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pour une recherche interdisciplinaire

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"Paix ethnique dans les Balkans" est le thème du Séminaire international qui s'est déroulé à Gallarate, près de Milan, du 20 au 22 octobre 1994. Les experts et chercheurs qu'il a réunis autour de ce problème difficile et dramatique provenaient de divers pays concernés par la situation de cette région du monde et appartaient à des organisations étatiques ou à des réalités sociales en conflit entre elles, ainsi qu'à des groupes et à des communautés religieuses assez diversifiées en leur sein.

L'Institut International Jacques Maritain, promoteur de ce Séminaire, entendait ainsi apporter sa contribution à l'analyse et à la connaissance sans parti pris d'une situation qui, au-delà de la tragiue réalité quotidienne des populations directement concernées, posait des problèmes de portée générale, comme la possibilité de cohabitation pacifique de diverses composantes dans le cadre d'un pluralisme ethnique, culturel, religieux et, finalement, politique. De l'avis unanime des participants, les travaux du Séminaire ont permis de combler certaines lacunes dans nos propres catégories mentales d'interprétations qui limitent souvent en Occident la compréhension de ce phénomène complexe, tant au niveau des plus hauts responsables politiques qu'à celui d'une opinion publique souvent mal informée par les mass media.

Ceux qui désirent en savoir plus sur ce Séminaire pourront lire utilement le volume des Actes intitulé Balkans en flammes: quelle paix ethnique?, édité par les soins de Roberto Papini, secrétaire général de l'Institut International J. Maritain, et de Rade Petrovíc, de l'Université de Sarajevo.

Trois ans se sont écoulés depuis ce Séminaire, mais une interrogation non académique, nourrie de préoccupations qui perdurent, d'espérances et de craintes, demeure bien présente dans nos consciences de croyants, de démocrates, de citoyens de divers pays, sur lesquelles pèse encore la longue et coupable inattention de la communauté internationale devant la tragédie qui a meurtri la Croatie, la Serbie et la Bosnie Herzégovine. Depuis trois ans, quoi de neuf dans ces pays qui faisaient partie de l'ex-Yougoslavie et, plus en général, de la région balkanique?

Cette rapide présentation n'a pas pour but de retraiter l'histoire récente ni, à plus forte raison, de proposer une analyse approfondie. Son objectif est plutôt d'éclairer le lecteur sur les raisons qui nous ont poussé à publier à nouveau, aujourd'hui, certaines interventions lors de ce Séminaire. Certaines, la sélection nécessaire parmi ces rapports copieux et de grande qualité pourra susciter quelques perplexités et commentaires. C'est le risque inévitable de tout choix, mais nous espérons que ce risque sera limité par les "critères" qui ont inspiré cette sélection. Il s'agit de lutter des témoignages sur le pluralisme d'une société qui a réalisé depuis longtemps son unité politique, comme la Suisse, ou qui poursuit cet objectif, comme l'Union
Evangelique de Jean XXIII reprise par ses successeurs, sont appelés à s’engager ‘‘spes contra speram’’. Jacques Maritain, à maintes occasions, nous a enseigné que les diverses idéologies ou convictions ne peuvent empêcher de travailler ensemble, efficacement, pour construire dans la paix et dans le développement la communauté des hommes.

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Evropéenne (Dušan Sidjanski), et de rappeler certaines réflexions éthico-culturelles sur la valeur de la paix et du nécessaire processus éducatif en matière de rationalité (Arij A. Roest Croillius, s.j.).

Cette dernière contribution a bien montré en particulier combien les analyses et les discussions lors de ce Séminaire attestent l’actualité de la pensée de Maritain qui, basée sur une longue tradition philosophique, met en relief le lien indispensable entre foi religieuse et raison.

Limitons-nous ici à rappeler quelques-uns des nombreux problèmes et interrogations qui émergent de la lecture des interventions republiées, à la lueur de la réalité actuelle et des évenements survenus dans ce laps de temps depuis le Séminaire de Gallarate.

Les accords de Dayton représentent-ils vraiment la solution aux nombreux problèmes qui sont apparus en ex-Yougoslavie? Ils ont certainement fait cesser le conflit armé, mais que de chemin encore à parcourir dans cette direction, pour trouver des réponses durables dans une réalité encore caractérisée par des oppositions ethniques, culturelles, historiques et religieuses alimentées par une guerre feroce et qui ne seront pas oubliées de sitôt.

Que peuvent faire la communauté internationale et, en particulier, l’Union Européenne, le Conseil de l’Europe, l’OSCE, l’ONU, c’est-à-dire les grandes organisations internationales, pour favoriser la réalisation de cet objectif de paix, de développement, de civilisation et pour remédier, même tardivement, aux passés et aux erreurs d’évaluation (innocentes ou voulues) qui ont marqué leur attitude face à ce conflit, depuis les années de son émergence jusqu’à ses développements sanglants?

Est-il possible, dans cette œuvre récente, indispensable et urgente de pacification, d’isoler les problèmes de l’ex-Yougoslavie par rapport à ceux de la région balkanique tout entière, dont la grande diversité ne doit pas faire oublier son indéniable enchevêtrement de situations ethniques, religieuses, économiques, politiques? Et la crise éclatée en Albanie pourra-t-elle avoir des répercussions dans les pays limitrophes où vivent des populations qui revendiquent des racines communes?

Quant aux problèmes économiques et politiques qui concernent la Bulgarie, la Roumanie et la République Fédérale Yougoslavie, quelles perspectives ouvrent-ils dans les Balkans? Quelle évolution prévisible pour une authentique démocratie en Croatie?

Qui supportera le poids économique et financier de la reconstruction après les horribles destructions en Croatie et en Bosnie-Herzégovine? L’ingénierie institutionnelle complexe imposée en Bosnie-Herzégovine, qui accuse déjà des tensions et des inégalités entre croates, bosniaques et serbes, résistera-t-elle?

L’expérience yougoslave, avec toutes ses souffrances, servira-t-elle de leçon pour faire progresser des solutions efficaces et durables pour la protection, non seulement nationale, mais aussi européenne et internationale, du droit des minorités aux plans individuel et collectif, avec des réponses politiques mais aussi juridiquement contraignantes?

Enfin, last but not least, quelle sera l’influence de l’appel dramatique lancé par le Pape durant sa visite tant désirée à Sarajevo, sur une terre divisée aussi au niveau religieux et où les efforts en vue d’un véritable œcuménisme, non dénué encore de certaines ambigüités et de contradictions, ne semblent pas avoir permis pour l’instant des progrès substantiels?

Il est aisé de constater que nous sommes tous confrontés à des problèmes énormes. Malgré tout, tous les “hommes de bonne volonté”, pour citer la très heureuse expression...
THE ECONOMIC ROOTS OF POLITICAL NATIONALISM

Ljubomir Madžar

1. Introduction

It is the set of overall systemic features, i.e. the exogenously given objective structure of the relevant decision-making environment, and not just the qualities, idiosyncrasies and whims of the agents, that appears to be responsible for the overall outcome of a complex sequence of interdependent events marking a concrete historical process. The idea is quite familiar and routinely applied in economics. Hardly anyone likes the outcome of a monopolistic market, but nobody is tempted to ascribe the responsibility for its distortions to the agents interacting in that market. Quite the contrary, it is the market structure that is "held responsible" for whatever deviations can be perceived in the allocation of resources. In a similar vein, remedies are sought and applied.

Can any of this reasoning be applied to politics, which is fraught with just about every imaginable kind of deviation? It is customary and universal to blame the actors alone for all misfortunes deriving from politics. The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on the other, poorly understood side of the political process - the set of objective, given and uncontrollable determinants of political change, the determinants whose consequences are exceptionally and, at least in some circumstances, mistakenly ascribed to the, more often than not, unfortunate players in the political drama.

To begin with, the overwhelming majority of problems, damage and evils stem from extreme conflicts which came to dominate the political scene of almost all the multi-ethnic post-socialist countries (PSCs). The roots of the conflicts are contained in the very foundations of the now disintegrated socio-economic system which the PSCs have definitively abandoned. The overall institutional framework of the PSCs was practically the embodiment and implementation of the all-pervading political determinism which dominated their societies at large and represented the operating principle of all important (and many unimportant) segments of social life. Whenever universalised and elevated to the level of the principal determinant of social dynamics, politics generates destructive conflicts in a systematic way. Everything in the PSCs eventually becomes a political issue, the subject of arbitrary political decision-making. The reason for this lies in the fact that some non-political regulatory mechanisms - particularly those which are of society-wide significance, such as the market, the rule of law, the machinery of pluralistic democracy and even the standard collection of parliamentary procedures - have in the PSCs been either badly damaged and severely restricted or eliminated altogether. When everything of significance becomes the subject of political bargaining, a series of destructive conflicts is imminent and then unavoidable.

Thus the PSCs have entered the democratic age with deep and serious conflicts, some hidden, others open. Most conflicts, especially the large ones, had their roots in the economic position of major social groups. By the logic of the system, these groups were defined by administrative boundaries and, as such, coincided with large ethnic entities. A disturbingly big number of decisions affected simultaneously, and basically in the same fashion, well-defined and numerous groups of individuals. In such a way the groups were set automatically against each other; the redistribution game was regularly transformed into one of a zero sum nature.

This paper explains in some detail why such conflicts are particularly destructive in multi-ethnic states. In such an environment honest and constructive political competition becomes impossible. The worst elements inevitably and predictably come to the top. This is because playing on inter-ethnic mistrust and nation-based hatred becomes the richest mine of political capital. The maximum number of votes can be obtained by, firstly, generating mistrust, fear and hatred, and then coming out with the platform of defense of "our sacred national interests". Trust takes decades and centuries to grow and become strong; but in a turbulent situation emerging after the dismantling of the old system it can be destroyed overnight. It is then easy for power-hungry politicians to create a situation in which every ethnic group is threatened by every other one and, at the same time, becomes itself a threat to all the other ethnic groups. Rather than being a tool for overcoming conflicts, politics becomes a means for generating, widening and deepening them. Constructive politics, which cultivates peace and understanding among peoples, has no
chance whatsoever in pluralistic political competition. Paradoxically, the multi-party system of political competition—certainly in the limited period of transition to a truly democratic system—proves inferior to the old authoritarianism with respect to political stability and the protection of life and property. Such a paradox came to the light of day in Yugoslavia, the most heterogeneous country, but history has not ended and it could surface quite easily elsewhere.

The objective determinant of the political predicament derives from the nature of political competition. The vote grabbers are most successful when they play on fear and hatred, but if the present elites had abstained from such a misuse of mistrust, they would have been swept away from the political scene, for their competitors certainly would not have shied away from using those destructive vote-catching strategies. Before this tragic situation is overcome, peoples are doomed to conflict and suffering.

They are made to participate in the production of evil, because of having been forced to vote for those who “protect them from the enemy.” Paradoxically again, the present establishment could prove to be the least unsatisfactory of the realistic alternatives available. Nobody knows who would have taken their place had they opted for peaceful policies and thus taken the risk of being ousted by their less scrupulous competitors.

2. The implications and effects of socialist political structures

The naiveté and inadequacy of the popular and conventional approach, whereby all deviations in political developments are flatly ascribed to the respective leaderships and, ultimately, to the broad masses of their followers, supporters and voters, can best be seen by invoking objectively determined, structural features of the situations in which such developments take place. Rather than looking for personal idiosyncrasies and individual errors as the determinants of the overall shifts in the global social equilibria, a more useful and more truthful—way of approaching this intricate conglomerate of changes and events is to identify the causative factors that are deeply rooted in the not-so-distant past. If anything, the past must be taken as given; nobody will ever find himself in the position of being able to re-elect the past. The past, in turn, is the source of a multitude of exogenous conditions and uncontrollable forces. It is only in the const-

1 L. Madzar, Sistem socijalističkih priroda, Ekonomika i institucionalna nauka, Belgrade 1990, pp. 70-77.
develops through time and becomes an ever-expanding source of growing political tensions. These tensions are, however, kept in check by the authoritarian political power residing in the ruling centre. With the global crisis of the socialist system the controlling (and containing) power of the centre vanished, while the long-standing and steadily growing latent conflicts found themselves unconstrained. The resulting destructive energy was suddenly unleashed, the equilibrium was disturbed and an explosion was imminent.

This pattern of social stratification came to dominate all socialist societies and paved the way for their epochal breakdown. It was every group against every other in this enforced cohesion of various parts of society, including workers, peasants, managerial elite, intelligentsia, government bureaucrats, etc. But the greatest degree of division and homogenisation within well-defined parts of society, and simultaneously the greatest intensity of conflicts marking their political behaviour, was achieved in multi-ethnic socialist countries. There, too, conflicts arose among sociologically defined parts of the community, but these were overshadowed by the conflicts among various ethnic groups.

As indicated above, all questions in socialist systems are ultimately political questions. Economic questions are no exception to the rule, but, in addition to that and most unfortunately, they become a question of relations between various ethnic or national groups. The reason again lies in the structure of the political system: it is the nations or ethnic groups which gradually become the pillars of the system, the organising principle of its strategic decision-making mechanisms. Thus economics becomes “concentrated politics” (Lenin), and the nationally determined groups become the key actors in the political tug-of-war over the distribution (and redistribution) of income and wealth.

Economic interests find their metaphysical justification in nationalistic historical myths. The dividing lines, based on various criteria, tend to coincide. The cleavages setting the more and more differentiated ethnic wholes not just apart but also against each other become deeper and deeper. Structurally induced and inherent to socialist authoritarianism, social conflict finds its most destructive and occasionally devastating expression in the realm of inter-ethnic relations.

To summarise: because it is based on political determinism as its operating principle, because it is over-centrali-

sed and because it forces people into large homogenised groups, the socialist community appears to be inevitably afflicted with intense conflicts of strategic import and significance. In multi-ethnic societies these conflicts predictably follow the lines of national divisions and take on a particularly threatening shape. The more heterogeneous the country, the more likely it is to become the victim of devastating national strife. Likelihood is not synonymous with inevitability, but nobody should be surprised by the fact that armed conflicts broke out, for example, in the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union but not in Poland or Hungary.

3. The mechanisms of conflict generation in the socialist societies

In a politically-dominated society politics becomes the principal vehicle for all social change. Nothing can be accomplished unless decided politically. Politics becomes the destiny of both individuals and organisations, in the literal sense of the word. In particular, it becomes the only effective channel for upward social mobility.

This is why politics becomes the most important basis of social stratification. In order to become a member of the social elite, one has to get involved in politics. For only there can one find a springboard to launch one into the heights of social relevancy. Socialist societies are just like any other type of society, stratified into several groups. But it is evident that the politically dominating ruling elite stands out as a particular group compared with the rest of society, distinct from all other groups. This is obviously what Djilas long ago had in mind when he spoke about the “new class” which derives economic and all other privileges and prerogatives from its political power and authority. In a society which is structured along the lines of political determinism and in which politics clearly dominates over all other walks of life it is only to be expected that its class stratification will be derived from political sources and based on political criteria.

The “class interest” of the ruling elite can ultimately be reduced to one single component: the maximisation of political power. All other desiderata - wealth, prestige, glory, a worthy place in history - can be derived from and secured by means of it. The elite as a group acquires power in two principal ways: (a) by augmenting the number and weight of its decision-making prerogatives, and (b) by increasing the number of important - i.e. influential and
well paid - places in the governing hierarchy. It is through (b) that room for ever forthcoming new posts is systematically expanded and the spectacular growth of political bureaucracy normally secured.

This is where the conflict-generating characteristic of this authoritarian arrangement comes in again. In order to secure space and create more opportunities for the growth of the political bureaucracy, ever new, additional attractive posts have to be created, which is why the inherited (administrative, historical, cultural etc.) divisions of the country have to be emphasised and steadily deepened and new ones, wherever possible, created. Divisions open new spaces for the growth of political bureaucracy; they are the easiest way in which its mechanical expansion is secured. In Yugoslavia, for instance, as soon as the communists came to power, not only were old historical divisions reaffirmed, but also quite a few new ones were added. Thus two new nations were created, with their respective territories and complete governmental and party machinery, and a third republic, containing several ethnic groups, was established. Needless to say, it too had a complete superstructure of governmental institutions and party fora and organisations. A large number of prestigious and powerful high-level political posts was secured overnight, a lot of people were quickly accommodated by the impressive structure of the ruling apparatus.

This was the way in which many participants in the revolutionary struggle were rewarded for their part in establishing the new regime.

The subsequent development of the power structure and its counterpart in the form of the governing institutional machinery can very much be interpreted as the story of mechanical expansion of the political and the general bureaucracy, based on ever-deepening divisions which made it possible for the number of attractive, high-level posts to multiply at an impressive, occasionally accelerating rate.

Despite the fact that divisions served as a vehicle for the ever-expanding bureaucratisation of society, they should not be considered as a purely degenerative process, generating only undesirable effects and social damage. At the same time they hugely contributed to the decentralisation of the country, which was an extremely desirable development given the totalitarian structure of the regime at its inception. However, decentralisation proceeded in a divisive, conflict-laden way due to the authoritarian structure of the system and also due to the motives underlying the observed institutional evolution. Unless strictly subject to the imperatives of an efficient handling of social affairs and unless liberated from the purely political motives of expanding the room for the growth of political bureaucracy, decentralisation cannot produce its usual desirable effects and may ultimately lead to the breakdown of the system and the breakup of the country.

The conflict-generating potential of the system can now be restated and more fully perceived. Because it is authoritarian and over-centralised, the few strategic decisions it manages to make are simplistic but affect a large number of people and organisations. The effects of these decisions on the economic and social position of various actors is different for different groups, but the same for the agents within any given group. The individuals and organisations are thus forced to coalesce into very large, quite powerful and rather, at times greatly, opposing groups.

The second factor significantly contributing to the degree of antagonistic differentiation of society is the systematic, predictable tendency of deepening existing lines of division and generating new ones - the tendency produced by the unconstrained urge of the ruling elite to grow both in terms of numbers and in terms of power and decision-making authority.

A third factor has to be singled out, even though it appears to be closely related to the two preceding ones. It derives from the above-mentioned fact that in a politically dominated socialist society all important large segments of social life are regulated on a purely political basis. Above all, that includes the economy, which in democratic political arrangements is basically autonomous and, being regulated by the market, practically independent from systematic interference by the centres of political power. In particular, a market economy is free from the daily interference of the political directorate of the country. A socialist economy is greatly handicapped by not being able to rely on the market when it comes down to settling a vast majority of economic issues. Rather than relying on the market - a huge mechanism which functions spontaneously and automatically, in an objective manner, solving the potentially most divisive allocational and distributive issues - almost everything in a socialist economy becomes subject to bargaining, a matter of political negotiations.

Unlike the markets, political mechanisms do not have the devices for generating objective parameters and solving potential conflicts discreetly and unnoticedly -
behind the backs of the producers, as Marx would put it.

When everything of importance becomes the subject of political bargaining and, thus, arbitrary decision-making, then everything of importance becomes an abundant source of constructive conflicts. Hayek perceived this forbidding problem with perfect clarity and gave a definitive answer. His warnings about the insurmountable difficulties of dividing the available investible resources politically between, say, Slovenia and Slovakia sound truly prophetic, especially when viewed in this light.

4. Economic roots of nationalist antagonisms

Political arbitration over all significant economic issues cannot fail to produce major conflicts in many fields of production and trade, particularly in the regulatory activities designed to shape major allocational and distributive questions. Only a few relevant instances can be touched upon here.

Determining the amount of public expenditure and, in particular, distributing the fiscal burden is a permanent bone of contention, giving rise to a variety of political tensions. True, this is a sensitive political issue in all countries, especially those with a federal structure, but in socialist countries, and certainly in Yugoslavia, it was made much more sensitive by the characteristic way in which all economic issues were politicised.

Even the universal principle of participating in the financing of common governmental activities on the basis of economic power — which is implemented through taxation proportionate to the GNP — can give rise to serious political misunderstandings in a federalised country in which the identity of the federal units is excessively emphasised and the divisions separating them sufficiently deep. It is only natural, as was the case in Yugoslavia, that the federal units have widely differing levels of development. One manifestation of this fact, as was recently shown by Marsenić, is the widely differing shares of federal units in terms of the GNP of the country and the total population and — much more important — differences between the share of the population and the share of the GNP for each unit taken separately. If one assumes, quite reasonably, that each unit shares in the federally provided governmental benefits proportionately to its population, and if the contributions to the federal budget are proportionate to the GNP of the respective units, then it is quite clear that the more developed units pay the federal government more than they get, while the situation is the reverse in the case of the less developed units. It is not difficult to calculate the substantial fiscal transfers which occur as a result. A recent calculation shows, for example, that through this mechanism Slovenia "lost" 1.07% of the Yugoslav gross material product (GMP) and Croatia "lost" 0.56%. In the case of Slovenia the outflow was equivalent to about 5% of its GMP. When one also takes into account the direct inter-budgetary transfers to the less developed republics (and the province of Kosovo) as well as the transfers through the Federal Fund for Underdeveloped Regions, then there were total transfers from the "developed" to the "underdeveloped" parts of Yugoslavia amounting to no less than 4% of the Yugoslav GMP.

The same calculations show that through transfers via the federal budget and the so-called "federalized fund" as well as through the excess of payments into the federal budget over what should have been paid had it contributed in proportion to its population, Slovenia paid out 8.21% of its GMP. That is the price Slovenia had to pay for membership of the Yugoslav federation. Less dramatic but nevertheless telling results have, in the same as yet unpublished research, been obtained for Croatia. The figures relate to 1987, the last normal year for which reliable data are available.

It is only to be expected that such quantitative relationships should generate a lot of discontent and consequent political tension. The developed republics felt that they were paying too much for being members of the federation and promoting the development of their less advanced compatriots. Interestingly enough, discontent grew at the opposite, receiving end as well. A typical complaint was that assistance had been insufficient, and international comparisons were called upon to substantiate this claim. The predictable reaction of both developed and underdeveloped republics was to turn forcefully to the federal budget: the former wanted to reduce it, while the latter wanted it to be as large as possible.

The next divisive issue was price policy and control, and, closely associated with it, the character and degree of tariff protection. This issue has, indeed, always been a serious one, because the arbitrariness of socialist economic policies carried over into the field of prices. The arbitrariness in this field was, moreover, more pronounced than elsewhere. Very briefly, prices were out of line with international valuations, out of line with costs and, not infrequently, very much contradictory to common
sense. Globally and roughly, industrial prices used to be above the relevant international level, while agricultural commodities and raw materials were conspicuously underpriced.

These price disparities also varied systematically with the degree of manufacturing involved; highly manufactured products had excessively high domestic prices (they also enjoyed a far-above-average degree of tariff protection), while products with a low degree of manufacturing used to be noticeably underpriced. Having such distorted prices is sufficiently bad in itself because it produces huge allocational losses. But in the case of Yugoslavia it had an additional, and more precisely regional, i.e. political, dimension. The structures of the economies of the developed and the underdeveloped regions were systematically dissimilar. The poor regions were characterised by a high share of agriculture and production requiring little processing, while a dominant component in the economic structure of the developed regions was industry and, more generally, more complex manufacturing activities. At such prices, the underdeveloped federal units earned much less than would have been the case in a normal price structure, while the developed republics correspondingly benefited. Income really seems to have been unjustly and dysfunctionally redistributed in what came to be called "the primary distribution of income". Milosavljević wrote about no less than three funds which redistributed income to the developed, at the expense of the underdeveloped, republics.

The cited instances of discontent should be taken as just a small sample of inter-ethnic confrontations which acted as powerful sources of political tension. The fundamental cause of such clashes among large, ethnically defined segments of society was the fact that economic matters were not left to the objective verdict of the market, where they rightly belong, but were brought into the political arena, where they were bound to create strife and antagonism.

The ways in which mutual relationships are perceived acquires central importance in this context. All strategic moves in steering development and regulating a (basically) non-market economy have a conspicuous redistributive aspect and, with no objective and neutral mechanism like the market to check them, could be seriously questioned from the point of view of legitimacy. There are large and important groups which can feel unhappy with any such move, and their frustration is legitimised by the fact that such moves are the result of arbitrary political decisions within an authoritarian institutional set-up.

This is the reason why every group - in this case every federal unit - perceives only those decisions or only those aspects of some overall policies which are unfavourable to them. The developed republics felt that the federal budget (the pool of common resources) is too large, while the underdeveloped ones believe that it is much too small; the former observe and analyse meticulously the mechanisms of fiscal redistribution, while the latter, with equal scrutiny, consider and study the mechanisms of the ("primary") income redistribution through price disparities. Most of such thought and analysis is honest and sincere - everyone is motivated to analyse, objectively and persuasively, changes and relationships which concern their own interests - but later the same sets of ideas and empirical findings come to be instrumentalised and used as convenient weapons in the political tug of war. On multiple occasions the scientific institutes from several republics have approached the same macroeconomic problem and reached mutually incompatible, contradictory conclusions about their republics being, in that particular context, overly exploited by all the others! The end result of such a manner of perception and communication was again a substantial increase in latent and even open conflicts.

5. Some political implications of conflicts induced by economic issues.

The situation in which the PSCs (post-socialist countries) find themselves following the demise of the old authoritarian system is thus shaky and precarious. To begin with, the breakdown of the system is the consequence of its structural traits and comes as the inevitable result of the long-term dynamic tendencies inherent in the system's internal architecture. The seeds of destruction were sown long ago, and the catastrophic disintegration of the system cannot be entirely blamed on the present actors. Yet the destruction of the system does have a decisive effect on the pattern of the actors' behaviour. Obviously that is an objectively determined adverse factor in the overall picture.

There are also many violent conflicts inherited from the extinct system - the system vanishes but the conflict survives. That appears to be another objective determinant of the dramatic instability of the constellation of for-
ces and interests which eventually characterise badly shaken societies. The demolition of the state and the dismantling of governmental machinery removes the usual safeguards of life and property, for it is obvious that all such changes mean a fundamental, qualitative change in the environment in which economic, political and all other agents take their decisions. Is it reasonable not to expect equally far-reaching changes in the behaviour patterns of all those who, through the bewildering set of exceedingly complex and never fully understood interactions, shape the future of these badly dislodged societies?

In Yugoslavia, on top of numerous and even deeper economic conflicts, there was also an unusual ethnic heterogeneity and a tremendous number of historical memories of wars and exterminations. Such a large number of adverse circumstances cannot be overcome without major disruptions. Tragic epilogues in Yugoslavia should, after all, not come as a surprise. It would have been more surprising if all the hordes described above had been overcome without serious repercussions. A number of additional objective factors, aggravating the complexity of the situation and contributing to the adverse outcome(s), will be pointed out below.

The Yugoslav republics entered the era of the disintegration of the socialist system with several marked disadvantages. Each of them felt strongly that it had been economically exploited. It could not have been otherwise, for systems based on a policy of allocation and distribution are certainly unfair and, what is worse, lack the minimum of transparency. Secondly, the dismantling of the state machinery and the imminent break-up of the country generated a lot of uncertainty and removed some of the preconditions for the normal unfolding of economic life and other social activities. Thirdly, historical memories came back to life, and, simultaneously, deep, all pervading existential fears were revived, together with the equally intense hatreds that are predictably associated with those types of fears.

This is a situation in which the elementary conditions for fair and socially purposeful political competition are markedly absent. In such a state of affairs, destructive politics, loaded with hatred and intolerance, acquire a distinct competitive advantage. With just a few negligible exceptions the political parties become ethnically centred national parties. By far the most effective way of collecting votes is to play on these existential fears and associated hatreds, which are strictly bound up with separate ethnic groups. Inter-ethnic trust takes decades to build up, but it can be almost irreparably destroyed in a matter of weeks if not days. The strategy is simple: scratch the old wounds a bit, quickly create fears amalgamated with hatred and then offer your ethnically clean electorate the political platform of struggle and defence against other, "inimical" national groups. Political entrepreneurs are thus able, almost overnight, to create an environment in which every ethnic group is really threatened by all the others, and at the same time represents a real threat to all the others. Political competition is turned upside-down: constructive politics, oriented towards conflict resolution rather than conflict creation and intensification, loses any chance it might have to assemble sufficient support. At times this competitive mechanism selects the worst among the worst. Decent and civilised people have no prospect whatsoever of coming to the surface, winning the elections and reversing the course of destructive politics.

One should note that the perverse outcome of this political game is the result of an objective set of circumstances. The predicament is due not to the evidently poor quality of politicians who, in order to win as many votes as possible, act as political entrepreneurs. Rather, is it the result of an objectively determined environment which gives opportunities only to them and not to their potential opponents. Even if, by some miracle, incumbent politicians changed their attitude and became constructive, peaceful and nationally tolerant, that would still not change the prevailing malaise of society, for they would instantly be swept away from the political scene and the system would relapse into nationalist violence. As long as there are just a few unscrupulous people who are ready to use ethically impermissible but politically efficient means - and every society contains a number of such people - the unscrupulous will come to the top and the scenario will continue to be one of nationalist totalitarianism. The PSCs, particularly if they are ethnically heterogeneous and if such heterogeneity contains negative but electorally exploitable political potential, are practically doomed to the predicament of deviant nationalist political developments. Irrespective of the personal qualities of individuals, the undesirable outcome is objectively determined by the structural features of the system.

The purpose of this diagnosis is to recommend the best therapy and to find suitable remedies, and this is where the real difficulties begin. Nobody knows what the future
The evolution of the political systems in the PSCs will look like and whether it will bring improvements by itself. However, as things stand at the moment, ways of overcoming this systemic failure cannot be perceived. The political systems are not controllable in the sense in which economic systems, for example, appear to be. There are no instruments, no institutions and no procedures through which the configuration and the balance of political forces could be purposefully managed. The absence of mechanisms and ways of steering political systems is, to speak, in the nature of things. The only way that can be perceived now is to ameliorating and, perhaps, even righting the systemic failure described above is external pressure and/or intervention. This is exactly what is happening, quite conspicuously, at the moment of writing this text (July 14, 1994).

One of my motives for writing this paper was to find a way in which I can fully side with my wretched people, a way in which I can be patriotic in a somewhat unconventional sense. My intent was to accomplish this by demonstrating a number of ignored, misunderstood or simply unknown truths. Ignorance sends the efforts of the world around us in the wrong direction, and does not remove individual and even collective responsibility for an uninterrupted series of disputable actions and the suffering these cause. Yet, while recognizing the unquestionable responsibility of human beings for human actions, this essay is meant to serve as a reminder of the important truth that the sinners are few, but the unfortunate are many.

The Russian public and political circles have been following the development of the Yugoslav crisis since the moment it began. It is not only Russia’s foreign policy that devotes major attention to it - the crisis has become an important factor in its domestic affairs as well. Why? It would hardly be sufficient to attribute this to the age-old traditional contacts between Russia and the Yugoslav people, especially the Serbs and Montenegrins. The basic reason for it, I believe, must be sought in the considerable similarity of the social processes that led to the break-up of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, the political events that accompanied that process, and the way they were assessed by public opinion. Let us analyze individual reasons in their logical succession.

1. Social anatomy of ethnic conflicts

The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were two multinational federations among the countries with Communist regimes. There was a far-reaching similarity in their state systems. The Yugoslav federation was built on the Soviet model. In line with the so-called Marxist-Leninist theory of the national problem, national-territorial autonomous formations were set up in them on several levels: republics, which were the component parts of the federation, and in some of the republics autonomous areas and regions. Experience has shown that such an experiment, which was based on priority given to national rights rather than to human rights, has led to a situation where practically all those autonomous formations have been transferred into hotbeds of refined nationalism. That experiment in the form of state policy has led to the formation of national-bureaucratic élites, to the title nations holding privileged positions, and to people of other nationalities (regardless of the share they accounted for in the total composition of the population) being treated as second-rate citizens. In conditions of a totalitarian state, those national-bureaucratic élites established control
over the economy and state enterprises, as well as various spheres of cultural and public life. A new nationalistic (and more often chauvinistic) political culture was gradually formed under their influence. Its main trait was suspiciousness and even hatred of other ethnic groups, with cultivation of "national injustice", "historical injustice", "political inequality", "economic exploitation" and other complexes, allegedly due to the attitude of other objects of the federation or its "centre", resulting in the birth of nationalistic myths. These were spread by historical writing and literature, as well as by the mass media.

In the period of the collapse of the Communist regimes, national bureaucracy cast away Marxist-Leninist dogma, discarding at the same time such slogans as "friendship of the peoples" and "brotherhood and unity", and replacing it with nationalism, its true ideology. That served as a foundation for rallying parts of the former par- tocracy, managerial bureaucracy, shadow economy businessmen, and nationalistic intellectuals. This gave rise to ethnocracy, a new social stratum. That was an entirely unexpected phenomenon of the post-Communist period. Fighting amongst ethnocratic clans for power, territory and property in the final stage led to the break-up of such multi-ethnic states as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

The ethnocratic clans managed to involve in that fighting many representatives of their nationalities, which led to ethnic conflicts.

These processes were typical of both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, although in the latter the development of the ethnocratic clan went on more intensively due to the specific features of the Yugoslav model of socialism (so-called "self-governing socialism"). However, apart from that similarity, which determined the destiny of the two federations, they differed on major points. Because of that, the break-up of the federation in Yugoslavia assumed a confrontational nature and led to the bloodshed which is now in progress.

2. Why did developments in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union take a different turn?

The answer to this basic question should be sought in the political sphere and in the history of each state. Let us first analyse the political sphere. The central bodies of the state administrations had a leading role to play in that respect. The Soviet government tried to resist the separatist tendencies of the republican ethnocratic clans (which existed in both countries). However, the Soviet centre's attempt to establish its control over the developments in the country in August 1991 was considered by the democratic forces of the Russian federation as a coup, with the result that it proved to be abortive. The democratic forces in Moscow, Leningrad and other large cities, as well as Russia's leadership, led by Boris Yeltsin, regarded the republican national movements as their allies in the struggle against the Communist centre and the Communist regime.

Second, the Russian leadership sought to establish equal relations with other republics, recognised the independence proclaimed by them, and established jointly with them a new community, the Commonwealth of Independent States, on the basis of the Belovezhskaia Declaration of December 8, 1991. That alleviated the problems associated with the borders and national minorities, i.e., the problems which served as the direct reason for the outbreak of ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia.

Third, ethnocratic clans on the territory of the former Soviet Union began playing the leading role at later stages than in Yugoslavia. They could not therefore come to power and exert the same influence on Russian developments.

In Yugoslavia, however, the Serbian ethnocracy did identify itself with the federal centre, which laid its imprint on the entire course of events in the initial and decisive stage. Second, the unilateral and uncompromising proclamation of independence by Slovenia and Croatia from the beginning lent a confrontational nature to the break-up of the federation, and was not accompanied by efforts to establish co-operation with the other republics on the lines of the CIS model. Third, the consciousness of the Serbian people held recollections of the genocide carried out by the Croatian Ustase fascists in the years of World War II. Attempts by the Croatian leadership to infringe upon the Serbian population's rights and their refusal to offer guarantees to the latter by providing territorial autonomy touched off the irredentist movement first in Croatia, and later in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Apart from the above-mentioned general considerations, it would be of interest to discuss the parallels drawn by the participants in the Yugoslav crisis themselves. For instance, while on his visit to Kiev in 1992, the Croatian leader Franjo Tudjman laid special stress on the fact that, as he saw it, Croatia had the same role to play in the break-up of Yugoslavia as Ukraine did in the break-up of the
Soviet Union. He probably wished to lay claim to the recognition of his special services. They would probably be appreciated by the forces interested in such a turn of events.

Other participants in the Yugoslav crisis are inclined to believe that the Yugoslav scenario may be repeated either in Russia or in its “near abroad”. That viewpoint is shared by a number of Moslem leaders in Bosnia, which might serve as a warning to Russia that it would be in its interest to maintain the unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina under their control. The Serbian leaders lay stress on the role of the external factor in the tragedy of Yugoslavia. The events there, and especially the position Serbia has found itself in, look much like a rehearsal of what the Western world together with Moslem states are preparing for Russia. That geopolitical argument is offered for Russia to comprehend the necessary conclusions to be drawn and to render assistance to Serbia.

Russian society heeded all those considerations in the sphere of foreign policy, and it is increasingly aware of the tensions that are building up. If, in the beginning, only the left of the political spectrum listened to such considerations, at present practically all political forces are prepared to discuss them quite seriously.

3. The collapse of multinational states, the world community and international law

Russian politicians were upset by the assertions of the Western press that the break-up of the Soviet Union was attributable to its defeat in the Cold War (“third world war...”). Such views are especially widespread in the West European countries and the United States, having replaced the initial shock caused by the collapse of the Communist regimes. They testify not so much to a certain interpretation of the changes that have taken place as to the mercenary approach to their consequences. The main thing in such a system of views is the desire to reap “the fruits of victory”. The fact that the Western countries are increasingly acting in this victorious style is cause for concern.

Most of the Russian analysts view with suspicion the attempts made by NATO to involve the countries of Eastern Europe, especially the CIS member states, in its sphere of influence. Such actions are quite consistent with the stand taken by a number of European powers in the period of the break-up of Yugoslavia. Their actions contributed to the exacerbation of the Yugoslav crisis. Moreover, one may quite often now come across criticism by some European powers in addressing others on that score.

Quite typical was the attention devoted to the Yugoslav crisis in the course of the campaign that preceded elections to the European Parliament (held on June 18, 1994). The ex-French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas expressed the opinion that Germany “bears the main brunt of responsibility for premature recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, which was not prepared with due attention to the legal aspects and has made the crisis uncontrollable”. And in France, a large group of intellectuals went to the polls under the following slogan: “Europe begins in Sarajevo.”

It should be recalled that the assassination in Sarajevo, which took place almost 80 years ago, served as a pretext for the unleashing of World War I. If such great importance is being attached to the Yugoslav crisis in Western European countries, it is no wonder that it is viewed as seriously in Russia, where it is regarded from the standpoint of Russia’s own problems.

The first parallels between the break-up of the Soviet Union and the development of the Yugoslav crisis were drawn by the European powers themselves by their own actions in late 1991. That was by no means a coincidence. The contrary, one can hardly reject the idea that the results of the Ukrainian referendum on independence, held on December 1, 1991, and the Belovézskaya meeting that followed were used by some countries as a pretext for their actions. The first to act was Germany. In early December it stated its intention to extend recognition to Slovenia and Croatia before Christmas.

On December 17, 1991, a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the European Council member states was held in Brussels. They adopted the Declaration on the Criteria of Extending Recognition to the New States in Eastern Europe, which contained references to a number of international documents and principles of international law, including human rights and those of national minorities, and stated the need to respect them.

A number of provisions were specified in the Declaration on Yugoslavia, adopted on the same day. This stated that the EU was prepared to extend recognition to the Yugoslav Republics that might express their desire for proclaiming it, if they confirmed that they would assume the obligations included in the Declaration on the Criteria of Extending Recognition to the New States. In keeping with those documents, on January 15, 1992, recognition was extended by the EU member states, as well as some other
the European powers and the US, gave rise to numerous questions. The basic one has been mentioned above: can it be that in the course of the Yugoslav crisis a model of interference in the affairs of other regions of the world is being tested? Will the same diplomatic machinery be used in the event of a conflict breaking out within the framework of the CIS? Attempts made by NATO countries to question Russia's right to carry out peace-keeping missions on the territory of the CIS, which do not need any additional legitimisation, give much food for thought.

Why then should Western powers seek to establish control over them? Is this most likely a manifestation of the desire to gain a foothold in the post-Soviet space? The list of such questions could be prolonged. What is then the meaning of the discussion which is being held in Russia in connection with the development of the Yugoslav crisis?

4. Russia and the Balkans in the past and present

At present, the Yugoslav crisis plays the role of a catalyst in Russia, which is in the process of comprehending its national and state interests and considering its real place in the new system of international relations. That process was especially accelerated in the second half of 1993 and the beginning of 1994, when Western powers, in an attempt to stop the war in Bosnia, tried to push Russian diplomacy into the background. Nevertheless, especially in the course of the crisis which took place in the spring of 1994, their only result was a standstill, and it was exclusively owing to the efforts of Russian diplomacy that a further dangerous escalation of the conflict was averted. The initiative of Russian diplomacy in the course of the Sarajevo crisis in February 1994 made it clear that it would be either impossible or extremely difficult to settle the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and, in general, attain a peaceful settlement in Yugoslavia without Russia, which has traditionally played an important role in the Balkans.

Another factor is this: if some two years ago the Russian public was divided politically in its views of the Yugoslav crisis, the situation now is entirely different. One might say that a certain consensus is being achieved on the issue. This was manifested in the course of the visit by an official delegation of the State Duma to Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina at the end of April, 1994, as well as in the course of the discussion that followed in the Duma, which summed up the results of that visit. Most of
the political parties and blocs, as well as the deputies representing them, are unanimous in the following opinion:

1) the principle of equal responsibility of both sides for the conflict should be strictly observed, without placing blame exclusively on the Serbian side, against which a veritable information war was waged by the Western mass media;

2) nearly everyone is unanimous in regarding the economic sanctions applied against Yugoslavia as a major manifestation of an unbalanced approach by the world community to the different sides in the conflict. Hence the conclusions about the need to lift sanctions coinciding with further progress in talks over the settlement of the conflict;

3) concern has been expressed about the weakened role and reduced authority of the UN, which transferred a part of its rights and functions to the military-political North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in the hope of settling the Yugoslav crisis;

4) while criticising the past mistakes of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (premature extension of recognition to Bosnia and Herzegovina as a unitary state, support for applying and later stiffening economic sanctions against Yugoslavia), the Duma approved its actions in the course of the Sarajevo crisis in 1994 and urged it to preserve the embargo on arms deliveries to all sides in the conflict.

Debates are now centred largely around the evaluation of the Russian Foreign Ministry's actions to offer counter-steps to the Western countries' attempts to oust Russia from the Balkans. This attempt certainly irritates many people, since Russia's influence in the region was traditionally regarded as being closely connected with the general position of Russia in the system of international relations and with the readiness of other states to take its interests into account. Much more discussion arose over the following problem: how far should Russia go in its support of Yugoslavia, and should it take steps for the world community to recognise its "special relationships" with the Balkan countries? In principle, such status is recognised in the practice of international relations (for instance, "special relationships" between the United States and Great Britain). An opinion is often expressed by the Russian public that Russia has every right for such "special relationships" with the Balkan countries, and in particular with Yugoslavia, owing it to their long-stan-

ding traditional contacts. Others believe that, in a new context, history should not be used as an argument. History has shown, among other things, that Balkan countries were often a burden to Russia, distracting it from promoting its own interests. They cite the example of Russia's going to war in 1914 in order to protect Serbia, resulting in its involvement in World War I. That viewpoint is shared by Alexander Solzhenitsyn, to name just one.

At the same time, in order to gain a deeper insight into the interrelationships between the Yugoslav problems and the situation in the CIS, one should take note of one more problem, i.e., the situation that the Russian and Serbian peoples found themselves in after the break-up of the federations.

5. The Russian national problem and the Serbian national problem

The Communist regimes in both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia pursued the policy of fragmenting the two peoples' national territories, while those nationalities accounted for most of the population of the former federations.

The Communist practice of arbitrary demarcation of internal administrative borders dividing the republics sometimes led to intentional separation of a considerable number of ethnic groups from their own entity, with the result that Russians and Serbs found themselves, partly for historical reasons, settled in other territories in the former united states. After the break-up of those multinational states, most of these Russians and Serbs immediately found themselves residing in other states as national minorities who were discriminated against and whose rights in many cases were not guaranteed.

The Serb population resided in compact communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. They naturally had not forgotten the genocide perpetrated on the Serb population during World War II by the Croatian Ustase fascists. Fears that the tragedy of the past may be repeated, as well as the discriminatory policy pursued by the semi-authoritarian regimes in the newly-formed independent states, gave rise to a mighty irredentist movement with the desire to unite all the territories with a Serb population into a single state. In theory, that is in keeping with the right of nations to self-determination up to secession. However, in practice that idea was (and is) opposed by the local rulers representing the titular nationality. Their aim
has been to establish their own unitary state and deny other nationalities the rights they have ensured for themselves. The Croatian and Bosnian Moslem leaders describe the Serbs' desire for unification as a scheme for the establishment of Greater Serbia. At the same time, the Western powers, which have extended recognition to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, objectively obstruct such tendencies towards unification.

This has all contributed to the rise of the "Serbian national problem", which was discussed in detail at the Second Congress of Serbian Intellectuals in Belgrade on April 22-23, 1994. The participants in the congress pointed to the anti-Serbian attitude of the majority of the Western mass media and voiced their protest against the "demobilisation of the Serbian people", as well as protesting against the sanctions that increasingly assume the features of a policy of genocide. The resolution, adopted by the congress, stressed that "there is no alternative to a single, united state for the Serbian people".

The solution to national problems in the territory of the former Yugoslavia comes up against an insuperable obstacle. This is the principle of "No minorities on the territory of my ethnically clean state!", to which the ethnocentric clans remain undeviating in their deeds, not their words. The only resolution to this problem under existing conditions would be national demarcation.

More than 25 million Russians have found themselves residing outside Russia on the territory of the CIS. That is the world's largest diaspora (the only one that can be compared with it is the Chinese diaspora). Many territories where Russians have resided for ages now find themselves outside Russia's frontiers. This is a legacy of previous Communist experiments in arbitrarily redrawing republican borders as a way of solving its national problems. To what extent is such a heritage legal? Is it in keeping with reality? Thus arose the "Russian national problem", which has not, however, become a topical issue of world politics, thanks to the existence of the CIS. Hence Russia's stake in preserving the CIS and in developing it further, on the model of the European Union. However, major corrections would be necessary here, too. The policy pursued by ethnocentric clans in a number of states (Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Moldavia), which are seeking to establish unitary systems in their states, has given rise to conflict situations. The threat that those conflict situations will be transformed into crisis situations may be removed by federalisation of those states, none of which is mono-ethnic.

The revival of Russophobia is another aspect of the "Russian national problem". That phenomenon was known to exist even in the early nineteenth century. The newly-formed Baltic states have been transformed into centres of Russophobia: an apartheid policy is being pursued there against Russians, who account for as much as 40% of Estonia's population and approximately 43% of the population of Latvia. Attempts by the local nationalist leaders to strip the Russians of civil rights are crude violations of human rights and of national rights. Here, too, the European powers are at fault in not recognising these violations. In particular, this lack of comprehension is seen in discussions about admitting these states to the European Union, while Russia's policy, which aims to protect the rights of the Russian population in those countries, is described as "neo-imperial tendencies". This situation poses a threat to the normal development of those states and to stability in the Baltic region.

It may be concluded on the basis of this analysis that there is much in common between the development of the Yugoslav crisis and the situation in the CIS, and a number of similarities indicate much the same topological features. At the same time, there are special features which have made it possible for the CIS member states to avoid the Yugoslav scenario. Those special features should be studied in order to keep the precarious balance in the vast spaces of the CIS, for destabilisation of the situation in that geopolitical region would pose a threat to the world as a whole.
This horrible war has made me realise that religion plays a more important role than I could previously have imagined. Unfortunately, it has been a mostly negative one in the Balkans, not because religion has not done anything but because it failed to do more. Religion did not use the war, but it did nothing to stop it.

During the elections in 1990, religion was placed at the service of the national parties. Today some religious authorities have their share of responsibility for the crimes that have been committed.

After fifty years, some Moslems and Catholics do not know who the war criminals in the Second World War were. How, then, can we expect the Orthodox Serb authorities to know who the war criminals are now?

The communists marginalised religion. The nationalists abuse it.

I met a young man who was destroying an Orthodox Church. I asked him why he was doing it, and he replied: "The Serbs have destroyed ours". So I asked him: "What's the difference between you and them?". "They started first", was his answer.

My comment was this: Croatian extremists started in 1941, Serbian extremists started in 1991 and Moslem extremists will be starting in 2001.

This growing evil can only be destroyed through religion that is tolerant and mediated. Over the centuries the peoples of the Balkans have been divided by religion. Now we must say, once and for all: nobody can divide us through religion, because there is one God and we all are sisters and brothers.

When Popes inspired or led Crusades against Moslems and Saracens, St. Francis of Assisi opposed them and instructed his followers not to fight Moslems and Saracens but to go unarmed among them, wishing them peace and happiness. Until the day when Pope John Paul II made a pilgrimage to Assisi with the representatives of all the religions in order to pray for peace, multi-confessional prayers had only been said in two out of twenty

Franciscan monasteries in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Orthodox Christians and the Moslems have not organised even one such encounter.

Eight hundred years after St. Francis the situation has completely changed: the Catholic Church started a process of renewal with the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) and the old charismatic Orders lost their authenticity. The faithful do not have peacemaking programmes, they do not organise prayer meetings. If one attempts to bring peace through religion, people believe it is just an attempt to support Karadžić's occupation. But when his land was occupied by the Romans, Jesus Christ pleaded for peace, and he was certainly not supporting the Roman occupation! It is on the basis of Jesus' Sermon on the Mount that not only his apostles but also the Churches founded in his name must strive for an understanding and peacemaking process between peoples in conflict. In reality, though, the Churches often present a different picture from that preached by Jesus Christ. Churches and religious communities, especially in Southeast Europe, do not act as peacemakers.

There are differences between individual religious communities, but unfortunately the prophetic, eschatological dimension of religion has been suffocated so strongly that it is hard for these communities to help achieve peace.

The people's democracies of a socialist character vanished quickly following the move prepared and triggered off by Gorbachev. This situation was also the result of the general development of the previous thirty years, in which the CSCE conferences, from Helsinki to Paris, were of great importance. Thus, in 1989, the Iron Curtain was torn down and Europe took a big step forward towards the creation of "one Europe, one Home". The political foundations for a new role and responsibility for religion in Europe were laid. The Catholic Bishop's Synod for Europe, which was held in Rome in 1991, called this time "Kairos" for Europe.

But neither Christianity nor Islam were prepared for the new situation. They were still in a political situation of a medieval kind, where no distinction was made between politics and religion, between Church and State, between theology and ideology, between religious community and State. As a result, religion was abused in political life.

Religion was instrumentalised for state ideologies or self-called national interests. If it is to regain its peacemaking role, then faith must be distinguished from politics. Only
then can religion unambiguously involve itself in the struggle for human rights and peaceful justice. I think of the deaths of all those thousands of men, women and children caused by the Balkan war and which were needed for religion to break the chains that kept them bound to the Roman Emperor-Pope traditions and to the integralist and fundamentalist traditionism of Eastern Europe. A return is needed to the authentic values of a universal nature that are shared by all the monotheistic religions.

Over the last seven decades the religious communities of Eastern Europe have been harshly persecuted by Bolshevik atheism. For them to be reborn, strong spiritual assistance from the outside is needed. Europe can play a very important role in this, together with the world centres of religion (the Vatican, the World Council of Churches, the Jewish Congress, etc.) and the religiously-inspired peace movements (World Conference on Religion and Peace, etc.). But all that by itself is not enough: help is needed not just from above but also from below - a grass-roots movement and an approach aimed at the person. To put it simply: we need specific projects for concrete and fruitful work. These projects must be organised systematically and carefully prepared. The fact that all people are created by one God or Allah or Jehovah means that all people are brothers and sisters. That is an excellent theological basis for a religious peace-making programme. Many Christians are convinced - wrongly - that Moslems have more than one God. ‘Be courteous when you argue with the People of the Book, except with those among them who do evil. Say: “We believe in that which is revealed to us and which is revealed to you. Our God and your God is one. To him we surrender ourselves” (The Koran, 29:46).

All Christians are baptised in the name of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, not in the name of a patriarch, a bishop or a pope. Through inter-religious dialogue people can come closer not only to each other but to God as well.

Religion in East and Southeast Europe can find a way out of its theological traditionism through action from above and concrete projects from below. These projects should have the following characteristics:

1. The projects must be inter-religious and multi-religious and must encompass all three monotheistic religions, i.e. Christianity (including its various churches and religious communities), Islam and Judaism.
2. The projects must be supported by European believers and by the eclesiastic institutions or must at least be approved by them.
3. “Houses of Religions” must become centres for the implementation of these projects, providing information, meeting places, space for meditation and research facilities. They must be organised on the same lines, while taking into account the contexts in which they are situated.
4. The projects must be based on criteria of justice, peace and respect for ecological principles. They must always reflect a religious and theological justification for human rights. Only then will religions regain their credibility in our part of Europe.
5. The projects must be carried out above all by those men of God who are willing and prepared to work together with other persons on the basis of the characteristics of these groups. We do not want theological, spiritual and charitable know-alls. What we want is the opportunity to participate in and contribute to the gradual development of mutual assistance.
6. Justification for our proposal comes from the fact that Eastern and South-eastern Europe are theologically under-developed. In this situation, religions cannot develop without the help of the church in the western world.
7. Religion must be above all a spiritual nature. It does not mean a patronising attitude or a kind of spiritual protection rate. For centuries many people in the East have seen “evangelisation” as a sort of forced incorporation into Western Christendom through conversion to the Catholic or Protestant faiths. We believe that from now on we have to acquitted in the broadest sense of the word.

7. In order to bring the different churches together it is important to follow some basic principles:
   a) Church and state, politics and religion, theology and national ideology have to be clearly separated from each other. Hence:
   b) The political prerequisite for inter-religious dialogue and team work must have an ethical basis. Otherwise politics will become more important than religion.

My hope is that, after all the difficulties encountered and the efforts made in the process of renewal of the three monotheistic world religions, they will regain their peace-making role in Southeast and Eastern Europe and will help to promote peace in the world.9

The Orthodox Church needs global renewal, and should announce a new Council. Catholicism must put into practice the guidelines laid down at the Second Vatican Council. Lastly, Islam and Judaism must recognise and respect human rights.

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10. Pope John Paul II’s visit to Croatia in 1994 was of great importance. See also: Verantwortlich leben in der Weltgemeinschaft. Zur Ausrichtung um das Projekt „Weltfrieden“, Catersloot, 1994.
Models for Ethnic Peace.
Switzerland and the European Union: Two Examples of Integration

Dušan Sidjanski*

1. Introduction

As I understood it, the main topic of this meeting is peace, so I will not try to be a judge of who is right and who is wrong in these conflicts, because I personally think it is very difficult to judge even from the inside, let alone from the outside. What I shall attempt to do is examine two cases of integration, namely Switzerland and the European Union, in the hope that these will help us to see what could be done in the future and not only what has been done and what is happening at present.

I do not believe that Switzerland can be taken as a model, nor do I believe that the European Union can either. Nevertheless, they are valuable experiences with many positive results and some problems, both of which we have to take into account.

There are, of course, similarities and differences in each of these two cases. First of all, both are multi-national, and here there is a similarity in some way with Yugoslavia. Secondly, of course, one is small and the other is big. The European Union is also the first case I know of in the history of a free association, a really free association, of nation states. Even Switzerland, a peaceful nation, was formed after a civil war, so its creation was not so peaceful. It was also a long process, whereas the European Union has seen relatively very rapid integration since its conception after the Second World War.

In the case of Switzerland, the civil war was between Catholics and Protestants, and I think it is interesting to note that after the Protestants won the war, they decided not to create a state based on majority rule, in which they could have imposed their rules on the Catholics. They decided instead that there were no real winners and no real losers, and so they respected the Catholics and gave them many privileges. This, I think, is a very important way of approaching this type of conflict, not only in Yugoslavia but in general. Majority rule is a possibility in Swit-

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izerland, but nevertheless compromise, consensus, is the real rule, the rule that is observed in practice. For example, in a referendum there will be a majority, but the minority will be respected and the government and the administration will take into account the views of this minority. I think this is a very important point to bear in mind in the current context.

Switzerland is still the chief example of a multinational federal political union, while the European Union is still in the building. We do not know yet what will happen exactly, what sort of structure the European Union will eventually have. Nevertheless, the two cases have some very important things in common: there is no single culture, no single religion, no single language and no nation state. This is very significant for our purposes here today.

The second point, also basic, is that both are based on democratic principles and human rights, and I think that when we speak about federalism of this type in the experience of European or other countries we have to look at the substance, not just the formal rules and constitutions. We also have to take into account political culture and the attitudes of the people, not just the formal structure. The Soviet Union was a federal state, and so was Yugoslavia, but in fact they were not federal states in the meaning I give them.

My final introductory point: I think we could use Durkheim’s concept. Durkheim thought that there were two types of solidarity in our world. One is solidarity through similarity - a union of similar people - and the other is solidarity through the division of labour, resulting in world interdependence and globalisation. We know that those concepts were already present in Plato and other classical works. Nevertheless, Durkheim tried to analyse these trends in our society, and as we look at our present society we see that on the one hand we have globalisation but on the other hand we have peoples seeking their identities - small identities, big identities, different types of identities, no matter what - the point is, there is a need for personal identity. In our society today there are some conflicting trends, transnational trends based on interdependence and the division of labour while on the other hand there are small regions, small communities of nations which are based on similarities and not only on interdependence. In my view, federalism tries to manage this conflicual situation. Probably it is the only way it can be managed successfully. In any case, these are the two examples I shall look at very briefly.
2. Switzerland

Let us take the example of Switzerland. On one hand there is great autonomy in the cantons, as in the German Länder, but perhaps even more so. On the other hand, there is intensive participation, so the cantons have a lot to say in the decision-making process.

Secondly, there is no homogeneous government. Instead, there is a complex government, with the participation of four national parties that hold about 70 per cent of the seats in parliament and which have been members of the federal government since the Second World War. It is a sort of coalition, but a permanent coalition, different from those found in a classical parliamentary system.

The third point, very important, is the consultative process. Before a bill is presented in parliament there is a long consultative process involving not only some political parties but also various interest groups - four big ones (trade unions, employers, farmers and small business, which are always present in this process) and other specialist or sectorial groups.

This is in some way similar to what happens now in the European Union, in different committees - "government by committees" as some people have suggested we call it. Decision-making is thus carefully planned; it is not just a decision by a majority, but is based on some sort of consensus. Why? Because people have to be convinced. There are great differences between individual cantons, they have different interests, so this is a form of learning process and consultation before a decision is taken. And, as I said, the decision is generally adopted by consensus, if possible.

Direct democracy is another very important point. With such a stable government something is needed to counterbalance this stability, and this is provided by direct democracy. In direct democracy we can be against the government, and in some instances this has been the case. I must confess that direct democracy is not one hundred per cent positive. Abstentions, for example, are very high, and so one might question whether it is democracy if only 30 or 35 per cent of the electorate vote.

But the importance of this experience, I think, is that in spite of all the cleavages we have in Switzerland - linguistic, religious, between cantons, differences in economic levels, and so on - in spite of all this, the federal state functions rather well, and manages to avoid conflicts. We did have a conflict in Jura, but that was because of the creation of the new canton. We also had terrorist activity in Jura, fortunately not too much, as it could have been very dangerous, because in Switzerland, as you know, everybody has a gun at home. It might even have been like the Yugoslav situation in some ways.

Anyway, as I said, nobody thinks in Switzerland about a single, uniform state or a single government for everyone. There is always some type of compromise and negotiation in this pluralistic society. I also think it is very important to stress the point that in the nineteenth century, when the nation state was being built, Switzerland was completely marginal. The choice was completely different - it was a pluralistic state, not a nation state with one language, one religion and soon, quite the contrary. This, then, in my view, is one of the main characteristics of Switzerland.

But there is also something else that is very important, and that is the people's political culture and political attitudes, which means no majority rule, checks and balances in society and the recognition not only of persons but also of groups - a very important factor. It is essentially Christianity that adopted this principle of recognition of the person as such. But we go beyond that by recognition of communities, of groups, and by applying the principle of tolerance. You have to tolerate others, and tolerance is sadly lacking in the conflict in Bosnia and the other parts of Yugoslavia, where everyone has their rights and can do whatever they feel entitled to do.

One of the consequences in a society organised like Switzerland is that there are no problems of minorities. Take the Rumanian language, which is spoken by at most 50,000 people. We try to give support in order to keep this language alive. That is one example of differences which are very much appreciated.

The last point, which is also very important, is balanced economic development and solidarity. Some cantons, such as Zurich, Basle and Geneva, are more developed, but this is offset by a system of equalisation or compensation for the less developed ones - a kind of solidarity that also exists in some way in the European Union.

In short, in Switzerland, there is a method, a spirit, a special approach, and a special type of political behaviour based on tolerance and acceptance of others.

3. The European Union

What about the European Union? Why is it so important to us? First of all it is very important because I remem-
ber the Ventotene Manifesto during the Second World War, in which Rossi and Spinelli wrote the first Federalist European Manifesto. It was very impressive to see that in this dark period of 1941 they were thinking of the future. What I suggest is this: that we should now think about the future of these peoples and not just be obsessed by the present. Human beings are changing. Evolution is at work, and there is also a generation change. Karadjic and others like him will not always be there.

The second point, an absolutely astonishing one, is that a mere five years after the war, such a terrible war, came Schuman's proposal. You can imagine what we who lived through this period felt - we saw the change, the incredible change, of the French people, the French government, proposing that they and the Germans become allies and constitute the core area of European integration. This was an extraordinary change, an utterly new experience.

The third point is that the same conditions as those in Switzerland can be seen in the European Union. Conditions sine qua non, like democracy - remember the case of Spain, which applied for membership of the EEC in the sixties? It was refused, but after the change-over to democracy it was accepted. So this is one of the most important conditions. Another is free and voluntary association. The big difference compared to Switzerland is that there are at least three levels in the European Union. There are, of course, the national and community levels, but there is also the regional level. The regions are emerging, and this is a very new process - even in France, a centralised country, even in England, so centralised, the regions are emerging. They have more and more contacts, not only centrally with Brussels, but also horizontally with other regions. These quiet changes, which are not under the spotlight, are very important for the future. New links are being created - not only those we see, governmental links and so on, but more profound ones. To this we have to add the formation of interest groups, which are not only significant as interest groups but also as a set of linkages, social linkages, between different types of leaders of organisations. There are about five or six hundred of these already, with about 20,000 people in Brussels - experts, lobbyists and so on. This is something new, a new network for the society of the future, and this is very important. It is something we should try to create for the future, not only in ex-Yugoslavia but in the Balkan region in general - recreate those networks which previously existed but

which are now probably interrupted. What this means, in short, is that the European Union is evolving towards decentralised systems, some new type of federal union - a topic obviously too complex to be analysed here today.

Finally another very important point: economic and monetary union, a move - an economic but still highly political decision - to create the monetary union and a single currency for the future. Of course, we know that there are still many problems. Nevertheless, what we see in this complex situation, much more complex than in a small country like Switzerland of course, is complex decision-making, which implies different actors and different levels.

Despite these positive steps, however, there is no clear political framework, no common foreign and security policy. Of course, these are mentioned in the Treaty on European Union, I know, but they are not effective, and I think Yugoslavia has been and still is a test for the European Union.

4. The crisis in ex-Yugoslavia

As far as the Yugoslav crisis is concerned, I shall just have to skim the surface, but I shall try to say what in my view is fundamental.

First of all, cultural and linguistic conflict. Unfortunately we and our leaders do not have time to read all that much, but if we had read and analysed papers written by Jezbegović in the seventies, the report by the Serbian Academy and Tjudman's history of Croatia, we could have predicted conflict. And this is what I invite you to see: the importance of words - not like Shakespeare's "words, words, words", but the astonishing importance of all the words which are invading us today. Avalanches of words are imposed through the media and supported by TV images, which are the most effective and popular means of communication. An analysis of these writings could help us to predict what the concept of the nation will be and how discrimination and the exclusion of others are the consequences of their thinking.

We tend to talk about Western culture and Eastern culture, but we heard yesterday, we know that Byzantine culture is very important for Europe, and Greek culture was fundamental, so why do we now suddenly want to separate them and explain that there is a contrast, a conflict, between Western and Eastern cultures in Yugoslavia? There are differences and tensions, but this is not the only
explanation or justification for the war! Unfortunately these arguments are manipulated and many of us, scientists and scholars, adopt them and repeat them without any serious analysis or reflection.

My view is that European culture is a complex whole, a common cultural background with rich differences. Russians, Ukrainians, Slavs from Serbia and Croatia contributed to this culture, all of them. The Churches also. There are different trends and tensions, but it is not possible to conclude that there are essential oppositions and natures of cultures. If one thinks in this way, how could it be possible to create the European Union? I think of Denis de Rouge-mont and Jean Monnet who insisted on a personalist approach, the importance of the person. As de Rougemont often said, our common European culture, with all its wealth of diversity, is the foundation of European federalism - which implies acceptance of the differences - as well as the common basis of our culture.

Finally, the party officials, the intellectuals and the media have all been important in fuelling the Yugoslav crisis. One thing that tends to be overlooked is that at the beginning of the crisis we were interpreting it as if it were in Switzerland or in Western Europe - somewhere in France or elsewhere - but in any case in a democratic setting. We forgot that the political culture in this country - ex-Yugoslavia - was completely different.

For years and years there was collectivity, collective concepts that predominated over individual values, and persons were not regarded as important in the process. There was authoritarian government for years and years. Of course we know that the process was much more complex, but nevertheless this was the spirit. And suddenly, they had elections, referenda. But they were not like referenda or elections in Switzerland or in democratic European countries. The situation was quite different, but we thought it was the same, and only now can we see that the transition in all those countries is much more difficult than we predicted or hoped it would be after 1989.

The really important point is the concept of the nation state and its sovereignty. The idea there is that if you have a majority - as, for example, in Serbia, where Serbs make up approximately 65 percent of the population - then you can apply your rules, majority rule is the rule for all. You can forget about Kosovo, forget about other minorities, Vojvodina and so on, by applying majority rule. The basic concept is that a sovereign state can do whatever it wants inside its own territory. The logical result of this type of reaso-

ning is the need to create homogeneous states, with all the consequences this entails. The Western governments - I am not saying whether they were right or wrong - recognised these new states without any conditions, without any guarantees for human rights, for minorities, for religious rights. What happened and is still happening now is mainly the consequence of this recognition of sovereign states and the way they interpreted sovereignty and the nation-state.

The absence of co-ordination between the so-called big powers of Europe and the United States made the situation even worse. There is no real common policy, the supposed result of the contact group - on the contrary, each government has been pursuing its own policy. What is even worse, these policies respond to their own internal constraints, not to the needs of ex-Yugoslavia. Needs, as General Morillon pointed out, that have been largely influenced by the media.

This is what has happened regularly in the United States, in Germany, in France, in Switzerland.

5. Conclusions

What conclusions can be drawn? The first point is that it is not the European Union that should be accused (although it has been accused so many times for its actions) but individual governments of member countries, because of all the differences and tensions they have displayed during this crisis. It must be admitted, though, that the crisis did break out before the existence of the common foreign and security policy, which was introduced in the Maastricht Treaty.

Nor should we forget the ambiguous interventions of the two super-powers: the US, which had promised military intervention - often announced by Clinton but never actually arriving - and Russia. Both these powers have been prompted mainly by their own internal problems and needs and have never acted with a view to finding a global solution to the Yugoslav conflict.

What can be done? I think for the future it is essential to encourage pluralism in all those countries - Serbia, Croatia and the others. We must support the opposition. We forget that there are people who oppose Milošević, that in Croatia there are many people who are opposed to Tudjman and his government. We have to promote pluralism, free and pluralistic media, in all of those countries. That is one point.
CONCLUSIONS

Arij A. Roest Crollius, s.j.

1. La paix est une valeur, surtout dans une période de changement

Nous vivons une période de grands changements, non seulement en Yougoslavie, mais dans toute l'Europe et dans le reste du monde. La Yougoslavie constitue seulement le cas le plus éclatant parmi les dimensions dramatiques prises par ces changements.

Le changement comporte une transition, laquelle se traduit inévitablement en une confusion; quand la confusion atteint un niveau de violence déterminé, c'est la guerre. Hélas, nous vivons une période de déséquilibrage.

Durant ces journées, nous nous sommes rencontrés pour parler de "paix ethnique" car nous considérons que la paix est une valeur. La culture a besoin de valeurs et une culture de la paix doit cultiver la valeur de la paix, dans le secret d'un laboratoire mais comme pour l'ex-Yougoslavie - dans le cadre de la réalité humaine chaotique et conflictuelle.

2. La paix n'est pas une valeur absolue

La paix n'est pas imposée en l'homme et n'existe pas dans la nature, elle n'est pas une donnée préétablie, mais un objectif à atteindre. La paix, en outre, ne peut être considérée comme une simple marchandise, elle est subordonnée à des valeurs plus élevées comme la justice, a vérité, le respect des droits de l'homme.

Si ces valeurs étaient à faire défaut, seules seraient possibles une "paix injuste", une "paix fausse" ou une "paix offensive". La paix ne peut pas être bâtie en dehors de cet ensemble de valeurs humaines qui sont historiquement et concrètement réalisées.

En tant que valeur devant être cultivée dans la réalité de l'existence humaine, la paix peut être définie selon l'expression de Martinin un "idéal historique concret". Notre discussion sur la paix n'a pas été de nature abstraite, mais a eu compte de la pluralité ethnique et culturelle de la Yougoslavie, une région caractérisée par la complexité de sa situation politique, économique et religieuse.

Un appel historique concret à une culture de la paix exige surtout que soit accordé au facteur religieux, dans les conflits en cours, toute l'attention qu'il mérite. Mais si la religion est, dans de nombreuses sociétés, l'enseignante et l'éducatrice principale du peuple, dans la mesure où elle transmet les valeurs, propose les idéaux, protège les institutions et conserve les éléments les plus précieux de l'identité d'un peuple, cette même religion peut, dans le cadre d'un pluralisme religieux, aggraver les tensions culturelles, ethniques et sociales. Dans de telles situations, un conflit politique signifie presque toujours que ceux qui doivent transmettre les valeurs religieuses ont négligé l'existence des "autres".

En d'autres termes, l'actualité invite chacun à accomplir des efforts authentiques et sincères pour l'exercice d'une compréhension mutuelle d'un point de vue religieux.
aussi bien entre les différentes Églises chrétiennes, qu’entre chrétiens et musulmans. L’expérience de siècles de conflits a laissé de doublures cicatrices. Ce n’est certes pas avec le geste symbolique d’une rencontre effective et visible qu’il sera possible d’intervenir en profondeur sur les sentiments de méfiance et, à plus forte raison, de réussir à les effacer.

Il est donc indispensable de créer des “chantiers” pour une éducation à la paix. Avec les musulmans, les orthodoxes, les catholiques et les représentants d’autres confessions et religions, il importe d’identifier un objectif précis, non un idéal abstrait, mais un plan d’action commun et concret, à travers lequel chacun des groupes concernés puisse apporter sa contribution avec le meilleur de lui-même. Un tel plan d’action devra aussi compter sur le concours nécessaire de spécialistes de la science sur la composition des conflits.

3. La paix se construit grâce à l’accord de divers efforts

Dans l’histoire de l’homme, la paix est le fruit d’un accord entre diverses forces qui agissent au sein d’une société humaine déterminée (ethnique, nationale, internationale).

Un effort combiné ne doit pas supprimer les différences. La paix présume une unité d’intentions et a même temps un ensemble conflictuel de forces opérant dans la société humaine. La paix n’exclut pas les conflits, mais l’intensité du conflit est contrôlée par la convergence des intentions. En imprimant les mots du saint François de Sales, l’on peut dire que la paix est l’harmonie qui provient, comme dans un concert, de la discordance concordée ou plutôt de la discordance concordante.

4. Une culture de la paix requiert une culture des droits humains

Les droits de l’homme, tels qu’ils ont été proclamés dans la Déclaration universelle de 1948, sont déjà en soi un phénomène culturel. Ces droits auraient été impossibles sans l’illumination européenne, sans les profonds changements culturels des révolutions française et américaine, sans les résultats sociopolitiques de la doctrine sociale du Magisterium du Pape Pie IX.

Une culture des droits de l’homme requiert une reconnaissance des différences profondes qui existent dans la compréhension et dans l’adaptation de ces droits (ces différences prennent un relief particulier dans le contexte de la culture islamique et dans les cultures d’inspiration confucianiste).

Sans cette reconnaissance du pluralisme dans l’adaptation de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme, aucune culture de la paix ne serait possible. Par ailleurs, la signification même des mots comme “paix” et “concorderie” diffère selon les cultures.

5. Une culture de la paix présume une conscience interculturelle, synchronique et diachronique

La conscience interculturelle diachronique est le fruit de l’étude de l’histoire et de son approvisionnement responsable. À l’inverse, la conscience interculturelle synchronique est le fruit de la connaissance et de l’acceptation des autres êtres humains dans leur diversité.

Dans cette perspective, la conscience interculturelle est à son tour le fruit de l’éducation sur le champ historique et sur le champ de la “géographie humaine”. L’éducation au plan historique est un premier lieu d’appropriation de sa propre histoire. Dans de nombreux cas, l’histoire est marquée par des terribles et drastiques conflits. Très probablement, de nombreux européens considèrent en fait qu’ils doivent essentiellement leur survie à une bonne dose d’injustice, de violence et d’élimination physique des adversaires.

L’éducation sur le terrain de la géographie humaine développe au contraire la curiosité (“la mémoire de toutes les sciences”), favorise la formation d’une attitude non préconçue et d’un sentiment d’hospitalité aussi bien spirituelle que matérielle.

Tout le mérite d’une institution culturelle comme l’institut international Jacques Maritain est de reconnaître et d’encourager ce pluralisme culturel. La culture de la modernité coexiste avec des phénomènes culturels prémodernes et postmodernes.

Ce que nous avons pu écouter à propos du conflit en ex-Yougoslavie nous a fait comprendre combien la persistance d’une attitude atavique de conservation s’oppose aux exigences des idées politiques modernes. C’est précisément le choc des catégories conceptuelles et des attitudes préconçues qui conduit, ou du moins favorise, le conflit armé.

6. L’influence de parler de paix ethnique sans une bonne connaissance de soi

Une culture de la paix présume une éducation à la paix. L’éducation des autres est toujours de quelque façon que ce soit, l’éducation de nous-mêmes.

Dans le processus éducatif, de nous-mêmes comme de celui des autres, il faut tenir compte des attitudes, des préférences et des choix irrationnels. Ces facteurs irrationnels sont:

- nostalgie d’un passé lointain ou récent
- idéalisation de sa propre identité culturelle
- “figures hostiles” collectives
- diverses phobies collectives ou d’autres groupes ethniques
- blessures psychologiques, séquelles de précédents conflits qui provoquent maintenant des sentiments de haine ou de répulsion.

Ce sont ces facteurs et d’autres similaires qui opèrent, au plan instinctif, dans les conflits ethniques. Ce séminaire nous a permis de comprendre plus clairement qu’une paix ethnique ne peut s’établir si l’on ne prend pas en compte ces facteurs irrationnels.

7. La culture de la paix est éducation à la rationalité humaine

La rationalité dans la société humaine signifie reconnaître l’action de diverses médiation. Au cours de notre rencontre, ces médiation ont été étudiées, proposées et discutées.

La “raison politique” a été analysée en premier lieu. L’organisation de la polis, avec ses structures et ses institutions. Puis, les raisons économiques, avec leurs tensions entre marché et planification politique, et enfin, au cours de diverses interventions, nous avons vu aussi l’importance de la raison historique et de la raison juridique.

La rationalité présume la reconnaissance de ces médiation entre idéal et réalité. La paix en tant qu’idéal, même quand elle est liée à une religion, ne peut devenir réalité sans ces médiation.

Ce séminaire a souligné à plusieurs reprises et de diverses façon la relation qui existe...
entre facteur ethnique et facteur religieux. Quand les méditations rationnelles ne fonctionnent pas ou sont inexistantes, alors la religion renforce les instincts tribaux.

De ce fait, ce que nous appelons conflit yougoslave est un scénario où apparaissent des religions en crise profonde, qui consolident une guerre faite d’exclusions réciproques, attisée précisément par cette situation conflictuelle.

En tant que chercheur dans le domaine des religions, j’observe l’échec des traditions religieuses quant à leur rôle d’éducatrices des consciences pour une culture de la paix, à travers une méditation rationnelle. Tout ceci a de tragiques conséquences. En effet, si d’une part la faillite des religions dans l’éducation des consciences humaines ouvre la voie à ce que Vico appelait “la barbarie de la raison”, d’autre part la rationalité, si elle est dépourvue d’un éclairage d’origine transcendantale, produit ses propres valeurs absolues et dégénère en l’unique ou l’autre des formes typiques d’idolâtries: idolâtrie du pouvoir, de la race ou de la tribu, de la classe ou de Mammon.

Les analyses et les discussions durant ce séminaire attestent l’actualité de la pensée de Maritain, laquelle, basée sur une solide tradition philosophique, retient comme indispensables un lien entre foi religieuse et raison.

Avec ce séminaire international, la voie qui s’ouvre à nous est celle d’un nouvel effort pour une éducation à la paix; une éducation qui ne soit pas fondée sur une plate-forme commune abstraite d’intuitions théoriques, mais sur un projet pratique, dans lequel chaque élément puisse fournir son apport à partir de ses propres traditions, intuitions et énergies.

Ce séminaire a constitué une expérience sur le chemin vers une éducation à la paix. Dans certains cas, la situation dramatique de l’ex-Yougoslavie a fait l’objet d’analyses contrastées. Mais c’est précisément cette diversité d’idées qui permet cette convergence dynamique (ou “explosive” comme certains pourraient l’affirmer) et qui caractérise une discussion civile.

Nous sommes reconnaissants envers tous ceux qui ont contribué au succès de ce séminaire. Un remerciement particulier doit aller à la Fondation Konrad Adenauer, à la Fondation Monde Uni et à la Commission européenne, dont le président a patronné ce séminaire.

Nous avons été particulièrement honorés par la présence du général Morillon, celles de l’ex-Premier ministre Mazowiecki et de l’Ambassadeur Kähöf. Ces figures nous ont rappelé que servitum sicutiam veri: “le service est garantie de vérité”.

La publication des actes de cet extraordinaire séminaire en amplifiera certainement les effets. Bien que tous les intervenants se soient exprimés à titre personnel – comme celui qui fait les présentes considérations –, en forme de conclusion l’élément le plus significatif de ce séminaire me semble avoir résidé dans le sentiment commun de solidarité exprimé à l’égard des femmes, des hommes et des enfants qui subissent les conséquences du conflit en ex-Yougoslavie.

Ce séminaire a signifié aussi un rappel à une plus grande coresponsabilité et à une plus large participation de institutions religieuses, culturelles et éducatives. Sans une conversion du cœur et de la lumière dans les esprits, même le meilleur plan de paix est voué à rester lettre morte.
FOREWORD

We are proud to publish the article written by Msgr. Rembert G. Weakland, Archbishop of Milwaukee, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the pastoral letter of the American bishops Economic Justice for All, which was published in November 1986. It is a very cogently-argued essay which, starting from some preliminary observations, gives a thorough analysis and evaluation of the main changes that have taken place in the world in the ten years since the pastoral letter was published: the collapse of Communism and reflections on the Church’s social teaching since that event; the globalization of the economy; the American people’s loss of trust in their government; the economic trends that characterize society in both America and the world in general.

Weakland’s essay is so precise and clear that it has no need of any interpretation or amplification. We shall therefore limit ourselves to a few background comments that will, we feel, help to emphasize still more the meaning and the importance of the letter published by the American bishops in 1986 and, therefore, of this look at that letter in a social context that has certainly changed but not to the point of devaluing it from the ethical and cultural viewpoints, nor from that of its practical implications as a source of guidelines for action.

In November 1980 the US bishops, meeting in their annual general assembly, decided to write two pastoral letters. One of these would deal with the moral implications of the nuclear arms race and peace, the other with the relationship between capitalism and Christianity. Work on the two letters began simultaneously, but the former was discussed and approved before the latter was completed because of the urgency of the nuclear problem.

Economic Justice for All took a long time to write because the task was very complex. This is not the place to describe the various stages of its preparation, but mention should be made of the particular procedure that was followed and which Msgr. Weakland explicitly recalls at the beginning of his essay. Consultations, in fact, took place with an enormous range of people, and three different drafts of the text were made, giving the letter an ecumenical and interfaith dimension and making it an original and relevant contribution to the teaching of the Church.

The Commission responsible for preparing the letter selected four areas on which to concentrate in greater detail, as concrete examples for testing the contact between Catholic social teaching and some essential economic topics. This was a very good choice, for Americans are used to thinking inductively, starting from concrete situations and moving on from these to principles - a welcome change from the innumerable studies, documents and official statements of the Church that still insist on proceeding in precisely the opposite direction! The letter is preceded by a pastoral message that is a very brief summary of the letter itself and also an exhortation and encouragement to Catholics to study it and familiarize themselves with the scenarios it sets out. The letter must obviously be read and evaluated in the light of the American situation, but its range of contexts - ecclesiastical, theological, philosophical, economic, sociological and global - give it a much broader perspective. The bishops aimed not only at presenting principles. They intended to go much further, providing concrete suggestions, although not going into excessively specific questions. They are clearly aware that the role of the Church goes beyond attempts to change social structures and systems. Their letter forcefully underlines the need for a broader vision when analysing the Church’s mission. “The Kingdom”, to quote the Message, “as it is preached in the Gospels affects both the structures and the consciences of individuals, here and now, in this moment in history”.

It is obvious, therefore, why the International Jacques Maritain Institute has organized various debates about the letter since its very first draft version. In March 1985 a debate was held during the international conference at the Study and Research Centre at Praglia on “Christians between technological innovation and social transformation”, and others took place in April the following year at Milan and Fribourg (Switzerland), all with the participation of Archbishop Weakland.

The Institute’s constant interest in these themes of fundamental importance for exercising reason in faith in society prompted it to embark on a vast research programme in which the statements of the bishops of all the world on the subject of economics, ethics and development were collected and analyzed. The result is an inventory of all such statements issued over the last hundred years. The Repertoire, which was presented at an international conference in Fribourg, will be an invaluable work of reference for further study and research in these fields.

Gianfranco Martini

ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL
TEN YEARS LATER

Rembert G. Weakland*

In the Catholic tradition, anniversaries are meant to help us recapture the thrust of the events of the past and the spirit that animated them, to re-embark on the same enthusiasm in us now, and then to assist us in projecting those same insights into the future. That so many celebrations have taken place this year on the 10th anniversary of the pastoral letter by the American bishops, Economic Justice for All (November 1986), is significant. The process of this pastoral was most important in its time, but on its 10th anniversary it engendered less interest, since the threat of a nuclear buildup appears to be behind us. The economic pastoral, on the other hand, confronted issues less restricted to the times in which it was written and so seems to be even more important than ten years ago. The situations that gave birth to it then have changed character somewhat but have not disappeared. Revisiting that letter ten years later, therefore, has special importance.

I would like, first of all, to present some preliminary reflections about the letter. Then, under four distinct headings, I will proceed to ask myself what has changed in the world situation that would alter significantly the content of, or the approach to, the letter if it were to be rewritten now. In other words, I ask myself: what new emphases would be

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needed because of new situations? Although one could say that the principles of Catholic social doctrine do not change, nevertheless they are constantly being refined as they face ever-new situations. Thus, I would also ask myself: what kinds of refinement would be needed now in that teaching that perhaps were not as necessary ten years ago.

Preliminary Observations

The procedure for writing the two pastoral letters of the early 1980’s was unique. The numerous hearings that preceded the first drafts brought many actors into play. That procedure gave breadth and scope to the letter that it could not have otherwise obtained. For an issue so complex, the consultative process was most helpful. One of its finest features was also its ecumenical and interfaith dimension. Although the time commitment for bishops involved was extensive, I can personally confess that it was well worthwhile. Some opposition came to that procedure from certain church quarters, namely, the fear was expressed that it could give the impression that the bishops were deficient in their knowledge of social justice and thus that their teaching authority would be diminished.

There is no reason to believe that the consultations gave negative impression. In the contrary, most applauded the bishops for such openness and gave to those of us who thought less in divergent views. If the letter were to be rewritten today, I am not sure that such a procedure would be engaged in. The energy might be lacking, as well as the enthusiasm and support on the part of all the bishops that was so essential to the undertaking. Yet, the procedure itself used for both the peace pastoral and the economic pastoral letter remains one of the major contributions of the two letters to the process of church teaching.

The chief criticism against the letter from a pastoral point of view was that it was too long. That criticism was valid in our society then and would be even more true now. It is clear now that we really tried to write three letters at one time and that it became totally unwieldy. We should have written a first letter that dealt only with the principles of social justice from a biblical and natural-law point of view. A second letter could have followed with examples of how those principles could be applied to several distinct areas. A third would have discussed the demands of the Gospel and social justice on our Christian lifestyle, including both the responses that the individual Christian as well as the church should give to the present economic situation.

We simply tried to do too much by including all these aspects in one letter. If we were to redo the letter today, I would suggest a series of at least three or even perhaps four letters, the last being a discussion of some of the alternative ways of looking at the present economic system, namely, an enlargement of the theme of cooperation found in Chapter Four of the original letter, a section that seems to have been forgotten in the discussion that followed.

If the letter were to be rewritten today, I feel certain that we would also have a different set of applications. As you might recall, the four sections of applications were: 1) Employment, 2) Poverty, 3) Food and Agriculture and 4) the U.S. Economy and the Developing Nations. We would go back to our original idea of doing something on natural resources and ecology and not on the more restrictive question of agriculture.

Some criticized the bishops for the sections dealing with the application of the principles, asserting that it would have been better if they had given only the principles and had left the application up to the experts in the field. As I see it now, I believe that the applications sections were most important.

The history of our Catholic teaching on social justice shows that it became more and more refined precisely through the attempts at application. Catholic social doctrine has not been at a standstill for these last 100 years. As different problem arose, it was necessary to delve more deeply onto one or the other of the basic principles, thus increasing our knowledge about the understanding of them. The teaching has grown and become more refined.

I repeat, precisely because there were attempts to apply it to different problems at different periods of time.

For example, subsidiarity became an important way of looking at the relationships between government and economic initiative in Pius XI’s encyclical Quadragesimo Anno (1931), but today the application of the principle of subsidiarity might be different and more refined because of our present circumstances and because it has become a commonly accepted principle, with a different twist, outside of the Catholic tradition.

After these preliminary remarks, I would like to take up issues that I believe would change the character of the letter if it were written ten years later. I would like to name and discuss some events that have occurred and how they would affect the discussion today. I would also like to mention shifts in attitudes that would have to be facing by the bishops.

I have grouped these reflections under the following four titles: (1) the fall of Communism and the reflection on church social doctrine since then, 2) the globalization of the economy, 3) the anti-government sentiments in our American society and 4) domestic trends in the economy that are affecting American society as well as the world.

The Fall of Communism and Catholic Social Doctrine

Perhaps the most important event in the world in the last ten years, i.e., since the economic pastoral letter was published in 1986, was the fall of Communism. Ten years ago the economic alternative of Communism was still much alive and, as an alternative that was attractive especially to third world nations, had to be reckoned with. Forseeing this new situation, Pope John Paul II had written in 1991 that "it is unacceptable to say that the defeat of so-called 'Red Socialism' leaves capitalism as the only model of economic organization" (Centesimus Annus, No. 35).

Still, free market proponents have assumed that the free-market system triumphed because of its inherent virtues. This single system now dominates the world. Even China has made an attempt to accommodate and enter world economic markets. Pope John Paul II pointed out that the fall of Marxism did not mean that the realities of marginalization and exploitation would disappear. In a prescient fashion he wrote: "Indeed, there is a risk that a radical capitalist ideology could spread which refuses even to consider these problems, if on a priori belief that any attempt to solve them is doomed to failure, and which blindly entrusts their solution to the free development of market forces" (C.A., No. 42).

Some had hoped that the fall of Communism would liberate economists to become more critical of the failures and problems of capitalism and free-market economic structures. Previously, any critique of capitalism was seen as support for Communist or socialist thinking. Unfortunately, openness to critique free-market economic structures has not come about as it was expected. It is now just taken for granted by so many that capitalism won; therefore, the system itself must be fine.

For us who are concerned about the inner life of the Church, this demise of Communism has had another repercussion that has become more and more visible in the last few years. There has been a definite weakening of interest in liberation theology. There
seems to be a consistent voice from Latin America now advocating a position that ten years ago were very strong.

Political changes in countries like El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala have modified the concerns within the church in those countries as well. The challenges now being faced in Latin America deal with the pastoral question of the new religious movements, more evangelical in character and more inclined to promise their adherents the same prosperity as found in their American origins.

The question must be asked if liberation theology has spun itself out and if we are entering a new situation in those countries. In spite of Michael Rudd's thesis that Latin America will remain very anti-capitalist and pose the vexing problem of a divided church, a capitalist one in the North and an anti-capitalist one in the South, it is not clear that this anti-capitalist trend will continue in Latin America. I sense that, in spite of what the theologians have written about the popular church, the people in those countries want what people everywhere in the world want, namely, a higher standard of living like that which they believe is found in the United States.

The concept of a popular church that would be at odds with the official church does not seem to me to be a serious development that will now gain ground. The expansion of secularism seems to be the more likely threat as these nations come more and more into contact with our consumer culture. The fall of Communism affected not just the basis of sociological analysis that was used by some liberation theologians but seems to have taken the wind out of the sails of those predicting a church of the poor that would be more communitarian in character.

Perhaps the error of the liberation theologians was to propose a biblical ideal of a church of the poor when most people want to live at the same basic economic level as the rest of the developed world. Just as Americans vote by their pocketbook and not their religious convictions, so others seek most of all what they believe will raise their economic standards.

It is also clear that Pope John Paul II and others have given up any talk about a "third economic way". Just as Chapter Four of Economic Justice for All has been forgotten, so also any other alternatives, other than various combinations of a mixed economy, have not prevailed. The economic situation is so complicated with its global implications that alternatives do not seem feasible. One is just happy to get some light on the present rapidly changing picture.

Recent Papal Encyclicals

In these ten years the teaching on economic justice has not been absent, as could be seen by the passages quoted from Pope John Paul II's encyclicals. If the economic pastoral were to be rewritten today, the authors would have to examine carefully these two encyclicals that appeared in the meantime, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis at the end of 1987 to commemorate the 20th anniversary of Pope Paul's encyclical Populorum Progressio (1967), and Centesimus Annus from 1991 to commemorate the 100th anniversary of Pope Leo XIII's Rerum Novarum (1891).

The difference in tone between these two encyclicals would pose an interesting exercise for drafters of a new pastoral letter. The first encyclical, you will notice, was written before the Communist bloc began to open up, the second after. The first has a sharper tone, similar to the encyclical of Pope Paul VI that it commemorated, the latter is more concerned about the fall of Communism, how it happened, why it happened and what could come after that fall.

Since the former dealt more with development of nations and was more concerned

about the poorer nations, it tended to be more critical of present situations. The latter is more cautious, less clear and less challenging. Some feel that it tends to be more ambivalent and thus has lent itself to so many different interpretations. Proponent of free-market economy co-opted it at once, saw it as a victory for their position and attempted to interpret it to suit their own interests.

The Pope seems to have been aware of this confusion, somewhat irritated by the feeling that his document had been co-opted, and he tried to give his own spin to his own work in the famous speech at the University of Latin America on September 3, 1993 (text in Origins, 23, pp. 256-8). He said in that academic milieu:

Besides, Catholic social doctrine is not a surrogate for capitalism. In fact, although decisively condemning "socialism", the church, since Leo XIII's Rerum Novarum, has always distanced itself from capitalistic ideology, holding it responsible for grave social injustices (see R.N., No. 2). In Quadragesimo, Amo Plus XI, for his part, used clear and strong words to stigmatize the international imperialism of money (Q.A., No. 109). This line is also confirmed in the more recent magisterium, and I myself, after the historical failure of Communism, did not hesitate to raise serious doubts on the validity of capitalism, if by this expression one means not simply the "market economy" but a "system in which freedom in the economic sector is not circumscribed within a strong juridical framework which places it at the service of human freedom in its totality" (C.A., No. 42).

In any case, one would have to say that Centesimus Annus is a remarkable document because it revises some of the earlier teaching of the popes in their condemnations of democratic political system and because it approves of a kind of free-market system that meets certain criteria. It also seems to approve of the reforms of the welfare states that were in progress at that time in Europe, much to the pleasure of so many conservative economists and politicians. The letter is an important one, not because it breaks new ground, but because it gives a clear reflection of the reasons for the fall of Communism and some cavets on the capitalist system that alone rules now in the world. I am afraid, however, that it will not have the same significance of some of the other encyclicals on social justice, because it is tied too much to the historical moment right after the fall of Communism and is not forward-looking enough, not being sharp enough in critiquing the new situations that are being evolved. I was not surprised, for example, that the "lineaments" (the preparatory outline) for the Special Assembly of the Bishops of the Americas cites Sollicitudo Rei Socialis much more frequently than Centesimus Annus.

The enemy, Communism, has disappeared. What we can learn from its demise is clear, but what we yet face is not so evident. The Pope was wise, however, to remind the countries of the former Soviet bloc about the perils of unbridled capitalism. Would that his wisdom had been listened to!

Conferences of Bishops

The bishops, if they were to rewrite their letter, would also have to look at another body of teaching, namely, the pastoral letters from conferences of bishops from around the world. These important documents could easily be forgotten, but given the internationalization of the economy, they become important for all to read.

Last year the Jacques Maritain Institute in Rome finished a project of enormous propor-
tions. For five years, through conferences held on the different continents of the globe, they examined the teaching of most of the local conferences of bishops on social justice. This body of teaching is enormous, as one could well imagine, but it again could be reduced to several overarching themes and concerns: the preferential option for the poor, the value of labor over capital, the disparity of wealth, and so on.

If Catholic social doctrine is refined by its continual application to current issues, then this body of teaching material is most important. I would like to cite in particular two recent documents of prime importance: The Common Good and the Catholic Church’s Social Teaching, a pastoral letter of the bishops of England and Wales published in October 1996 in preparation for the papal visit to that country, and A New Beginning: Eradicating Poverty in Our World, published by the Australian bishops in September 1996. This latter lengthy document is a unique attempt to treat the poverty issue on a worldwide basis and not just as a domestic problem.

As one looks at this whole body of teaching, one is immediately aware that the Catholic social tradition and its teaching have never been and still will not be comfortable with free-market economic solutions as such. Any attempt to “baptize”, to “Christianize” the system ends in unreal expectations. There will always be a tension between the Bible and capitalism, the Sermon on the Mount and the market-place. The capitalist system is now accepted as a given in church documents since that is the world in which we all must live, but the defects and dangers in that system are also clearly pointed out. Ten years ago some had hoped that the American bishops would have condemned capitalism as intrinsically evil in itself. Pressure from South America pushed this direction. The position of the Holy Father in Centesimus Annus is the one the American bishops had also assumed. The reality we live under is a free-market economic system, and we simply accept the fact. We must ask the question then: How do we avoid the negative aspects of that system so that it works for the largest number of people, and what are our responsibilities toward those who seem to be outside the system?

I have come to accept the reality that the church will always be uncomfortable with every economic system, with some perhaps, more so than with others, because no system is perfect, and no system can meet all the biblical requirements. All systems, like human persons themselves, are imperfect, fallible. The attempts of the Enlightenment to create a rational system that would work in a perfect fashion for the benefit of all is an ideological utopia that we can now perhaps put behind us.

I have come to accept that I will always live in a world where human frailty will infect whatever economic system arises. It is not pleasant to have to admit that the prophetic stance of critiquing the human systems will never go away, but that is the realism we have learned. Every system will constantly need critiquing and controlling. Even practitioners of the free-market system like George Soros have arrived at the same conclusion. (See his article “The Capitalist Threat” in The Atlantic Monthly, February 1997). At this moment, when so much is at stake in the internationalization of the economic free-market system because it affects the lives of everyone on this globe, such criticism is absolutely necessary.

This theme leads into my next section. The second clear change since the pastoral letter was written ten years ago is certainly the rapid growth in the globalization of the economy.

The Globalization of the Economy

Ten years ago we bishops knew of the growing internationalization of the economy. In fact, at the beginning of our discussions among committee members about the scope of the letter, some were in favor of making globalization the dominant theme in the undertaking. It was an enticing suggestion and would have made the letter more prophetic at that time. We knew that the internationalization of the economy was happening at a rapid pace and would continue to do so with even more rapidity in subsequent years, but we felt impelled to look first at the American economy because we sensed that such a critique was what the other nations of the world expected of us.

We compromised by making the international economic scene one of the four areas where we applied our principles, but it did not become the centerpiece of the letter itself. If the letter were to be redone today, globalization would have to be central, not a peripheral theme. The globalization of the economy is a fact now, not just a tendency. It is difficult for us in 1996 to sum up in a single definition what capitalism in its different manifestations around the world was all about, it would be even more difficult today to describe all the nuances and idiosyncrasies of free-market economy in so many different cultures on this globe.

If one is to take seriously such works as Lester Thurow’s The Future of Capitalism: How Today’s Economic Forces Shape Tomorrow’s World (1996) and William Greider’s One World, Ready or Not: The Mismeasure of Global Capitalism (1997), the picture seems to be one of an enormous engine that is just rolling ahead at a most rapid pace, without clear goals and with no conductor. The pace defies an analysis that is clear and secure. There has been no single economist who has proposed a theory, a mechanism, that could pull it all together in a comprehensible way. The variables seem too many. This rapidly changing economic climate makes the search for new modes of analysis and prediction almost impossible.

One of the changes that has become evident in the last ten years in this globalization process has been the shift, if one could call it that, of economic activity from the North to the South, which is reflected in the financial transactions of the global economy. But there are other changes as well. In general, the “dismal” science finds it more and more difficult to keep up with all the factors that must be taken into account if one wishes to argue on the basis of a single equation to be obtained. The confusion among economists themselves would be one of the factors that might be aggravating to a system that wants to right the economic pastoral letter today. Perhaps the flip side of the coin is that economists are now more and more aware of the human equation in their work and less inclined to rely purely on mathematical solutions.

One of the most trenchant and real criticisms brought against the economic pastoral of 1986 was that it did not treat of the relationship between wealth and power. That such a relationship existed was a truism, but it should have been explicitly studied. In this present period that theme has become more and more important as we see that some of the larger international corporations are economically more powerful than some of the countries they do business in.

We are all familiar with those lists that include the major international corporations and their worth in comparison to the G.N.P. of a whole series of nations. For example, Mitsubishi has more economic power than Indonesia; Ford is more powerful than Turkey; Wal-Mart is financially stronger than Israel. The question of nation-states also poses its own problems today, exacerbated by the breaking up of the old Soviet bloc and the ethnic exclusivity that one sees growing everywhere in the world.

Kenichi Ohmae noted this problem a few years ago in his book The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies (1995). He stated that most government leaders thought that the borderless economy we are entering would not affect national sovereignty, but they were wrong. “The forces now at work”, he wrote, “have raised troubling questions about...
the relevance - and effectiveness - of nation states as meaningful aggregates in terms of which to think about, much less manage, economic activity.

Moreover, the relationship between wealth and power poses specific problems also for those nations that are large and where there cannot be any talk of the demise of the nation state. We all see how the question of wealth and power comes into play in election campaigns and seem a need, probably in vain, to try to regulate that use of power. George Soros's concern about the effects on unbridled capitalism on democracy is a serious one precisely because wealth is power. Concentrated wealth means concentrated power.

We have also seen that the globalization of the economy has only exacerbated the difference between the poorer and the richer nations. This question of global inequality - posed by every pontiff since the time of Pope Pius XII - will not go away. However one wants to analyze the question of economic dependency, the fact is that some players will be major economic and political forces in the world, while others will not have a chance but will remain dependent on the decisions of others.

The issues of justice and equality will be constantly raised in such a world. Because of these inequalities, especially in the labor market, we will continue to see waves of immigration on a large scale and problems maintaining safe borders. The other scenario proposed by some economists assert that we will instead see a lowering of wages of unskilled laborers in the United States till they are the same as third world wages. One aspect is sure in this globalization process: labor is suffering most. Some predict that the situation is much like that at the turn of this century and will call forth a similar kind of reaction of social upheaval except this time, on an international level.

If the bishops were to tackle again the question of an economic pastoral letter, they would have to deal with this fluctuating situation and its consequences as the centerpiece of their endeavor. As this borderless economy moves ahead, they could not help but notice that labor has become just one more fragile factor in the big equation and that the church's position that it should not be the object of uncontrolled market forces is losing ground. The bishops could not now, as we did ten years ago, deal with domestic poverty in the United States without analyzing its connection to growing poverty throughout the world.

Finally, in such a new world, they would have to ask the question already posed by Pope John XXIII about a world authority that could bring some kind of order into the chaos that is ensuing. To state that the markets themselves will bring that kind of order leaves most of us highly skeptical. Moreover, even if one assumes that the markets could effect such an order, the time needed to do so, as estimated by even the most optimistic capitalist theorist, would be so long that the human suffering in the meantime would be horrendous. One would have to ask again whose responsibility such poverty would be. Since so much of this globalization of the economy is tied into the advances in technology, especially information technology, countries without access to such means of information will be left out of the circle and remain dependent for as far as one can look into the future. It is not too soon to ask what that new world will look like with such disparate partners and new forces.

I feel sure the bishops, facing such a world, would repeat the basic moral principles they articulated in 1986. In this regard the times have not changed; the speed has just accelerated.

The four principles enunciated in *Economic Justice for All* (No. 258) still remain as valid as the day they were written:

1. The demands of *Christian love and human solidarity* challenge all economic actors to choose community over chaos. They require a definition of political community that goes beyond national sovereignty to policies that recognize the moral bonds among all people.

2. *Basic justice* implies that all peoples are entitled to participate in the increasingly interdependent global economy in a way that ensures their freedom and dignity. When whole communities are effectively left out or excluded from equitable participation in the international order, basic justice is violated. We want a world that works fairly for all.

3. *Respect for human rights*, both political and economic, implies that international decisions, institutions, and policies must be shaped by values that are more than economic. The creation of a global order in which these values are secure must be a prime objective for all relevant actors on the international stage.

4. The special place of the poor in this moral perspective means that meeting the basic needs of the millions of deprived and hungry people in the world must be the No. 1 objective of international policy.

When those lines were written, ten years ago, they seemed totally unrealistic. There would not have been the will to do anything about them. They are more realistic today. But that is the more reason why they have to be reiterated.

**Loss of Faith in Government**

The third area that has taken on new dimensions in the past ten years is the growing tendency to blame government for all our problems. It has become commonplace today to hear speeches, one after the other, about the ineptitude of government. The solution then to all problems is to have as little government as possible. One could say that this is the theme of the nineties. To win elections, every politician has to give obeisance to those sentiments. The most divisive element in our political scene today is precisely the disagreements on the role of government. At first that division seemed to be along political party lines; today it is much more blurred.

Ten years ago, the bishops did not feel they had to become involved in that debate. They reiterated the classical position in Catholic social teaching of a both/and for position for government, emphasizing certain areas as the proper role of government and then citing the classical teaching about the use of subsidiarity in the execution of policies for social reform. But the bishops ten years ago were very weak. We had not anticipated that money is power and that some forces would use that power to send out the message that this classical interpretation of the role of government was a "statist" position, even a native form of socialism. That the bishops were positive on the role of government seemed to worry some because it went contrary to their political ideology, and thus they immediately tried to label the document as "leftist". Today there would be no way in which the bishops could avoid taking on this issue of the role of government, since it dominates the political scene at this time.

It is noteworthy that even the self-styled libertarian Charles Murray gives the government some power in the regulation of the economy, namely, in the use of its antitrust powers. With the merging of large corporations to form big conglomerates, an ever-increasing phenomenon in our day, the question of antitrust legislation and the need to break up such large entities in order to have effective competition seems like a moot question. There exists no single authority able to do this on a world scale and we will have to rely on trade agreements, as ineffective as they seem to be at times.

The role of the state was laid out clearly by Pope John Paul II in *Centesimus Annus* (No. 40):
It is the task of the State to provide for the defense and preservation of common goods such as the natural and human environments, which cannot be safeguarded simply by market forces. Just as in the time of primitive capitalism the State had the duty of defending the basic rights of workers, so now, with the new capitalism, the State and all of society have the duty of defending those collective goods which, among others, constitute the essential framework for the legitimate pursuit of personal goals on the part of each individual.

In other places he remarks on the need for the free-market forces to be controlled by the State "to guarantee that the basic needs of the whole of society are satisfied" (No. 35).

Even in the famous passage where he asks the question about whether those nations that had been in the Communist bloc should adopt capitalism, he answers cautiously, rejecting any form of capitalism "that is not circumscribed within a strong juridical framework that places it at the service of human freedom in its totality" (No. 42). This cautious response notes that other forces must also be at work besides the free-market, and one of those forces is the need for corrections that only the power of the state can effect.

I wonder if the proponents of limited government in all economic affairs do not have to ask themselves about the effects that this rhetoric has had on other aspects of society where they consider government intervention, at times even strong intervention, as necessary. People do not live in a schizophrenia world. If government is so bad, people say, why should we not form our own militia? (an argument I hear in some of the rural parts of Wisconsin). This attitude also extends to all other regulations in society including moral behavior.

The bishops would avoid, I am sure, this libertarian strain in the debate today. They would not take seriously the newly defined position of Charles Murray in his new short book, What It Means to Be a Libertarian (1997). In its negative tone toward government it is simply not in the tradition of Catholic social doctrine. That tradition has proposed a positive role for government and not just a minimalistic one. Nor would the bishops, in being true to the Catholic tradition, side with those who would see the role of government as total and decisive. They would keep to the middle-ground of stating those roles that are the rightful domain of government and then, using the principle of subsidiarity, outline how government is to help individuals, groups and social entities work toward solutions to social problems. They would not fall victim to the negative rhetoric against government these days, nor would they espouse concepts of higher centralization of power in government.

In this whole discussion of the role of government it would be necessary for the bishops to define more clearly what subsidiarity has meant in the Catholic social tradition. Some have used this concept naively to mean that the government stays out of all social concerns. Others have used it to support the power of the states over the Federal government. If these decentralizations had been the original meaning, then the word "subsidiarity" would not have been used by Pope Pius XI, because its basic insight is that the higher level of authority gives help; it does not wash its hands of all responsibility. The text most often cited is from Quadragesimo Anno, No. 79. I give it here in its totality since the first part of the passage is always omitted today (a practice that began with the encyclical Mater et Magistra of Pope John XXIII and has continued ever since):

It is indeed true, as history clearly shows, that owing to the change in social conditions, much that was formerly done by small bodies can nowadays be accomplished only by large organizations. Nevertheless, it is a fundamental principle of social philosophy, fixed and unchangeable, that one should not withdraw from individuals and commit to the community what they can accomplish by their own enterprise and industry. So, too, it is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil and a disturbance of right order to transfer to the larger and higher collectivity functions which can be performed and provided for by lesser and subordinate bodies. Inasmuch as every social activity should, by its very nature, prove a help to members of the body social, it should never destroy or absorb them.

The encyclical notes that there are some actions that can take place only on the highest levels, given the present forms of our society. It would be necessary to outline these roles. Then the encyclical states that powers proper to individuals and groups should not be taken from them and given to the public sector. It would be well to outline these initiatives. Only finally does the principle relate to finding solutions to social ills. In that case, almost all agree that the local level is more qualified to find solutions to social problems, but only if they are of local origin and do not find their causes in other policies and programs that relate to the larger society. It does not imply either that all funding must also come from that local level. There are many problems, the solutions to which go beyond the means of the local community, and where help from outside would be needed.

The bishops would find in the words of Robert Kuttner the summation of their tradition at this point in history. In his recent book, Everything for Sale: The Virtues and Limits of Markets (1997), Kuttner wrote: "This book begins with the working hypothesis that a capitalist system is a superior form of economic organization, but even in a market society there are realms of human life where markets are imperfect, inappropriate, or unattainable. Many forms of human motivation cannot be reduced to the market model of man."

Domestic Issues Still to Be Resolved

In this section I can only enumerate briefly the domestic issues the bishops would have to take into consideration if they were to look at the current scene in the United States. Almost all of these issues were noted by the bishops in their own anniversary document, A Decade After "Economic Justice for All": Continuing Principles, Changing Context, New Challenges (November 1995). That excellent document characterizes the present scene very well. I will only highlight a few issues that might be emphasized by the bishops if they were to write more extensively about the whole economic scene.

The bishops would probably place the rising disparity between poor and rich as the centerpiece of their domestic concerns: The statistics cited ten years ago in No. 183 about economic inequality in our nation have become decidedly worse, not better. Everyone today is aware of the growing problem, everyone talks of the need to do something to mend the social fabric of the nation ripped apart, but there does not seem to be the will to take any corrective measures. It would be political suicide in our current climate to suggest any kind of program that would diminish this gap. If the bishops were to rewrite their letter, they would have to spend much time and effort on this issue and - if they spoke out strongly and prophetically accept the consequences of being rejected or called all kinds of new or old names.

What the bishops wrote ten years ago on the issues of employment and poverty is still very valid. I recall how we were assailed then by suggesting that the government might - if all other efforts in the private sector failed - become the employer of last resort. Yet I notice that this idea has become again part of several of the welfare reform programs initiated by some of the most conservative governors.
So many of the issues faced ten years ago are still with us. I can say that in rereading the sections on employment and on poverty they still made eminent sense. What might be missing now is the will again to take the big steps necessary to alleviate poverty, not just to reduce the number of people on welfare. The search for real jobs that bring sufficient wages and decent benefits is still often in vain. When this problem is compounded by the question of unemployment and poverty around the world - also of concern to all who believe in human solidarity - the proportions become unmanageable and tend to paralyze us.

Unfortunately, the concomitant issue of education that was dealt with in 1986 has not improved. Signs of hope are still not present.

No list would be complete without talking also about the immigration question and the connection between that challenge and Nafita and other such agreements. The bishops have spoken out on this issue in the last ten years and thus the writers of a new pastoral letter would be able to use that track record.

Finally, I feel that the bishops today would also want to add a more lengthy section on labor and trade unionism. The principles of our Catholic social teaching on this issue are clear, but the present situation should induce us to look again at the realities of our labor force and its needs. Although business has been able to internationalize itself, labor has been less effective in doing so. Recently we have seen a revitalization of labor in the United States. Its connection with world labor movements will be most important as it faces up to a global economy. I feel sure bishops writing today would encourage that wider role for labor, since it is the area most highly affected by the globalization of the economy. My feeling is that if existing labor unions are not to find strategies on how to meet the needs of the workers both here and abroad, some other force will rise up to deal with the global labor issues that are present among us and growing. I would only hope that the church would be a part of such an important wave of concerns.

Conclusion

I have sketched here, all too briefly, how I feel the bishops would approach rewriting the pastoral letter on the economy ten years later. The globalization of the economy would be the lens under which the other factors would be examined. They would be forced to face up to the questions raised by that economy and plan for some basic principles to guide as it moves toward the next millennium. All of the teaching that has been issued since then, be it from the Pope or from conferences of bishops around the world, would have to be studied. They would see that most of the domestic issues are the same as they were ten years ago, but that the conditions are worse. They would be encouraged by what they have written before, but forced to go even deeper now in their analysis, because the economic situation of the world has moved so rapidly. The problems have grown more intractable, and the effects of wrong moves can be even more disastrous. I am sure the bishops would say that there is new need for guiding principles than there was ten years ago.

Probably bishops who hear or read my words will be thinking: But should not the lay people be doing this job? Where are the universities? They would be right. It is a project now for all of us.
Enrichissements mutuels des dons conservés des temps de l'Eglise "indivise" augmentés des acquis des derniers siècles des Eglises séparées, malgré les pechés de la division. Jean-Paul II exprime cela très bien dans le chapitre 23 de son livre *Entre dans l'espérance* : "Pour quelles raisons l'Esprit Saint a-t-il permis toutes ces divisions? (...). Il s'agit d'un chemin qui a conduit et continue à conduire l'Eglise à découvrir les multiples richesses contenues dans l'Evangile. Peut-être ces richesses n'auraient-elles pu venir à jour d'une manière différente? Il faut que le genre humain atteigne l'unité grâce au pluralisme, qu'il apprenne à se rassembler dans l'unique Eglise, mais dans le pluralisme des formes de penser et d'agir des cultures et des civilisations. Une telle manière de faire correspond peut-être mieux à la sagesse de Dieu?. Et dans l'encyclique *Ut unum sint*, n° 23, Il sous-entend la "pro-existence" lorsqu'il dit : "Sur la route qui mène à la pleine unité, le dialogue œcuménique s'efforce de susciter un soutien fraternel par lequel les Communautés s'attacherent à échanger ce dont chacune a besoin pour grandir selon le dessein de Dieu vers la pléitude définitive. (...) Il faut que les deux de chacun se développent pour l'unité et l'avantage de tous". Tout cela explicite ce que Paul de Tarse a dit en sa première Lettre aux Corinthiens, 12, 12-25 au sujet de "l'unité du corps humain malgré et grâce à la multiplicité des ses membres".

Ce n'est donc pas par un retour en arrière, c'est-à-dire à la conception de la primauté (et de l'infallibilité) définie par le Concile Vatican I, qui attribue à l'Évêque de Rome "un pouvoir jurisdictionnel réellement épiscopal, ordinaire et immédiat sur l'ensemble des pasteurs et de tous les fidèles... par vertu propre et par la volonté du Concile Vatican I, qui est la source de la solution; bien au contraire! En faisant ainsi l'Eglise finirait par se retrouver au point de former une "secte" fermée sur sa certitude de vérité, qui se réduirait vite à un intérêt du genre de celui du schisme de Grèce Lefebvre. C'est sur la lancée de l'accusation de l'Eglise de Vatican II que doit se trouver la solution, celle de l'ouverture sur le monde et sur les signes du temps au cœur des Eglises, en "quête d'unité" doit essayer de susciter un désir qui doit être celle de la Trinité elle-même.

Nous savons bien que le monde actuel arrive à un tournant de son histoire, et bien plus qu'à un tournant c'est une révolution "épique" qui attelle nos enfants et à laquelle l'Eglise "unifiée" doit faire face sous peine de vie ou de mort. Ce que nous avons dit dans l'Evangile, et tout particulièrement en Matthieu 16,17-19, sur la certitude que les Portes de l'Enfer ne peuvent rien contre l'Eglise, est l'unique source de notre espérance: "Tu es Pierre et sur cette pierre je bâtirai mon Eglise et les Portes de l'Enfer ne tiendront pas contre elle". Par cette promesse solennelle l'Eglise fondée par Jésus possède la certitude et l'assurance de la Vérité.

Dans son encyclique Ut unum sint, au no 4, Jean-Paul II en parle de façon très emouvante: "C’est dans la faiblesse humaine de Pierre que se manifeste pleinement le fait que, pour accomplir son ministère spécifique dans l’Église, le Pape dépend totalement de la grâce et de la prière du Saint-Père: 'J’ai prié pour que tu ne dénies pas' (Luc 22,32). Que tous prient avec moi pour cette conversion!"

Si les Églises orientales, séparées depuis la date fatidique de 1054, avaient participé aux Conciles dits 'oeuméniques' qui ont eu lieu depuis la fin de l’'Église indivise", il est évident que la définition de Vatican I aurait été très différente. Mais depuis l’éclatement de la “pèpite d’or" que constitue la richesse de l’Église une, les Églises orientales ne sont pas senties d’ôsmiser des Conciles "oeuméniques", alors que l’'Église d’Occident n’est pas fait faute de le faire. "Ce besoin de toujours définir", nous reprochent souvent les Orientaux! C’est un peu ce que disait le père (et Cardinal) Yves Congar, op: "Il n’aura lieu depuis lors dogmatisé unilatéralement, comme si les Églises orthodoxes n’étaient pas des Églises seules: Immaculée Conception, en 1854; Infalibilité pontificale, en 1870; Assomption de Marie, en 1950 (cf. In Rerum, 1962/4, p. 411). Ces Conciles desquels nous occidentaux, "oeuméniques", ne sont pas pour les Orientaux des "locaux", importants certes, mais "ocidentaux", auxquels ils ne sont pas tenus d’adhérer et dont les définitions ne les concernent pas; au plus ces "dogmes" latins constituent des theologiaen. A ce sujet je fais remarquer que Paul VI n’a pas hésité de façon tant à fait définitive de parler, lors du 700e anniversaire du Concile "oeuménique" de Lyon, comme du "second Concile général de Lyon", puis - ce qui est encore plus frappant - du "sixième des synodes généraux tenus en Occident" (lettre adressée au Cardinal Willebrands, en 1974, lue publiquement dans la Cathédrale primatiale St Jean de Lyon, en 1974). Paul VI, qui s'est bien gardé à cette occasion d'utiliser l'adjectif "oeuméniques", indiquait une voie que nous restons à suivre, avec quelque sévérité l'importance des Conciles oeuméniques du premier millénaire de l'Église indivise" de celle des "synodes ocidentaux" tenus après la natale séparation de 1054.

Cela s'accorde fort bien avec ce que dit Mgr Elias Zoghby, ancien évêque melkite (donc "uniate") de Baalbeck, au Liban, dans une interview donnée à Il Bagno, du 20/6. "L’Église est infalliblen le pape exprime la vérité annoncée par l’Église. Vatican I, qui a défini le dogme, a été un Concile latin, donc particulier, comme du reste Vatican II. Nous orientaux n’avons pas représenté l’Orthodoxie; nous étions étrangers comme uniates. Il ne s’agit donc pas de Conciles oeuméniques et infailibles. L’infailibilité dépend de l’oeuménicité'.

On voit bien donc que la question de la primauté est essentielle. Il est plus que probable qu’en écrivant son encyclique Ut unum sint, Jean-Paul II le reconnaît. "Il le pape" a dû se persuader que la papauté telle qu'elle est actuellement, n'a aucune chance oeuméniq"ue réelle. Pour en avoir, il faut un changement. Mais seul un pape peut changer la papauté. Jean-Paul II a donc commencé à le faire, ou plutôt effectué ce qu'il est déclaré prêt à le faire. Ce dernier a ouvert une spirale qui pourrait, dans un avenir plus ou moins lointain, se révéler décisive pour la reformation de l’'unité chrétienne'. écrit le pasteur Vaudois italien Paolo Rocca dans Invenit 97/1, p. 31, dans l'article "La papauté en discussion: attentes et perspectives pour le troisième millénaire". Et il ajoute: "L'encyclique réaffirme que la papauté est un pivot de l'unité et de droit divin, mais elle préfère noter que l'affirmation massive est une réalité qu'il serait probablement excessif de qualifier d'autocritique, mais qui manifeste néanmoins la claire intention d'intervenir sur la papauté, si loin dans son être, du moins dans sa manière d'être, afin qu'elle puisse exercer un service de l'unité chrétienne, la fonction décisive qu'elle s'attribue' (idem, p. 34).

Jean-Paul II a sollicité les chrétiens de toutes les confessions de l'aider dans cette tâche. Un des meilleurs moyens de faire ce ne serait pas d'organiser un Concile vraiuniversel, donc "oeuméniq"ue", du genre de celui dont Olivier Clément parle avec tant de délicatesse et de vérité au début de cet article, afin d'instaurer un dialogue authentique sur le thème de la primauté où chacun aurait l'opportunité de donner son avis sur cette question qui est au centre du débat, dans la liberté la plus absolue. Si le Pape prenait l'initiative d'organiser une telle rencontre, je pense que tout le monde chrétien en serait reconnaissant.

Nous sentons bien - après Graz notamment - que le chemin de l'unité est entré dans une phase critique, et particulièrement avec le monde orthodoxe. Les séctateurs de ces Églises se font de plus en plus vivants et beaucoup de vieilles rancœurs ressortent de loin de plus, avec une certaine raison d'ailleurs (uniatsisme, prosélitisme, etc.). Si le but final de l'unité organique est encore très lointain, cela ne signifie pas que le désir d'unité doit ne pas être poursuivi, car c'est le désir même de Jésus Christ, "que tous soient un", je pense sincèrement que Jean-Paul II joue un rôle important dans ce secteur de première importance, par ses nombreux voyages et ses initiatives. Dans ce sens on peut dire que la bonne se trouve actuellement dans le camp des autres. Mais, dans ce domaine, il est dangereux de raisonner de cette manière, car la bonne est toujours dans le camp de "chacun". On comprend trop bien que le pape actuel ne peut pas voir son Église cheminer trop vite, sans avoir la patience d'attendre les autres. C'est là une tendance très attendue, celle des Réformés, des Anglicans et des Catholiques. Il faut avoir la patience d'attendre ceux qui cheminent plus lentement avec le risque d'attendre longtemps. On n'oubli pas le chemin de souffrance de nos frères russes et en général de tous ceux qui souffre sous le régime communiste et qui ont d'autres traditions et surtout une autre culture profonde qui depuis des temps immémoriaux portent des fruits. S'ils ont besoin eux aussi d'une réforme, ce ne sera pas qui pourrons le faire à leur place, mais eux seuls avec l'aide fraternelle de notre prière et de notre respect. Laissons faire le temps. Il est dans un certain sens le maître de l'histoire. Cela ne doit pas nous empêcher d'aller de l'avant, mais sans heurter les autres. L'unité organique semble aujourd'hui encore impossible, mais cela ne signifie pas que d'autres formes d'unité "imparfaites" ne soient pas possibles. Un Concile "universel" qui partait de cette unité "imparfaite" serait une magnifique opportunité de marcher vers l'unité "parfaite". Nous pourrions prendre un exemple dans la vie des couples "mixtes" dont parle Bondi 97/1, pp. 86-98, que je cite: "On peut et on doit s'assurer, non pas dans une simple appartenance ecclésiale, mais vers une participation effective de la vie des communautés des deux conjoints. L'Église de Jésus-Christ dépasse toute réalité confessionnelle. Il ne saurait à voir pour un chrétien qu'une appartenance..."
nance unique à l'Église du Christ par le baptême. Cela vaut aussi pour un couple 'mixte' où, en fait, les deux conjoints possèdent cette même appartenance unique...''.

Pour conclure cet essai, j'en reviens à l'article du quotidien Il Giornale et à l'éditorial de Gianni Di Bozzo défendant l'idée que, pour survivre, le catholicisme doit conserver sa structure fondamentalement "autoritaire". Je pense au contraire que le Concile Vatican II a pris un tournant irréversible qui va dans un tout autre sens. "L'Église ecclésiologique de Vatican II est centrée sur la communion fraternelle. Mais la logique structurale, inhérente à ce changement vécu par le Concile dans sa conception même de l'Église, ne peut produire ses fruits que selon un processus assez lent. La nostalgie hiérarchique, je veux dire, la conviction que le magistère se situe entre Dieu et le peuple est inscrite dans une mentalité qui n'a pas encore vu ses valeurs. Ces conséquences du changement d'orientation ecclésiologique, ce qui explique les résistances suscitées par la peur de voir la catégorie 'historicisme' conditionner l'interprétation du magistère'' (Évaristo Vilanova, Préface du livre de Jose I. González Faus, La autoridad de la verdad. Momentos obscuros del Magisterio eclesástico, Herder, Barcelona 1996, p. 10). Il ne s'agit donc pas seulement d'un changement de perspective, mais d'un changement culturel qui ne peut s'assimiler en un court laps de temps.

A mon humble avis, je pense que deux documents de Jean-Paul II se détachent par leur importance. Le premier date de 1988: sa belle méditation sur la condition de la femme, Mulieris dignitatem (voir mon article sur cette Lettre apostolique dans Notas y documentos, N. 24/25, 1989, p. 141-60); le second est l'encyclique Ut unum sint, de 1995. Ces deux écrits marquent des points de non-retour. A ce sujet j'attends avec impatience le Document officiel de la Conférence de Lambeth qui donnera un nouveau point d'orientation de l'Église Anglicane sur les propositions de Jean-Paul II dans son encyclique.

Ut unum sint marque probablement la fin d'une Église conçue avant tout comme une monarchie absolue, dans laquelle l'évêque de Rome est le Souverain Pontife, Vicaire du Christ, selon le texte incroyable de Grégoire VII (au XIe siècle), appelé Dictatus papae, "Seul le Pontife romain peut être appelé universel et utiliser les insignes impériales, ne faire baisser les pieds et ne peut être jugé par personne..." (op. cit., p. 180).

En réalité, celui ou ceux qui exercent une autorité dans l'Église ne peuvent s'appuyer que sur le texte évangélique de Luc 22,24-27 et parallèles, Marc 10,42-44 et Matt. 20,25-27: "Il s'élève entre eux une contestation; lequel d'entre eux oubliera le plus grand? Il leur dit: 'Les rois des nations leur commandent, et ceux qui exercent l'autorité se font appeler bons. Pour vous, il en va pas ainsi; au contraire, le plus grand prendra la servitude de l'autre. Quel est en effet le plus grand, celui qui est à table ou celui qui sert? N'est-ce pas celui qui est à table? Eh bien moi je suis au milieu de vous comme celui qui sert'." "Serveur des serviteurs de Dieu", voilà le titre le plus authentique de ceux qui exercent l'autorité dans l'Église, le Peuple de Dieu. Grégoire le Grand (VI-VIIe siècle), s'appliquait à lui-même ce titre, refusant d'être appelé "pape universel". Il appelle le Patriarche d'Alexandrie "son frère selon le rang" et rejette "toutes les paroles qui offensent la vanité et blessent la charité" (Ibid., p. 180). Bartolomé de Las Casas, dans sa simplicité et son ingénuité, réplique à Ginés de Sepulveda: "L'Église n'a pas plus de pouvoir que n'en avait Jésus-Christ en tant qu'homme" (cf. D. Soto, Obra indigenista, Madrid 1985, p. 179).

Ce dialogue qu'il faut initier entre les diverses confessions de traditions différentes sur le sujet délicat de la primauté et de l'infaillibilité qui lui est connexe, n'est et ne sera pas simple. Dialogue signifie être décidé à s'écouter mutuellement dans le respect des positions les plus diverses. Dans Écologie du 28 octobre 1978, p. 4, l' alors Cardinal Karol Wojtyla écrivait: "Il ne peut exister un dialogue si l'Église se situe au-dessus du monde. L'Église doit se présenter au monde non pas comme enseignante, en exigeant seulement obéissance et en parlant de manière autoritaire; il faut au contraire qu'elle cherche ensemble avec le monde comment trouver la vérité; si cela n'a pas lieu, son 'dialogue' ne sera qu'un monologue.

Dans tout dialogue il y a toujours un troisième élément qui est la vérité, à laquelle ceux qui exposent leurs vues doivent chercher à se conformer. Une force de la vérité! L'autorité de la vérité - et non pas la 'vérité de l'autorité', comme cela a été trop souvent le cas dans les discussions du passé récent. Sur ce point l'Église catholique part d'une position de force que elle ne peut imposer à priori: celle de sa définition dogmatique et "infaillible" de Vatican I et celle, plus nuancée, de Vatican II, grâce à l'affirmation de la collégialité. Il faudra donc défendre ce que l'on croit la vérité indispensable, il faudra surtout beaucoup d'écoute. Spécialement de la part de la tradition orthodoxe qui possède des idées bien précises sur le ministère de la primauté. Pour ces Églises, l'Église ne peut jamais être pour ce qui est essentiel de la foi et elle s'en remet pour cela au sens profond de l'Église du peuple des croyants.

Il faudra probablement manquer le sens juridique typique de l'Occident par le sens spirituel et "pneumatique" de l' Orient. La tradition protestante, elle aussi, doit apporter son sens de l'Eglise basée sur l'autorité de l'Église et dans sa volonté de plus en plus et de plus en plus d'un ministère de communion, donc d'une autorité liée à une fonction ministérielle que le luthéranisme et le calvinisme pensent que revient au Roi de Dieu, évoque le premier siècle qui est appelé à présider la charité. Quant à la tradition anglicane, elle est très proche de la tradition orthodoxe mais s'appuie en outre sur la collégialité de tous les membres du Peuple de Dieu, c'est sur ce point aussi qu'elle apporte des Églises dites "libres", qui ont une commune et laïcisme qui est la Réforme, peut être d'une grande aide pour les Églises dites "traditionnelles".

La force de la vérité! Le chapitre 5 des Actes des Apôtres nous relate les réflexions du pariaire Gamaliel, le maître de Paul de Tarse, déterminant pour la délibération du Sanhédrin qui jugéait les Apôtres mis en prison parce qu'ils prêchaient l'Évangile: "...à présent donc je vous le dis, ne vous occuppez pas de ces gens-là, laissez-les. Car si leur entreprise ou leur oeuvre vient des hommes, elle se détruira d'elle-même; mais si vraiment elle vient de Dieu, vous n'arriverez pas à la détruire. Ne risquez-vous de vous trouver en guerre contre Dieu".

Ne pourrions-nous pas faire confiance à cette "politique" concernant la primauté et l'infaillibilité pour que la vérité finisse par triompher?

1 Frentre connaissance sur ce point d'un article de Mgr P. Dupray, secrétaire du Conseil Pontifical pour la Promotion de l'Unité des Chrétiens, intitulé "Conciliation, Primauté", donnant toutes les indications pour qu'un Concile puisse être appelé "comœcuménique"; in Procure orient chretien, XXXIX, pp. 225-256.

IN MEMORIAM:
MOTHER TERESA DE CALCUTTA

Ma première réaction en apprenant la mort de Mother Teresa de Calcutta a été le silence. Silence devant la grandeur de Dieu qui choisit les témoins qu'il veut. Cette "petite grande" femme, comme on l'appelait souvent, était albanaise, une inconnue, je pensais au choix de David, celui à qui personne ne pensait, le petit cadet de la famille, l'insignifiant. Mais Dieu choisit ceux qui semblent faibles pour confondre les forts.

C'est au Venezuela que j'ai eu un premier contact avec les Missionnaires de la Charité, à La Guaira, dans un bidonville proche de l'aéroport de Caracas; elles y tenaient une paroisse très pauvre - manque de prêtres-, il y régnait une ambiance extraordinaire, la joie des pauvres... Je n'oublierai jamais: c'était en 1962. J'ai eu un deuxième contact avec elle, ici à Rome, il y a une dizaine d'années, sur la Via Casilina. Je m'étais arrêté dans leur chapelle, toute blanche et nue, avec une seule inscription à gauche du crucifix qui dominait l'autel: "I thirst" - j'ai soif. Le silence des sœurs qui adoraient était total, impressionnant, une contemplation silencieuse. J'en suis sorti tout ému.

Quel était le secret de Mother Teresa et de ses sœurs spirituelles? Une intimité avec le Christ glorieux mais souffrant dans ses frères les plus démuni. Une sorte de mariage "mystique" mais aussi matériel et concret avec les mourants de Calcutta: un vrai mariage qui se consumait à chaque instant avec la délicatesse de Jésus Incarné. À notre époque où en Occident triomphe l'idéologie du "New Age", cette décadence d'une civilisation décadente, qui nie le mal et ne veut pas voir la souffrance, Mother Teresa et ses sœurs prennent la souffrance des autres et la leur à bras-le-corps, sans mot dire, en silence mais en adorant, et "sauvent" ainsi notre culture trop superficie, par un langage qui ne peut se traduire mais qui est le plus authentique de tous.

On pourra dire que l'on veut, que les moyens employés sont désuets, qu'on ne fait que prolonger la souffrance des pauvres les plus pauvres, les aidant sans plus à mourir. Mais ce sont aussi ces moyens-là qui, de nos jours encore, peuvent être source de salut et, de quelle sainteté! Et tant que ce mariage durera, les Missionnaires de la Charité sont assurées d'être fidèles à leur vocation sans la présence physique de Mother Teresa.

Jean-François Nothomb
partie est rurale, il existe une zone industrielle et minière. Et c'est là que, sous prétexte de dîner, on refusait aux ouvriers le pain, officiellement rationné, pour les obliger à l'acheter au marché noir dans lequel trépignaient même les autorités locales. L'événement s'en est dégagé et, devant le manque de réponse des autorités à ses injonctions, dit-il, il me suis assis à ma machine à écrire et un trait s'est révélé une lettre pastorale que j'ai intitulée "Donnez-nous aujourd'hui notre pain de chaque jour".

Ce texte de 1933, il y a aujourd'hui, paraît bien modéré. À l'époque, il a pu sembler une déclaration de guerre. "Défendre le droit des pauvres et des travailleurs à une vie digne et humaine - comme le Cardinal - paraissait inadmissible aux gouvernants qui se prétendaient de bons catholiques et ne juraient que par les principes de la doctrine chrétienne."

Ainsi, pendant dix-huit ans, Mgr Tarancón, dans son petit diocèse provincial, s'est acquis une solide renommée d'évêque "progressiste" et a inauguré en Espagne un genre nouveau de documents épiscopaux attentifs à la situation réelle du pays. Vient ensuite le Concile où notre évêque a pris une part très active et engagée. C'est à partir de la fin du Concile que Mgr Tarancón est devenu l'homme de confiance sur qui le pape Paul VI, le cardinal Villot et monseigneur Benelli ont compté pour faire pénétrer en Espagne l'âge de l'esprit et même la lettre des réformes conciliaires.

Car le gouvernement espagnol, et avec lui une bonne partie de l'épiscopat, s'ils ont adopté sans broncher la nouvelle liturgie en langue vulgaire, ils ont pratiquement refusé Gaudium et spes et encore plus la Déclaration sur la liberté religieuse Dignitatis humanae. Ce faisant, ils prétendaient rester fidèles à la bonne tradition, dont le Concile se serait écarté, et préserver en Espagne le seul régime dans le monde chrétien où l'Etat assumait la pleine sauvegarde des valeurs religieuses.

Mgr Tarancón, promu archevêque de Tolède et cardinal, ensuite archevêque de Madrid et président de la Conférence épiscopale espagnole, eut à mener, de 1969 à 1975, un combat silencieux, mais combien acharné, avec le catholicisme formel d'un régime qui n'acceptait pas les excommunications sociales et politiques de l'Église post-conciliaire et réclamait en revanche l'appui inconditionnel de la hiérarchie ecclésiastique. Peu à peu, grâce surtout à l'intervention du nonce Mgr Dadaglio, la majorité de la Conférence épiscopale s'est rangée du côté du cardinal Tarancón et de l'esprit de l'Église conciliaire.

De ce dur combat, les neuf cent pages des Confessions en racontent toutes les incidences avec une franchise remarquable et peu catholique, en fournissant une information précieuse et détaillée. On y voit le Cardinal pris entre l'enclume et le marteau d'une situation sociale, politique et ecclésiastique terriblement tendue. L'enclume était la résistance farouche du Régime, fermée à toute réforme, et le marteau l'exigence d'un renouvellement des prêtres et des laïcs engagés, qu'ils fassent valoir dans leur prédication ou dans des actions publiques, telles que l'occupation d'Églises et même de l'église de la Nonciature apostolique. Somme toute, les deux extrémités : l'intégrisme et le progressisme à outrance, dont le Cardinal s'est toujours éloigné. Mais les sanctions gouvernementales qui s'abattaient sur ceux-ci, sous forme d'amendes et d'emprisonnement, jusqu'à trente prêtres et religieuses se retrouvèrent dans la prison, dite "concordataire", de Zamora) obligeaient le Cardinal à défendre ceux qui nageaient que pour des raisons ecclésiales. Dans son écrit, la sincérité du porte jusqu'à stigmatiser parmi les plus ardents défenseurs de l'ordre établi sous Franco, et donc contre le Cardinal, les ministres membres de l'"Opus Dei" et les autres affiliés à cet Institut qui, même à la Curie romaine, menaçait la vie dure au Cardinal et à la Conférence épiscopale. Le plus triste incident de cette période eut lieu lors de l'entremise de l'archevêque Carrero Blanco, président du gouvernement, assassiné par l'ETA : alors, un groupe de "guerilleros de Cristo Rey" - protégés par la police - violetaient dans les rues de Madrid. "Tarancón au poteau..."

Mais les années passent et le Seigneur n'oublie pas les siens. Le 29 novembre 1975 le général Franco est mort et deux jours après le nouveau roi Juan Carlos a prêté serment. Au cours de la messe du Saint-ESprit le cardinal Tarancón a prononcé une homélie qui est comme un brillant résumé des exigences chrétiennes en politique, tout à fait dans l'esprit de Gaudium et spes. Heureusement, son royal auditeur a fort bien compris la leçon du Cardinal et il en a fait sa ligne de conduite : à peine quelques mois plus tard - le 14 juillet 1976 - le Roi écrivit une lettre personnelle au Pape pour lui annoncer qu'il ne ferait pas usage du droit de présentation des évêques. L'obstacle principal était levé, le 28 juillet fut signé à Rome, entre le Ministre des affaires étrangères, Marcelino Oreja, et le Secrétaire d'Etat du Vatican, l'accord qui réglait définitivement tous les autres points d'un contenu entre le Saint-Siége et un État qui pendant quarante ans avait prétendu être plus catholique que le Pape.

La publication de ce livre (malheureusement trois ans après la mort de son auteur) nous invite à admirer l'action de ce "pauvre évêque sur qui ont pesé des responsabilités supérieures à ses forces" - comme il le dit lui-même et son exemplaire rendu à l'Église. "Marlais, Don Sturzo et les chrétiens de la "paix civile" pendant la guerre civile, y trouveraient leur justification posthume.

Ramon Sugranes de Franch
Est-ce le chef-d'œuvre de Giancarlo Zizola? Je serais tenté de répondre oui. Il nous brosserait dans ce livre "magistral" non seulement un panorama global de la vie de l'Eglise italienne qui couvre les 80 ou 90 années de la vie passionnante de Don Giovanni Rossi, ce prêtre de Milan, héritier du grand évêque de cette ville qui était le Cardinal Andrea Carlo Ferrari (1850-1921), mais surtout une fresque monumentale de cette époque qui a précédé Vatican II en Italie, quelques rares "énergumènes" faisant avancer - sans souvent s'en rendre compte - ce que l'auteur appelle "l'utopie chrétienne" dans ce moment de transition de l'Eglise qui se considère comme une "société parfaite" que ne devrait rien attendre du monde et de la sécurisation qui la guettait de partout sans s'apercevoir et qui menaçait sa "sécurité". Alors, récriminations Zizola pour ce travail intense où on découvre à chaque page combien il est "donné" à cette biographie d'un homme en même temps vénéré et aimé et qui a été un de ses guides mais sans peur de mettre au nu ses limites et ses défauts. Il faut dire que Don Giovanni Rossi a vécu à la charnière d'une époque, au moment même où un abîme était en train de se creuser entre les deux conceptions de l'Eglise, celle de Pie XI et de Pie XII et celle de Jean XXIII; trois pontes de grande valeur et sainteté mais diamétralement différents dans leur façon de voir leur rôle et les choses qui les entouraient.

Don Giovanni Rossi, innovateur et traditionnel à la fois: innovateur par sa capacité de perception de l'importance du rôle des laïcs dans la vie du Peuple de Dieu et donc, sur ce point, un véritable précurseur du Concile, mais tout en restant le plus clérical des hommes au point d'obliger les membres du groupement fondé par lui, bien que leur permettant de choisir librement leurs "directeurs de conscience", de ne se confesser qu'à lui. Innovateur dans quelques choix fondamentaux et dans son ouverture à la "beauté" du monde, mais traditionnel au plus haut point, non pas par son obéissance à l'autorité mais par son "cœur" vis-à-vis des papes et de la papauté. "C'est le Pape qui le veut! Vive le Pape! Que le Pape soit remercié!" (p. 115) ou encore "Quelle grâce! Le Pape! Il signifie tout!" (p. 154) et bien d'autres passages. Lui fait suite un nationalisme exacerbé: "Nous savons que l'Italie est le palais de Jésus-Christ; plus elle s'élevera dans l'histoire du monde, plus elle émancipera Rome avec elle, cette Rome, où Jésus-Christ a voulu avoir son trône et sa chaire pour dominer les peuples et les âmes..." (p. 177). Signa-tons également un passage de la page 121 qui signale l'adieu de Don Giovanni Rossi, qui s'il n'en est que le prodige garanti tout cela le mystère de l'obéissance du Christ, serait perdu dans sa forme extérieure aux procès de Moscou du temps de Staline!

Une certaine ambiguïté entoure son désir d'une nouvelle Congrégation religieuse. Fondée en 1920, la Communauté de Saint Paul veut insuffler les valeurs démocratiques dans une forme d'œuvre religieuse extrêmement structurée et stricte: ce sera une sorte de conflit perpétuel où se manifesterait la personnalité compliquée de Don Giovanni Rossi; il sera exclu de sa Communauté sous la pression des événements et des hommes particulièrement de la part de la Curie romaine - ce qui l'amena à fonder, en 1939, la "Pro Civitate Christiana". Il faut, pour comprendre tout cela, se mettre en face de la situation italienne et savoir qu'il existe dans ce pays "deux mondes d'âmes qui ne se connaissent pas et qui, malheureusement, ne dé- rent pas se connaître: le monde catholique et le monde néo-païen. Chaque monde marche dans sa propre voie... Il y a des murailles invisibles, si hautes, qu'elles sont totalement imperméables. Réussi-rons-nous à les abattre?" (p. 130). Et cependant "on a jamais autant désespéré recherché Jésus-Christ que de nos jours... dans ce tumulte de culture, de secousses sociales, de recherche d'une nouvelle face de la terre qui est le signe que l'Esprit guide l'histoire humaine de manière inattendue et enigmatique malgré tout le chaos que nous percevons autour de nous..." (p. 392). Raniero La Valle ira dans ce sens en dénonçant dans un cours donné à la Pro Civitate Christiana, "en Italie, l'existence d'un "athéisme des croyants", dont les symptômes sont plus évidents et plus nombreux qu'on ne pense le croire..." (p. 393).

C'est à cet point crucial que se situent les grandes options de Don Giovanni Rossi. Il faut reconnaître que son audace est grande en face de cette situation: entre autres, ouverture au monde de l'art, y compris celui des artistes les plus contestés - par exemple celui de Pierpaolo Pasolini auquel sont consacrées pages 320 à 324 du livre, pages de toute beauté - englobées dans ce chapitre 12 consacré à "L'époque de Jean XXIII" qui est le chapitre le plus "consolant" de tout l'ouvrage: ouverture au monde des "gauches", au Parti Communiste, à la révolution provoquée par l'annonce du Concile, dans les résistances imaginaires de la Curie; citons, entre autres, la manière dont la visite à Rome de l'archevêque de Canterbury, Geoffrey Fisher, est annoncée par L'Osservatore Romano (pp. 336-337); la position de la revue Rocco, publication mensuelle de la Pro Civitate Christiana, face à la question de l'abrogation de la loi sur le divorce en Italie; etc.; tous ces "séquences du Verbe à l'époque de la sécurisation", dont parlent les pages 352 à 403, qu'il faut absolument lire.

Il faut arrêter; en dire plus ne pousserait pas le lecteur à pénétrer mieux dans la pensée de Zizola et, surtout, de celle de Don Giovanni Rossi, cet homme, ce prêtre, dont la femme du professeur Lucio Lombardo Radice, le rénové idéologue marxiste, a dit: "Ecoute, Lucio. Il est vrai que Don Rossi a fondé la Citadella avec une vision étrange de ses devoirs. Mais, mon cher, Don Rossi est un chrétien, un chrétien authentique comme j'en connais peu; et plus, un chrétien qui possède la 'grâce', le don permanent de la grâce" (p. 379).

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son attitude d'historien; il rapporte les faits et analyse les documents. A juste titre il peut être fier de son objectivité (p. 261), puisqu'il ne porte guère de jugements subjectifs sur les événements - sa propre élection au poste de secrétaire général ne fait l'objet que d'une allusion, en note au pied de page. (Il me permettra toutefois que je le laissem à propos de son appréciation - p. 194 - des capacités supérieures des Allemands dans l'organisation et la gestion politique... Cela dit, je ne peux que faire l'éloge de son exposé, précis, riche, circonstancié. Il fournit une information exacte, avec abondance de détails, sur les hommes et les œuvres qui ont porté le PPE à son épanouissement actuel.

Une remarque préalable; le récit de M. Jaunet concerne exclusivement l'histoire d'un parti politique européen. Et pas celle de la naissance et le développement de l'Union Européenne des États. Des événements d'une portée aussi grande que la création de la Communauté Economique Européenne (CEE), pour remplacer la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier, en 1958, ou le Traité de Maastricht qui a transformé en Union Européenne (UE) en 1992, n'y sont évoqués que comme une toile de fond ou comme la cause des transformations successives de l"internationale" démocrate-chrétienne. Son sujet ainsi délimité, le livre devient, en ce qui concerne le PPE, un ouvrage de référence incontournable.

Une première partie, en guise d'introduction, présente l'ensemble des problèmes liés au surgissement d'un système de partis politiques au plan européen. D'abord, la nécessité des partis "européens" pour recueillir et exprimer les désirs et les espoirs des citoyens de cette Europe qui s'est lentement construite. Toutefois, ces partis ne peuvent être, pour le moment, que des entités fédératives des partis existants au plan national - et régional, cela est important - dans les États membres de l'Union Européenne. Leur tâche, basée sur le principe de subsidiarité, consiste à assurer les actions que les partis membres ne peuvent exercer par eux-mêmes auprès des organismes supra-nationaux de l'Union. L'article 138 du Traité de Maastricht reconnaît, d'ailleurs, les partis sur le plan européen comme un facteur important de l'intégration. Leur faiblesse et le peu d'impact qu'ils rencontrent encore auprès de l'opinion publique dérive du fait que la source du pouvoir au sein de l'Union ne réside pas (ou pas encore) dans le Parlement européen, mais dans les gouvernements des États qui la composent. Or, la pensée démocrate-chrétienne, qui a toujours proposé l'intégration européenne comme un idéal, doit être présente dans les organismes qui sont chargés de la réaliser. En outre, dans la dynamique de l'Union européenne, une tendance se fait jour vers un regroupement progressif des partis qui tendent de la droite vers le centre dans le PPE, ceux de la gauche qui tendent vers le centre dans l'UE (p. 47).

Il suit une deuxième partie, historique de cette fois, qui retrace les efforts de coopération des partis démocrates-chrétiens sur le plan international, jusqu'à y compris la fondation du PPE. C'est l'histoire, compliquée, des institutions qui se sont succédées depuis que la tutelle de Don Luigi Sturzo, en 1925, a réussi à mettre sur pied le SIPDC (Secretariat International des Partis Démocratiques d'Inspiration Chrétienne), en passant par les Nouvelles Equipes Internationales (1945-1965) qui n'avaient à peine manifesté leur identité démocrate-chrétienne, jusqu'à l'Union Européenne des Démocrates Chrétiens (UDEC), qui a pris place en 1965. Le lecteur que cette histoire intéressante, la trouvera plus largement développée dans les deux ouvrages du secrétaire général de notre Institut, prof. Roberto Papini, L'internazionale democratic cristiana. La cooperazione tra i partiti democratici cristiani dal 1925 al 1985, paru à Milan en 1986 et traduit dans plusieurs langues, ainsi que Il coraggio della democrazia. Storico sull'Internazionale Popolare tra la due guerra, paru à Rome en 1995.

Un autre facteur qui a contribué à la création du PPE est le renforcement des partis parlementaires (un allemand on appelle "fraktion") des députés démocrates-chrétiens, aussi bien dans l'Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l'Europe (1949), que dans les assemblées communautaires de la CECA (1953) et enfin dans le Parlement européen à partir de 1958.

En dehors de l'Europe occidentale, d'autres regroupements démocrates-chrétiens, se sont constitués en Amérique latine, en ODCA (Montevideo, 1943), parmi les hommes politiques exilés des pays communistes, l'Union Chrétienne-Démocrate de l'Europe centrale et orientale; enfin, l'Union mondiale démocrate-chrétienne (Santiago, 1951) qui a été proposée pour réunir toutes les autres. Cette mosaïque baroïlée et somme toute hétérogène, étant donnée la diversité des conditions politiques dont les structures communautaires ou les structures chrétiennes avaient à développer leur action, témoigne des efforts accomplis pour un peu pour arriver à constituer une véritable "interneionale" de ceux qui suivent cette inspiration.

Face à cette dispersion, surgit le 29 avril 1976, à Bruxelles, par décision du comité politique de l'UDEC, le nouveau "Parti Populaire Européen. Fédération des partis démocrates-chrétiens de la Communauté Européenne". La nouvelle entité a des caractéristiques bien définies et une possibilité d'action plus concreta, quoique non dépourvue de problèmes. Et la troisième partie du livre de M. Jansen rapporte en détail sa marche en avant, à travers ses congrès, qui se tiennent en principe tous les deux ans et ses programmes d'action. Jusqu'au dernier, fort ambitieux, établi lors du X Congrès, à Bruxelles, en 1993, pour la période 1994-1995. Ce programme est très important parce qu'il n'est pour ainsi pas à proposer en termes généraux la paix, la sécurité et la cohésion en Europe, mais il définit aussi les intérêts communs européens dans la politique mondiale et plaide pour une Europe économe en tous sens et sociale propre, basée sur le respect des droits de l'homme et l'accueil des étrangers, et au contraire des questions concrètes, telles que la drogue, la criminalité, sans oublier les exigences de l'écologie.

Deux gros problèmes se posent au PPE pendant ses vingt ans d'activité. Le premier a été de circonscrire les compétences respectives du Parti et de la Conférence des chefs des partis et des gouvernements nationaux, très influente étant donnée la composition du Parlement européen par des députés élus dans les différents États. L'autre, la question longtemps débattue de l'admission des partis "conservateurs" de la Grande-Bretagne et des Pays Scandinaves - ou celle du Parti Populaire européen. Ces demandes d'admission mettaient en jeu l'identité chrétienne des partis fondateurs. L'Union Démocratique Européenne qui, depuis 1976, était le pendant du PPE pour tous ces partis de tendance conservatrice - a fini par rejeter le PPE à la suite de son IX Congrès à Athènes en 1992, où un consensus a été trouvé des principes fondamentaux de la philosophie démocrate-chrétienne, c'est-à-dire la subsidiarité et la solidarité, basés sur l'idéal personnaliste et l'adhésion à l'économie sociale de marché, ont permis l'accord final. Et les partis conservateurs de Suède, de Norvège et de Finlande sont entrés dans le PPE en 1995. La quatrième partie du livre qui nous occupe est consacrée aux structures et aux problèmes de fonctionnement aux perspectives actuelles du PPE. Elle contient l'analyse détaillée de ses différents organes et des organisations sectorielles parallèles (celles des jeunes, des femmes, des...
membres des autorités régionales et communales, des travailleurs, des milieux indépendants, jusqu'à celle des "seniors"). Un chapitre concerne les rapports avec les partis analogues en Europe centrale et orientale, pour finir avec une galerie de portraits des hommes et des femmes - qui ont contribué à bâtir le PPE et de leurs apportations respectives.

Le dernier mot de M. Jansen est sa profession de foi personnelle dans l'avenir d'une Europe unie. De plus en plus, les problèmes qui se posent à tous les États membres espèrent des solutions au niveau européen. L'essentiel est que le Parlement européen, au-delà de la "diplomatie" internationale, devienne le véritable interprète des aspirations des citoyens.

Un long appendice, d'une centaine de pages, réunit les documents fondateurs de la constitution du PPE, ainsi que les rapports présentés aux Congrès par M. Jansen, en tant que secrétaire général, de 1984 à 1993.

Ramon Sgurany de Fanch


Après le livre de Jean-Luc Barré, Jacques et Raissa Maritain. Les mandalas du ciel (et Notes et documents, N° 44), voici ce livre de Yves Floucourt, du plus haut intérêt, un peu un complément du précédent. Nous connaissons bien Yves Floucourt, sa compétence dans le domaine philosophique, ses initiatives "maritainiennes" à Toulouse et ailleurs, sa fondation du Centre Jacques Maritain de Toulouse et sa participation active au CIREP (Centre Indépendant de Recherche Philosophique), sa collaboration à la Revue Thomiste. Il était donc tout indiqué pour écrire ce livre.

Devons-nous voir un regain d'intérêt pour l'oeuvre de Maritain? Certainement. Mais cela n'empêche que l'intention de Floucourt n'était pas là; il a voulu "mettre en lumière la profondeur et la richesse d'une philosophie qui... me paraît susceptible d'apporter l'homme d'aujourd'hui, non seulement à formuler les questions essentielles, celles qui relèvent du regard de la sagesse et qui souffrent de ne plus pouvoir se dire à lui-même, mais encore et par là même à retrouver la valeur de ce qu'il est et de ce pour quoi il est fait, bref de son identité perdue" (p. 127).

Que Jacques Maritain ait été un des plus grands philosophes chrétiens du XIXe siècle est une évidence. Il a incontestablement marqué la période de l'avant et de l'après deuxième guerre mondiale, et son influence est sensible en de nombreux pays, du Brésil jusqu'au Japon. Yves Floucourt a voulu donner un panorama philosophique équilibré et tout en montrant sa forte sympathie pour l'oeuvre de Maritain qu'il a eu l'occasion de frequenter à Toulouse, avant la mort du philosophe, dans la dernière partie de sa vie, il cherche à prendre quelque recul sur le terrain où ce dernier s'est laissé emporter par des enthousiasmes liés à un zélé de néophyte, dans le domaine intellectuel et religieux - je pense personnellement à sa "querelle" avec G. Bernanos sur le contenu de l'Institut de Satan.

Si une large place est donnée à la présentation des idées politiques de Maritain, les grands thèmes de sa pensée sont systématiquement analysés dans ce livre. Il a été frappé avant tout - car Maritain y est resté "secondum quid" fidèle jusqu'à sa mort - par ce que Floucourt nous dit des options du jeune Maritain, assez peu connu en fait. Maritain avait 25 ans (il est né le 18 novembre 1882) au moment où la science est proclamée "la lumière, l'autorité, la religion du XIXe siècle". A ce moment même il écrivait des phrases incendiaires dont voici un ou deux exemples: "Les bourgeois m'inspirent une haine que je pourrais qualifier de fondamentale. (...) Je ne peux exprimer le dégoût immense qui m'anéanti à l'idée de bourgeois antitotalitaires, lourds, vulgaires, ces âmes qui semblent être le plus ignobles de ceux qui puissent se relever" (p. 311), ou encore: "Le christianisme est la plus grande calamité qui ait frappé le monde"; "Pendre le dernier des rois avec les royaumes du dernier des pères" (id.). On ne s'étonne pas qu'il ait été un socialiste sincère, total, absolu - comme il a été pour ce qu'il croyait être la vérité - et comme le dit Floucourt, son "vœu de servir le prolétariat... n'a jamais été révoqué" (p. 12).

Oui, Jacques Maritain a été l'homme de l'absolu; désespérait de trouver la vérité - face au désenchantement de la Sorbonne d'alors - il "s'est dehors de devoir suivre le plancher de sa chambre, parce qu'à toutes les méthodes il utilisait l'âme, la science, la morale", nous dit Raissa, son épouse, dans Les grands desseinuts (p. 12). Raissa lui, désespérant de la philosophie, désespérant de la raison, se trouvaient devoir affronter un désespoir absolu, à tel point que "nous voulons mourir sans un livre refusé s'il n'était impossible de vivre selon la vérité" (p. 14).

Inutile de continuer, nous connaissons tous la suite: Henri Bergson, Léon Bloy, St Thomas d'Aquin, trois coups de fouet provoqués par trois hommes hors du commun, qui ont enflammé la flamme du sain, la petite touche qu'allume de grands incendies et ouvre vers les plus hautes perspectives: la personne admirable de Jésus, l'amour de l'intelligence, celui de la sagesse. Désormais le tournant est pris.

Parcourons en hâte les divers chapitres du livre que nous recensions. Celui sur la civilisation médiévale où l'essentiel se trouve dans le fait qu'elle ait eu lieu sur le mystère de l'incarnation au centre du mystère humain, ce qu'il suffit pour que désormais l'on ne puisse jamais se satisfaire de moins; ce qu'il faut aujourd'hui c'est "retrouver la force d'une telle inspiration" (p. 64). Celui sur la métaphysique: "Dans ce petit mot 'est', le plus vulgaire de tous... c'est là que se trouve offert, mais caché, bien caché, le mystère de l'être en tant qu'être, c'est de l'objet le plus usuel de la connaissance commune que le métaphysicien va à faire sortir, le tirer de son ironique banalité pour le voir en face" (p. 83). C'est la métaphysique qui "nous installe dans l'éternel et l'absolu" (p. 84).

Pour ce qui concerne la personne humaine, elle occupe une place centrale chez Maritain, dans sa dimension ontologique: son libre arbitre n'a pas sa fin en lui-même puisqu'il est ordonné à la spontanéité de l'être, autrement dit à la liberté d'autonomie, une des perforations de l'homme (p. 122).

Le cinquième chapitre est consacré au "Philosophie dans la cité", dans lequel est mis en avant la "loi de la démocratie" considérée comme essentielle; mais elle ne concerne que les convictions pratiques, rassemblant tous ceux qui rêvent semblablement, peut-être pour des raisons différentes, de la vérité et de l'intelligence, de la dignité humaine, de la liberté, l'amour fraternel et la valeur absolue du bien moral..." (p. 140).

La philosophie sociale selon Maritain constitue le sixième chapitre; il contient une série critique du capitalisme qui est finalement "un esprit de haine de la pauvreté et de mépris du pauvre; le pauvre n'existe que comme outil, non comme personne" (p. 162) et une non moins sévère critique du communisme marxiste. "La dernière hérésie chrétienne", qui lance un combat actif contre tout ce qui rappelle Dieu. "Sa genèse est d'ordre philosophique... qui implique une position athéiste absolue" (p. 168).

Le dernier chapitre est consacré à l'"Art et Poésie. Pour notre philosophie l'intelligence en nous s'efforce d'engendrer, elle est impatiente de produire non seulement le verbe intérieur qui demeure en elle, mais..."
une oeuvre à la fois matérielle et spirituelle comme nous-mêmes ou passe quelque chose de notre âme, par une surabondance naturelle. C'est toute une introduction à ce qu'enseigne d'original Maritain sur l'inconscient ou préconscient spirituel... est tout autre que l'inconscient infrarationnel des instincts et des tendances de la part animale ou sensible de l'homme, que la psychologie des profondeurs a porté à la lumière" (p. 231).

Un dernier chapitre essaye d'évaluer la prétention et l'influence de Jacques Maritain et l'auteur en profondeur pour réaffirmer que c'est au service d'un tel regard métaphysique et sans aucun souci de notoriété personnelle que Maritain a élaboré toute son oeuvre et c'est donc dans cette perspective que nous devons mesurer l'influence que ses livres peuvent éventuellement exercer dans le présent et pour l'avenir" (p. 249).

C'est pourquoi je crie répeler ce que Jacques Maritain disait de lui-même (je suis) "une espèce de sourcier collant son oreille sur la terre pour entendre le bruit des sources cachées et des germinations invisibles..." (p. 7).

Nous avons ici un très beau livre dont il faut remercier l'auteur, avec tout petit regret pourtant dans la liste des Associations qui perpétuent la pensée de Maritain, il oublie de citer notre institut international. Mais il n'est agit d'un reproche un peu égoïste.

Jean-François Nothomb

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Entre Jacques Maritain et Benjamin Fondane, penseur juif en lutte contre les systèmes fondés sur la raison, entre ces deux esprits aux conceptions éloignées, un dialogue passionné s'est engagé. Il allait en naître une grande amitié. Une amitié qui associe Raisa, poète comme l'était avant tout Fondane, et Geneviève, sa femme, dont la personnalité attachante est révélée par cette correspondance. Ce dialogue est interrompu par la mort de Fondane à Auschwitz, mais il se poursuit entre Geneviève et le couple Maritain.

Nous allons connaître Benjamin surtout par ce qu'en dit son épouse: "La destinée de mon mari, la destinée de sa personne, Dieu l'a menée jusqu'au bout. Alors qu'il croyait encore chercher et appeler du froid de l'âme, Dieu avait déjà répondu mais il était en lui. Celui-ci qu'on ne voit point" (p. 116). Et Geneviève ajoute: "Pour mon mari, vous le savez, il n'est pas de compromis" (p. 117).

Ce que dit Geneviève elle-même est de la même trempe: "Quoi qu'il en soit de mon déchirement, je vais marcher sans naisissement et sans hâle, en dépit de mes préférences et de mes défections, me retenant de conclure aussi longtemps qu'il le faudra, attentive aux exigences de mon âme et de Dieu. Je demande à Dieu d'arriver non pas à telle vérité, mais à la Vérité (...) Je me souviens avec quelle tension obstinée mon mari a poursuivi sa recherche, dans l'attente, a-t-il écrit, de 'ce quelque chose que je savais déjà impossible, impossible et pourtant souhaité au delà du possible'" (p. 124).

Grâce à l'aide discrète - mais comme toujours décisive - de son amitié, elle avoue à Maritain: "Je ne puis me passer de votre témoignage, de la petite lumière, si pure, que vous avez allumée pour moi. Je veux à Meudon, et qui m'a aidée à votre inox, et qui a grandi et doit se changer en un brûlant soleil. Votre Dieu est le mien, non pas tant peut-être qu'en vous en parlez, en philosophe que lorsque vous me croyez (...) Mais pour découvrir mon Dieu dans le Dieu de mon mari, je dois me frayer passage, douloureusement, à travers la forêt dense et émoussée de son angoisse, de son intuition, de son ardent désir. Ainsi c'est à travers son horreur d'un Dieu 'premier moteur' que je découvre son besoin d'un Dieu incarné, par 'cette compensation singulière' par laquelle le dogme de l'incarnation, comme vous le dites si lumineusement dans votre Sort de l'Homme, réagit, chez ceux qui n'y croient plus, sur la notion même de l'essence divine" (p. 115).

C'est en ceci va la déshumanisation, d'amitié, de tendresse, que se déroule la trame de cette correspondance. Ceux qui connaissent Jacques et Raisa Maritain ne s'en étonneront pas. Heureuse Geneviève Fondane de les avoir rencontrés!

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**JANINE HOURCADE, Une vocation féminine retrouvée, L'ordre des vierges consacrées, Pierre Téqui Editeur, Paris 1997, pp. 198.**

Ce n'est que dans la moitié du XIX siècle
que fut remise en honneur la "Consécration des Vierges", alors qu'elle avait été florissante durant les siècles précédents de la vie de l'Eglise en Orient et en Occident, étant ainsi un élément comémorique important. Domm Guéranger, en effet, Abbé de Solesmes, consacra le 15 août 1668, sept moniales de l'Abbaye Sainte-Cécile, mais il s'agissait de moines ayant prononcé des "vœux solennels" alors qu'origine les vœurs consacrées dépendaient des évêques, sans s'organiser dans une vie commune quelconque. C'est ce qui a voulu suggérer le Canon 604, du nouveau Droit Canon de 1983, dans la partie traitant des formes de vie religieuse ; "A ces formes de vie consacrées s'ajoutent l'ordre des vœurs qui exprimant le propos sacré de suivre le Christ de plus près, sont consacrées par l'évêque diocésain selon le rite liturgique approfondi, épousent mystiquement le Christ Fils de Dieu et sont voués au service de l'Eglise". Ce que commente l'expression post-synodale Vita consecrata de Jean-Paul II d'octobre 1994, au n° 37 : "Les femmes consacrées sont appelées de façon tout à fait spéciale à être, par le don d'elles-mêmes vécu en maturité et avec joie, un signe de la tendresse de Dieu pour le genre humain et un témoignage particulier du mystère de l'Eglise, vierge, épouse et mère". (p. 135).

Il est donc de première importance de noter que les "vœurs consacrées" ne sont pas des religieuses, ne prononçant aucun des trois voeux de religion. Elles sont donc de simples laïques, appartenant aux Églises locales et, comme la Vierge Marie, vivent leur consécration au cœur du monde. Le fait de n'être pas religieuses leur donne une grande créativité et indépendance. Il est d'une forme très moderne de vivre la sexualité, qui est incluse dans une consécration de la personne totale, corps et âme en même temps" (p. 143).

Quoi de plus libre, en effet, qu'une femme seule, ayant choisi sa solitude, assurant avec totale indépendance une vie laïque avec toutes les responsabilités professionnelles et matérielles qu'elle comporte? N'y a-t-il pas là de quoi faire pâlir d'envie nos féministes les plus impétueuses?


Ce livre est une audacieuse "re-lecture" de l'histoire de la philosophie occidentale à partir de la Renaissance. Il met en question une opinion généralement acceptée affirmant que la philosophie moderne depuis Descartes est réellement une philosophie. L'auteur prétend que la philosophie la plus pure, enracinée dans l'expérience des sens externes comme la mesure de l'intelligente, a été obscurcie par une tradition fondée sur l'inspiration. Cela s'est effectué surtout sous l'influence de St Augustine qui a autorisé une notion "apocalyptique" de philosophie, de se mêler à la poésie et à la rhétorique pour être transmise telle quelle par le Moyen-Age aux humanistes de la Renaissance.

Peter A. Redpath a enseigné la philosophie pendant plus de 30 ans. Membre de l'American Marvin Association et de l'Yves R. Simon Institute, il est l'auteur de nombreux livres. Un de ses intérêts majeurs est l'utilisation de principes philosophiques pour résoudre une série de problèmes sociaux et politiques contemporains.


Lorsqu'ens 1492 fut découvert le continent sud-américain, une abondante littérature a commencé autour des droits des "envahisseurs" espagnols (et portugais). Ce n'est pas uniquement la souffrance de l'Amérique qui a été à la base de cette aventure mais aussi l'action de conquête qui a marqué pour toujours de nombreux peuples indigènes et toute leur destinée en tant que peuples et en tant que personnes. Les documents que reproduit cet ouvrage sont le témoignage d'un homme remarquable, qui a été un des défenseurs les plus sérieux de ces hommes destinés à un anéantissement total. Alonso de Veracruz était un moine dominicain qui a dû s'opposer à la politique de l'Espagne qui, après avoir conquis ce vaste espace, voulait y faire régner l'ordre du peuple d'origine. Cet ouvrage comporte le texte complet de l'Estudio preliminar, écrit par le prof. Luciano Pereira et intitulé "La economía de la solidaridad", est du plus haut intérêt. Ecrit en 1495, ce texte est un témoin de l'envahissement, des conquêtes et des destructions des indigènes. Les Dominicains, frère Joaquin Turriani. Elle a été publiée Universitas privilegiae en 1553, moment à partir duquel elle a été un droit très précieux. Le point de départ de ce texte est l'arrivée des espagnols et de leur culture, de leur religion et de leur économie. Ce droit leur a été acquis après que l'armée espagnole ait conquis un pays inconnu. Sans leur accord, les peuples indigènes n'ont pas le droit d'être détruits, de prendre possession des terres et des biens des Indiens. (...)

Cependant ces droits des Indiens sur leurs propriétés publiques et privées ne sont pas des droits absolus; ils remplissent une fonction "sociale" au service de tous les hommes" (p. 25).

Remercions le "Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas" pour ce genre de publications qui montrent à l'évidence l'existence d'un Droit des Peuples qui n'est que la conséquence des Droits de l'Homme.


Le Père Veres est un grand ami de l'Institut Maritain. Nous sommes heureux de présenter son dernier livre qui présente une investigation sérieuse et approfondie sur les sources les plus récentes concernant les origines de l'Université Domincaine de Žadar. Il apparaît que cette Université n'a pas été fondée en 1553, comme on le croit généralement, mais bien en 1396. Elle fut fermée pendant une dizaine d'années, de 1468 à 1482, à cause de l'offensif des troupes turques, mais fut bientôt réouverte en 1495 par ordre du maire général des Dominiens, frère Joaquin Turriani. Elle a été déclarée Universitas privilegiae en 1553, moment à partir duquel elle a été un droit d'octroyer tous les degrés académiques, ce qui la mettait au même niveau que les universités de Paris, de Salamanque, de Liège, d'Oxford et de tant d'autres.

Frederic Ozanam et la civilisation de l'a-
Qui connaît Frédéric Ozanam (1813-1853) ? Ceux qui ont suivi les Journées Mondiales de la Jeunesse à Paris, sous l’égide de Jean-Paul II, se souviennent peut-être de sa béatification par le Pape le 22 juillet 1997. Durant sa courte vie (il est mort à 40 ans), ce membre laïc de l’Église catholique a fondé avec quelques étudiants de Paris les "Conférences de St Vincent de Paul" aux alentours de 1835, dans ce siècle "vide" pour l’Église qui a été le XIXe siècle, où les autorités "ultramontaines" étaient plus préoccupées d’assurer leur autorité sur des bases officielles et canoniques que de consolider dans la définition de l’Infaillibilité pontificale de Vatican I en 1870, que de s’occuper de la révolution industrielle qui allait bouleverser la culture mondiale. C’est de ce temps que date la première encyclique sociale de Léon XIII (Rerum novarum) qui comportait l’avenir inéxprimé de la classe ouvrière. Elle est, c’est dans ce moment "noir" de l’histoire de l’Église que ce fait à l’accordait découvrir le drame qui se préparait et écrivait cette fameuse phrase qu’il était temps que l’Église "passe aux barbares" pour commencer à se renouveler.

Ozanam était un homme "clairvoyant" en avance sur son temps, un prophète, dirions-nous de nos jours, un homme qui a crié dans le désert mais dont nous devrions peut-être relire quelques textes d’actualité, celui-ci par exemple : "La question qui divise les hommes de nos jours n’est plus une question de formes politiques, c’est une question sociale, c’est de savoir qui l’emporte de l’esprit d’égoïsme ou de l’esprit de sacrifice si la société va accueillir une grande exploration au profit des plus forts, ou une consécration de chacun pour le bien de tous et surtout pour la protection des faibles. Il y a beaucoup d’hommes qui ont trop et qui veulent avoir encore; il y en a beaucoup plus d’autres qui n’ont pas assez, qui n’ont rien, et cette lutte menace d’être terrible. Tôt ou tard, derrière la puissance de l’or, de l’autre, de la puissance du désespoir. Entre ces armes ennemies, il faudrait nous précipiter, sans faire de prétexte, en moins pour amortir le choc p. (49).

Ce petit livre, bref mais substantiel, dont Patrick De Laubier, professeur de sociologie à l’Université de Genève, a écrit une excellente préface, nous ouvrira peut-être l’esprit et le cœur. Nous l’espérons.


La préface de ce livre est de René Mon-
gel et il se trouve d’en faire un éloge plus que mérite. Voici quelques passages de ce que dit : "Seul du monde, qu’une des plus riches philosophies de l’éducation est l’œv-
er de l’humanité ? Mais aussi, comment le saurait-on tant que les spécialistes français eux-mêmes de l’éducation n’en ont pas pris conscience ? (...) Alain Mouginotte voit dans le système pluraliste préconisé par Maritain un enjeu qui pourrait être essenti-

t dans le système éducatif français. Ouvert sur longtemps de limiter ces propositions au cadre français, car par-delà l’her-
gone, l’actualité des problèmes touchés par la pensée de Maritain devient celle de la planète entière. La mondialisation des échanges, économiques aussi bien que cultu-

cuels, les immigrations et brassages de populations posent effectivement derrière la question première et immédiate : quel vivre ensemble voulons-nous ? La question con-

nexe et toute charge des responsabilités de l’avenir : Comment préparer nos sociétés, comment en particulier y aider nos enfants dans cette fantastique chaîne de solidarité humaine et de transmission sociale qu’est l’éducation ?"

Le livre est composé de 9 chapitres et chaque chapitre est suivi de textes qui contiennent le sujet traité. Ils sont dans l’ordre : Genèse des idées de Maritain sur l’édu-

cation ; les finalités ; l’éléve ; références à St Thomas ; les institutions ; les problèmes actuels ; charte démocratique et éducation ; une pédagogie chrétienne ; quelques objec-

tions ; le tout suivi d’une conclusion.

Émanant de convictions fortes et bien exposées, ce livre force l’adhésion par son bon sens. C’est cela qui est le plus sédui-
sant dans tout ce qui y est dit, tant il est vrai qu’il s’agit de caractéristiques qui sont défaut du discours pédagogique actuel, si souvent marqué par l’incertitude et la compli-

cation.

Alain Mouginotte, l’auteur du livre, est docteur en sciences de l’éducation et maître de conférences à l’Université Lumière-Lyon 2, il est également président du centre lyonnais d’études et de recherches en sciences de l’éducation.


Ce livre fait penser au dialogue de Job et de ses amis. A la place de Job, nous trou-

vons Charles Péguy (1873-1914) pris d’assau-
s de ses amis, Dom Louis Bal-

et Jacques Maritain, qui le pressent de se faire baptiser et de mettre en pratique toutes les leçons qui caractérisent un catho-

lique normal. Les atermoiements de Péguy en effet, après sa profession de foi en Jésus-Christ, laissent supposer qu’il hésitait à franchir le seuil de l’Église. Il n’est pas un catholique normal, mais comme Simone Wei (et Henri Bergson, pour d’autres raisons), il se tiendra jusqu’à sa mort "au porche de l’Église". Mystère d’une destinée chrétienne telle particulière ; nous y découvrons, de plus en plus maintenant, surtout après les ouvertures du Concile Vatican II, que les voies de Dieu ne sont pas nos voies, ni ses pensées nos pensées.

Cet échange épistolaire qui s’étend de 1907 à 1913 entre Louis Ballet, moine béné-
dictin, et Jacques Maritain a comme unique objet la situation religieuse de Charles Péguy. La valeur personnelle des deux amis n’est jamais mise en cause ; mais leur zèle intercessif et leur insistance insistante sont trop forts pour ne pas stigmatisés comme il se doit. Mettre tout sur l’ar-
deur de néophytes qui veulent "convertir", n’écarte pas cette ingérence déplacée de Dom Ballet et surtout, de Maritain. Se rendant compte de sa maladresse, Ballet écrira à Maritain : "Tout ce qui s’adresse, dans votre lettre, à ma personne (Péguy) est blessant : le ton est souvent dur, ironique" (p. 165). Plus tard, en 1972, Maritain le reconnaitra : "Je me sens honteux maintenant, non pas des certitudes que je tâchais de lui rappeler, mais du ton dog-
matique et de la manière naïve et insupportablement arrogante qui s’em-
ploie pour cela. (...) jusqu’à quel degré de sottise on peut aller quand on est jeune et que, de plus, on veut en voir le coup dur de la conversion" (p. 231).

Deux seules lettres de Péguy sont reproduites ; dans l’une d’elles, du 20 avril 1909, il dit ent’ autres : "Il est difficile de vivre en chrétien dans les frontières où j’ai été placé. (...) Il y a dans le siècle des misér-

es incesantes, qui sont petites, qui recommencent tous les jours, qui font souffrir atrocement... Je me soumets moi-

d-même dans le siècle à des règles si sévères de moeurs, de travail, de prière, de misère

René Mougel, du Cercle d'Études Jacques et Raissa Maritain, présente ces lettres en les commentant et en les situant dans l'histoire du temps; il fait cela de manière excellente. Il faut dire que les documents présentés dans l'ouvrage sont d'une importance de premier ordre pour comprendre le milieu intellectuel catholique français du début du siècle et nous aident à interpréter l'itinéraire spirituel des personnes ici concernées.

Ce numéro a été réalisé avec le concours de la "Section Friuli-Venezia Giulia" de l'Institut International Jacques Maritain.