qu'il n'y a pas de solution politique et temporelle au mystère d'Israël, un simple dialogue ne sera pas la solution du rapport entre la Synagogue et l'Église. D'une certaine manière, l'agonie de la Croix et l'agonie des Juifs sont intrinsèquement liées, mais sous une forme encore plus mystérieuse et presque totale cachée à notre regard.

Pour comprendre Israël et les Juifs, il faut partir des événements des deux Alliances. Mais sur ce point il faut avouer qu'il est plus facile pour les chrétiens de reconnaître l'origine divine du judaïsme que pour les Juifs celle du christianisme. La nature spécifique des relations entre judaïsme et christianisme vient de leurs ressemblances et de leurs différences ; le Christ est pour eux, en même temps, une pierre d'achoppement et une pierre de renonce.

Au sujet des deux Alliances, le point de vue des Juifs est que ce qu'il y a de vrai dans la deuxième n'a rien de nouveau et ce qui y est nouveau n'est pas vrai, le point de vue chrétien, que ce qui est vrai dans l'ancienne appartient désormais à la seconde. Le dialogue interconfessionnel chrétien est d'une qualité diverse puisqu'il s'appuie sur l'unique Seigneur Jésus-Christ, alors que dans le dialogue judéo-chrétien le Christ fait toute la différence. Sur ce point l'enseignement de St Paul dans l'Épître aux Romains est très éclairant, lorsqu'il fait allusion à l'imitation et à la jalousie qui existe tout encore entre la Synagogue et l'Église (11/11-15).

Cependant ce dialogue judéo-chrétien produit des fruits féconds et nombreux, parmi lesquels soulignons que connaissant mieux Israël et sa richesse culturelle, sa sagesse ancestrale, son sens de la prière et sa liturgie, les chrétiens découvrent plus en profondeur leur propre foi et leur connaissance d'eux-mêmes. C'est là où les Juifs et les chrétiens peuvent de nos jours être les témoins d'une attitude commune face au sécularisme occidental qui, voulant réduire toutes les religions à un humanisme temporel indistinct, souvent marqué par le consumisme, par l'utlitarisme et le terre-à-terre, les prive de leurs raisons d'être les plus intimes. Les trois grandes religions monotheistes du Livre devraient réagir en cherchant des éléments pour une action concertée. Elles peuvent et doivent maintenir fortement l'idée selon laquelle l'homme a été créé à l'image de Dieu. Cela ne signifie-t-il pas que la vie humaine est un «reçu» et se savoir et s'accepter «reçu» est le cœur de tout humanisme authentique, en opposition à la hybris sécularisante du scientisme technologique ?

Vittorio Possenti

*Comme d'habitude, nous publions également dans ce numéro de la revue une «fiche de lecture» sur une œuvre de J. Martini. Le texte que le Prof. Possenti nous a autorisé de publier a paru comme introduction de l'édition italienne du Mystère d'Israël, qui est sorti récemment des presses des Éditions Mariolo, de Milan.
Humanisme integral... encore. Un livre pour demain*

En 1949 je m'étais trouvé à Buenos Aires et il me semblait être en plein dans la campagne contre Maritain qu'avait déclenché un livre haineux de l'abbé Mounieville, De Lamenais a Maritain. Le but de mon voyage était de jeter les bases d'une section argentine de «Pax Romana», mouvement international des intellectuels catholiques dont j'étais secrétaire général. Ce qui m'a valu la visite d'un journaliste et l'inévitable question: «Que pensez-vous des discussions autour de Maritain?» Je n'ai pas hésité à répondre: «Les antis-mariatistes se reconnaissent au fait qu’ils n’ont jamais lu Maritain les maritainistes non plus, trop souvent!»

J'entendais dire par là que la polémique au sujet de Maritain en recouvrait une autre: celle qui évoluait entre les partisans d'un gouvernement autoritaire, protecteur intéressé de l'Eglise, et ceux qui avaient lié la vie dans une Église libre d'entraves politiques et dégagée des pouvoirs temporaires. Ce qui provoquait l'hostilité envers Maritain, ce n'était pas ses livres sur la philosophie de l'être, même pas Humanisme intégral, mais sa position radicale contre la «guerre sainte», la solis-disant croisade pour rétablir par la violence et la guerre l'Église et la position prépondérante de la religion en Espagne.

Je ne voudrais offenser personne, mais il me semble qu'à la racine de la polémique provoquée dernièrement en Italie par un historien qui a qualifié Humanisme intégral de «livre nèfaste», il y avait encore un relent des incompréhensions nourries par ces vieilles querelles. Beaucoup en ont voulu à Maritain de ne pas s'être laissé leurner par les avances du fascisme italien à l'Église ou par la réaction improyable de la droite aux taudis essais de libération et de renouveau agraire de la République espagnole. Puis, la guerre civile ayant éclaté, ce qui a permis aux communistes de prendre le pouvoir dans la zone républicaine, Maritain n'a fait que ce que l'on pouvait attendre d'un esprit libre et équilibré comme le sien: il s'est dressé «au dessus de la mêlée» et a fondé le Comité pour la paix civile en Espagne entre autres dans la bonne compagnie de Don Luigi Sturzo.

C'est quelque chose d'étonnant que la figure d'un penseur aussi solide, aussi sûr et aussi cohérent que Jacques Maritain ait pu être si souvent exploitée par des personnages sans scrupules, en passant par dessus ses propres intentions. Et cela dans des sens opposés. N'avons-nous pas, dans Trenta Giorni, l'étude définitive, un texte protecteur de Maritain pour taxer d'hérétique l'Eglise de France, à cause d'un mot dans la traduction usuelle du Credo? Lorsqu'on a pu filtrer, comme La Stampa, «Esplo- de la bombe Maritain», ce qui se cache sous toutes ces manoeuvres est l'intention d'attaque de ce qui est pour nous un texte méconnu par le Concile Vatican II et d'empêcher le développement normal de l'œuvre des deux grands pontifes Jean XXIII et Paul VI.

Mais soyons sérieux et revenons à une lecture honnête et complète d'Humanisme intégral. C'est ce que l'Institut international Jacques Maritain vous propose de faire, en publiant chez l'éditeur Marietti, à Gènes le livre Dopo «L'unanissimo integrale». Dibattiti di sera, problemi di oggi, par les soins d'Antonio l'Avano, qu'il a eu l'homme de préférer. Son texte est composé des conférences prononcées au colloque que le même Institut avait organisé à Lucques, en 1986, pour marquer le cinquantenaire de la parution de ce livre capital. «Débats d'hier, problèmes d'aujourd'hui», on ne saurait pas mieux intituler cet ouvrage tout entier consacré à montrer la cohérence doctrinaire et la portée méta-historique d'Humanisme intégral.

Car il s'agit d'un livre de philosophie de l'histoire, dans lequel notre maître a ouvert avec beaucoup de maîtrise, de cohérence et de perspicacité la voie que nous avons suivie et que nous suivons encore dans la période actuelle, mais dans un temps plus long, plus profond, plus large. Car il s'agit d'un livre de philosophie de l'histoire, dont les humains se seraient mises au service de l'Église pour le salut des âmes. Puisqu'une telle situation ne s'était jamais réalisée, et était pratiquement irréalisable, vu l'imméritation de l'homme - il fallait bien accepter des situations d'hypothèse, où, compte tenu des circonstances, la prudence pouvait autoriser la tolérance civile comme un moindre mal. Autrement dit, on pouvait vivre en hypothèse sans commettre un péché mortel.

Il faut que nous confessions comboient, nous jeunes chrétiens et démocrates, nous messieurs embrassés par cette doctrine en même temps sévère et ambiguë. La lecture de Jacques Maritain dans les années 1935-36 a été pour nous un choc salutaire et clarificateur. Le plus important de ses principes libérateurs fonda ses racines dans le cœur même de la philosophie de l'être: dans la distinction entre nature et surnaturel, entre temporel et spirituel. En un temps, Maritain nous enseignait à distinguer, sans aucune confusion mais aussi sans discontinu dans (disguizier) pour unir, le plan de la religion de celui de la culture.

Voilà comment nous nous sommes sentis libérés: ce n'est pas l'autorité religieuse qui doit résumer les problèmes liés à notre vie temporelle et ce n'est pas l'autorité politique qui doit veiller sur notre salut éternel. Cette proclamation de l'autonomie du monde séculier, celle même que le Concile Vatican II a proclamé doctrine officielle de l'Eglise dans la Constitution pastorale Gaudium et spes - nous l'avons trouvé déjà pleinement développée pour la première fois dans les quarante premières pages du chap. 3 d'Humanisme intégral, intitulé «Le chrétien dans le monde». Nous avions déjà trop souffert de cette «erreur théocratique», comme l'appelle Maritain, lorsqu'elle a été telle qu'elle pouvait nous aider à découvrir l'état de «sauver le Sauveur»...

Mais il y a dans la doctrine de Maritain un autre principe complémentaire du premier. Il consiste dans la prise de conscience des exigences évangéliques par rap-
port à la vie séculière et temporelle de l’activité profane». Ces exigences demandent la transformation de l’ordre humain, de la vie sociale et économique dans un sens plus humain, plus respectueux de l’homme dans son intégrité. C’est ainsi que nous pouvons parler de nos jours des «exigences chrétiennes en économie», paraphrasant ce que disait le Cardinal Journet, ami intime de Maritain, lorsqu’il a parlé «des exigences chrétiennes en politique».

Voici ce que Maritain appelait l’humanisme intégral, notion anthropologique et vision de foi en même temps.

Ceux qui accusent Humanisme intégral de n’avoir frappé qu’à «droite» et d’avoir capitulé devant le laïcisme et le communisme, montrent clairement qu’ils n’ont même pas lu la table des matières de cet ouvrage fondamental. S’ils l’avaient fait, ils se seraient aperçus que l’athéisme marxiste (l’Union Soviétique nommément) et le libéralisme bourgeois y sont renvoyés dos à dos et condamnés avec la même force.

Le livre qui a été un phare lumineux pour notre génération, le sera encore pour la prochaine. Il se termine par une vision optimiste du cours de l’histoire: de tristesse en allégresse, de ruines en renaissances, «l’histoire humaine croît, parce qu’elle ne consiste pas dans un processus répétitif, mais d’expansion et de progrès». Celui qui un jour a écrit Antimodern (1922) deviendra-t-il donc un jour le maître à penser de la post-modernité?

Ramon Sugranyes de Franch

* Par le texte suivant, écrit à l’intention du quotidien catholique italien L’Osservatore, le Prof. Ramon Sugranyes de Franch intervient dans le débat ouvert il y a peu dans la presse italienne sur l’actualité de la pensée maritainienne.
The American Maritain Association's Annual Meeting

The topic for the 1992 American Maritain Association meeting, organized by Deal Hudson of Fordham University, was "The Present Crisis in Moral Philosophy: Ethics, Metaphysics, and Religion," and the conference was held on November 5-7 at Rockhurst College, Kansas City, Missouri. The focus was upon the ethical vacuum in and problems of contemporary society. If there was an overall theme, it was that it is only by metaphysically examining what we are as human beings and what the different forms of human knowledge are that we can learn to solve these problems.

Professor Mark McGovern of St. John's Church, Cogging, Iowa, showed us how *synderesis*, the habit of mind by which we judge the good to be done was "The Key to Understanding Natural Law in Aquinas." He was to introduce the key concept of conaturality that was to become a focal point of the conference.

While McGovern stressed the distinction between the supernatural and the natural, Joseph Koterski, S.J., of Fordham University, stressed, in a different area, the unity of the two as he spoke on how revelation often addresses natural human reason directly. In his paper, "A Biblical View of Natural Law in the Book of Wisdom," Koterski argued that far from presupposing or avoiding natural theological argumentation, the Bible in the Wisdom literature actually engages in it. The Book of Wisdom does argue for belief in God by displaying the consequences of disbelief and idolatry. There is an appeal to reason.

Prof. Joseph Califano, on the following morning, gave brisk, personal, and cogent arguments for the need to base ethics on a philosophy of nature and a metaphysical view of reality. When such a metaphysical base is missing, reality becomes a function of popular agreement alone, and the casualties are enormous. Thinking about the nature of the human being is crucial and getting that wrong can be devastating. His thesis was aptly illustrated by the next paper.

Responding to those who hold that every facet of the human being must have a sexual component, Mary Carmen Rose of Goucher College spoke on "Eros and the Catholic Tradition," and argued against the pansexualism rampant today. Rose's criticisms were very a propos not only because of the influences of those whom she mentions such as Rosemary Haughton, Matthew Fox, etc., but also, because of the current reports on sexuality being released by some of the major Christian denominations. Pansexuality is the view that everything we are and everything we do involves us as sexual beings. While not denigrating sexuality, Rose argued that there are many facets of the human being and *eros* which are non-sexual; one needs only to think of Augustine's restless heart. Furthermore, this view gives too much emphasis on the derivative of human life that does not always have beneficial consequences.

When Don T. Asselin of Hillsdale College spoke on "The Natural Immortality of the Soul," he said it wasn't - naturally immortal - or, at least, the proofs given by Thomas are insufficient.


John Trapani told us why there are no sinners in hell. There are no sinners in hell, for sinners were the friends of Jesus. In Hell there are only the wicked (Maritain, Notebooks). According to Trapani, we have paid insufficient attention to the thought of Maritain on Love. Love is important because love determines how we see reality, so while we can judge the outside act of a person, we cannot judge the inner culpability of her/his heart and mind. We can judge the sin but not the sinner. And in the last hour, the one who does know will judge "on how much we have loved," (St. John of the Cross).

Donald DeMarco, of the University of St. Jerome's College, in "The Fundamental Role of Duty in Maritain's Moral Philosophy," spoke about how philosophy tries to balance rights and duties in accord with the first principle of doing good and avoiding evil and about how we know how to do this through a knowledge by conaturality - acknowledge where one consults the inner melody the vibration of the inner strings makes present in him. Contrary to Rousseau whose guides is only his will, Sartre who is committed to be free, Kant who has absolute obligations and no duty of being, and Comte who had a duty to humanity, Maritain brings the various elements in moral philosophy together in harmony.

Joseph Pappin, Illini University of Arkansas-Little Rock, in "Rahner and Maritain of Existential Ethics," spoke on the fundamental agreement that exists between these two types of Thomists - transcendent and metaphysical - and their common view that man does have a preconceptual knowledge of and is, himself, dynamically oriented to the supreme good which is God.

Rev. Romanus Cessario, O.P., of the Dominican House of Studies, Washington, D.C., in "What difference Do the Infused Virtues Make?" argued that they were critical for the moral life.

Ralph McNerny, of University of Notre Dame, in "On Yves R. Simon as a Moral Philosopher" illustrated the many shades of differences between speculative and practical judgments.

Saturday morning brought us Herbert Reiner M.D., who spoke on "Nature, Nurture and Natural Law: an Exercise in Simon's Second Division of Natural Law.", While all living things in nature are working to be eternal and divine (Aristotle) and while humans are a part of nature, they are the best of all the animals and are the best when they live in accordance with law and justice. Dr. Reiner spoke on Thomas's maxim that God wrote two books, the book of creation and of revelation. He added, "The world is a great volume and man is the index to the book," and natural inclinations are given to us in order to help us in our reason.

Peter Redpath, of St. John's University, New York, spoke on "Private Morality and Public Enforcement." He said that while private morality should not be regulated by the state, the enabling means to acquiring virtue should. Without virtue humans cannot be good and society cannot operate. While it is in our power to acquire moral virtues, it is only up to the point to which we are able to get the means. We need liberty, freedom of speech, basic goods and protection.

Next, W.L. LaCroix, S.J. of Rockhurst College, spoke on "A Fresh Look at the Principle of Double Effect." LaCroix spoke on how moral standards could be obtained by observing how ordinary people make decisions and how the principle of double-effect is inevitable most of the time. "Rulers only act just insofar as they act for the common good," spoke Ralph Nel-
son of Windsor, Ontario in «The Scope of Justice». Nelson contrasted and compared Yves R. Simon’s view of justice with that of Mortimer J. Adler.

John B. Killoran of the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies at King’s College in London, Ontario spoke on «Yves R. Simon’s Interpretation of Habitus», where he argued that Yves R. Simon’s interpretation yields a moral realism that is not only an effective antidote to moral anti-realism but also the spiritual malaise spawned by misguided moral philosophies.

Then came the papers that involved MacIntyre’s recent book, Three rival versions of Moral Inquiry. Thomas Hibbs began with a brilliant paper on «Moral Crisis and the Turn to Narrative». He stressed the role of narrative in the work of Aquinas, moral reasoning as well as the role of poetry, poetry, recalling the work of Aristotle, mediating between the universal and the particular and it also describes nature as it would be if it were allowed to develop into its full potential. Hibbs argued for a crucial role for poetry and narrative in moral discourse.

Thomas Lohman of the University of Portland, in «Three Rival Versions of the Moral Good», defined the good as what a mature and virtuous person within a tradition would desire to do if she/he were adequately informed. Thomas Lohman spoke of St. John’s University, New York, spoke on «Tradition as “Bearer of Reason” in Alasdair MacIntyre’s Moral Enquiry». She spoke on MacIntyre’s notion of the absence of teleology in the modern world. In Kant, theism lost the morality it once presupposed and Christianity became secularized from within. Kantianism was an invitation to irrationalism, and even since Descartes, ethicists have been trying to do ethics as if they were pure disembodied egos; but, as Ramos summarized MacIntyre, we cannot understand our morality without a tradition. If a person seeks a good, he/she is the bearer of a social identity. Ultimately, the Thomistic tradition is the one MacIntyre has most recently embraced.

Roger Duncan of the University of Connecticut at Hartford, gave a talk on, and Alan J. Hicks of the University of Kansas responded to «Unnatural Acts». Duncan claimed that certain acts such as contraception were unnatural. These are certain acts that «contradict» their very nature. Contrary to Germaine Greer, Duncan holds that there are metaphysical facts and the attempt to avoid these skew thinking about ethics at every point. Certain acts violate their nature. «Lying» for example, for St. Thomas, «is unnatural». It is always wrong to lie. This is because speech is ordered to truth. I do not have to speak, but when I do, I may not act contrary to the whole point of speaking. Focusing on contraception, Duncan claims that it «scoops off» the spiritual good all the while denying the bodily good. It is a kind of lie, and as Piere noted, «Lying Splits the Soul».

Do we have the inalienable right to the pursuit of happiness? No, claims William Bush of the University of Western Ontario, who contested against Deal Hudson that happiness in the minds of many is unclean, demonic toxin hurting their spiritual growth. Citing many French authors such as Paul Claudel, Georges Bernanos and Charles Péguy, along with saints such as Theophilus of Luxe, Bush spoke of the incompatibility of the American ideal - with which he noted that Maritain agreed - with the doctrines of the Catholic Church. Suffering was reprehensible and not to be avoided. Deal W. Hudson of Fordham University defended Maritain and Thomas Aquinas by arguing that it is necessary to see the human person as a home visiter - a person on the way to heaven. «To love someone is to wish to be happy with them», said St. Thomas and genuine charity wishes for well-being and happiness of others not for their suffering. Suffering, after all, does have ambiguous results; sometimes it is salutary, but at other times it crushes. Hudson continued by remarking that only providence can make the judgment about when and how we should suffer and we - without that - have the obligation to respond to the in-built teleologies of human persons for happiness and not to our worries about how they will misuse them.

To understand morality, we must understand what we are and in what way we know what is good. The American Maritain Association session of the American Catholic Philosophical Association convention (March 26-28, 1993) at St. Louis will address the latter. The paper will be on this key issue of the knowledge of communitarily.

Gregory J. Kerr

Information, Culture and Participation
Deuxième Symposium de Budapest

La situation des anciens pays satellites de l’URSS et celles existant dans l’empire russe actuel est des plus troublées et présente des incertitudes telles qu’il est difficile d’en faire une analyse complète sur les plans politique, économique, social et culturel. La transition est bien plus compliquée que ce qu’on aurait pu le prévoir. A l’optimisme qui s’est créé au moment de changements, penchant sans doute, a fait suite un pessimisme quasi général, tant l’Est qu’à l’Ouest. Si de nombreux murs se sont écroulés, d’autres ont surgi, qui se révèlent aussi difficiles à abattre. Ce sont ceux battis sur des problèmes nationaux, ethniques, linguistiques, religieux, entretenus par des conflits locaux d’une violence insoutenable qui triguent toute politique internationale sérieuse et planifiée. Il existe bien des tensions entre certaines minorités d’Europe occidentale, mais elles ne peuvent en rien être comparées à celles qu’on trouve à l’Est. A l’Ouest, ces crises de dimensions réduites se situent dans une ère de post-nationalisme, tandis qu’à l’Est elles se situent dans une ère post-internationale. En Europe centro-orientale, la crise des partis communistes est souvent synonyme de crise de l’État.

Le Symposium international de Budapest

Dans le cadre de cette chronique, nous devons nous limiter à quelques annotations qui faciliteront la compréhension et le jugement sur les problèmes qui ont été discutés lors de cette conférence de Budapest, organisée du 24 au 26 septembre 1992 par l’Institut International J. Maritain, la Fondation Universitaria San Pablo-CEU de Madrid, le «Wissenschaftskolleg Institut für die Kultur der Westzonen» de Berlin et par les universités hongroises suivantes: Estgôs Loránd Tudományegyetem, Budapesti Muszaki Egyetem, Budapesti Közgazdaságtudományi Egyetem. Cependant, puisque le Symposium a été consacré aux thèmes de l’information, de la culture et de la participation pour le développement de la démocratie en Europe centrale, il nous semble utile d’ajouter quelques considérations ultérieures.

Dans la société européenne actuelle, nous voyons un certain nombre de tendances. D’un côté, on cherche et on découvre de nouveaux modèles de vie, de relations sociales, de méthodes d’enseignement, de systèmes de gouvernement. D’un autre côté, on observe une certaine instabilité et déstabilisation de ces systèmes. Il est clair que la transition vers une société moderne est loin d’être facile. Elle nécessite une approche multidisciplinaire, une compréhension des enjeux politiques, économiques, sociaux et culturels. Le Symposium de Budapest a été un pas important dans cette direction, en apportant des perspectives novatrices sur les problèmes de transition en Europe centrale.
évolution la constitution non seulement d’une union européenne politique et économique, mais une véritable «maison commune européenne», tandis que la première tendance se caractérise par l’explosion de nationalismes, de réformes de l’État au niveau régional, par des revendications souvent violentes et sanguinaires, en faveur des droits des minorités et des peuples.

Ce Symposium de 1992 a été précédé d’une autre réunion en 1991, qui avait mis l’accent sur les caractéristiques d’un processus institutionnel, répondant aux exigences de certains pays de l’Est de se donner de nouvelles règles pour substituer celles légées par les régimes totalli- stes du passé. Ce Symposium par contre s’est consacré à l’analyse de la société centroeuropéenne, Hongrie, Pologne et Tchécoslovaquie (encore unie en l’État fédéral), qui cherchent une participation effective de leurs citoyens à leur destin sur le plan personnel et en tant que nation.

Les objectifs de la Conférence

Quatre ont été les objectifs que s’est fixés cette Conférence: 1) une meilleure connaissance de la situation intérieure de ces pays; 2) un examen des aspects plus spectaculaires de ce qui se passe à l’Est. Il fallait donc discerner les transformations souterraines et les réactions qu’elles susci- tent dans la mentalité des habitants de ces pays; 2) quelles sont les grandes lignes culturelles dans la recherche de nouvelles valeurs et quel est le rôle des intellectuels dans ce processus; 3) quels sont les modes et les processus de participation à cette société qui se cherche et qui est maintenant libre des conditionnements idéologiques et politiques qui lui ont été imposés d’en haut dans le passé; 4) un dernier objectif concerne les perspectives futures de la coopération entre l’Est et l’Ouest de l’Europe dans le domaine culturel et la responsabili- té dans ce domaine des organisations qui s’y intéressent.

De cette façon le Symposium de Budapest, à partir des prémisses indispensables de connaissance et d’analyse, a débouché sur la phase d’une collaboration plus étroite entre les deux réalités européennes, séparées depuis plus de quarante ans, permettant des développements culturels qui se traduiront par des initiatives économiques et sociales, qui sont attendues et seront les bienvenues en Europe centroe- oriente. De nombreux organismes comme les universités, les autres institutions publiques, les groupes privés pourront offrir leur aide afin de contribuer de mieux à l’établissement de cette nouvelle maison commune européenne, dont on parle tant mais en faveur de laquelle on ne réalise pas grand-chose.

Pour atteindre ces quatre objectifs, on avait invité à Budapest des personnalités de haut niveau, représentants des secteurs importants de la société de l’Europe de l’Est et centrale, des sociologues, des professeurs d’université, des économistes, des membres des organismes d’information, des parlementaires et des hommes politiques, ainsi que des responsables de centres de recherche, de fondations et d’instituts cultu- rels.

Approches des problèmes

Comme d’habitude, la première journée des travaux a été consacrée à des consi- dérations générales. A la tribune se sont succédé le sous-secrétariat d’État à la pré- sidence du Conseil hongrois, Tamás Katon- na, le secrétaire général de l’Institut inter- national J. Martín, Roberto Lapini, et le directeur du Centre international de FORMATION européenne de Nice, Ferdinand Kinsky. Ce dernier a introduit le débat en montrant aux auditeurs le fil conducteur qui doit les aider à voir clair dans la diversité des thèmes étudiés et qui consistent en l’analyse du processus de transition des pays de l’Est vers une société civile articulée et structurée, qui servira de base à des institutions démocratiques stables. Kinsky a fait sonner les paroles de Denis de Rougemont dans son dernier livre: «Une civilisation commence à dégénérer quand l’homme commence à interroger sur ce qui va arriver, au lieu de se demander: que dois-je faire?». Il y a des signes d’appréhension - a déclaré Kinsky - mais ils ne peuvent masquer le malaise actuel. Examinons-le: les jeunes démocrates doivent faire face à des difficultés énormes. En Pologne l’abstentionnisme est létal, en Tchécoslovaquie la guerre culturelle, en Hongrie le conflit entre les maïs media et le pouvoir. L’Europe centroe- orientale est soumise à l’aggravation de la situation de la crise qui traversant la Russie et la Communauté des États indépendants et le risque d’une bul- lomisation augmentent encore à cause de l’in- puissance des organisations internationales. L’ONU et la CSCE sont des organismes supranationaux exposés à des contradictions internes et aux jeux d’intérêts nationaux et la CEE est encore loin de l’unité politique dont on parle.

La situation de l’Allemagne particulièrement intéressante dans l’analyse fait par Kinsky, lorsqu’il compare la situation qui a suivi la dictature hitlérienne avec celle qui a été conséquence des dictatures espagnole et portugaise; impersonnalité des décisions et organisations internationalisées. L’ONU et la CSCE sont des organismes supranationaux exposés à des contradictions internes et aux jeux d’intérêts nationaux et la CEE est encore loin de l’unité politique dont on parle.

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Les problèmes de l’information

Tous ces problèmes sont apparus au grand jour durant le Symposium, spécialement dans le débat sur le droit à l’information dont doit jouir tout citoyen qui se veut responsable. Il y a une question qui a été répétée dans des réunions, dans d’autres pays du bloc occidental, comment dans le circuit de l’information est resté aux mains des membres de la nomenclature officielle du passé ; elle joue souvent un rôle de connaissance non objective mais d’opposition au système démocratique, en soulignant avant tout les insuffisances et l’inéfficacité. Les citoyens, peu habitués à vivre dans un climat d’ouverture quotidienne de l’information propre à une société libre, éprouvent de la difficulté à s’y habituer. Il est difficile de décrire, dans ce panorama actuel, le rôle négatif, qui est en train de s’organiser d’un modèle d’opposition qui déplace la lutte politique plus sur les médias que dans son siège politique normal qui est le parlement. Dans tous les pays d’Europe centrale et orientale, les forces électorales réalisent un grand effort pour donner vie à des organes de presse indépendants, parlés ou écrits. Le problème de fond qu’ils doivent affronter est le manque de moyens en hommes et en moyens financiers, qui, dans l’absence d’un public préparé à recevoir leurs messages. Un autre problème, connexe au premier, est constitué par le manque d’argent de presse qui diffusent ces informations ; ce problème est important car la nouvelle façon de concevoir la manière d’être citoyen passe à travers une réorganisation générale dans un sens démocratique du système de l’information. Le ministre hongrois de la Justice, Mr. János Lázár, a beaucoup insisté sur l’aspect des choses par rapport aux interprétations que donne la Cour Institutionnelle sur le projet d’une nouvelle loi en préparation qui concerne la liberté d’information, la sauvegarde de la personne et sa dignité, le rapport entre l’intérêt individuel et l’intérêt public, les conditions égales pour tous dans l’accès aux informations.

Le prof. Achille Ardigò, de l’Université de Bologne, a insisté sur le rôle des intellectuels dans cette situation nouvelle, qui atteste le manque de la d’intelligence hongroise qui ont joué un si grand rôle au moment de la résistance au totalitarisme en question et qui doivent promouvoir maintenant une culture du droit à l’information, et se mettre au diapason de la réalité de la société civile et non plus seulement interpréter ce que pensent les personnes qui ne jouissent pas encore de la possibilité de se exprimer et de dire ce qu’ils éprouvent. Si les intellectuels ne sont pas capables de collaborer à l’extension des bases sociales et culturelles de la nouvelle société qui naît, ils courrent le risque que, dit Ardigò, d’être écartés entre des pôles, celui du capitalisme privatisant, simple imitation, et celui du nationalisme intolérant qui porte aux crises de la société et aux crises de l’historique entre les deux pôles. Ce qui est le capitalisme social et les pressions de la société civile qui n’ont pas encore de réponse possible.

La culture

Sur le thème de la culture s’est exprimé le Recteur de l’Université de Budapest, Rudolf Andorka, qui a fait une analyse approfondie des mutations qui ont eu lieu en Europe centrale et orientale. Il a fini l’année 80, il a formulé quelques hypothèses sur les changements d’avenir possibles. Faut-il préférer une transition rapide sur le plan économique, et donc une période de « choc », ou bien une période plus longue de transformation qui s’accompagne d’une protection vis-à-vis des couches les plus démunies de la population, au point de réduire les incidences normales des inégalités que l’ouverture au marché provoquerait anormalement ? Les postes politiques hongrois sont divisés sur cette question, et, même si un renforcement des mouvements extrémistes ne représente pas pour le moment un réel danger, il subsiste tout de même un risque d’un vide de la société civile, comprise non seulement comme réalité d’institutions et de marché indépendants de l’État, mais aussi comme volonté et capacité de faire de soi. Mais, toujours selon le prof. Andorka, une culture et une mentalité réellement démocratiques ne pourront être réalisées que sur un temps très long ; « lorsque nos petits-enfants auront atteint l’âge adulte ». M. Jean Oprescu, membre du Centre de Recherche Anthropologique de l’Académie roumaine de Bucarest, a défendu de manière rigoureuse les valeurs morales qui sont les prémisses d’une culture authentique. On a pu noter dans ses paroles l’écho de l’expression de son pays sous le gouvernement de Ceausescu, le refus des idées imposées, la revendication de l’autonomie de jugement, la nécessité urgente d’une réforme radicale de l’enseignement, la défense de l’insatiable permanence des intellectuels dans lesquels il n’y a aucun progrès possible. Le débat sur les contenus d’une authentique culture a soulevé, à côté de la dimension morale, la dimension religieuse et anthropologique. Quelle est la notion de l’homme qui doit être la mère, lorsque nous abordons les problèmes de la culture, de la liberté, de la solidarité ? Quelle influence peut avoir l’adhésion à la foi chrétienne pour le progrès réel de la société ? Il s’agit là d’une question complexe, que le Symposium de Budapest n’a pu qu’évoquer mais qui mériterait certainement un examen approfondi, car c’est la même personne qui agit sur le plan moral, sur le plan politique et sur le plan économique. Il faut dire qu’on ne parle pas dans les pays de l’Est européen de l’urgence de la nécessité de reconstruire le tissu social et d’établir une culture qui ne prétende pas exclusivement refléter la mémoire d’un passé qui existait avant l’époque communiste, mais qu’on en arrive à un processus projeté vers l’avenir. En effet, souvent les populations de ces pays tendent à mettre entre parenthèses le passé récent ou en faisant une véritable dannatio memoriae. Seule une authentique culture centrée sur la personne peut aider à comprendre la signification de la traversée du désert de ces populations soumises à une utopie distordue, bureaucratique et oppressive.

Comment la culture occidentale, parfois nihiliste, peut-elle aider la génération nouvelle de ces pays, souvent sceptique ou désirable d’un ultra-libéralisme éthique et économique, ou la partie de cette génération angoissée par rapport à la recherche de sécurité dans le monde actuel que les nationalismes et les fondamentalismes semblent porter en eux ? Objectivement parlant, il nous semble qu’une pensée de réinspiration personnaliste serait une aide plus forte que l’unique confrontation aux sciences sociales.

Les participants au Symposium ont unaniment souligné la nécessité pour les pays occidentaux la Communauté européenne de coordonner leurs efforts, en dirigeant complètement leur attention et leurs moyens non seulement au développement du marché et des structures économiques, mais également à des initiatives culturelles adaptées. Il existe en Hongrie de nombreux organismes qui peuvent contribuer au développement de la société civile. Mais ces organismes ont un besoin urgent d’aide de tous genres, pour cette mission indispensable. La croissance culturelle nécessite les moyens financiers, qui doivent être largement répartis, mais doit aussi prendre conscience de la fragilité des relations existantes entre les deux parties de l’Europe qui s’établissent sur des bases seulement commerciales et économiques. Une confirmation de ce fait provient du document concernant les orientations de la Commission européenne sur l’avenir des relations entre la CEE et les pays de l’Est, qui a été}

INFORMATIONS / septembre - décembre 1992
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Les problèmes de l’information

Tous ces problèmes sont apparus au grand jour durant le Symposium, spécialement dans le débat sur le droit à l’information dont doit jouir tout citoyen qui se veut responsable. Il y a sur cette question un vaste débat en cours en Hongrie, comme dans d’autres pays du bloc ex-socialiste.

L’information est restée aux mains des membres de la « nomenclatura » officielle du passé ; elle joue souvent un rôle de connaissance non objective mais d’opposition au système démocratique, en se soulignant avant tout les insuffisances et l’inefficacité. Les citoyens, peu habitués à vivre dans un climat d’ouverture quotidienne de l’information propre à une société libre, éprouvent de la lutte à discerner, dans ce panorama acrétique et négatif, ce qu’est en soi le processus d’organisation en place, qui déplace la lutte politique plus sur les médias que dans son siège politique normal qui est le parlement. Dans tous les pays d’Europe centro-orientale, les forces démocratiques réalisent un grand effort pour donner vie à des organes de presse indépendants, parmi ou écrits. Le problème de fond qu’ils doivent affronter est le manque en hommes et en moyens financiers, ainsi que l’absence d’un public préparé à recevoir leurs messages. Un autre problème, connexe au premier, est constitué par le manque d’agences de presse qui diffusent les informations ; ce problème est important car la nouvelle façon de concevoir la presse doit être citoyen passe à travers une réorganisation générale dans un sens démocratique du système de l’information.

Le ministre hongrois de la Justice, Mme Edit Pápács-Fritz, a beaucoup insisté sur cet aspect des choses par rapport aux interprétations que donne la Cour institutionnelle sur le projet d’une nouvelle loi en préparation qui concerne la liberté d’information, la sauvegarde de la personne et sa dignité, le rapport croissant entre l'intérêt individuel et l'intérêt public, la condition économique pour tous dans l’accès aux informations.

Le prof. Achille Ardigo, de l’Université de Bologne, a insisté sur le rôle des intellectuels dans cette situation nouvelle, qui attentent des membres de l'intelligentsia hongroise qui ont joué un si grand rôle au moment de la résistance au communisme et qui doivent promouvoir maintenant une culture du droit à l’information, et se méfier au dépassage de la réalité de la société civile et non plus seulement interpréter ce que pensent les personnes qui se jouissent pas encore de la possibilité de s exprimer et de dire ce qu’ils éprouvent. Si les intellectuels ne sont pas capables de collaborer à l’extension des bases sociales et culturelles de la nouvelle société qui naît, ils courent le risque, dit Ardigo, d’être écartelés entre deux pôles, celui de l’élite privatisante, simple imitation, et celui du nationalisme intolérant qui porte au pire répressions xenophobes contre ceux qui sont divers.

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Sur le thème de la culture s’est exprimé le Recteur de l’Université de Budapest, Rudolf Andorka, qui a fait une analyse approfondie des mutations qui ont eu lieu en Europe centrale et orientale à la fin des années 80. Il a formulé quelques hypothèses concernant les changements d’avenir possibles. Puis il préconise une transition rapide sur le plan économique et donc une période de « choc », ou bien une période plus longue de transformation s’accompagnant d’une protection vis-à-vis des couches les plus démunies de la population, au point de réduire les incidences négatives des inégalités qu’ouverture au marché provoquerait immédiatement ? Les partis politiques hongrois sont divisés sur cette question et, même si un renforcement des mouvements extrémistes ne représente pas pour le moment un redoutable danger, il subsiste toutefois le risque d’un vide de la société civile, comprise non seulement comme réalité d’institutions et de marché indépendant de l’Etat, mais aussi comme volonté et capacité de faire de soi. Mais, toujours selon le prof. Andorka, une culture et une mentalité réellement démocratiques ne pourront être réalisées que sur un temps très long, lors de ces petits enfants auront atteint l’âge adulte.

M. Ianc Oprescu, membre du Centre de Recherche Académique de l’Académie roumaine de Bucarest, a défendu de manière rigoureuse les valeurs morales qui sont les présupposées d’une culture authentique. On a pu noter dans ses paroles l’écho de l’oppression de son pays sous le gouvernement de Ceausescu, le refus des idées imposées, la revendication de l’indépendance de jugement, la nécessité urgente d’une réforme profonde de l’enseignement, la défense de l’insatisfaction permanente des intellectuels, sans lesquels il n’y a aucun progrès possible.

Le débat sur les contenus d’une authentique culture a souligné, à côté de la dimension morale, la dimension religieuse et anthropologique. Quelle est la notion de l’homme qui doit être la nôtre, lorsque nous affrontons les problèmes de la culture, de la liberté, de la solidarité ? Quelle influence peut avoir l’adoption à la fois chrétienne pour favoriser un progrès réel vers la démocratie ? Si s’agit là d’une question complexe, le Symposium de Budapest n’a pu qu’effleurer mais qui méritait certainement un examen approfondi, car c’est la même personne qui agit sur le plan moral, sur le plan politique et sur le plan économique. Il faut dire qu’on ne parle pas assez dans les pays de l’Est européen de l’urgence et de la nécessité de reconstruire le tissu social déchiré et de bâtir une culture qui ne privilège pas exclusivement le culte de la mémoire d’un passé qui existait avant l’époque communiste, mais qu’on en arriverait à un processus projeté vers l’avenir. En effet, souvent les populations de ces pays tendent à mettre entre parenthèses le passé récent en en faisant une véritable damnatio memoriae ! Seule une authentique culture centrée sur la personne peut aider à comprendre la signification de «la traversée du désert» de ces populations soumises à une utopie distordue, bureaucratique et oppressive.

Comment la culture occidentale, parfois nihiliste, peut-elle aider la génération nouvelle de ces pays, souvent sceptique ou désireuse d’un ultra-libéralisme éthique et économique, ou la partie de cette génération angeee par rapport à la recherche de sécurité dans un monde vital que les nationalismes et les fundamentalismes semblent porter en eux ? Objectivement parlant, il nous semble qu’une pensée d’inspiration personnaliste serait une aide plus forte que l’unique confrontation aux sciences sociales.

Les participants au Symposium ont unanimement souligné la nécessité pour les pays occidentaux et la Communauté européenne de coordonner leurs efforts, en dirigeant complètement leur attention et leurs moyens non seulement au développement du marché et des structures économiques, mais également à des initiatives culturelles adaptées. Il existe en Hongrie de nos jours une quantité d’organismes privés qui peuvent contribuer au développement de la société civile. Mais ces organismes ont un besoin urgent d’aide de tous genres. C’est une mission indispensable. La croissance culturelle nécessaire des moyens financiers, a besoin d’idées, de réflexions, mais doit aussi prendre conscience de la fragilité des relations existantes entre les deux parties de l’Europe qui s’établissent sur des bases seulement commerciales et économiques. Une confirmation de ce fait provient du document concernant les orientations de la Commission européenne sur l’avenir des relations entre la CEE et les pays de l’Est, qui ont été

La participation


Une attention toute particulière a été attribuée au rôle des ONG par le rapporteur néerlandais. Mme Maria Carmen Garcia Viyuela, de la Fondación Fernando Rico de Madrid, a attiré l’attention sur l’urgence de la communication culturelle, du fait que le passage d’un système social à un autre s’est fait à un rythme tellement rapide, qu’il risque de ralentir la prise de conscience graduelle des nouvelles responsabilités qui en dérivent et qui sont importantes pour le futur. Il faut dépasser l’apathie et la fragmentation sociale qui ont à l’opposé d’une participation démocratique efficace. Cela se reflète sur la fragmentation politique, si visible en Pologne, suivie d’un désintérêt pour la chose publique de la part des simples citoyens. On a fait remarquer la surprenante continuité entre les régimes autoritaires des années ’20 et ’30 et les “démocraties populaires” d’Europe de l’Est. Les deux cas ont comporté une couverture visible entre les détenus du pouvoir et les masses, marquée par le mépris des premiers par rapport aux règles fondamentales de la démocratie, et surtout du droit des citoyens de manifester leur désaccord.

La coopération indispensable entre les instituts culturels

Une Table ronde a clos le Symposium ; elle a été introduite par le secrétaire général de l’Institut International J. Martin, Roberto Papini, qui a fait remarquer combien est indispensable une collaboration culturelle entre les pays d’Europe de l’Est et le reste de l’Occident. Il y a dans ce domaine un vaste champ de coopération entre les gouvernements et les ONG. Il faut chercher les dénominateurs communs pour éviter toute dispersion. Les participants ont été unanimes pour affirmer qu’un dialogue est nécessaire entre toutes les formations culturelles, leur fonction d’être en même temps des pionniers, grâce à des projets pilotes et des laboratoires d’idées. Elles doivent également explorer les raisons profondes des problèmes des minorités et des nationalités qui sont de nos jours les protagonistes dramatiques de nombres d’épreuves qui touchent l’Europe centro-orientale.

On pourrait dire que, dans la recherche de son identité, l’Europe occidentale regarde plus son présent et son avenir, alors que l’Europe de l’Est, paradoxalement, manifeste, au moins pour le moment, plus d’intérêt à explorer son passé et à en rouvrir les plaies. En réalité, ce passé revient de manière fragmentaire pour être utilisé instrumentalement comme matériau de construction dans des projets encore incertains. On a parlé du développement de “réseaux” professionnels, ainsi que d’appels aux instituts culturels pour qu’ils s’ouvrent aux réalisations en mutation et ne se contentent pas à la tentative de se replier sur des formes de culture élite.

Reprise l’Europe ; expériences et espoirs

Pour conclure, disons que les participants et les organismes promoteurs du Symposium de Budapest, sont entrés chez eux avec un bagage d’expériences disparates. Mais ils ont découvert plus de nouvelles problèmes qu’acquiers des certitudes définitives. Il est évident que, dans ce sens, ce Symposium a joué un rôle de “provocation” à chercher des solutions aux questions nouvelles qui vont se poser ou se poseront déjà, et à faire sortir les pays d’Europe de l’Est hors des “lieux-communs” qui jalonnaient sa route. Sagesse du doute ? Moi, moitié de l’humilité et de la compassion face à tous ceux qui ont été les protagonistes de tant d’épreuves ? L’Occident a certes acquis des expériences positives en thème de liberté, c’institutions démocratiques, d’économie de marché, de droits humains, mais ces expériences sont mêlées de contradictions, de résultats négatifs, d’incohérences évidentes. Les peuples de l’Est ont probablement mythifié - et on comprend les motifs, une vision de la démocratie et de l’économie telles qu’elles ont été conçues et enseignées en Occident. A Budapest, face à certaines affirmations de participants occidentaux plutôt autoritaires, un ami roumain a dit : « Après 50 ans de dictature, vous nous enlvez maintenant un mirage. »

Nous devons repenser une Europe unie, ce qui est une perspective complexe mais exaltante, avec ses diverses indispensables qui doivent être valorisées, avec des rapports réciproques, et non seulement par des solutions à sens unique, d’Ouest à Est ; une Europe ouverte à ce que leurs appel : « l’humanisme de l’autre homme » dans lequel les droits de l’homme se manifestent concrètement comme le « droit de l’autre auquel je dois répondre. » Voilà la marque : culturelle - qui évoque aux droits de l’homme de devenir une sorte de nouvel impérialisme.

Le Symposium de Budapest ne s’est pas occupé de manière directe de politique, mais cette dernière est restée en permanence filigrane dans les relations et les débats. Les évocations répétées des problèmes ethniques, des nationalismes, des minorités, du pluralisme culturel, ne peuvent cacher le fait du rôle essentiel que joue la politique dans l’assiette de fond des pays de l’Est, et donc dans tout l’ensemble institutionnel de l’Europe, pour le dépassement de l’Etat-nation, de la souveraineté absolue de l’Etat, du nouvel ordre à construire avec difficulté, certes, vers une unité respectueuse des diversités, des droits de tous, individuels ou des peuples, capables d’une solidarité institutionnalisée, ouverte à une citoyenneté nouvelle. Une Europe fondée sur les autonomies, capables de ne pas confondre unité avec centralisme, dans laquelle les modèles respectifs et les expériences culturelles ne soient pas aventurement importées, subies ou imitées, mais donnant dans leur confrontation perpétuelle un résultat de mutuel enrichissement et de compréhension réciproque.

Voilà la formule du fédéralisme, de l’authenticité fédérale, non pas russe ou yougoslave, qui doit être redécouverte et récupérée. Seulement dans ce cas sera dépassé ce que la revue Time, du 7 décembre 1992, disait dans un article en affrontant le thème du château du communisme : « Un mirage enveloppé de danger. »

Gianfranco Martini
On 27th September and 12th November 1992 two meetings were convened by the International Jacques Maritain Institute in Budapest in order to promote the constitution of the Hungarian Jacques Maritain Association. At the first meeting some intellectuals and politicians were invited in order to acquaint them on the Institute initiatives concerning Central Europe. The second meeting intended to configure a joint study-project among International Jacques Maritain Institute and Centre-Europe Maritain associations about democratic development. In both cases, the International Institute was represented by Prof. A. Favan (Deputy Secretary General of the Institute).

Le Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches de l'Institut International J. Maritain, en collaboration avec le gouvernement de la Région de la Vénétie, a lancé un programme d'études sur le thème de la démocratie locale. Dans ce cadre, deux sessions d'études ont été tenues à la Villa Albrizzi-Franchetti, à Trévise, le 31 octobre et le 5 décembre 1992, consacrées à la politique italienne et aux nouvelles lois en préparation. De nombreux spécialistes et hommes politiques engagés dans la politique locale régionale ont refléchi sur les nouvelles opportunités ouvertes par la réforme qui s'annonce et qui sera un banc d'essai, autant pour le développement des racines politiques que pour un gouvernement local plus efficace et réel. Le titre général de ces sessions était: « Nouvelles institutions pour une démocratie locale ».

Le Comité directeur de l'Institut s'est réuni à Rome le 10 novembre 1992. Il était présents MM. Ramon Sugranes de Franch, président; Roberto Papini, secrétaire général; Antonio Favan, directeur du Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches de Trévise; Giancarlo Serafini; Vincenzo Fiorini, administrateur; Mme Maria Silvia Pacetti. Les travaux ont été ouverts par le prof. Sugranes de Franch et le rapport général, fait par Roberto Papini, a été approuvé à l'unanimité. Le Comité directeur a également discuté et approuvé le bilan 1992 et le budget 1993. Le programme des activités proposées par le secrétaire général pour l'année 1993 a reçu l'approbation des membres présents après une discussion.

On 7 and 8 November 1992, at the International Institute offices in Rome, there was a meeting of the Scientific Committee of the research project on «Ethics, Economics and Development. The Contribution of the Christian Communities». The following were present: Prof. Ramon Sugranes de Franch (Chairman of the International J. Maritain Institute), Father C.J. Pinto de Oliveira CP (Professor of Moral Theology at the University of Fribourg), Prof. Roberto Papini (Secretary General of the International J. Maritain Institute), Father Sergio Benza SJ (Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the Gregorian University, Rome), Prof. Vincenzo Buonomo (Latterian Pontifical University, Rome), Mrs. Maria Silvia Pacetti (Secretary General Assistant).

An analysis was made both on the conclusions of the research on the episcopal documents and on its possible continuity. Besides, general criteria were given for the research editing. Another subject of the meeting was defining the programme for the forthcoming Seminar at Fribourg (April 1993).
On 30th November 1992 at Villa Albrizzi-Franchetti in Treviso, a session was held on Credit and solidarity in local systems. The meeting was organised by the Study and Research Centre of the International Jacques Maritain Institute in collaboration with the Veneto federation of the Rural and Artisan Savings Banks on the occasion of the hundred-year-long experience of the Italian credit co-operation in Italy. An historical view was given on the role played by these institutions into market economy and on their future perspectives.

After the address by the Executive Chairman of the Centre, Hon. Lino Innocenti, and the Chairman of the Italian Federation of Rural and Artisan Savings Banks, Amedeo Piva (Chairman of the Veneto Federation of Rural and Artisan Savings Banks) introduced the meeting. Subsequent speakers were Giuseppe De Rita (Chairman of the Economy and Employment National Council), Prof. Ferruccio Bresolin (University of Venice), Angelo Calota (Chairman of the Mediocredito Lombardo). The conclusions were presented by Hon. Nino Cristofori, Italian Minister of Employment.

The next Annual Meeting of the American Maritain Association will be held on November 4-7 1993. It will take place at the University of Dallas, in Irving (Texas), and its theme will be «The silence of St. Thomas: On Thomism and Postmodernism». The programme, arranged and coordinated by Prof. Deal Hudson (Department of Philosophy of Fordham University), will be devoted to such topics as postmodern interpretations of St. Thomas' silence; the influence of Heidegger on Thomism; postmodernism and the question of nihilism; Thomism and gender; Derrida and nega-

tive theology; the backdrop of Maritain's critique of Bergson. Scholars interested in participating the meeting are requested to send a substantial abstract to Prof. Deal W. Hudson - Dept. of Philosophy - Fordham University - Bronx, NY 10458.

We are glad to acquaint our readers, that from 13 to 20 July 1993 a session over Jacques Maritain ahead Modernity will be held within the framework of the «Fontigny-Cerisy's Friends Association» activities (22, rue de Bouilainvilliers, 75016 Paris - Tel: 1/45204203), under the direction of Michel Bressollet and René Mougel. Anybody interested in attending the meeting is kindly requested to apply to the address indicated above or to the «Centre Culturel International de Cerisy la Salle», (tel: 33/ 49.91.66 - fax: 33/46.11.39).

We are glad to acquaint our readers about the important initiative taken by the Personalist Research Circle of Teramo (Italy) in starting the publication of a quarterly journal. The first issue was published in July 1992. The Journal, whose title is Proposetica persona, is edited by Prof. Attilio Danese and Giulia Paola Di Nicola who are the responsible. The review will have 4 numbers per an, and contain a «Dossier» on the same. The number 1/2 has been published in July 1992.

Nous sommes heureux de signaler aux lecteurs de Notes et Documents que, du 13 au 20 juillet 1993, dans le cadre des activités culturelles de l'Association des Amis de Pontigny-Cerisy (27, rue de Bouilainvilliers, 75016 Paris - Télecopie 1/45204203), aura lieu une session sur «Jacques Maritain face à la modernité», sous la direction de Michel Bressollet et de René Mougel. Ceux qui seraient éventuellement intéressés à participer à cette semaine de travail peuvent contacter dès aujourd'hui l'adresse sus-indiquée ou encore le Centre Culturel International de Cerisy la Salle (Tél. 33/49.91.66 - Fax: 33/46.11.39).

Nous nous réjouissons d'annoncer aux lecteurs de Notes et Documents: la décision du Centre de Recherches Personnalistes de Teramo, en Italie, de lancer une nouvelle revue qui porte le nom de Propositica persona. Ce sont Attilio Danese et Giulia Paola Di Nicola qui en sont les responsables: la revue s'articulera sur un «Dossier» sur la même. Le numéro 1/2 est paru en juillet 1992.

Comme le dit Giulia Paola Di Nicola dans l'éditorial: «Si nous avons pris l'initiative de revoir un espace au féminin, c'est pour donner une insistance particulière aux fragments dispersés de la politique féminine, pour mettre en valeur l'égalité et les différences foncières qui sont les marques d'aujourd'hui des rapports entre femmes et hommes... deux voix, chacune dans la conscience de la propre dignité et...»
Prospects persona joins the others important Italian and French personalism journals and publications, for which the Personalist Centre in Teramo represent an important point of reference.

dans la stupeur attentive à la différence de l’"autre".
La revue se rattache de très près à la revue Esprit et à tout le groupe de journaux et publications personnalistes italiennes et françaises, pour lesquelles le Centre de Teramo a été pendant de nombreuses années un point de référence essentiel.

International Jacques Maritain Institute Publications

During 1992, the following books were published by the Institute:

3. V. Buonomo (a cura di), Etnie, culture e unità dell’Europa. Ed. Franco Angeli, Milano 1992, pp. 188.

Publications de l’Institut International Jacques Maritain

Au cours de l’année 1992, l’Institut a publié les livres suivants:

3. V. Buonomo (a cura di), Etnie, culture e unità dell’Europa. Ed. Franco Angeli, Milano 1992, pp. 188.

The Institute also sponsored the publication of the following volumes:


The following book was published with a contribution of the International Jacques Maritain Institute:


Notas y Documentos, the Latin-American edition of our journal, during 1992 published the following issues:

Nº 28 (Enero-Marzo): Siglo XXI. el hombre, cultura y desafíos
Nº 29 (Abril-Junio): Creación artística y sociedad
Nº 30 (Julio-Diciembre): Aproximaciones al V Centenario del Descubrimiento.

Le volume suivant a été publié avec une contribution de l’Institut International Jacques Maritain:


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THE FUTURE OF

THOMISM

DEAL W. HUDSON

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PREFACE BY GERALD A. MCCOOL, S.J.

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Colloque international

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René Mougé

Table Ronde
Humanisme chrétien et monde contemporain
Présidence: Ramon Sugranies de Franch

Samedi 23 octobre 1993

Le rôle de l'oeuvre de J. Maritain dans le débat culturel du XXe siècle
Emile Poulat

Du 21 au 23 octobre 1993, sera organisée à Rome une Conférence internationale à l'occasion de la publication du dernier volume des Oeuvres Complètes de J. et R. Maritain, date qui correspond d'ailleurs au 20ème anniversaire de la mort du philosophe français. Cette conférence se tient sous l'égide du Centre d'Études Saint-Louis de France, à Rome, ensemble avec le Cercle d'Études J. et R. Maritain de Kolbheim, et notre Institut International. La LUMSA (Libera Università Maria SS. Assunta) de Rome s'associe à l'organisation de cette Conférence.